A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN *NYĀYA* AND CARAKA ON THE CONCEPT OF *VĀDA*.

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Abstract: Argumentation is a prevalent aspect of our daily lives, and it also holds significant importance in fields such as philosophy and medical science. This paper aims to explore the process of argumentation, its necessity, and its outcomes. Additionally, it will delve into why philosophical schools engage in argumentation from a specific philosophical perspective. Argumentation can be categorised into three types: *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitaṇḍā*. The distinct characteristics of each type of *kathā* (discourse) will be examined. Within argumentation, the concepts of *pakṣa* (proposition) and *pratipakṣa* (counter-proposition) play vital roles. This paper will not only discuss their roles in the context of philosophy but also explore their relevance in other domains. Overall, this paper seeks to provide insights into the various facets of argumentation, shedding light on its importance and applications in different areas of knowledge.

Keywords: *- vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, pakṣa, pratipakṣa, kathā.*

In the Indian context, the term 'thought' means critical thinking. There are mainly two branches of Indian philosophy, viz., *āstika* philosophy and *nāstika* philosophy. *Nyāya* philosophy is one of the *āstika* philosophy. They introduce the concept of critical analysis. Except for *Cārvāka* philosophy rest of the schools of Indian philosophy focused on the process of liberation.[1] They provided different ways of liberation. According to *Nyāya* philosophy, the true knowledge of twelve *padārthas* will help to achieve liberation. That is why *nyāya* philosophy is different from *Upanishad*. According to them, through argumentation, one can get acquainted with the true nature of the twelve padārthas. Argumentation means the critical analysis of *pakṣha* and *vipakṣha*. For example, 'sound is eternal', this is *pakṣha* and 'sound is non-eternal is *vipakṣha*. Proponent and opponent will also be treated as *pakṣha* and *vipakṣha*. Both proponent and the opponent should provide supportive logical ground to establish their position. That is called *sādhaka yukti* and *vādhaka yukti*. They should follow some terms and conditions of argumentation, such as:

They should provide their position.

They will provide a supportive logical grounding in favour of their position.

They will justify the validity of their logical ground.

They will refute the challenge raised by the opponent.

They will raise some objections against the proponent's position.

They will establish their position.

But if the participant is a *vaitaṇdik*, then he is not obliged to establish his position.

Naiyāyikas are involved in the process of argumentation to establish the meaning of the Veda. The opponents of naiyāyikas are the Buddhist philosophers. They want to establish the truth of the Vedas through inference. Argumentation takes place in the context of *parārthānumāna*. Because if the speaker wants to convince the hearer about his position, he has to provide a source of knowledge about that particular position. It can only be done by *Parārthānumāna.*

But the question is, if one wants to get knowledge regarding liberation, then why does one have to know the nature of argumentation? That means, what is the connection between them? If anyone wants to know the true knowledge of *padārthas*, then he has to follow the processes of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*. Manana is the critical analysis of *pakṣha* and *vipakṣha*.

Argumentation is of two types, viz., *vāda, jalpa, and vitaṇdā*. Also, these are the variations of *kathā*. *Kathā* is a kind of argumentation. *Kathā* is of two types, viz., *tattvabubhuṭsu kathā* and *vijigīṣu kathā*. *Vijigīṣu kathā* is of two types, viz., *jalpa* and *vitaṇdā*. *Kathā* means the critical analysis of *pakṣha* and *vipakṣha* by both the proponent and opponent. *Kathā* depends on some limbs, or *avayava*.[2] *Kathāhood* is present in *kathā*, which means it is present in *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitaṇdā*. The necessity of *kathā* is to a) determine the truth that has not yet emerged, and, b) maintain that truth that has emerged, confirmation of the maintenance of the truth, and *paravyṭpādan*.[3]

The eligibility criteria for participating in kathā are as follows: they will not be allowed to go against universal experience and must have unimpaired power of perception (*śravaṇādipatavah*). They would not be quarrelsome and would be able to maintain their respective positions. They should be able to point out the drawbacks of the opponent's positions. They must be cautious and conscious of the defects on both sides. Both the proponent and opponent must be equal in respect to learning. Because the argumentation cannot be held between an expert and an ordinary person.[4] The members of *jalpa* and *vitaṇdā* are proponents (*vādī*), opponents (*prativādī*), other members, *sabhāpati*, and *madhyastha*.

