



Dialectics Of Tagore Songs (*Rabindrasangeet*) - An Overview

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Abstract

This paper attempts to examine the complex and confusing relationship between dialogue and dialectics with a focus on their philosophical underpinnings. First, the terms dialogue and dialectics are defined, together with their background and range of applications. Retracing the history of these concepts via the evolution of human mind is important. Second, it looks at how dialectics and dialogue relate to one another as well as numerous attempts to contrast, compare, or combine them. This paper tries to demonstrate that the dialogical approach and dialectics may be merged, despite their fundamental differences. It's critical to realise that links between various approaches, including dialogical and dialectical ones, are dynamic and change as human mind does. What could have seemed unimaginable at one time in the development of human cognition becomes possible at another. It looks at the possibility of combining dialogism and dialectics as theoretical frameworks and the idea of their complementary development. Under such a backdrop of study, the main objective of this paper is to read Rabindranath Tagore's songs, known as Rabindrasangeet from the perspective of dialogue and dialectics.

Index Terms- Dialogues, Dialectics, Tagore Songs, Rabindrasangeet

INTRODUCTION

In-depth discussions have taken place on the issue of the connection between dialogue and dialectics in global academic groups. Different scholars have voiced opposing opinions. (Reigel, 1979; White, 2011; Matusov, & Hayes, 2000; Sullivan, 2010; Nikulin, 2010; Matusov, 2011; Rule, 2015, Dafermos, 2018). The relationship between Bakhtinian and Vygotskian dialectics is how several of them have presented this topic. The integration (or blending) of Vygotsky's cultural-historical psychology with Bakhtin's dialogist conceptions has been pushed by the humanities and social sciences as an appealing perspective. (Wertsch, 1993; Roth, 2013). Others focus on the fundamental differences between Vygotsky and Bakhtin's research philosophies as well as the incompatibility of their ideas. (Cheyne, & Tarulli, 1999; Wegerif, 2008; White, 2011; Matusov, 2011; Dafermos, 2018).

Along with the relationship between Vygotsky and Bakhtin's ideas, the issue of how dialogue and dialectics relate to one another within the framework of the history of human thinking might be investigated. Under the influence of postmodern concepts, the North Atlantic Academy developed a particularly unfavourable attitude towards dialectics. With the use of dialectics, a "foundationalist" philosophy and a broad, all-encompassing social theory are frequently associated. (Gardiner, 2000). The anti-dialectic position is especially strong in the field of Bakhtin studies, where a dialogical technique has been formed. The main focus of the anti-dialectic "camp" is the conflict and mental incompatibility between dialectics and dialogism. Many intellectuals disagree with this widely held belief and argue that conversation and dialectical reasoning are compatible concepts. (Paul, 2012), and there have been numerous efforts to combine dialogue and dialectics (such as the relational dialectic theory). (Baxter, 2004).

Plato's dialogues, the earliest dialogical accounts in human history, were set in the ancient polis. After a lengthy gap in the history of human thinking, the conversation was revitalised in the 20th century in the writings of Russian literary theorist and philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin. He developed a sophisticated theory of dialogism based on several concepts, such as dialogue, monologue, polyphony, heteroglossia, utterance, voice, speech categories, and chronotype. A wide range of dialogical techniques have been created and employed by several academics and professionals. For instance, in education (Matusov, 2009; Matusov, & Miyazaki, 2014); psychology (Shotter, 1995; Hermans, & Kempen, 1993); psychoanalysis (Seikkula, 2011; Hermans, & Dimaggio, 2004; Dafermos, 2018); and cultural studies (Hermans, & Kempen, 1993); as a result of inspiration from Bakhtin's works. (Wertsch, 1993; Thornton, 1994).

The polysemy of the concept of conversation and the many perceptions of its application in various contexts are to blame for the appearance of complexity in the newly forming multidisciplinary field of dialogical studies. A real discussion between two or more persons is the definition of dialogue in its original form. Discourse is further defined as a verbal exchange between two or more interlocutors. A discussion must involve two or more participants, and you must listen to their opinions and answer appropriately. But right away, the concern of whether dialogue refers to all discussions or only a particular kind of in-depth communication between various subjectivities arises.

