



PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE RESERVIST PROGRAM IN REGION III

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Abstract: This study aimed to describe and analyze the Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in Region III, based on the unit scorecard accomplishments for the last six (6) years (2019-2024). It also sought to evaluate the Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in Region III by the reservist.

Index Terms – Reservist Program, Balance scorecard.

I. INTRODUCTION

Reservists had historically played an impressive role in several countries during the times of armed conflict and disasters. Most developed countries' armed forces had found a way to overcome this specific situation by utilizing more reservists. A reservist was both a service member and a civilian, a person who was a member of a reserve force that could be utilized for mobilization and deployment of the military towards the expansion of the armed forces in the event of war, invasion, rebellion, disaster, and emergency response.

The Philippine National Guard (PNG) was a militia established by the Philippine Assembly in 1917 in response to the escalating war in Europe. The Philippine National Guard assisted active military troops in responding to threats abroad and provided humanitarian assistance to those affected by such events. However, no military training was established for the Philippine National Guard. As a result, limitations were demonstrated in the mobilization of the PNG; in particular, there was no specific training program with appropriate equipment for military training, and one of the biggest challenges to said program was that there was the lack of guarantee of a military career for those who completed reservist training. The government decided that the Philippine National Guard was informal and posed a risk to the monitoring and management of reservists; it was disbanded shortly thereafter.

The implementation of the reservist program was emphasized in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Under section 2, the state may call on the citizens to protect the country, and under certain conditions, all citizens could be required to render personal military or civil service. Also, it was highlighted in Section 3, the State acknowledged the importance of youth in nation-building and encouraged and safeguarded their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. Reservists' programs and activities help to foster a sense of duty, and responsibility. By combining practical training, a sense of responsibility, and a connection to the larger community and nation, the reservist program was one of the highly effective tools for developing patriotism and nationalism among the youth.

The Reservist Act of 1991 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) emphasized the mission of the people or reserve force. The said law focused on providing a foundation for the expansion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the event of war, invasion, or rebellion; assisting in relief and rescue operations during disasters or calamities; and providing support and assistance in the operation and maintenance of essential government or private sector facilities.

The established reservist program of the Philippines had evolved and adapted to the ever-changing needs of the modern military and disaster response landscape. The organization and manpower of the reservist component, authorized by the Philippine President through the Secretary of National Defense, was composed of the Army Reserve Component, Air Force Reserve Component, Navy Reserve Component, AFP-wide Technical Reserve Component, and the Affiliated Reserves. Additionally, under the supervision of the Reserve Force, reservists were divided into three (3) classifications: (1) the First Category Reserve, which comprised of reservists between the ages of 18 to 35; (2) the Second Category Reserve consisted of active reservists whose ages between 36 to 51 years old; and (3) Third Category Reserve members who were 51 years of age or older (RA 7077/ AFP Reservist Act of 1991).

Mandated by law as one of the reserve force components, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) established the Air Reserve Division, a unit with the sole purpose of managing, recruiting, and organizing the Philippine Air Force Reserve Force. On 01 October 1986, the Air Reserve Division was re-designated as Air Force Reserve Command (AFRESC); however, Air Force Reserve Command was renamed Air Reserve Command (ARC) in 1995, and its three (3) Air Reserve Groups were re-designated as Air Reserve Centers (ARCENs) with an additional three (3) more Reserve Centers. Furthermore, the Philippine Air Force-Reserve Officer Training Corps (PAF-ROTC) unit was originally stationed at Far Eastern Aviation Technical Institute (FEATI) in Santa Cruz, Manila.

The activation of the Air Reserve Division underwent several cycles of deactivations and reactivations, organizational overhaul, regime transitions, and leadership changes, before finally reaching its present status on 01 June 2007 as Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC). Air Force Reserve Command was one of the Philippine Air Force units co-located within Clark Air Base. The Air Force Reserve Command was the overall administrator of all Philippine Air Force Reservist programs throughout the archipelago. Additionally, Air Force Reserve Command through the Air Force Reserve Center (ARCEN) was the only Philippine Air Force unit that trains Reserve Officer Training Corps Cadets and was tasked with organizing, training, equipping, developing, and implementing Philippine Air Force-Reserve Officer Training Corps (PAF-ROTC)-related programs.

Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) was composed of eight (8) Air Force Reserve Centers (ARCENs) each with an Air Force Wing Reserve and Air Force Group Reserve. Since the Air Force Reserve Centers were co-located within the major Philippine Air Force bases, the 2nd Air Reserve Center (2ARCEN) was the primary unit responsible for implementing the Philippine Air Force reservist program in Region III. Additionally, the 2nd Air Reserve Center has a dedicated reservist unit, the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve (2AFWR), a separated organization specifically designed for all Reservist Officers and Enlisted Personnel. The plantilla position or reservist designation in the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve (2AFWR) was aligned with the active military organization. Thus, the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve provided clear supervision and management of the reservist administrative requirements, capacity building through formal and informal training, and annual reservist assembly tests to ensure reservist readiness in case of mobilization.

The researcher used the Balanced Scorecard to evaluate the Philippine Air Force Reserve program in Region III from 2019 to 2024. The balanced scorecard was a comprehensive methodology consisting of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that serve as a metric for assessing the alignment of the unit scorecard with the organization's goals and achievements. Also, a balanced scorecard was used by the Armed Forces of the Philippine particularly the Philippine Air Force as a strategic management framework that looks beyond capabilities (Training, Material, Personnel, and Facilities) and the scorecard for each item (actual and target) that driven the organization towards achieving its vision was discussed. In addition, the study identified the problems encountered in the implementation of the reservist program. These plan of actions suggest ways to address material and non-material solutions to further improve the implementation and management of the Philippine Air Force reservist program in Region III. Finally, the implications of the study for public administration were discussed.

Finally, this study offered new insights and awareness on important issues regarding the readiness of the Philippine Air Force Reservist, and served as a benchmark to develop new strategies or innovate new systems and processes. Also, the study enhanced enhance the Philippine Air Force Reservist programs in Region III and laid the foundation for future development. This study provided significant and valuable suggestions and recommendations to improve the Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in Region III. Also, the study shed

light on the significance of the reservist program, which focused on civic-military training and preparedness during actual disaster response operations, improved the nation's capacity to produce the needed force multiplier, expanded its manpower resources in times of war, calamities, and disasters, emergencies, and in support of the organization's strategy by creating a pool of capacitated reservists.

Theoretical framework

Quantitative Data:

The Likert scale was used by the researcher to describe and analyze the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve scorecard accomplishments from the years 2019 to 2024, as part of the assessment of the Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in Region III:

Scores	Adjectival Rating
96 % and above	Outstanding
86% to 95%	Excellent
76% to 85%	Average
70% to 75%	Marginal
60% to 69%	Failure
51% to 59%	Failure
50% and below	Failure

Qualitative Data:

To describe the Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in terms of training, materiel, personnel, and facility, the participants' responses were tabulated and tallied. The weighted mean was then computed and described verbally using the following scheme:

Mean Interval	Verbal Description
4.50 – 5.00	Outstanding
3.50 – 4.49	Very Satisfactory
2.50 – 3.49	Satisfactory
1.50 – 2.49	Unsatisfactory
1.00 – 1.49	Poor

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study used a mixed-methods descriptive research design to examine the Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in Region III. The quantitative component consisted of the analysis of unit scorecard accomplishments from 2019 to 2024, to determine the program's performance during the specified years and rating-based evaluation. Moreover, the study's qualitative component documented the reservists' insights and experiences and identified problems encountered with the program implementation through the structured survey questionnaires, focus group discussions, and interviews.

Population and Sample

In conducting the study, the respondents of the study were composed of the reservist personnel assigned in 2nd Air Reserve Center. To make a fair representation from the entire respondents, the researcher used a stratified sampling design wherein two hundred fifty-seven (257) Philippine Air Force Reservists were divided into classifications based on their rank or position (Reserve Officer and Enlisted Personnel), number of respondents per rank, and gender prior to the random sampling. The aforesaid design was utilized to provide equal and independent opportunities to be selected for the samples. Thus, the number of respondents was based on the Air Force Reserve Command Unit Manning Documents (UMD) CY-2024.

Data and Sources of Data

By means of the data gathering method, the researcher utilized four (4) instruments namely: a (1) validated structured questionnaire in hard or electronic copy; (2) Focused Group Discussion outlines; (3) interview guide; and (4) documentary analysis.