A writer, or lekhaka, will be appointed with the approval of both the disputant and his respondent if the debate is to be recorded. The members of the assembly must be agreeable to both contending parties and free from undue attachment and repugnance. They should be capable of comprehending, retaining, and articulating the meaning of others' speech. The number of members should not be less than three, and it must be an odd number. Their responsibilities include monitoring the argumentation and pointing out the merits or flaws of the participants. Furthermore, the members are tasked with encouraging those participants who are disheartened to repeat their speech if they fail to grasp its implications. Both parties will approve the members and the president. The selected members should be mindful of the nature of the positions of the proponent and the opponent. They must possess the ability to hold their ground, display intellectual brilliance, exhibit forgiveness, and maintain strict impartiality. The president (*sabhāpati*) should be able to express approval or disapproval without being influenced by attachment and aversion. *Madhyastha* will declare the result of the argumentation. He will admire the participants according to their worth. He will reveal the conclusion of the argumentation when it comes to a close. Persons coming by chance before a council of debate may point out irregularities, if there are any, in the debate. But in the case of *vāda*, such a person will not be allowed to play their role in setting the main point at issue. The case is different in *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. *Madhyastha* will perform some duties such as: he has to state the point of dispute first, which initiates the process of argumentation, the intermediary will decide the procedure to be followed in debate, he has to decide how far the process of argumentation is to be continued, he will summarise the arguments of both parties; he will maintain a clear conception of the respective positions of the two parties; he has to be neutral; he will be able to point out the merit and demerit of the two respective positions, and he will declare the results of the argumentation.[5] He should point out if the agreed-upon procedure of the argumentation gets violated.

The first form of *kathā* is *vāda*. The goal of *vāda* is to attain the truth. No other form of *kathā* except *vāda* has the attainment of truth as the goal to be attained. If *vāda* were defined in terms of the motive that directs one to this form of discourse, it would be very difficult to identify a particular discussion as vāda. Determining whether an individual is driven by a motive to seek the truth is not easy to ascertain.[6] *Vāda* is *ubhayapakṣasthāpanāvati kathā*. Both the proponent and opponent are present in this type of argumentation. They will try to substantiate (*sādhana*) and refute (*upālambha*) their respective positions with the help of *pramāṇa* and *tarka*.[7] That's why it depends on the five limbs of *nyāya*. But if the opponent is a Buddhist philosopher then he will not apply the five limbs *nyāya* as he did not accept *pratijñā* and *nigamana*. They think that without these two *avayavas*, one can establish their position. Because nigamana is a mere repetition of *pratijñā*. Thus the Buddhist philosopher would apply three limbs of *nyāya* and the naiyāyikas would apply five limbs of *nyāya*. So both parties participating in *vāda* do not subscribe to five limbs *nyāya*. Now the question is, should the number of relevant sentences be determined by the accepted theory of the system the participant is arguing for? In that case, the insertion that in *vāda* substantiation and refutation are done by employing the five *avayavas* can, at best, be taken to be an instruction of Gautama to the disciples that if they participate in *vāda* they should employ the five limed sentences for the said purpose.[8] So the general pre-condition is that a participant in *vāda* should not deviate from a tenet already accepted in the system he is arguing for, otherwise, he will be defeated.[9] In other words, *vāda* must be *siddhāntāviruddhaḥ*. So one cannot

argue according to their intention. Because he has to follow the intention of the hearer. The application of the five limbs *nyāya* is mandatory for those participants who belong to the *nyāya* tradition only. But this goes against Vātsyāna's assertion as to the possibility of *vāda* where *pramāṇa* and *tarka* are employed for substantiation and refutation without being associated with *avayavas*.[10] Does it mean that in some cases of *vāda*, the use of all five *avayavas* is uncalled for?[11] The reason is that the speaker can assess the intellectual capacity of the hearer.[12] He may think that the purpose will be solved despite employing a lesser number of *avayavas*.[13] Again, if the participant applied a lesser number of avayavas, he will be defeated due to nyǔna, on the other hand, if he applied innumerable reasons or examples, he will be defeated due to *adhika*. Another important aspect is that he has to follow the order at the time of applying the five limbs *nyāya*. As the process of argumentation will be going according to the intentions of the hearer.

