Strategies And Efforts Of The U.S.A And Taliban 2.0 Government In Afghanistan

Shivam Srivastava,
Junior Research Fellow,
Department of Political Science,
Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India

Abstract- Almost one year ago in 2021, Afghanistan’s history pronounced a major turning point for the country. In the second decade of 2000, the U.S. felt, it was an unwinnable war. In the last twenty years, United States personnel were killed by approximately 2500 and over 22000 military casualties during the fatal and growing Taliban insurgency. Within the same period, the U.S. gave approx $150 billion for the development and security force for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The elected Afghan government got immense support from the U.S. and worldwide. So the U.S. negotiated with the Taliban with the help of countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. In this scenario, the U.S. and Taliban made a deal under which the U.S. would withdraw fully in exchange for the Taliban making a promise not to allow any Islamic militant group to operate from Afghanistan. As President Joseph Biden announced the withdrawal by August 2021, the Taliban, a Sunni extremist group that lasts governed from 1996 to 2001, regained power. The Taliban revival early extends its control over numerous provinces, finally capturing Kabul. U.S. official told that the United States would maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Khorasan Province without a military presence on the ground thereby utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what U.S. officials described as an “Over the horizon approach”. In this situation, there is a big dilemma in U.S. policy towards Afghanistan after Taliban 2.0. Some members of congress suggest an interest in alleviating human suffering, containing regionally based terrorists, and support for Afghan women and girls. And on the other hand, many members {supporters of the Biden administration} clearly seek to avoid any action in the name of development assistants that might have the effect of benefiting the Taliban for heinous activity.

In the context of India, the era of prolonged peace in Afghanistan secured by the U.S. military presence has come to an end. India has focused on intensifying its engagement with various Afghan groups including the Taliban and finding effective regional partners to secure its interest in a changing Afghanistan. The paper will cover information and analysis on development in Afghanistan and its implication for U.S. policy including the government of the Taliban and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human rights, woman’s role, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country.
Keywords: Taliban 2.0, U.S.-Afghanistan relations, India-Afghanistan regional partners, human rights, Economic crisis, Terrorism

Introduction
America's longest battle in history against the Taliban in Afghanistan ended on August 15, 2021, about a year earlier. The United States has made an effort over the past 20 years to develop a democratic government with a robust civil society that respects everyone's fundamental rights, including those of women and girls. In the second decade of 2021, the U.S. felt, it was an unwinnable war. In the last twenty years, United States personnel were killed approximately 2500 and over 22000 military casualties during the fatal and growing Taliban insurgency. Within the same period, the U.S. gave approx $150 billion for the development and security force for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The elected Afghan government got immense support from the U.S. and worldwide. So the U.S. negotiated with the Taliban with the help of countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. In this scenario, the U.S. and Taliban made a deal under which the U.S. would withdraw fully in exchange for the Taliban making a promise not to allow any Islamic militant group to operate from Afghanistan. As President Joseph Biden announced the withdrawal by August 2021, the Taliban, a Sunni extremist group that last governed from 1996 to 2001, regained power. The Taliban revival early extends its control over numerous provinces, finally capturing Kabul. U.S. official told that the United States would maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Khorasan Province without a military presence on the ground thereby utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what U.S. officials describe as an “Over the horizon approach”.

As a result, the Taliban seized total power in the nation. Both inside and outside of Afghanistan, observers were speculating about how the Taliban government would affect the nation. Then, on September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced the formation of a 33-member caretaker cabinet, which was largely made up of Pashtun Taliban and supporters. Afghanistan is currently speeding toward a humanitarian catastrophe as its banking system is on the verge of collapsing, its currency is threatened by hyperinflation, and its population confronts poverty and even hunger. The United States, which has some of the responsibility for these events, must decide decisively on its approach to Afghanistan and how it will interact with the incoming administration.