Structured questionnaire. The validated survey questionnaire included both optional items (name and rank), and required items (province in Region III), and all possible problems raised and proposed measures in the study were answered. The questionnaire was divided into two (2) sections. In the first section, the respondents evaluated unit scorecards of the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve from 2019 to 2024 by selecting from highest to lowest adjectival equivalent (Outstanding, Very Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, and Poor), which was focused on the training, materiel, personnel, and facilities. Moreover, in the last section of the questionnaire, respondents selected or placed the check marks on the checklist of problems encountered and the proposed measures or recommended solutions in the implementation of the Philippine Air Force reservist program in Region III.

Focus Group Discussion (FGD). The FGD was facilitated in person or via video teleconferencing to provide insights into the different opinions among different classifications involved in the change process and gather relevant information.

Interview. In order for the researcher to obtain data from the surveys, the research held as series of interviews with the respondents to gain an accurate, full, and reliable data. Furthermore, unanswered questions were resolved immediately.

Documentary Analysis. This activity was conducted to supplement the surveys and interviews. This involved acquiring data of the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve from the 2nd Air Reserve Center by analyzing and examining completed unit scorecards from 2019 to 2024. The records and associated documentation included the number and list of trainings conducted, the procurement of reservist-related equipment, personnel recruitment based on the program, and the actual number of reservists needed. Finally, the established reserve unit's operating and support facilities throughout the aforementioned coverage years.

Descriptive Statistics

Data collected through questionnaires, interviews, and documentary analysis were recorded and analyzed to arrive at a complete understanding of the Philippine Air Force reserve program in Region III. Responses were recorded, and they were reviewed for completeness and accuracy. Inconsistencies were reviewed, corrected, and deleted, while remaining entries were assigned to categories and reviewed for consistency. Descriptive statistics, including frequency counts, percentages, and mean scores, were used to examine the demographic characteristics of the various respondents. Numerical percentages were used to determine the number of responses that fell under each subjective category of the questionnaire, primarily to illustrate how many respondents had similar opinions or experiences. As a result, the researcher determined the distribution of the characteristics, facilitate interpretations and analyses, the collected data were quantified and presented in tabular and graphical forms. Frequency counts, continuum means, and simple percentages were used.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

According to the Overall scorecard accomplishment of the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve, the delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the implementation of the reservist program in region III. In the area of training, the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve completed 2,101 training activities out of 2,896 annual targets, for a numerical rating of 72.55% and an adjectival rating of Marginal. The inability to conduct face-to-face training sessions during the pandemic significantly decreased the number of trainings that could be implemented.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Overall 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve Scorecard (2019-2024)

Capability Enablers	Program	Total Nr of Activities	Numerical Rating	Adjectival Rating
Training (Total nr of trainings conducted)	Actual	2,101	72.55%	Marginal
	Target	2,896		
Materiel (Total nr of acquired equipment)	Actual	166	48.82%	Failure
	Target	340		
Personnel (Total nr of personnel assigned)	Actual	257	10.62%	Failure
	Target	2,419		
Facility (Total percentage of facility renovation)	Actual	4	100%	Outstanding
	Target	4		
Overall Rating	Actual = 2,528 / Target = 5,655		44.70%	Failure

Additionally, materiel acquisition was significantly impacted by the pandemic. Only 166 number of equipment were on hand or procured out of the 340 targeted, resulting in a numerical rating of 48.82% and an adjectival rating of Failure. This failed rating was attributed to limited budget allocations, procurement delays, travel restrictions, and supply chain interruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic, all of which hindered the unit's ability to acquire adequate Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR)-related equipment.

Personnel recruitment was considered the greatest challenge faced by the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve Center. Only 257 of the projected or the targeted 2,419 reservist personnel were assigned to the unit, resulting in a numerical rating of 10.62% and a Failure adjectival rating. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the recruitment and processing of new applicants were severely restricted, particularly in 2020 and 2021. Applicants were required to report in person to the reservist office, and the lengthy, highly procedural application process further hindered the recruitment of the reservist human resources.

Additionally, despite these limits due to pandemic, the Facility program was considered as the most successful part of the reservist program. The unit had a 100% completion rate, with all four (4) targeted facilities successfully renovated, gaining an Outstanding adjectival rating. Although the COVID-19 pandemic caused some initial delays, the renovation activities were finally constructed and completed after restrictions were lifted.