Dialogue is a literary device or subgenre that is focused on dialogue. Among the most well-known examples of the dialogical style as a genre are Plato's dialogues. During the heated discussions regarding the switch from oral to written communication, Plato's written speeches frequently came off as an imitation of oral communication. Many philosophers have used dialogue as a literary device to convey their views in a number of contexts. However, monographical content can be given an external structure by using the dialogical genre.

It is important to recognise how dialogic awareness enables us to demonstrate how scientism and cognitivism are mirror reflections of one another. Michael Bakhtin provided one of the most compelling arguments against cognitivism, contending that truth does not originate in or emerge from a person's intellect but rather develops amongst individuals who are searching for truth together through dialogic interaction. (Bakhtin, 1984). Bakhtin distinguished between conversation and monologue. Individual consciousness cannot grasp the complexity and diversity of the human cosmos. Instead of the one, isolated, monological consciousness, a dialogical cohabitation of many irreducible consciousnesses appears. Bakhtin claims that rather than developing in the consciousness of a single individual, the notion is created through dialogic exchange between many consciousnesses. The idea is inter-individual and inter-subjective; dialogic dialogue amongst consciousnesses is its realm of existence rather than individual consciousness.

The word "dialectics" has been used in a variety of contexts throughout history. The art of discussion and a method for discussing ideas initially arose in ancient Greece. A shared progenitor of the words "dialogue" and "dialectics" is the word "dialectic". It pertains to a mode of argument or conversation centered on the search for logical truth. "...someone attempts to arrive at the being of each thing itself by reason, without reference to any sense perceptions and through dialectical discussion" (Plato, 2004). True insight is provided through dialectics through the power of conversation. Dialectics as a method initially appeared in the Socratic elenchus, a method of hypothesis elimination that takes the form of a question-and-answer discussion and reveals the contradictions in the interlocutor's arguments (Dafermos, 2018).

Dialectics is a way of thinking that is based on an understanding of the contradictory nature of both reason and being. In order to offer a sensory, concrete, and alive vision of the world as it was changing and developing, ancient philosophers developed naïve, spontaneous dialectics. In the "Tao-Te-Ching" of Ancient China and Heraclitus' philosophy of Ancient Greece, the idea that "everything is in a state of flux" was expressed as an ancient spontaneous dialectic. (Skirbekk, & Gilje, 2001). Despite employing the term "dialectic," Heraclitus developed a dialectical understanding of how everything is changing. The representation of objects as processes, however, lacked a conceptual, categorical foundation in the old world. To depict becoming, metaphors or images of an aesthetic equivalent are utilised. A river is a good example of such a metaphor: "You cannot step into the same river twice." (Plato, 1997).

Dialectics was given a new term by Aristotle, which also altered its connotation. Aristotle believed that dialectic was more of a method for developing persuasive arguments than it was a way of life. Additionally, dialectic lost its relationship to discussion and evolved into a method largely used for gathering information. A set of logical precepts served as the foundation for the development of dialectic as a method of thinking in the Middle Ages. (Nikulin, 2010).

The formation of knowledge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was predominantly analytical in the physical sciences and metaphysical in philosophy. (Pavlidis, 2010). The premise of the metaphysical line of thought is that reality is composed of diverse, unconnected, and independent entities.

According to a metaphysical viewpoint, objects are autonomous, distinct from their surroundings, and abstracted from them. (Sayers, 1976). It effectively ignores both the development of items and the interconnectivity of those objects within themselves. The term "dialectic" was reintroduced and given new definitions and connotations within the context of German classical philosophy, from Kant through Hegel, and later in Marxism. Kant proposed the "transcendental dialectic," which he characterised as the logic of mistakes and illusions that emerge when reason veers from its proper place to comprehend the things themselves (the thing-in-itself). (Williams, 2014). Kant offered proof that illusions are inherently essential and unavoidable. According to Kant, logic confronts antinomies and collides with itself. Kant's notion of dialectic as a logic of illusions was contested by Hegel, who developed a "positive" dialectic based on the inquiry of a universal as a concrete union of multiple determinations. (Hegel, 2010). Hegel created dialectics as a way of thinking that involved articulating conflicts and resolving them in the body of a logical comprehension of an object. (Ilyenkov, 1977). For the purpose of intellectually reconstructing a real biological whole (the capitalist mode of production), Marx developed the network of related concepts known as the materialistic dialectics.