Background: Rise of Taliban

The Taliban's beginnings can be traced to the early 1990s when the new Afghan government struggled to impose civil law and control warlordism following the end of the Soviet-Afghan War. The religious rhetoric of the "mujahideen" gained popularity among common Afghans in the conditions of lawlessness. By 1994, the "mujahideen" warriors who belonged to a madrasah in a Kandahar village began to gain support from the local population and were successful in putting an end to the warlordism that had been roiling the area and restoring peace and order. They became known as the Taliban, and within two years they had seized Kabul and taken over a significant portion of Afghani land.

---

The religious philosophy of the Taliban was a synthesis of conservative Pashtun social code and "Deobandi traditionalism and Wahhabi puritanism," on the one hand. The consequence was a brutally oppressive administration that completely excluded women from public life, destroyed non-Islamic historical artifacts without hesitation, and implemented a medieval system of criminal punishment, which led to a humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan. Non-Pashtuns attempted to challenge the Pashtun rule it established but in vain. However, the regime continued to engage in criminal activity, including harboring al-Qaeda, hijacking flights to demand the release of well-known terrorists, and collaborating with Islamic militancy.

The relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, two utterly unlike groups, was shaky. The Taliban sprang from established religious networks, and the majority of its members were rural residents who received their education at nearby mosques and madrasas. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, was composed of contemporary extreme Islamists, many of whom had advanced degrees and exposure to other countries. While Al-Qaeda was transnationally focused and wanted to violently upset the international order of nation-states, the Taliban were nationalists who were focused on keeping Afghanistan safe and law-abiding. Nevertheless, the two organizations grew closer, in part because of cunning moves by Al-Qaeda's leadership and in part because the Taliban had few other allies in the world. Nevertheless, many Taliban members understood the dangers associated with their connection and took action to cut off Al-Qaeda's communication and attack planning and execution channels. Despite these precautions, Al-Qaeda was able to carry out its strikes on the US on September 11, an attack that would trigger the interventions that would eventually undermine the Taliban's authority. In October, the United States and its allies started bombing Afghanistan and aided the Northern Alliance, a coalition of Afghan anti-Taliban factions that had been fighting the Taliban's takeover of the nation. The Taliban government was overthrown by the Northern Alliance at the beginning of December.

**Taliban 2.0 Government: Changes and Continuities**

As a result of nearly 20 years of significant U.S. and international support, including the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops and the commitment of tens of billions of dollars in assistance, the Afghan government was a close U.S. counterterrorism partner at the beginning of 2021. Prior to the full military pullout that the US agreed to in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, President Donald Trump had already withdrawn all but 2,500 US troops, the lowest US force level since 2001. While acknowledging that the Afghan forces continued to depend on U.S. help, U.S. officials vowed to support...

---


4 After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement.
them financially and voiced confidence in their ability to defeat the Taliban. A few weeks after President Joseph Biden stated that foreign troops would leave Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban fighters launched a massive push that conquered large parts of the nation's rural areas, strengthening the group's control on certain districts where it already had a sizable presence. More unexpected than the Taliban’s takeover of other districts was the fact that some northern regions had militarily fought the group in the 1990s, making the Taliban's quick 2021 takeover of those regions extremely important. One Taliban leader said that his forces were purposefully avoiding seizing provincial capitals before the expected withdrawal of U.S. forces, and it was stated that the Taliban's rapid advance even startled some members of the group.

The Taliban have revealed a fresh aspect of their political ideology and message since taking control and in their media statement. The fact that the Taliban of 2021 are politically informed and proactive is a significant change. The group may have received instruction and the chance to practice political negotiation and diplomacy through the group's political office in Doha (Qatar), which was formed in 2013. The US's decision to acknowledge the Taliban as a legitimate political force during the Doha peace negotiations also gave the group the legitimacy it desired. According to reports, the Taliban utilized their strength to persuade Afghan army personnel to surrender, and they then posted recordings of the surrender to their social media accounts.

