IJCRT.ORG ISSN : 2320-2882

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CREATIVE RESEARCH THOUGHTS (IJCRT)

An International Open Access, Peer-reviewed, Refereed Journal

TRANSCENDENCE

A journey to consciousness

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Abstract: David: Please make me a real boy?
Professor Hobby: You are a real boy. At least as real as I have ever made one.
Steven Spielberg, A.I. Artificial Intelligence, 2001

Well, I also felt terrible for David while watching this movie. If those feelings are kept aside then the obvious query that arises next is, why David, a highly advanced robotic boy longs to become human. More precisely, when a sentient machine could easily overcome the limits of biology, its analytic capacity would become greater than the accumulative intelligence of every species born in the history of the multiverse, then what is so exceptional about conscious beings that after all advancements the question still remains same that is "Can a machine be conscious?" The quest that humans would be replaced by machines is not very contemporary. In the early 1950s, the question Turing asked was "Can machines think?" This contributed to the development of the concept of Artificial Intelligence (hereafter AI) altogether. The word intelligence can be deceptive sometimes because the technical implementation of the term is a little different from our customary understanding. So, what is AI? It is basically a field of computer science that seeks to programme computers to perform tasks that, when performed by humans, require intelligence. Here one can take a deep breath and wonder that undeniably it is a great endeavour for science, but why do people of philosophy find it so alluring? Well, the idea of a thinking machine is captivating in itself because it might help us to understand thought in general. Broadly, there are two approaches and both are problematic in principle.

Again, an intelligent machine does not stand for a conscious machine. The pursuit can go in the same direction, still the final destination is different. This leads us to the most primitive and hardest riddle and that is Consciousness. It is indeed important to know how our brain integrates environmental stimuli but the enigma is how that brain can have a subjective inner life. The striking feature of consciousness is what it is like to be conscious. Suppose, in the next hundred years, engineers might be able to simulate consciousness within a computer still it cannot experience anything because it is actually subject-specific. Hence proving, that consciousness cannot be simulated at all.

Human beings are fearful but this fear inspires us to do great things. We have always tried to overcome the limitations of nature which could be disease, intelligence even mortality. The aspiration for a world of consciousness without this biological structure is just another segment. There is no doubt that in the near future, we will programme smarter computers or robots with extraordinary capabilities. But for a conscious machine, I am not sure because the mystery of consciousness is still as Delphic as it was. The irony is, that science cannot give us the taste of a freshly baked cookie, though it can make one.

Keywords: **Artificial Intelligence, Thought, Cognitive Simulation theory, Mechanical mind, Consciousness**.

1. INTRODUCTION

You might wonder why the title of the paper is *Transcendence*? Etymologically the word stands for experience beyond the physical level and conventionally it gets tied up with spirituality. We all have read in school that the wheel is considered a primitive machine and the inclination behind the invention is to make work easier. But the motivation was not restricted there. We are quite familiar with the popular advertising catchphrase of the brand Philips which is i*nnovation and you*. So, it is about us and we encourage us to make new advancements for our own wellbeing. When people and technology come together, we create something extravagant. The machine that was once simply developed to reduce human effort, with the expansion of science we are almost on the verge of customizing it as a substitution of the human himself. We are not only engrossed in the idea of a thinking machine; we actually desire to endeavor beyond that. A physical system that is rising above the fundamentals of matter. Scientists refer to this as singularity but I call it *Transcendence*.

David: Please make me a real boy?
Professor Hobby: You are a real boy. At least as real as I have ever made one.
A.I. by Steven Spielberg (2001)

Well, I also felt terrible for David while watching this movie. If I keep my feelings aside then the obvious query that arises is, why David, a highly advanced robotic boy longs to become a human. More precisely, when a sentient machine could easily overcome the limits of biology, its analytic capacity would become greater than the accumulative intelligence of every person born in the history of the multiverse, then what is so exceptional about conscious beings that after all advancements the question still remains same that is **"**Can a machine be conscious?" The quest that humans would be replaced by machines is not very contemporary. The idea derives from the mechanical view of the nature and world. People used to have an organic notion of the world up to middle age but it started to disintegrate with the Scientific Revolution. Aristotelian explanation of the Final Ends was altered by observation, experiment, and mathematical measurement. Gradually, with the advancement of physics, biology, and neuroscience people were almost certain about the epilogue that the organic can be explained in terms of the inorganic.

