Published Paper Details:

Abstract The evolution of constitutional law in emerging democracies reflects a dynamic interplay of political incentives, judicial empowerment, societal pressures, and constitutional design choices. This article examines how constitutional orders in transitional contexts adapt to institutional fragility, elite contestation, socio-economic inequality, and episodes of populist disruption. Drawing on comparative constitutional theory, judicial politics, and empirical illustrations from various regions, the study demonstrates that constitutional law evolves through continuous negotiation between courts, political elites, and civic actors. The article argues that while constitutional courts often serve as stabilizers of democratic governance, their authority remains vulnerable to strategic manipulation, institutional capture, and majoritarian populism. The findings underscore that constitutional evolution is shaped less by textual provisions and more by political culture, institutional independence, and societal mobilization. The study contributes to debates on democratic consolidation by identifying core conditions for constitutional resilience and pathways through which constitutional backsliding emerges and can be countered.