The philosophical way of reasoning was contested by systematic or conscious dialectics. There are two distinct ways to approach reasoning: metaphysics and dialectics. Contrary to the metaphysical approach, which is based on a one-dimensional, abstract analysis of an item and its components as permanent and immutable, dialectical thinking analyses an object as it is evolving. The dialectical approach focuses on analysing the connections, dynamics, and growth of objects. Dialectics is a style of reasoning that shows how a specific item evolves in relation to other objects. (Pavlidis, 2010). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the tendency in Western academics to reject dialectic and favour alternative movements, such as Kantianism, philosophy of life, and positivism, grew widespread. In the Western academic world, positivism and reductionism were long linked with the bulk of research. In contrast to reductionism, which is frequently used in specific domains and focuses on the study of separate aspects of reality, the dialectic approach is designed to grasp the whole complexity of the interrelationships of reality and the contradictions that symbolise them. (Bidell, 1988). The famous "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" formula is a bloatedly simplified and schematic explanation of the dialectical theory of development. This kind of caricatured representation of dialectics might lead to a negative attitude towards (or open rejection of) dialectical thinking.

KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS – AN INTERCONNECTED NARRATIVE

The two traditions of conversation and dialectic have developed independently throughout the development of human cognition. There may be complex linkages between these cultures, albeit there was not a full separation between them. Tradition has it that dialectics is a method of thinking connected to a certain kind of knowledge production. Dialectic in modern times "continues to assume the function of the organon of thought." (Nikulin, 2010). On the other hand, dialogue has traditionally been seen as a particular kind of discourse that creates shared understandings among diverse themes. Conversations are more about the exchange of consciousnesses than they are about the production of new knowledge. However, there is no separation between consciousness and knowledge. Dialectic connections arise in the liminal space between awareness and information. One of the moments that consciousness encompasses is knowledge. On the other side, reflective thinking has had an impact on dialogic discussion between diverse issues. Therefore, rather than being a solo activity of a fully independent subject, thinking is a dialogical act that occurs between many subjects. Topic interactions are an essential stage on the path to knowledge, and they are publicly mediated in the knowledge representation of an object.

Knowing the other demonstrates awareness of dialogical character. (Shotter, 2006). Vygotsky (1987) looked at the development of relationships between thoughts and speech as the key to understanding the character of human awareness. Examining the internal links between thinking and speaking as forms of human consciousness is one of the most important pillars for establishing the connection between dialectics and conversation. Vygotsky (1987) addressed this major issue from a psychological perspective, but it has not gotten enough attention. But it's crucial to remember that dialectical thinking is a unique mode of thought that appears at a certain time in the historical development of human knowledge. Dialectical thinking offers a possibility to counter the dominant positivism and reductionism in science. (Ilyenkov, 1982a, 1982b; Dafermos, 2014).

In addition to revealing the dialogic nature of awareness, Bakhtin also advanced the idea that thinking should be conceptualised as a conversation as opposed to the prevalent "paradigm" in the social and human sciences, the monologist. This manner of thinking makes the thinking human mind and the dialogic realm of its existence particularly accessible as they are not amenable to aesthetic absorption from monologic views. (Bakhtin, 1984).

According to Feuerbach, who integrated dialectics with communication, the authentic dialectic does not constitute a monologue of the lonely thinker with himself. This is a dialogue between "I" and "You." (Feuerbach, 1843). After revealing the shortcomings of pure speculation, wherein a solitary thinker goes on alone or with himself, Feuerbach focused on a discourse between "I" and "You" as sensuous and palpable human beings in his critique of Hegelian philosophy. It's important to note that Vygotsky's theory of social education in the field of defectology was inspired by Feuerbach's ideas on dialogue. According to Vygotsky, "Only social education can lead severely retarded children through the process of becoming human by eliminating the solitude of idiocy and severe retardation. The excellent adage of L. Feuerbach, "What is impossible for one, is possible for two," should serve as the guideline for research on atypical child development. Let us add: That which is impossible on the level of individual development becomes possible on the level of social development" (Dafermos, 2018). According to Vygotsky, interpersonal communication and cooperation serve as the cornerstones of social development. However, there are drawbacks to the notion that discussion and progress may coexist.

