Published Paper Details:

As cyber attacks on industrial control systems become more common, it is more important than ever to use cyber security controls and check security against these attacks. Cyber attacks on nuclear power plants (NPPs) can cause not only economic loss, but also loss of life. So, to protect NPPs and other places from security threats, cyber security controls must be put in place. However, there aren't many resources available right now for protecting information, which is necessary to use all the controls needed to follow cyber security rules. To solve this problem, we need to find good cyber security controls and give each NPP enough resources to protect their information. NPPs use a different security control based on NEI 13-10 (Cyber Security Control Assessments) to protect their systems. However, this is not enough to show that the security controls have really reduced these threats or to show that they have really reduced these threats. To solve this problem, the Electric Power Research Institute (ETRI) came up with the technical assessment methodology (TAM), which can be used to give a quantitative score by looking at how possible cyber attacks could affect an asset and the security controls that go with it. This method lets you use differential security control based on the score to see if the security controls have really reduced the risks. In light of this context, the objective of this paper is to perform a comparative analysis of the outcomes obtained from the implementation of security controls and risk assessment utilising solely NEI 13-10, as well as both NEI 13-10 and TAM, on the plant protection system of the nuclear power reactor APR1400. This paper also talks about the areas for future research by talking about the TAM's limits and things to think about when using it.