**Political Stability and survival and Taliban 2.0**

The Taliban declared a “caretaker government” to administer Afghanistan on September 7, 2021. The Taliban refer to their government as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, much as they have done for decades when referring to themselves. The Taliban, who ruled from 1996 to 2001 without passing a formal constitution, have stated their intention to rule under Islamic law (sharia), but they have not yet created "a coherent and cohesive legal structure, judicial system, or enforcement mechanisms.

Almost all of the government's members were either lifelong Taliban supporters or previous Taliban officials. They are all men, overwhelmingly ethnic Pashtuns (the bulk of the population in Afghanistan), and the majority are from the southern part of the country. There were sanctions against more than half of them, including the acting interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, for their roles in terrorism. For years, the U.S. Department of State has offered a reward of up to $10 million for information that results in the capture of Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani Network, an FTO that the United States has designated and which has carried out numerous attacks in Afghanistan against American and other foreign targets.

---

5 See House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Holds Hearing on Pathway for Peace in Afghanistan, CQ Congressional Transcripts, February 19, 2021
6 Kate Clark and Obaid Ali, “A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second Resistance,’” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 2, 2021
7 Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the Taliban are surprised at how fast they're advancing in Afghanistan,” NBC News, June 25, 2021.
8 It remains unclear as of August 2022 how or in what sense these “caretaker” positions differ from permanent positions. One analyst has described the Taliban's government during the 1990s as “nominally interim.” “Who Will Run the Taliban Government?” International Crisis Group, September 9, 2021
Taliban 2.0 Government and U.S. interest

The United States continues to have a security interest in preventing extremist groups from using Afghanistan as a base to attack it or its allies even after American forces have left the country and the Islamic Republic has fallen. It also has a moral and reputational interest in ensuring the expulsion of Americans and Afghans who are in danger as a result of their prior support for American initiatives, as well as in assisting the vast majority of Afghans who are still living in the nation to maintain at least some of the political, social, and economic gains made over the previous 20 years. The primary priority of the United States is to stop terrorist organizations from using Afghanistan as a refuge for assaults on American soil. Preventing terrorism has been stressed by numerous governments as the main American objective in Afghanistan. When Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011, President Biden declared that this first purpose had been accomplished. However, he pledged that the United States would continue to work to prevent future attacks by employing facilities and resources outside of Afghanistan. Using the justification that the threat from Afghanistan no longer exists, President Biden partially justified his decision to withdraw American forces from that country.

Open sources claim that although the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and al Qaeda (including its affiliate, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) have certain local capabilities, they do not currently seem prepared to launch an international attack. Al Qaeda still maintains close ties with the Taliban, according to UN reporting, and currently numbers between "a few dozen and 500 people". ISIS-K is a branch of the Middle Eastern ISIS core. The group first appeared in 2015–2016, expanded to control areas in eastern Afghanistan, and then lost that territory in 2020 as a result of a joint offensive by the Taliban, the US, and the Afghan government.

The future of the Afghan people is also important to the United States morally and politically. This entails securing the freedom of movement for Americans and Afghans who assisted the US and its allies and wish to leave the nation as well as assisting those Afghans who remain in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and, ideally, to preserve some of the political, social, and economic gains of the previous 20 years. For instance, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke about both American efforts to make it possible for Afghanistan to leave and American "expectations" of the Taliban, such as "inclusive government" and "upholding the fundamental rights of Afghans, including women and minorities," in a statement on September 3, 2021.

---

Impact regarding U.S. policies after Taliban 2.0

A variety of U.S. policy objectives would be impacted by renewed Taliban authority in Afghanistan. The many terrorist organizations that are present in Afghanistan have been given opportunities and faced problems as a result, and previous U.S. intentions to work with Afghan authorities to confront terrorist threats "beyond the horizon" have been rendered ineffective. Since 2001, a significant objective of U.S. policy in Afghanistan has been to strengthen the protection of women's rights and other human rights, as the Taliban have actively worked to restrict these rights ever since regaining power. As of August 2022, U.S. politicians, including numerous Members of Congress, are still working to secure the relocation of the last surviving American citizens and Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government.

