Published Paper Details:

Abstract The India-Pakistan rivalry, based on the territorial competition for Kashmir, is one of the longest and mainly insecure rivalry since the partition of British India in 1947. Both nations have fought several wars and crises over the decades, with the 1998 nuclear tests being a turning point in the strategic context of South Asia. This article discusses the development of the conflict with an emphasis on how nuclear deterrence has influenced regional stability. It deconstructs significant clashes such as the wars of 1947, 1965, and 1971, the 1999 Kargil war, and post-nuclear crises such as the 2001-2002 crisis, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes. The research examines India's No First Use policy against Pakistan's more pragmatic posture in the use of nuclear weapons and the effect these postures have on deterrence. The research also examines the stability-instability paradox in which the possession of nuclear weapons deters major war but facilitates limited-duration war through the use of proxy fighters and cross-border terrorism. New challenges in the form of tactical nuclear weapons, missile technology, and cyber warfare are analyzed for their effect on escalation during crises. The article also addresses the influence of international actors, especially China and the United States, in regulating tensions at the regional level and shaping strategic action. The main thesis is that nuclear deterrence has prevented war at the conventional level but has not created long-term strategic stability. Rather, it has produced a fragile and precarious equilibrium. The report ends with policy suggestions to enhance transparency, crisis management, and pursue sustained bilateral dialogue in an attempt to bring long-term peace and stability to South Asia.