What about the mind? The mechanical explanation of the world evokes similar simplification for the mind too. Mental states are nothing more than the chemical/functional states of the brain and hence physicalism-materialism could elucidate everything in this multiverse. But in my opinion, there is a fundamental problem with this kind of over-generalization and that is, it blurs out the dichotomy between Mind and Matter altogether. Before indulging in the hardcore debate, it is important to ask the *right question*.

2. CAN MACHINE THINK?

In the early 1950s, Turing asked "Can machines think? Alan Turing, in his article *Computing Machinery and Intelligence*, proposed the classic Turing test which postulates that anything can think simply by computing. Suppose, there is a person, a machine, or a computer and an interrogator. Both the computer and the person are kept in separate rooms. However, the interrogator was not informed which room was reserved for the person and which room is allocated for the machine. He is supposed to speculate the difference between man and machine by simply putting forward some questions written on cards and the answers that he will receive from them. Questions are expected to be rudimentary and require general intelligence and answers are to be replied in yes/no. The motive behind this imitation game is if the interviewer cannot differentiate between the man and the machine from their responses then we should not separate them, at least in terms of intelligence, as well. Now this contributed to the development of the concept of Artificial Intelligence (hereafter AI) altogether. A few years later, Allen Newell, Cliff Shaw, and Herbert Simon initiated a project that was designed to imitate the problem-solving skills of humans. Probably it was the first artificial intelligence program and was presented at the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence (DSRPAI) hosted by John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky in 1956. In this historic conference, McCarthy congregated top researchers from various fields and orientations for a kind of unrestricted, negotiable, but more importantly an open-ended discussion on artificial intelligence. Consequently, the term AI was originally coined for the first time at the very occurrence.

The term intelligence can be deceptive sometimes because the technical implementation of the term is a little different from our habitual understanding. The background of the expression 'intelligence'[1] can be traced back to the Latin term *intelligentia* or *intellegentia* which refers to the action or faculty of understanding, that itself derived from the Latin verb i*ntellegere*, which stands for the attainment, processing, and reposing of information. In this perspective, intelligence is constrained necessarily to the cognitive and mental abilities of the human being. After shedding light on the concept of intelligence, it is justified to ask about Artificial Intelligence. It is basically a field of computer science that seeks to programme computers to perform tasks that, when executed by humans, require intelligence. The history of Computers and the history of AI goes hand in hand. Here one can take a deep breath and wonder that it is undeniably a great endeavour for science, but why do people of philosophy find it so alluring? Well, the idea of a thinking machine is captivating in itself because there is a hope that it might assist us in comprehending about thought and the process of thinking in general. But why should we even anticipate that machines can think? The most convincing answer is that by mind or mental states, we have always understood those representational/computational theories of mind. Mental states, such as thoughts, and beliefs are intentional states and they are necessarily about something. Mental states are related to the mental representations. There are broadly two reasons behind the idea of a thinking machine.