More complex and contradictory links exist between conversation and dialectics than are commonly acknowledged. The "horror of dialectics" stands in the way of fostering communication across these distinct but linked traditions in the human sciences (Gardiner, 2000) in the area of Bakhtin's studies. Dialectic and conversation historically developed as distinct theoretical lineages with their own conceptual frameworks while having a similar origin in ancient Greek philosophy. The phrases "voices," "utterance," "speech genres," and "polyphony" are employed in the dialogic paradigm. The cornerstone of the dialectic legacy is composed of the concepts of "contradiction," "development," and the distinction between "understanding" and "reason."

The North Atlantic Academy has recognised dialogism and dialectics as legitimate alternatives to positivism's monopoly. Although there are many differences between dialogism and dialectics as theoretical frameworks, they also "mutually enrich each other" in some areas. (Sullivan, 2010). Dialectics may offer a fresh perspective for re-examining history, especially the history of ideas, as a contradictory process in the dialogical study. For instance, it is challenging to assess the historical evolution of Bakhtin's texts due to the absence of dialectical reasoning. Many Bakhtian academics find it difficult to make sense of the contradicting accounts of his life in the writings of the creator of the theory of dialogism, as well as the inconsistent stances, terminology changes, and evidence about the authorship of the so-called contested materials. Because of the predominance of a presentist and teleological mode of thought and the lack of a dialectical understanding of the development of Bakhtin's works, many Bakhtian scholars have a tendency to read the early texts through those of the central or later period, which were published first, and thereby to read early concepts in terms of later ones. (Brandist & Shepherd, 1998; Dafermos, 2018). A dialectical approach that emphasises contradictions, change, totality, and growth may help us better understand Bakhtin's creative laboratory and highlight its complexity.

Dialectical thinking is ongoing and non-final, just like discourse. Historical changes have been made to debate and dialectic. New sharing and mutually nourishing spaces might lead to unanticipated changes in dialectics and dialogue. Perhaps in the future, the internal relationship that existed in Ancient Greece between "dialogue" and "dialectic" will reappear in a novel, surprising form. Nothing is completely lost; "every meaning will celebrate its rebirth." (Bakhtin, 1986b). Bakhtin recognized that dialectics can lead to "a higher-level dialogue" despite his significant objections, which were mentioned above. (Matusov, 2009). Based on Hegelian reasoning, Bakhtin discovered a viewpoint that united dialectics and dialogue: "Dialectics was born of dialogue to return to dialogue on a higher level (a dialogue of personalities)" (Bakhtin, 1986a; Dafermos, 2018).

DIALECTICS OF RABINDRASANGEET – AN OVERVIEW

By reading Tagore dialectically, one may see how he simultaneously engraves nationalist, ethnic, and linguistic particularity inside the horizon from which he originates and universality within the horizon of his situational particularity. One might frame a particularity by enshrining it inside the purview of universality by situating it on the greater world's canvas, where many other particularities also exist. It may seem more paradoxical to enshrine a universality inside the bounds of particularity than to perceive a particularity as a specific representation of a universality that, strangely, is also its element. It is noteworthy that these identical inscriptional moves form a pair that is dialectically related, that each is incommensurable with the other, and that only a dialectical reading can reveal the necessity and incompleteness of both terms in this dialectic. This understanding includes the knowledge that the two of them together when understood as mere representations and not as an unmediated real, and thus understood with full awareness of their individual shortcomings, provide the closest approach to the real that can ever be achieved. Exactly this kind of dialectical knowledge is what Slavoj Žižek refers to as a "parallax view" (Žižek 2009). One might see Tagore enshrining both a

universality and a particularity inside a universality when reading him dialectically. One can align oneself with Tagore's dialectical motion and thereafter be able to follow it by reading Tagore dialectically while adopting a parallax viewpoint.

