Published Paper Details:

India has witnessed a major transformation in labour relations since the advent of the platform economy, the most prominent aspect of which is the misclassification of gig workers as independent contractors. Through this classification, digital platforms are legally exempted from their employer obligations such as minimum wages, social security, and the right to unionization, while they maintain substantial control over the work of workers through algorithmic control and performance metrics. While much of the literature views this issue through a policy or regulatory lens, this paper takes a constitutional and doctrinal legal approach. Through doctrinal methodology, this study critically analyses Articles 14, 19(1)(c), and 21 of the Indian Constitution and argues that gig worker misclassification is a systemic fundamental rights denial. The paper identifies a doctrinal gap: there is still no clear framework in India's legal jurisprudence that brings private platforms under constitutional accountability when they perform state-like functions. To bridge this gap, the paper proposes an original legal doctrine called constitutional piercing. In this framework, platforms are considered quasi-state actors, especially when they apply coercive algorithmic control and mediate people's livelihoods. Drawing on the public function theory and horizontal rights application of Indian jurisprudence, this framework reframes the legal understanding of employment and rights in the digital labour market. The conclusion is that gig worker misclassification is not just a policy loophole but a constitutional failure that must be addressed through a rights-based reform.