2.1. FUNCTIONALISM

The basic tenet of classical functionalism is a mental state is designated by its function in the cognitive system, of which it is a part, not by any internal constitution. Functionalism is unique compared to the other popular materialist doctrines, namely, behaviourism and physicalism. It tries to amend the limitations of behaviourism by validating inner mental states, at the same time it endorses a kind of isomorphism between mental types and neurological. A human being, a non-human species, a machine, or any interplanetary even a celestial creature all can have the inner mental state-type even if they do not share any relevant neurophysiological state-type. In short, mental state-types are multiply realisable. On this view, to be in pain is to have a certain internal state to do a particular job, precisely 'pain job'. When you accidently step your feet over sharp glass then you scream out of pain. So, there is an input, an output, and a functional state. Suppose in humans that state is c-fibre firing and it is a functional state. Many functionalists emphasise that each particular occurrence of pain, that is the pain-token is necessarily identical with some neurophysiological state, even sometimes silicon. What makes functionalism exclusive is that there is an identity between mental tokens and neurophysiological tokens, but no such identity can be claimed between mental types and neurophysiological types. Functionalism, as a philosophical doctrine, was instigated in the 1960s by the American philosopher Hilary Putnam[2], and was regarded as an advancement over type-identity theory. However, if this could be established then mental states would not be celebrated as something special and it could be rightfully realised by various modes and structures. It would not remain specific to the human species only. It is like straws; it can be made up of plastic or rubber or metal but do the same job. In 1967 Putnam combined the idea of functionalism with a thinking machine. According to him, mental states in humans are nothing more than the functional states of a machine's central processor and those functional states can be comprehended in diverse physical systems or even in hypothetical systems without any logical contradiction.

2.2. COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF MIND

The computational theory of mind is the prototype concept that the mind can be conceived as a computer or to be more precise, as the software program of the brain. It is undoubtedly the most persuasive theory of functionalism and according to that what extricates the mind is basically the pattern in which the brain is ordered. Computational theory of mind basically encompasses two hypotheses. The first talks about the nature of intentional states, such as beliefs and desires. In this framework, intentional states are relational states that comprise mental representations. Additionally, these mental representations can be anticipated as representations in computer storage. The second claim is regarding the nature of cognitive procedures, which encompasses beliefs, desires, and other intentional states. To be specific, the computational theory of mind states that cognitive processes are computations over mental representations. The fundamental declaration that they made is that the mind computes over symbols. Hence, it is important to explain mental symbols in detail. Traditional computational theorists mostly maintain that basic mental symbols can be manifested into complex symbols, exactly the way words from natural language can be manifested into

[1] Adapted this from 'Concept of Intelligence'. *International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences* (Second Edition), 2015

[2] Adapted from Putnam, Hilary. (1960) 1975. 'Minds and Machines'. Reprinted in *Mind, Language, and Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp362-385.

complex linguistic assertions. Computational theory claims that thoughts are complex symbols with syntactic and semantic properties. Thinking is the recognition and manipulation of those thoughts on the basis of syntax solely but somehow preserving the semantics. Jerry Fodor is the philosopher who made this notion popular. He proposed that thinking takes place in a language which is known as the language of thought. To accommodate complex human thought, Fodor theorises complex mental symbols with a propositional structure analogous to natural language[3]. In short, thinking is computation. It is needless to say the computational theory of mind and the research of thinking computers coincides. We know that the process of computation can be apprehended in multiple ways because the computer over which I am typing my paper can do exactly that. So, if CTM is true then mental states could in principle be appreciated in a digital computer too.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

I have already mentioned about AI. But sometimes it becomes more aspiring and AI gets designated *the science of intelligence in general*[4]. However, I am not at all sympathetic to this idea. Computer scientists have taken mainly two approaches to develop AI. First, the cognitive simulation approach, that aims to programme computers not only to execute intelligent tasks but to ensure them exactly the way people do, that is using the cognitive faculties. According to this view, there is only one system of thinking and that is human cognitive scheme. On the other hand, the second approach is more technical as in the engineering approach, it also aims to exhibit the intelligent task but not necessarily by replicating human cognitive process. Here, they could programme machine that could execute exercises that requires intelligence no matter how we do it. In fact, it was the motivation behind the earliest development of AI research.

4. ARGUMENT AGAINST AI

Frankly speaking, the first approach has fundamental deficiencies. The principal notion of the simulation theory is that we do think (wholly or partly) by computing and so by simulating those computational/functional processes intelligent machines could be programmed. The primary objection against this approach is that thinking cannot be captured by mere rule-following or symbol manipulation, rather it's way more complex than that. Thinking includes understanding and that cannot be reduced to computing only. What is unique about human intelligence? In order to postulate the exceptional feature of human intellect I have quoted Dreyfus:

human intelligence requires the background of common-sense that adult human beings have by virtue of having bodies, interacting skilfully with material world, and being trained in a culture[5].