Finally, the overall performance of the implementation of the Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in Region III was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic with a total of 2,528 activities accomplished out of 5,655 target activities, or 44.70%, with adjectival rating of failure. The training, materiel acquisition, and human resource recruitment programs for reservist all faced significant challenges due to training limitations, process delays (requirement determination, procurement, and delivery), and inadequate financial and materiel resources, resulting in marginal to failing adjectival rating. In contrast, the Facility program emerged as the most successful program, with a 100% completion rate and an Outstanding adjectival rating, highlighting the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve's resilience and dedication to enhancing reserve force operational readiness during the time of the pandemic.

Overall Scorecard Evaluation of the Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in Region III

Scorecard Evaluation	Mean	Verbal Description
Training	4.53	Outstanding
Materiel	4.18	Very Satisfactory
Personnel	4.51	Outstanding
Facility	4.51	Outstanding
Mean	4.43	Very Satisfactory

Table presented the overall scorecard evaluation of The Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in Region III. The table showed an overall mean rating of 4.43, which was assessed as Very Satisfactory. Training received an Outstanding grand mean rating of 4.53, indicating that the program regularly provided high-quality education and considerably improved reservist competencies. Meanwhile, materiel obtained a Very Satisfactory mean of 4.18, demonstrating that initiatives to improve procurement program were implemented. However, several areas still required further improvement, particularly, the organization's initiatives to gain support from partner agencies and strategic stakeholders.

Additionally, personnel management received an Outstanding mean of 4.51, indicating that the reservist acknowledged the unit's recruitment program efforts, career development programs, and administrative practices, all of which effectively supported the overall well-being and the professional growth of the reservist.

Finally, facilities also received an Outstanding mean of 4.51, indicating that infrastructure effectively addressed the needs of reservists and improved their training experience with a safe, secured, and equipped facilities. Overall, the results indicated that the program had successfully reached its objectives, with minor areas requiring additional development plans and programs, strengthened stakeholder engagement, and a more career development plans in order to achieve an even higher level of excellence in the reservist program.

Summary of Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

This chapter summarized the main findings of the study, drew some conclusions, and provided recommendations based on the evaluative study of the Philippine Air Force Reservist Program in Region III. It also provided a glimpse into what those findings meant in terms of public administration and socio-economic development, serving as a touchstone whether any further delivery improvement and policy-setting activities were initiated with regard to reservist programs.

Summary of Findings

Based on the results of the study, the following findings were drawn.

1. The 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve training scorecard consisted of 14 trainings (1 pre-entry, 3 PME courses, 3 enhancement trainings, and 7 specialization trainings) with a total of 2,101 out of 2,896 training from calendar years 2019 to 2024, with an overall adjectival rating of 72.55%, which was interpreted as "Marginal".

2. The materiel scorecard was composed of 116 out of 224 HADR equipment, 28 out of 58 CEIS equipment, 1 out of 6 vehicles for field units; and 21 out of 52 firearms, (116 out of 340 materiel equipment) from calendar years 2019 to 2024 had an overall adjectival rating of 48.82%, or defined as "Failed".

3. For the Personnel Scorecard, the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve had 23 out of 317 officers and 234 out of 2,102 enlisted personnel who earned an overall adjectival rating of 10.62%, which was interpreted as "Failed".

4. The overall qualitative rating for the facility scorecard covering the years 2019 to 2024, consisting of the AFRC Firing Range, Obstacle Course, Reservist Training Center Building, and AFRC Auditorium and Badminton Court, reached 100% and was categorized as "Outstanding".

5. The scorecard description on training, evaluated by the reservist, attained an overall mean of 4.53, which was interpreted as "Outstanding".

6. For the material scorecard, evaluated by the reservist, reached an overall mean of 4.18, which was interpreted as "Very Satisfactory".