Vātsyāan suggests that in the context of *vāda,* the participants should apply the five limbs of *nyāya*. The proponent cannot present his position according to his own preferences; instead, he must adhere to the intention of the hearer. This is crucial to ensure that the opponent gains inferential knowledge. For instance, when the speaker states, "There is fire on the hill," and the hearer inquires why it is so, the speaker responds by saying, "Because there is smoke on the hill." Thus, the process continues in this manner.

If the adduced logical ground fails to establish the original thesis under the following conditions, as well as if there is an inconsistency between any two factors of reasoning, and if the proposed thesis is inconsistent with any other accepted thesis. They should give such a logical ground that is structured properly, i.e., they should apply the five limbs of *nyāya*. Until they apply those five limbs of *nyāya*, their logical ground should not be treated as a proper logical ground. Still, if the *avayavas* can't establish the proponent's position, that means they are not the original *avayavas*. They cannot actually be so without being backed by *pramāṇa* and *tarka* and consequently, they would fail to establish the intended thesis itself.[14] It is not mandatory to employ five limbs *nyāya* in the case of *vāda*. But the employment of fallacious logical grounds fails to yield the truth even in a situation that does not involve the application of the five limbs of *nyāya*. So the logical ground in the case of *vāda* should be effective in establishing the truth. That means the participants will not be allowed to apply contradictory or fallacious probān in the case of *vāda*. Another assertion of the term *siddhāntāviruddhaḥ* asserts that in the case of *vāda,* the participants should not be allowed to deviate from the accepted tenets. If he does so, then he will be defeated due to *apasiddhānta*.

 The participants should apply the five limbs of *nyāya*, and they should justify their position. That means they should ensure that their position is free from defects. It is called *kaṇṭakoddhāra*.[15] That means the logical ground should not be inconclusive or contradictory or itself be *asatpratipakṣa*. Those five limbs of *nyāya* can justify one's position, and they function as proof of that particular position. So they justify the legitimate character of that logical ground.

Apart from this, another question is: who is eligible for *vāda*? They should not involve any kind of dishonesty, they should be patient; and should be opposed to unnecessary refutations of the opponent. They should be able to raise the value of the opponent's position, and they should offer only such arguments that are certain to prove the point of the argumentation. They should have an interest in ascertaining the truth.[16] According to

Gautama, teachers and pupils who belong to the same school and who are interested in this type of argumentation should participate in *vāda*. They should have the intellectual capacity required. But the question is, how is it possible that the teacher and the pupil have the same intellectual capacity? The answer is that this type of argumentation is for discussion, not instruction. If he feels it necessary, the preceptor may approach his disciple to enter into this form of discourse with him.[17] Vanity does not prevent a real teacher from quenching his intellectual thirst for this form of discussion.[18]

There are four classes of people, viz., *pratipanna* (learned), *apratipanna* (ignorant), *vipratipanna* (who has an alternative position of his own), and *sandigdha* (who is in doubt).[19] The last three pupils will be treated as learners, and who is *pratipanna* will be taught. Now, one who is eager to do good to the ignorant may make an attempt to generate in him a query to know the truth.[20] He gives rise to doubt in the ignorant with the hope that if he is in doubt, he will ascertain the truth.[21] That means he wants to spread true knowledge among others so that they get enriched. The opponent in this type of argumentation may want to fulfil his own self-interest. And so he will divert himself from the goal. That means his aim may shift from knowing the truth to his own self-interest. If his inability to defend his position is proven in an open debate, then he becomes doubtful about the acceptability of the position he has adopted so far.[22] Unless his counterposition is repudiated, he cannot be a party to the discussion known as *vāda*.[23] For this reason, discussion with someone who is *vipratipanna* is prohibited.[24] The result of *vāda* is to remove doubt, attain knowledge of what is completely unknown, and confirm what is already known.[25] When it is said that the learned person initiates an ignorant person and a person having an alternative position of his own to *vāda kathā* after generating doubt in them, the actual point that might have been emphasised is that truth is ascertained by an enquiring person.[26] So, queries are not only the result of *vāda* but can also be considered a pre-condition for *vāda*. That means a participant who is in doubt may participate in *vāda* to remove his doubt.