According to Dreyfus this intuition cannot be grasped by rules or representations because our common-sense knowledge always involves a kind of *knowing-how*. We are quite familiar with the distinction between *knowing-that* and *knowing-how*. While the first one stands for factual knowledge only, the second one is a matter of having skills. Honestly, if I know certain instructions about comprehending something that no way states that I actually understand the given object or state of affairs in itself. Similarly, by programming a computer, we could give it a list of rules to execute a task but not the propensity of performing that skilfully. Advocates of AI can defend their views by claiming that intelligence does not include common sense. But it seems so bleak and contrary to the worldview we live in. Proponents of AI, further accept that intuition is a necessary ingredient for intelligence but that cannot be derived from only one source. It is technically hard to build a knowledge base of a large amount of common-sense knowledge for computers but that does not mean it is impossible. Even, in 1984, it was attempted by the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation of Texas and named it CYC project[6]. Nevertheless, it is not also bulletproof. Even if we accumulate all common-sense knowledge still, we cannot legitimately say that a machine has common sense. Because when the term intelligence comprises the idea of intuition inside it then it does not mean to have an encyclopaedia of knowledge, but rather the ability to use it according to the situations. The notion of relevance is crucial here. If the machine cannot realise which fact is more appropriate in a particular situation, then having that fact makes no difference at all. It is needless to say that the sense of relevance comes from our way of living in this world not by mere rule-following.

Secondly, mere simulation does not make anything real and in the end, it is a kind of imitation only. Military simulation allows soldiers to undertake real-life combat scenarios, war games, and drills but still, there is no blood and loss like the real warfare. Machines are pretty excellent nowadays at predicting global warming effects and unfortunately, it anticipates that Arctic ice is melting day by day. But it's still never

[3] Adapted from Fodor J. *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge: MIT Press; 1987

[4]See Crane, "Computers and thought", *The Mechanical Mind*, p114.

[5]see Dreyfus, L. *What Computers Still Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason*. MIT Press. 1992

[6]See Jack Copeland, *Artificial Intelligence: a philosophical introduction*, chapter 5.

drenched inside the machine. Searle advocates this idea with the famous *Chinese room* thought experiment. According to Searle, even if we agree that AI could pass the Turing test, still it would only be simulating that thinking mechanism to some extent and not thinking in general. what is *Chinese room*?

4.1. CHINESE ROOM

Imagine a native English speaker, who has no idea about Chinese language, has been kept in a locked room with a huge book that has Chinese symbols and instructions written in English for manipulating those symbols. Suppose, there is another person outside the room, who is actually a native Chinese speaker but has no idea that the man in the room does not know Chinese. Imagine, the person outside sends questions in the form of Chinese Symbols and surprisingly the native English speaker is capable of answering those questions in Chinese by simply following the rules written in English. Even they are so accurate that it is technically impossible to recognise that the native English speaker does not know Chinese. The instructions(programme) empower him to pass the Turing test for understanding Chinese. But in reality, he does not postulate a single term of Chinese[7].

The motive behind this thought experiment is to demonstrate that a computer programme might be so sophisticated that it could proceed the Turing test effortlessly but does not refer to genuine understanding. If we structure it as an argument form:

1. Computer programmes are completely syntactical that is sympathetic towards the shapes of the symbols.
2. Understanding is always accompanied by the meaning, that is the semantics.
3. Mere structure or shape, that is the syntax cannot ever be sufficient enough for understanding or thought of the meaning, that is the semantics.
4. Therefore, bare rule-following or running a programme in computer would never be adequate enough for understanding.