7. The reservist assigned to the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve evaluated the scorecard description on personnel and garnered an overall mean of 4.51, which was categorized as “Outstanding”.
8. The facility scorecard described by the reservist, obtained an overall mean of 4.51, which was interpreted as “Outstanding”.
9. Limited budget to acquire and upgrade material requirements and facilities was the most serious problem among 173 reservists (67.32%), who ranked first.
10. A limited number of reservists participated in the training because most reservists had their full-time jobs was the second challenge, with 149 reservists (57.98%), who ranked it second.
11. Lack of a stringent policy for monitoring/evaluating inactive reservist was the third serious problem. There were 123 respondents (47.86%), who ranked it third.
12. Low levels of competence in Reserve Force operations and Humanitarian and Disaster Response (HADR) affected the 121 reservists (47.08%), who ranked it fourth.
13. There was no specific program for facility maintenance and management, the fifth problem, mentioned by 121 reservists (47.08%).
14. Limited personnel management system or unit initiatives to monitor reservist status, particularly for those who were unable to report at least once a year, were the sixth problem responded by 117 (45.53%).
15. Inadequate organizational initiatives to achieve the required number of reservists as prescribed in table of organization affected the 112 reservists (43.85%), who ranked seventh.
16. The eight problem was the incomplete equipment, supplies, and materials for training, operations, and Humanitarian and Disaster Response (HADR), which was evaluated by 104 reservists (40.47%).
17. Reservists lacked knowledge regarding the unit's training programs/courses, which was the last problem, affecting the 96 reservists (37.35%), who ranked ninth.
18. Limited budget to acquire and upgrade material requirements and facilities was the major problem encountered. The action plan involved the programming and procurement of adequate material requirements and upgraded/renovated facilities within 3 years, with a ₱664,442 budget. This was intended to increase the reservist capabilities in region III.
19. The limited number of reservists participating in the training because most reservists had their full-time jobs was addressed by establishing a flexible training program, with a ₱40,000 budget for administrative support, to provide flexible training schedule.
20. Lack of stringent policy for monitoring and evaluating inactive reservist was identified. The plan action aimed to address by establishing a comprehensive policies and guidelines with budget of ₱40,000 primarily for administrative support and management.
21. Low level of competence in Reserve Force operations and Humanitarian and Disaster Response (HADR) had a budget allocation of ₱144,400. The plan to address this was to conduct an annual reservist enhancement training.
22. No definite program in managing and sustaining facility maintenance was addressed by the repair and maintenance program, with a proposed funding allocation of ₱40,000 to support the administrative requirements. This program will be addressed the present and future facility challenges.
23. The limited personnel management system or unit initiatives to monitor the status of reservist, particularly for those who were unable to report at least once a year, were addressed by establishing a personnel management system. The said activity had a budget allocation of ₱40,000 to support administrative needs during the review and validation period.
24. Inadequate organizational initiatives to achieve the required number of reservists as prescribed in the table of organization, were mitigated by establishing a program. This effort, valued ₱40,000, aimed to increase the recruitment and retention of reservists.
25. The incomplete equipment, supplies, and materials for training, operations, and Humanitarian and Disaster Response (HADR) were addressed by including them in the unit's Annual Plan and Budget (APB) with a time frame of three (3) years, totaling ₱24,931,000.
26. The establishment of an information and dissemination program through quarterly cascading activities addressed the lack knowledge among the reservists, regarding the unit's training programs/training courses. The budget allocation for the said activity was ₱40,000, to support administrative needs during the cascading activity.

Conclusion

Drawing from the comprehensive summary of findings presented, the following key conclusions have been carefully formulated.

1. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the unit effectively provided relevant training programs to develop the reservists' competencies.
2. Unit's inability to reach its targets was mostly beyond the unit's control, identified as the effects of the pandemic, procurement process, budget allocation, and other systemic challenges.
3. The delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, human resource recruitment challenges directly contributed to the "Failure" adjectival rating, particularly because individuals interested in joining the reserve force were required to personally report to the reservist office to initiate their application.
4. Despite facility renovation delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which directly impacted the unit's facility programs, the renovations were completed in the calendar year 2024.
5. Comprehensive and well-structured training programs improved reservist competence and performance.
6. The reservists valued and maximized the use of existing equipment, and additional equipment acquisition and upgrades were also required.
7. Effective human resource management delivered outstanding performance for reservist skills development, recruitment, and retention.
8. Implemented facility maintenance delivered training facilities that are well-equipped, accessible, facility-maintained, and functional.
9. Financial limitations to acquire and upgrade reserve equipment hampered the unit's capability for both training and disaster response, and required additional budget allocation.
10. Reservist with schedule conflicted with full-time employment, limits their participation in the training program, and demands a flexible training plan.
11. Lack of monitoring policy hindered the unit's ability to effectively utilize and deploy reservists, and required to establish monitoring guidelines and program measures.
12. Limited experience and expertise to perform reservist-related operations and activities, and the necessity for the establishment rigorous training, and evaluation programs, were drawn.
13. The absence of a structured facility maintenance and management program led to facility deterioration, increased repair and maintenance costs, and potential risks to the safety and security of reservist.
14. Challenges in providing accurate numbers of reservists, updated roster of troops, and their respective locations hindered the utilization and deployment of reservist, and establish an improved monitoring mechanism.
15. There was difficulty in increasing the number of reservists and filling the required number of reservists based on the desired table of organization, and demanded an improved recruitment and retention program.
16. Inadequate equipment, resources, and training materials limits the unit's capabilities to respond, and hence demanded immediate procurement.
17. Lack of awareness of the unit training programs limits participation and reduces opportunities for skills development, hence the need to have intensified awareness campaigns.
18. Adequate budget allocation to procure and upgrade material requirements will increase the reservist capabilities.
19. Increasing reservist training participation requires a flexible training program.
20. The establishment of comprehensive policies and guidelines for monitoring and regularly updating the status of active and inactive reservists was essential.
21. Training enhancement and validation were needed to develop reservist competencies.
22. A facility repair and maintenance program provides sustained operations, safety, and efficiency of training and operational infrastructures.
23. The establishment of a personnel management system will monitor, track, and update the status and condition of personnel.
24. Lack personnel will be mitigated by strengthening organizational initiatives for recruitment and retention program.
25. The lack of equipment will be addressed through inclusion in the unit's APB to ensure allocation of funds for future procurement and capability enhancement.
26. Information and dissemination program will foster reservist awareness and participation in unit training program.