Another feature of *vāda* is, it must be *pratyadhikaraṇasādhana*. If the proponent only wants to find out the fault of the opponent's position, then it will turn into *vitaṇḍā*. In the case of *vitaṇḍā*, the participants have no obligation to establish their position. So *vāda*, according to this view, is of two types, depending on whether each of the participants argues both constructively and destructively.[27]

Like Indian philosophy, ancient medical scriptures like Caraka Saṃhitā discussed argumentation. In chapter eight of vimānsthāna of *Caraka Saṃhitā. Caraka* explained the necessity of the discussion of the scriptures.[28] Because the discussion regarding scriptures will help to remove doubt, it will also help to get new knowledge, it will increase the power of speech, etc.[29] According to Caraka, this discussion will be held between a physician and a fellow physician.[30] They should discuss the various topics of *Āyurveda*. It is known as *Saṃbhāṣā*. *Saṃbhāṣā* provides the standard of argumentation. According to Caraka Saṃbhāṣā is of two types, viz., *sandhyāya saṃbhāṣā* or *anuloma saṃbhāṣā* (friendly discussion), *vigṛya saṃbhāṣā* (hostile debate).[31] This classification depends on the spirit of the discussion. If a friendly debate with a fellow scholar occurs in the spirit of cooperation, it is known as *sandhyāya saṃbhāṣā*.[32] A learned person who knows the scripture and is not jealous must participate in *sandhyāya saṃbhāṣā*. Again, it is also called *anuloma saṃbhāṣā*. Because here the participants must clear their senses to the opponent and must not argue in the wrong way, if

he can defeat the opponent, they still can't express their joy. He will not be biased towards his own position. Whereas if the debate is held in the spirit of hostility, then it is called *vigṛya saṃbhāṣā*.[33] In this type of discussion, the participants will argue with those who do not possess those qualities. Here, the participants must examine themselves before participating in this type of discussion.[34] Here the opponent means *pravar*, *pratyavar* and *sama*.[35] Also, the assembly is of two types, viz, *jñānavati sabhā* and *muḍa sabhā*.[36]

Where two participants quarrel with each other and argue according to the scripture, it is called *vāda*. This is of two types: *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. Where the proponent and opponent argue with each other on the basis of their positions, it is called *jalpa*.[37] In the case of *jalpa* the participants present their position with the help of their reasons and refute the positions of the opponent. But in the case of *vitaṇḍā,* the participants only find out the faults of the opponent's position.[38]

The question is: between friendly debate and cooperative debate, which one is always conducive to the attainment of truth?[.39] How does one decide whether the spirit of cooperation or the spirit of hostility prevails in a particular context of argumentation?[40] To answer this question, we cannot rely only on the behaviour of a person; rather, we may rely on the means by which they proceed in argumentation. If the participants use some illogical means under the wrong impression, then the debate will not be entitled to hostile debate. So the adoption of illogical means in the case of argumentation can be taken to be an expression of one's hostile attitude if it is ascertained that he makes use of this extra logical instrument while being fully aware of the fact.[41] He may use that extra logical means to test the opponent's capability as well.[42] So neither the behaviour of the participants nor the instruments they apply are indicative of the spirit prevailing in the context of argumentation.[43]

We can envision a discussion in which a physician participates. The process is as follows: first, they present their position, known as *pratijnā*. Next, they establish their position with the aid of *hetu, upanaya, and nigamana*. Then, they must establish something contradictory to their initial position, referred to as *pratisthāpanā*. For instance, if their *pratijnā* is that the self is eternal, their *pratisthāpanā* would be that the self is non-eternal. Similar to *pratijnā*, *pratisthāpanā* is also established with the support of hetu, upanaya, and nigamana.

The use of *hetu* allows one to apprehend the *pratijnā*. If both the knowledgeable person and the layman can comprehend the same thing, it is referred to as *dṛṣtānta*. If they can present the reason using both similarities and dissimilarities, it is known as *Uttara*. After a thorough examination and with the support of reason, they establish a conclusion known as *siddhānta*.

According to Caraka Samhita, before teaching someone, a teacher must assess the learner. This examination includes evaluating the learner's interest, willingness to understand ideas, and intellectual capability. The teacher may create challenging situations to gauge the learner's ability to handle them.

Thus, it can be concluded that the relevance of argumentation is crucial in our daily lives as well as in any kind of scripture, be it philosophy or medical science. Argumentation plays a significant role in modifying theories and resolving doubts effectively.

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