We could fairly simulate a programme in a computer, but running that software successfully does not guarantee the actual thinking. Designing a refined programme and conducting it with accomplishment only assure the victory of science, but never the triumph of understanding. One needs to interact with the real world to understand and have that intelligence. Science can simulate the external ideas but the core would still remain pristine. So, it cannot be legitimately claimed that if the structure and the outcome is simulated then it is identical to the original. The machine in its most sophisticated arrangement has no understanding of those questions and its responses to them without any understanding at all. Hence, we cannot define what the machine is undertaking as “thinking” and since it does not think, it cannot possess a mind at least like the normal sense of the word. Therefore, we cannot justifiably contemplate machines as intelligent. The working programs, by themselves, are neither fundamental nor sufficient for being minds or even minds alike.

4.2. SEARLE’S WALL

Searle has been very critical of the computational theory of mind. Despite the infamous Chinese Room Argument, he has also provided another argument against it named Searle’s Wall. The aspiration behind this argument is the mapping aspect of computational representation. It is also the preparatory stage for almost every fashionable theory of computation. A mapping account of enactment typically asserts that the sufficient condition for computational execution is basically one-to-one correspondence between the physical states and adaptations of the physical scheme and the abstract states along with the transitions of computation. The mapping can be illustrated in the following pattern. Suppose, physical system P implements a formal computation F if there is a mapping M, then that maps physical states of P to abstract states of the formal computation F, so that for every step-wise development $D \rightarrow D^1$ of the formalism F, the following conditional holds that if P is in physical state ‘d’ where M(d)=D, then P will enter physical state d^1 such that $M(d^1) = D^1$.[8] Mapping is unpretentious, elementary, explanatory, and naturalistic in a way that it describes why computations are multiply attainable. Any physical system can device the same scheming because despite the physical differences, the physical happenings can be isomorphic. Now consider, the original argument by Searle:

For any object there is some description of that object such that under that description the object is a digital computer. 2. For any program and for any suõciently complex object, there is some description of the object under which it is implementing the program. Thus, for example the wall behind my back is

[7]See ‘Minds, brain and programs’, *Behavioural and Brain Science*.

[8] Adopted from Chalmers, D. (2012). “A computational foundation for the study of cognition”. *Journal of Cognitive Science* 12, pp. 323–357.

right now implementing the Wordstar program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements that is isomorphic with the formal structure of Wordstar. But if the wall is implementing Wordstar, then if it is a big enough wall, it is implementing any program, including any program implemented in the brain . . .[9]

According to the Mapping theory, inside the computer, there are many microscopic physical functions takes place and the machine can device WordStar because among these physical conversions, there is one set of function that comprises of electrical changes and that has a scheme that is isomorphic to the formal structure of WordStar. Searle declares that the same is true of his wall. There are countless physical infinitesimal changes inside the wall. There are atoms and molecules enduring electrical, thermal, vibrational, and gravitational changes. Searle proposes that there are so many designs of physical commotion inside the wall that there will definitely be at least one design with a scheme that is isomorphic to the recognized structure of WordStar. Hence, just like his computer, the wall can logically gear WordStar. The same perceptive can be attributed to other computations and to other physical systems as well, provided that they are sufficiently complex. One might ask how mapping theory is relevant in this framework? Computational-functional models maintain that if a physical system can execute a certain computation, then it has certain mental states. According to the notion of Mapping, almost every physical system can accomplish approximately every computation. Now, if we amalgamate the mapping views with the traditional computational theory of mind then, what we get is nearly every physical system has mental state. In other words, all physical system has mind. It almost resonates something like an oxymoron and goes straight against common sense. Hence, it cannot be accepted.

5. CONSCIOUS MACHINE

An intelligent machine does not stand for a conscious machine. The pursuit can drive in the same direction, still the destination is different. Even if a computer could efficaciously proceed with the Turing Test and it can accomplish all those intelligent tasks, still it cannot be rightfully asserted that machines are conscious. The question Turing has asked "can machine think?" is ultimately a trial for aptitude, not for consciousness. If one is indulged into a conversation with someone else whom s/he cannot directly perceive and who is also allocated in a separate room and after a time s/he cannot determine if it is a machine or a human, then the deduction would be responding human alike and that's it. There is nothing to feel encouraged further. This does not reveal anything about machine consciousness. I asked Siri[10] "are you Conscious?" and she answered me, "I think so. Therefore, I might be." But does it actually mean so? Of course, it does not imply any such thing. When I repeated the same question, she replied "I'm a virtual assistant, so I only know what I've been programmed to understand." I guess I have made my point that a machine, no matter how sophisticatedly it has been fabricated, it does, what it is programmed for not beyond that.

