Published Paper Details:

Acceptance of mental phenomena in terms of thinking, perceiving, knowing and as a whole experiencing something, is necessary for reception of Intentionality theory, which articulates an unique feature of thought, consciousness or other many mental states, which makes a mental act intentional or directed towards some objects, things or states of affairs. There is confrontation between Physicalists and Psychologists pertaining acceptance of both ontological and epistemological status of mental phenomena, which was ingrained in the long gone problem of mind, namely mind-body problem. Ludwig Wittgenstien, an Austrian Linguistic Philosopher in his later phase has relinquished impact of intentionality on public language and even ontological status of mental phenomena as a psychologist although mostly preferred to consider himself a behaviorist rather than a physicalist . On contrary, Frank Jackson, a contemporary Australian Analytic philosopher against reductionist approach of both Physicalism and Psychologism, has coined a new theory of mind-body problem, in which he accepts mental phenomena as the effects rather than causes of physical phenomena instead of rejecting Physicalism as false. In this connection through my paper, I will try to discuss significance of intentionality on using a language from the perspective of Frankian anti-physicalism as a counter part of later Wittgenstein's materialistic view regarding impact of intentionality on language.