Political Economy of Welfare Scheme in India: A Study on Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) Implementation

Abdus Salam

Political Economy; Welfare State; Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT); Public Policy; Welfare Governance; India

The political economy of welfare delivery in India has undergone a significant transformation with the introduction of the Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) mechanism. Conceived as a reform to enhance transparency, efficiency, and accountability in welfare administration, DBT aims to transfer benefits directly into beneficiaries' bank accounts, thereby reducing leakages, intermediaries, and systemic corruption. This paper examines the implementation of DBT in India through the lens of political economy, focusing on the interplay between state capacity, technology-driven governance, political incentives, and welfare outcomes. Drawing upon secondary data from government reports, policy documents, and existing scholarly literature, the study analyzes how DBT has reshaped the design and execution of major welfare schemes such as subsidies, pensions, and social assistance programmes. The paper also critically evaluates the political motivations behind DBT adoption, including fiscal consolidation, electoral considerations, and the reconfiguration of state-citizen relationships. While DBT has contributed to improved targeting, timely disbursement, and enhanced financial inclusion, the study highlights persistent challenges such as digital exclusion, Aadhaar-related concerns, infrastructural deficits, and regional disparities. The findings suggest that although DBT represents a paradigm shift towards technology-enabled welfare governance, its effectiveness remains contingent upon inclusive digital infrastructure, institutional coordination, and political commitment to equity. The paper concludes that DBT, as a welfare instrument, reflects both efficiency-driven reforms and evolving political priorities within India's developmental state.

Volume 12 Issue 6, June-2024

Pages : k464-k475