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Kierkegaard's writings are often criticized for being so intensely individualistic that social theory finds little application for them. In this essay, however, I contend that Kierkegaard's concept of "the single individual" really provides crucially significant resources for a number of modern identity politics issues. By carefully examining the two notes that make up the brief essay "The Individual," I propose that, contrary to popular belief, Kierkegaard does not reject embodied historical existence; rather, he merely rejects the notion that moral dignity can be reduced to or determined by such embodied differentiation. Rather, Kierkegaard's writings reject the quantifiable assessment of "the crowd" in favor of the qualitative neighborly love of community. I argue that we can develop a Kierkegaarddian identity theory consistent with some aspects of Patricia Hill Collins's and Kimberle Crenshaw's standpoint and intersectionality theory, given Kierkegaard's claim that true human equality is only possible in the specifically religious category of the single individual. While Kierkegaard operates at a theological level and Collins and Crenshaw operate at a structural level, they all provide crucial reminders to one another regarding the stakes of meaningful lives in light of the embodied job of social justice.