A section of Tagore's 1892 epistolary work *Manabprakash* (Human Expression) serves as an example of how he employs this logical technique. In this article, Tagore claims that humans can only develop a distinct awareness (*swatantra chetana*) through the conflict (*parasparik sanghat*) caused by the opposition between their inborn nature (*antarer prakriti*), their acquired knowledge (*bahirer gaan*), and their habits (*sanskar*). According to Tagore, the "human species-family cognized as unified" (*ekannoborti manasparibar*) only breaks into the phenomenological experience (*upalabdhi*) of distinct individual subjectivities (*swa swa pradhanya*) after such a conflict occurs in human history. (Tagore 1961). Literature is only needed in human societies as a replacement for the cohesive whole that has been lost once this split has occurred. Tagore says, "When literature broaches some part (*angsha*) of human nature, then it shows it as a representative (*pratinidhi*) of a larger entity, of a totality (*samagra*), which quite resonates with interpretation of Luk'acs on totality. (Tagore 1961)⁹⁷. This means that for Tagore, the specific—which, it should be stressed, is always particular because it is inscribed in language and a product of particularly relevant political and social circumstances—is still the outward expression of a "greater" totality that lies at its core. However, Tagore also felt that this totality might be communicated through the particularity of writing, precisely since this completeness can never be fully known by direct observation. Totality and particularity are incommensurable, yet the pictures or perspectives that totality and its constituent parts construct of one another are the closest one can get to knowing any of them.

It is not surprising that for Tagore, the relationship between particularity and wholeness becomes a paradoxical moment. "Something like the dialectic will always begin to appear when thinking approaches the dilemma of incommensurability," asserts Jameson persuasively. (Bhattacharyya, 2010). However, to identify these dialectical moments, one must develop the habit of reading with an open mind to incommensurability. One must also be willing to see where the opposition between such incommensurability can go when it does, as Jameson suggests, presuming that any opposition can serve as the catalyst for a dialectic in and of itself. Therefore, practicing dialectical reading will help readers accomplish two goals: first, it will help readers comprehend dialectical moments in the texts; and second, it will help readers break the habit of viewing the author's texts as components of a growing trajectory that ultimately leads to the final aim embodied by his later works. Once this pattern is broken, it will be able to relate these shifts and fluctuations to things other than time or biographical evolution, such concerns of form and the ways in which form encourages and hinders the production of particular sorts of components.

Considering a song written in 1924 under *prem parjay* (Love Theme) composed for a metaphorical play *Raktakarabi* (Tagore, 1926), Tagore writes through the main protagonist Nandini's voice

ভালোবাসি, ভালোবাসি--
এই সুরে কাছে দূরে
জলে স্থলে বাজায় বাঁশি॥

আকাশে কার বুকের মাঝে ব্যথা বাজে,
দিগন্তে কার কালো আঁখি আঁখির জলে যায় ভাসি॥

I love, I love,
In this tune, far and near,
Plays the flute on land and in water.
In the sky, in whose heart
Sounds pain,
Whose dark eye, at the horizon,
Floods with teardrops?

There is a peculiarly ungrammatical Bengali construction in the first sentence, in which the subject of the sentence is curiously missing. In the first sentence of the song, the verb form that Tagore has used *bajay* [plays], not *baj'e* [sounds], although *baj'e* does occur in the second sentence. The form *bajay* [plays] requires a subject in the nominative case, which is absent in this sentence. The accusative case is used for the verb's object, which is the flute. Because of this, the statement is not grammatically correct in Bengali, and its use is consequently very provocative. According to a casual reading of these sentences, Nandini is making a reference to the "substantive multiplicity" that Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari discuss. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the idea of multiplicity "was created to escape the abstract opposition between the

multiple and the one, to escape dialectics, to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as an organic element of a Unity or Totality yet to come" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988).

According to this viewpoint, Nandini's Song depicts an immanent consciousness in which the earth, water, sky, and distance are all only diverse manifestations of the same fundamental multiplicity. Such a reading is undermined by the odd (and wrong) grammatical construction that indicates a subject who, despite playing the flute, is unidentified and strangely absent. It might be interpreted as an illustration of enallage. Instead of using the word *baje* (sounds), the word *bajay* (performs) generates an expectation for the phrase's subject—a subject who plays the tune—that is not fulfilled by the actual sentence. In the same way that Nandini knows Ranjan will show up at any moment, the issue is missing yet expected.

The enallage of "Nandini's Song," however, argues that in the Tagorean universe in which Nandini's Song is sung, the death of the subject has most definitely not occurred by setting up the anticipation for a subject of the phrase. (Bhattacharyya, 2010). The subject, whose absence is highlighted by the enallage, is waiting for its constitution, which will be accomplished by a dialectical sublation, in this world where dialectic functions. The narrative of *Raktakarabi* (Tagore, 1926) does, in fact, support this, since the play's conclusion shows the King learning to give up his fruitless habit of treating everyone and everything as though they were objects. The King gains the ability to understand the subjectivities of individuals he is connecting to by the play's conclusion. The King's voyage entails a step away from identification; the King gives up his long-assumed identity as King, and joins the rebellious miners who are opposing his rule, a sublation into a fuller totality is attained.