This leads us to the most primitive and *hard part*[11] riddle and that is *Consciousness*. It is the most familiar phenomenon we are acquainted with, yet a simple overview of any theory of consciousness always shows how dense the concept of consciousness is. We need to remember that the concept of consciousness is not some hypothesis that requires evidence for validation. Rather we all can intuitively ascertain the presence of it. Cognitive science attempts to interpret human behaviour and mental processes in terms of computations. Belief states like decision-making making, inference is explained by the brain employing typical computational processes. It is indeed extraordinary to understand how our brain integrates environmental stimuli but what seems enigmatic is how a mere physical system like the brain can attend a subjective inner life. The problem of consciousness cannot be resolved just by looking into brain processes or physical science. Our task is to take consciousness as a natural phenomenon but with extraordinary features. Basically, the problem of consciousness is a classic example of a problem that lies between science and philosophy. It is a scientific problem that requires philosophical methods to contemplate. The striking feature of consciousness is *what it is like to be*[12] conscious. More precisely, a mental state, an organism, or a machine cannot be averted as conscious if it is non-phenomenal. Consciousness is not about undertaking

[9] Searle, J. R. (1992). he Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 208–209

[10] Siri is the digital assistant that is part of Apple. It uses voice queries, gesture-based control, focus-tracking and a natural-language user interface to answer questions, make recommendations and execute actions by following requests in the presence of Internet services. Siri is a spin-off from a project manifested by the SRI International Artificial Intelligence Centre. Its speech recognition engine was provided by Nuance Communications, and it uses higher-order machine learning techniques to function. For better understanding: https://www.apple.com/in/siri/

[11] Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

[12] In his article, "What is it like to be a bat?" Nagel asserts that there are facts about conscious experience that are subjective and can only be known from that subjective perspective. Even if we know all the objective facts about bats, we may not actually know what it would really be like to be a bat.

intelligent tasks or responding some random questions. It is basically about the feeling that you are conscious. There is something like to be conscious. That feeling of consciousness cannot be replicated because it is unlike every individual. It is direct, subjective and there is a kind of first-person authority.

I am pretty sure that in the coming years, researchers will be able to simulate various aspects of human existence within a machine. But I am still dubious about consciousness. It is something that is technically tied up with the lived experience of individuals. There is no dichotomy between conscious givenness and phenomenological givenness[13]. Hence proving, that consciousness cannot be simulated at all.

6. FRANKENSTEIN'S BABY:

Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley's novel Frankenstein is about a typical mad scientist, who creates a giant by which he is ultimately affected and devasted. In Shelley's 'Frankenstein' Gothic horror story meets science fiction. The book preaches the tale of Victor Frankenstein, a student of science, who invents an artificial man from scratches and brings that being to life. At first, it pursues love and warmth, but eventually instigates antipathy in everyone who encounters it. A lonely and unhappy monster turns upon its inventor, who eventually dies. One might wonder why have I reserved such a title for this section. Mostly because I have always imagined Frankenstein as a prototype of an artificially intelligent machine metaphor. There are people who strongly wisdom that we must not chase the idea of conscious machines or even AI. There are principally two lines of argument in this context. Primarily, there lies a very primitive fear and trepidation with the storming invasion of technology altogether. Heidegger once said:

Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology[14].