Recommendations

Pursuant to the study's results and conclusions, the researcher, in conjunction with the respondents, proffers the following recommendations as solutions for the identified areas of deficient effectiveness and to inform strategies aimed at enhancement.

1. As the 2nd Air Force Wing Reserve was responsible for administering the reservist program in areas of Region III: Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, and Zambales. The organization through, the Assistant Chief of Command Staff for Education and Training, may consider establishing mobile training program for reservists. Said program may reduce the training gaps and geographical challenges in facilitating training, making it more accessible for reservists who balance military duties with civilian activities.

2. The unit may propose a comprehensive tabulated Materiel Capability Assessment Plan focusing on the following: comparison between the actual and target number of equipment, materiel shortfall or equipment gaps, and total estimated equipment cost or value. Additionally, this plan may be supported with the justification and recommendation highlighting the significance of providing adequate equipment for the reservist to respond in any given situation. Once accomplished, the said plan may be presented to the Philippine Air Force leadership for prioritization and appropriate allocation of funds to support the procurement of the materiel capabilities.

3. The organization may consider establishing a comprehensive Human Resource Recruitment Program, through cascading activities, information drives, and forums within academia, government, and private institutions, and communities. Thus, such plan may encourage individuals interested in becoming reservists.

4. The unit may consider establishing a monthly facility inspection program, focusing on inspection, status or findings, and recommendations. The aforesaid activity may identify and address the building and structural integrity, plumbing and water system, electrical system, fire safety and hazard, emergency equipment, security measures and access control, cleanliness and sanitation, among others. Therefore, the unit may propose additional funding allocation for facility repairs and maintenance.

5. The unit may facilitate an annual training review, revision and validation. This activity may highlight the training objective, desired learning outcomes, scope or topics, assessment tools, number of hours per subject, and lecture references to provide a comprehensive and well-structured training program.

6. The unit may adopt establishing a monthly inventory of equipment, focusing on the name and types of equipment, actual and target numbers of equipment based on the table of equipment, equipment variations, equipment manufacturer, location, and condition. This initiative may monitor, value, maximize, and allocate the use of existing equipment. Additionally, the organization may propose an allocation of additional funding for equipment repairs and replacement.

7. The unit may facilitate a quarterly review, revision and validation of human resource management. This activity may focus review and validation on the actual and target numbers of personnel, designation, personal information, physical profile, issues and concerns.

8. Establishing a monthly facility inspection activity to identify administrative and operational facilities that need to be repaired and maintained, before submitting it to higher headquarters for additional fund allocation.

9. The unit may submit a proposal emphasizing the identified variations in equipment to facilitate prioritization and the appropriate allocation of funds necessary for the procurement of the required equipment.

10. The organization may consider developing a training calendar to organize reservists' schedules based on their available time to maximize their participation in training or activities. The training calendar focuses on monitoring and evaluating training, and considers providing alternative mode of training (either physical training or via video-conferencing) for reservists to actively participate without sacrificing their respective civilian duties and responsibilities.