This particular dialectical move makes its appearance in several places in Tagore's writings – most notably in his conception of *paoa*, the Bengali word for "to get" or "to receive". There is an interesting song written by him in 1933 under *prem porjay* (Love Theme) which reads:

না চাহিলে যারে পাওয়া যায়, তেয়াগিলে আসে হাতে,
দিবসে সে ধন হারিয়েছি আমি-- পেয়েছি আঁধার রাতে ॥

That which can be received when not desired,
and comes near when renounced
That wealth I lost in daylight
To find it in the darkness of night

If the reader is unaware of the complex dialectical nature of this sentence, it may initially appear to be unclear, contradictory, or even incomprehensible. The idea described in these songs can be compared to Hegelian logic, even though there is no evidence that Tagore was familiar with Hegel. Hegel adds the following annotations to the dialectic. Hegel provides the following commentary on the dialectic in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Swimming in the ether of the One Substance*, where all that man formerly took to be real has disappeared, is where the freedom of the mind and its fundamental source can be found. Every scholar must reach this rejection of anything distinctive. (Hegel 1955).

Hegel claims that rejecting the "particular" is the first step towards the "absolute" (what he refers to elsewhere as "absolute spirit"). The actualization of the supreme spirit is only possible via the rejection of "all that is particular." In these lines from Tagore's songs, the poet seems to be portraying a dialectical movement like to the Hegelian move, in which the progression of actualization (or what Hegel would term "spirit") proceeds, paradoxically enough, via negation. According to Tagore, in order to get the desired "wealth"—or, to use Hegel's word, the actualization of "absolute spirit,"—it will be essential to first let go of individual demands. Therefore, in Tagore's dialectic, denial is the first step on the way to assertion (of the Ultimate).

This kind of dialectical move occurs in quite similar ways in several other songs by Tagore. For example, the song written in 1914 *puja parjay* (Devotional Theme)

যে রাতে মোর দুয়ারগুলি ভাঙল ঝড়ে
জানি নাই তো তুমি এলে আমার ঘরে

The day my doors were broken by the storm,
I had not known that you had come into my room

In this *tumi* (you) can be taken to refer, with a characteristic ambiguity that one often encounters in Tagore, to either God or an earthly beloved. Here, the road to the actualization of the absolute – *tumi ele amar ghore* - "you had come into my room" lies through the negation of the particular - *mor duar guli bhanglo jhore* - "my doors were broken by the storm". Tagore is here clearly influenced by the tradition of the Sufi-inspired *bauls* (wandering singers) of Bengal. He is known to have been familiar with the *baul* Gagan Harkara, in one of whose songs, আমি কোথায় পাবো তারে আমার মনের মানুষ যে রে (Where will I find him, who is

the man of my heart) [*ami kothay pabo tar'e, amar moner manush jere*] – the *baul* actively looks for the “man of the heart”, and certainly hopes to find him. If the “man of the heart” is thought of as an absolute universal whose actualization through the seeker's journey entails an openness practice founded on intersubjective recognition, then that process is dialectical and must involve non-identity and negation of particulars.

But recognising these instances of logical thinking in Tagore in this manner should prompt us to pause. The first thing it does is take into account the problem of how ideas may be applied to situations when those concepts and circumstances come from various philosophical traditions. Of course, this problem lies at the heart of each comparison study. It may seem unusual to read Tagore citing examples of his use of logic. Since concrete and entire processes constitute “the only point of view from which understanding becomes possible,” in the dialectical tradition as usually understood, according to Luk'acs, dialectics in the Hegelian tradition is tied to totality. (Luk'acs 1971)¹⁰⁴. Instead, consider Tagore as a dialectical theorist who favored “the notion of a local dialectic, or many dialectics,” as advocated by, for instance, Fredric Jameson. (Jameson 2009)¹⁰⁵. According to Jameson, “any opposition can be the starting point for a dialectic in its own right,” so it is “possible to abstract an emptier mechanism from the stages of Hegelian logic.” (Jameson 2009)

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