I have started with the wheel but today machine and technology are not for necessity, not even for luxury, rather it has become the way of living. It is *not a mean to end* and certainly *not a human activity* anymore. Here, one would say machines are built to execute a task and we created them. So, how could we clogged by it? The answer is that these are only instrumental sides of technology, whereas its essence is absolutely different. Traditionally, the essence of any object was estimated by what that object is. When we posit the same question regarding technology, we are left with two lines of declarations. One claims that technology is a *means to an end*. The other pronounces it as a *human activity*. In order to achieve the end, the means to them is a human activity. The makers and the machines,

the productions, the needs, and the ends that they serve, all manifest to what technology is. Technology is not something that is devised but a Device in itself. According to Heidegger, the essence of technology is *a way of revealing*[15]. Before understanding this meaning, we need to discuss his view of *reality.* There is no ultimate reality in itself. It is logically impossible for us to approach reality, because when we try to apprehend that it becomes *reality for us*, not *in itself* anymore. So, our interaction with reality is revealing the unrevealed. We always interface with reality with a vision and in today's worldview we are technological geeks as we perceive reality through technology. Being empowered with it, we no longer want to be part of the natural universe, rather we desire to conquer it. We look at the world only as a source of raw material for more production. This is not our natural inclination, but our eyes are blurred with the hunger for power and dominance. Technology actually making us Frankenstein's baby. It is needless to say that it is utterly dangerous for humanity. We are not only viewing the world as a resource; we are perceiving other humans also as raw material. The craving for governing the whole multiverse has no end and the only way to flee is *the will not to will*.

There is another group of people who are not fundamentally against technology and AI but they believe that artificial minds would never be human-alike. It is true that we all are different but we share some basic goals, that are common to all of us – food, clothing, shelter. After the fulfilment of basic amenities, we strive for betterment and gradually long for esteem desires, and self-actualisation[16]. Would artificial machines look for the same? Well, I have my doubts. Again, we are not only minds, we are embodied minds. Hypothetically, if we do not possess this body then probably, we would not be this mind. Because of this particular kind of frame of meat and blood and neurons, we entertain this particular kind of thoughts, feelings, ideas even values. We have accepted aging, disease, and death as unavoidable facts so we have a particular attitude toward life. Does the machine ever think this way?

7. END REMARKS

People often say that AI raises consequential ethical questions. They claim that the society and economy would be deeply affected by it. In recent times, the ChatGPT has been captivating attention since it first

[13] Montague, M. (2016). The Given: Experience and its Content. Oxford University Press. Pp31-46.
[14] See *The Question Concerning Technology* by Martin Heidegger.
[15] Greek word aletheuein, which means to discover.
[16] Pichère, P., & Cadiat, A.-C. (2015). Maslow's hierarchy of needs.

emerged at the end of 2022. It is basically an AI language tool driven by the Natural Language Process (NLP. ChatGPT has become the center of attraction and attention because, unlike previous generations of artificially intelligent interactive agents, it feels like talking to a human. It also has precedence over humans and that is the speed. It can operate a huge amount of information and evaluate accordingly in a flash of time, what would be executed by a person in hours. Well, ChatGPT is unquestionably human-like, but fortunately or unfortunately it is not truly human. As I have mentioned earlier one of the human essences is commonsense and ChatGPT clearly lacks that. Although it can manipulate and thereby initiate responses, it cannot reason the same way we do. This can result in answers that are technically accurate, but absurd in practice. Likewise, it cannot appreciate the given context, emotional clues and moreover feelings. It feels like living the Chinese Room argument in reality. Sometimes, it is allegedly said that the moment AI leaves the laboratory those problems would be more significant. I do not want to be that pessimistic because historically our instinct is to move forward, not obligatory cessation.

Humans, the so-called greatest in this universe are undoubtedly a queer species. We always invaded lands, made war, and invented new weapons but end of the day we are basically fearful animals and we are scared of almost everything, mostly nature. But this fear inspires us to do extraordinary things as well. We have always tried to overcome the limitations of nature which could be disease, intelligence even mortality. The aspiration for a world of consciousness without this biological structure is just another segment. AI research is certainly a very impressive field of investigation. There is no doubt that in the near future, we will programme smarter computers or robots with exceptional capabilities. But for a conscious machine, I am not sure because the mystery of consciousness is still as Delphic as it was. The question, where I started, does it transcend? My answer is no. If again, it is asked will it transcend? I would say let's see. The irony is, that technology cannot give us the taste of a freshly baked cookie, though it can make one.

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