Human Rights emphasis on Women and Minorities

When the Taliban seized power in August 2021, Afghanistan was very different from the nation they had previously ruled in 2001. Protections for them, as well as ethnic and religious minorities, were incorporated into the country's 2004 constitution. Women became active participants in many facets of Afghan culture after 2001. Although the Taliban's early behavior hinted at some potential moderation from their oppressive rule from 1996 to 2001, UN Rapporteur Bachelet stated in June 2022 that "what we are witnessing in Afghanistan today is the institutionalized, systematic oppression of women" and that "Afghan women are rapidly facing the worst-case scenario many-fear."  

The Ministry of Women's Affairs, which was a part of the previous Afghan government, has been shut down by the Taliban, and the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which upheld the Taliban's view of Islam in the 1990s, has been reinstated. The ministry has released guidelines that aim to impose additional restrictions on Afghan women. For example, the guidelines state that women should not be permitted to travel over long distances alone and that male relatives of women who do not cover themselves completely in a hijab should be punished. According to a July 2022 report from Amnesty International, more women and girls are being detained for breaking these rules. The combination of these limitations and the general economic downturn has reduced the number of women working. The Taliban takeover appears to have decreased the high levels of bloodshed that characterized the conflict, a development that was particularly appreciated by residents in rural regions, but it has exacerbated fears of repression and women's rights in many Afghans.

Taliban policies on Afghan females' education are those of the United States. In early 2022, Taliban spokespeople declared that girls' secondary schools, which had been essentially closed in most of the

nation since the takeover in August 2021, would reopen with the start of the new school year in late March 2022\(^{15}\). On March 23, however, the Taliban quickly changed course and declared that secondary schools for girls would remain closed, stunning many observers as several girls were already present in the classrooms.\(^{16}\)

U.S. policymakers have also analyzed Taliban statements and actions regarding racial and religious minorities. Since the Taliban's takeover in August 2021, many Hazaras (Shia Muslims who make up 10-15\% of Afghanistan's population and are one of the largest ethnoreligious minorities in the nation) have expressed concern about the Taliban's potential return\(^{17}\).

Despite some allegations of massacres and forcible evictions in the Hazaras historical homelands in central Afghanistan in fall 2021, the Taliban have shown a more accommodating official stance toward the Hazaras, particularly in urban areas. Even though Hazaras have not been mistreated by the Taliban rule, many Hazaras blame the Taliban for failing to create an inclusive government and for failing to halt the ISKP attacks that repeatedly targeted Hazaras in 2021 and 2022.\(^{18}\) In that policy scenario, the United States has contributed more than $900 million to Afghanistan since the Taliban's takeover. While such play support is essential for enhancing the well-being of Afghans.\(^{19}\)

**U.S. policy again terrorism**

The Taliban have a variety of relationships with the many Islamist extremist terrorist organizations that have long operated in Afghanistan. The Taliban's takeover has had varying effects on the two most prominent terrorist organizations, ISKP and Al Qaeda (AQ). ISKP, which has fought with the Taliban as was previously said, has long been the United States' top concern in the counterterrorism arena. In a rare instance of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation, the U.S. launched airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against the ISKP while also supporting the Afghan government.\(^{20}\) Anyhow, as per U.N. Al Qaeda "is not viewed as posing an immediate international threat from its safe haven in Afghanistan due to its lack of an external operational capability and because it does not currently wish to cause the Taliban international difficulty or embarrassment," according to sanctions monitors. The U.S. intelligence community estimated in March 2022 that AQ "will gauge its ability to operate in Afghanistan under Taliban restrictions" as Al Qaeda and the Taliban reevaluate their relationship and act differently.\(^{21}\)

The United States has maintained its ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan like ISKP and Al Qaeda without a military presence on the ground thereby utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what U.S. officials refer to as an "over-the-horizon" approach, since the beginning of the 2021 U.S.

---


\(^{17}\) David Zucchino and Fatima Faizi, “They Are Thriving After Years of Persecution but Fear a Taliban Deal,” New York Times, March 27, 2019.

