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This study investigates the dynamic relationship between Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs), funding mechanisms, and political influence in Kenya's public sector between 2021 and 2025. CBAs have become central to industrial relations in Kenya, particularly in education, health, and civil service, where unions exert significant bargaining power. The research problem addressed is the persistent gap between negotiated agreements and their enforcement, often shaped by fiscal constraints and political cycles. By examining how funding allocations and political considerations affect the implementation of CBAs, the study contributes to understanding the sustainability of labour relations in Kenya's evolving governance context. The study adopted a qualitative research design anchored in documentary analysis. Data were collected from government budget policy statements, Teachers Service Commission (TSC) circulars, Ministry of Public Service reports, parliamentary Hansards, and union press releases (KNUT, KUPPET, UASU, KMPDU). Secondary sources included academic articles and media coverage of industrial disputes. A thematic analysis approach was employed to identify recurring patterns in CBA funding, enforcement, and political influence. Case studies from the education, health, and university sectors provided sector-specific insights, while triangulation enhanced validity and reliability of findings. The study reveals that CBA enforcement in Kenya is uneven across sectors. Teachers and civil servants benefited from relatively higher allocations, with the 2021-2025 teacher CBA receiving KSh 83 billion, while university staff secured KSh 13.8 billion in 2022 after prolonged negotiations. Health workers' CBAs were partially enforced, with risk allowances implemented but salary adjustments delayed due to fiscal constraints. Funding commitments were frequently politically motivated, with governments making concessions during election cycles or under union pressure to avert strikes. Inflation and currency depreciation eroded the real value of negotiated increments, undermining the intended benefits. Enforcement mechanisms were weak, with phased disbursements and delayed Treasury releases fueling industrial unrest. Strikes remained a recurrent outcome, particularly in the health and education sectors, highlighting the fragility of Kenya's industrial relations system. To achieve sustainable CBA funding and enforcement, the study proposes several measures. First, integration of CBA obligations into the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) would ensure predictable and transparent budgetary allocations. Second, a centralized negotiation framework should be established to harmonize CBAs across unions, reducing fragmentation and duplication of demands. Third, inflation-indexed increments should be introduced to safeguard workers' earnings against economic shocks. Fourth, performance-based funding models could link portions of CBA resources to measurable service delivery outcomes, particularly in education and health. Fifth, enhanced transparency and accountability through annual public reporting of CBA commitments and disbursements would build trust between government and unions. Finally, the study recommends depoliticizing CBA negotiations by anchoring them in fiscal discipline and institutional frameworks rather than electoral cycles, thereby promoting industrial harmony and strengthening public service delivery. The findings underscore that CBAs in Kenya are not merely labour instruments but are deeply intertwined with fiscal policy and political strategy. Sustainable funding and enforcement require a shift from ad hoc, politically driven commitments to structured, transparent, and economically grounded frameworks. By addressing fiscal constraints, harmonizing negotiations, and insulating CBAs from political manipulation, Kenya can enhance industrial stability, protect workers' rights, and improve the efficiency of public sector service delivery.