11. The crafting of comprehensive policies and guidelines may be considered, relevant to personnel data management and to develop a standard operating procedure (SOP) in record's management, and handling reservist personal data, to create more organized, timely, reliable and secure data for reservist information management.

12. The organization may consider conceptualizing on-the-job familiarization training in Humanitarian and Disaster Response (HADR) operations, with other agencies (private or government), to enhance reservists with the necessary knowledge, skills, procedures, and confidence while conducting operations. Additionally, the proposed training may develop their ability to perform rescue, and recovery tasks and enable reservists to operate safely and efficiently under pressure.

13. The conceptualization of monthly preventive maintenance calendar that involves reservist in maintaining the facilities in good condition may be considered. Therefore, a responsive maintenance calendar maintains conducive training facilities for skills enhancement and physical development.

14. To improve personnel monitoring and administration, the unit may review and benchmark a similar monitoring system (Reservist Data Management Information System (PRDMIS) with other branches of service (Philippine Army and Philippine Navy reservist units). This initiative may create a more effective, standardized, and user-friendly system for monitoring status, personal information, and mobilization of reservists.

15. Since academic institutions operated as hubs for varied talents and skills. To fill the gap in the personnel fill-up rate, or the variance in the programmed number of reservists. Therefore, the unit may establish partnerships with agencies or colleges in Region III. These collaborations allowed the unit to recruit a diverse range of potential reservists with various educational backgrounds, areas of expertise, and abilities.

16. The organization may facilitate stakeholder forums, focus group discussions, dialogues, and reservist capacity exhibits. Such activities may strengthen stakeholder engagement with partner agencies to gain support for the acquisition of additional equipment, supplies, and materials for reservists

17. The organization may develop strategic communication material, such as the distribution of leaflets, magazines, posters, and posting on social media platforms, among others. This mechanism provides intensified awareness and may encourage reservists to join in the program training.

18. As resources were limited to acquire adequate equipment for reservist operations, the organization may develop a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the reservist organization and stakeholders for inter-agency partnership and resource sharing and mobilization.

19. The reservist unit may establish an information dissemination system utilizing digital platform such as social media accounts, unit official website, and group chats. With this, reservists were updated on the upcoming training programs, avoiding missed opportunities because of lack of information. Furthermore, accessible platforms encourage active participation, and cooperation among the reservist, which was especially important given that many reservists work both military and civilian duties.

20. The unit may facilitate an activity or training on a monthly and quarterly basis that requires reservist participation and engagement. Such an activity may be implemented to support the development of a monthly/quarterly training monitoring plan. Therefore, these initiatives served as a valuable tool for managing and organizing reservist training, ensuring that training was on track and skills and knowledge were established.

21. The organization may revisit policies and manuals to shed light on areas for joint training activities between the active military and reservists. Joint training ensures better coordination, partnership, and seamless competency integration between two groups. Therefore, joint training may help identify gaps, align training programs with current and future requirements, and maximize the participation of reservists in both military and civil defense and disaster response activities.

22. The unit may develop timely facility maintenance mechanisms to minimize expensive repairs, maintain a safe and comfortable working environment, and nurtures a positive setting to ensure that desired training objectives are achieved.

23. The organization may facilitate a reservist activity that highlights reservist accomplishments, meaningful stories and experiences, and sharing information with individuals interested in becoming reservists.

24. The unit may strengthen its reservist recruitment program by enhancing incentives program such as medical assistance, identification cards, and commissary discounts, among others. Thus, this activity may encourage individuals to join in the reserve force. Moreover, the unit may establish a user-friendly and accessible recruitment platform or kiosk to encourage individuals to join the reserve force.

25. The Joint-use equipment and facilities may be viewed as initiative to optimize resources. Sharing facilities with other branches of service reservists, government entities, or civilian institutions with disaster and response capabilities, organization may gain high-quality training environments without the need to build and acquire expensive facilities and equipment. As such, joint-use facilities may foster better coordination and interoperability during disaster and response missions.

26. The organization may consider revisiting the reservist training plan or the program of instruction (POI) to address gaps in implementing training programs. The POI may be revisited every two (2) years to validate training modules, the number of training hours and students, logistical and administrative requirements. Thus, these initiatives will help maintain reservist awareness of the timely training program,

responsive with the new trends, safety and security challenges, technological advancement, and establish a pool of trained reservists.

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