\(^{18}\) Nilly Kohzad, “It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Diplomat, May 27, 2022.

\(^{19}\) USAID press releases, August 12, 2022.


\(^{21}\) Office of the Director for National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 2022.
withdrawal.\textsuperscript{22} The United States has had to revise any plans that had been based on the continuation of the former Afghan government and its security forces now that the Taliban are in charge of the country. U.S. President Biden claims that the Zawahiri strike validated his decision to complete the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Afghanistan and pursue an over-the-horizon strategy\textsuperscript{23}. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla described over-the-horizon capabilities as "extremely difficult but not impossible" in February 2022 testimony. Since the United States has no military or diplomatic presence in Afghanistan and its closest military bases are hundreds of miles distant, it is believed that the country is seeking to improve its intelligence-gathering capabilities in other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{24}

**Economic crisis and U.S. Policy**

Prior to August 2021, Afghanistan was already experiencing a terrible humanitarian catastrophe, mostly brought on by fighting, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Afghanistan, long one of the world's poorest and most aid-dependent nations, is currently experiencing one of the world's worst humanitarian crises as a result of the Taliban's return to power. Several U.S. policy decisions, such as the suspension of foreign development assistance, the imposition of domestic and international sanctions against the Taliban, and the American hold over the assets of Afghanistan's central bank, appear to be pertinent to the humanitarian issue' underlying economic collapse.

The United States no longer offers support for Afghanistan's reconstruction since the Taliban took control in August 2021. In order to address basic human necessities and prevent a total and impending economic collapse, the United States has modified the nature and scope of its actions in Afghanistan to concentrate instead on humanitarian aid and targeted support. In support of these initiatives, the US has taken the lead in mobilizing the international community to provide $775 million in humanitarian aid to the Afghan people through UN agencies and NGOs as of July 2022. In the critical areas of food security/agriculture, health, and education, the United States has advanced efforts to give Afghans life-saving humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{25}

In cooperation with other members of the international community, the United States has undertaken major efforts to prevent the Afghan economy from collapsing without the Taliban profiting. These initiatives have increased the financial sector's liquidity and assisted Afghan banks in maintaining their connectivity to the global financial system.

\textsuperscript{22}See, for example, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, White House, April 14, 2021.
\textsuperscript{23} See transcript at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6450846?3&search=8TnqSQnx
Realist theory

The study of international politics through the lens of realism emphasizes the role of power in explaining and interpreting global affairs. Realists place a strong emphasis on security, the state's centrality, national interest, and power politics. One of the "founding fathers" of the realist movement in the 20th century is Hans Morgenthau. According to this school of thinking, nation-states are the primary actors in international relations, and the study of power is the core focus of the discipline. In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau underlined the significance of "the national interest," noting that "the concept of interest articulated in terms of power is the essential signpost that permits political realism to make its way through the landscape of international politics."

In the scenario of U.S.-Afghanistan relations, For many years, a core element of realist philosophy has been the disengagement from the fight against terror in Afghanistan and the Muslim world. Realist foreign policy detractors have always supported the notion of strategic restraint. Some of their beliefs, which were frequently frustrated by their lack of authority, are now mirrored in an emerging bipartisan foreign policy consensus that the war on terror must come to an end.

And for this reason, from a realist standpoint, the fall of Afghanistan does not constitute a strategic disaster—at least not a complete one. American grand strategy should aim to prevent any nation from controlling the Persian Gulf or the heart of Eurasia in a new period of great-power struggle. Russian, Chinese, and Iranian ambitions to establish such domination are likely to be frustrated by an Afghanistan dominated by the Taliban, emboldened by its triumph against the United States to expand its uprising. Washington should see this much more favorably even if it will undoubtedly be greatly unwanted in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran. If the American foreign policy establishment is finally prepared to abandon the antiquated logic of liberal internationalism and primacy and adopt the enduring logic of balance-of-power realism, then whether it will or won't play out will be mainly determined by that.

U.S. Congress's perspective on Afghanistan

Stabilizing Afghanistan and supporting Afghans while avoiding acts that might help the Taliban are two U.S. policy aims that may be challenging to balance. it is unlikely to significantly improve economic conditions while preventing mass casualties. Financial support may help Afghanistan's economy and alleviate the humanitarian crisis, but there is a chance that some of the money will be diverted or used in ways that benefit the Taliban more broadly. American foreign policy instruments that have historically been employed as leverage may not be as effective in Afghanistan as they are in other situations.

---


Congress may take a number of policy options into consideration while determining American policy toward Afghanistan, including

First, The Government Accountability Office or the Administration may be required to submit reports on the effects of U.S. sanctions on the targeted individuals, the Afghan economy, and Afghan society in general in order for Congress to assess whether these sanctions are accomplishing their intended goals. Second, The Administration may be required to provide Congress with additional information about the number and condition of American citizens and Afghan allies still present in Afghanistan, as well as the state of American efforts to secure their relocation, including the resources allocated to those efforts, challenges to further relocations and Administration strategies to overcome those challenges. And third, In order to inform its discussion of the Administration's budget request and decision on FY2023 appropriations, Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may impact Taliban actions, including with regard to women's rights more generally and the capacity of Afghan girls to attend secondary schools, in particular.

India and Taliban 2.0

In the context of India, The era of prolonged peace in Afghanistan secured by U.S. military presence has come to an end. India has focused on intensifying Its engagement with various Afghan groups including the Taliban and finding an effective regional partner to secure its Interest in a changing Afghanistan. India has sent 17,000 MT of wheat out of its overall commitment of 50,000 MT since last August, despite the fact that Taliban 2.0 are not formally recognized by India. According to Financial Express Online, 500,000 doses of Covaxin, an Indian-made version of the Covid-19 vaccine, have been sent to the nation ripped apart by war. Additionally, more than 60 million doses of the polio vaccination, 13 tonnes of winter clothes, and 60 tonnes of crucial life-saving medications.

A progressive approach to engagement with Kabul. "New Delhi would demand a firm guarantee from the Taliban that its citizens and property won't be attacked there. Second, other terrorist organizations should not undertake operations against the territory of India from Afghanistan. Third, before beginning full-fledged diplomatic and political engagement, New Delhi would work on development projects and humanitarian aid in the initial months, according to Prof. Rajan. The Taliban understands India's importance in development projects and how India may serve as a bridge to other nations.

---

Conclusion

The Doha Agreement was agreed upon by the United States and the Taliban on February 29, 2020, and it resulted in the departure of American and Allied forces from Afghanistan on August 30, 2021. The United States has adopted a pragmatic communications plan in Afghanistan since the Taliban took over forcibly in August 2021, ending with Kabul's collapse on August 15. The Taliban or any other organization may or may not be recognized by the United States as the Government of Afghanistan or as a component of such a government. The U.S. has made enormous efforts to help the Afghan people during a time of humanitarian and economic calamity in coordination with the international community.

For the United States to significantly help to halt Afghanistan's catastrophic destitution and serious deterioration of public services, there would need to be some level of engagement. The fundamental requirement of an engagement approach is ongoing diplomatic interaction with the Taliban. Without frequent communication, the United States won't be able to adequately communicate its expectations or monitor any changes in the Taliban's openness to serving its objectives. Any type of assistance beyond the most basic would require knowledge of the situation in Afghanistan and the capacity to oversee implementation, both of which can only be attained through regular interactions between diplomats and development agencies and their Afghan counterparts, and other individuals working there.

Additionally, as all nations work to sway the Taliban's priorities and actions to suit their own interests, Washington will be at a disadvantage relative to more active nations the less direct contact it has with the Taliban. The countries that are most prominently embracing engagement while delaying official recognition for the time being include Pakistan, China, Iran, and Russia. Reestablishing a diplomatic presence in Kabul would be the best method for the United States to keep in touch frequently and get knowledge of the situation there.