



GLASNOST IN SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE DURING THE GORBACHEV ERA

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Abstract: The paper attempts to fathom the series of initiatives taken by Gorbachev aimed at global disarmament and arms control. The renewed interest in arms control and disarmament was mainly due to the initiatives taken by Soviet Union. It presents Gorbachev's *novoye myshleniye* in the field of arms control negotiations and analyse the onslaught of peace proposals put forward by him. Gorbachev's new thinking and his impassioned appeals to USA to enter negotiations to freeze the arms race gave a new facet to the process of arms control mechanism. In keeping with the Leninist tradition of peaceful co-existence, Gorbachev gave the clarion call for a world free of nuclear weapons. He followed it up with a set of unilateral proposals, which received applause from even his critics in the west.

Index Terms - Glasnost, Gorbachev, Soviet, strategic doctrine, arms control, disarmament

The change of guards at the Kremlin brought Mikhail Gorbachev at the helm of power on 11 March 1985 – a time when the world was passing through a period of increasing tensions. Even before his appointment as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, he talked of 'reform' in a confidential report delivered to a Party and government officials.¹ It is small wonder that he unleashed a revolutionary force directed to change the very political order (but not the system) in Soviet Union through the famous *novoye myshleniye* (the "new political thinking").² Fresh hopes were aroused then-- hope which set the ball rolling for thinking *de-novo* the question of whether the world could live with nuclear weapons. His appraisal of the nuclear question vividly reflected the idea of the late president of United States of America (USA), John F. Kennedy, who spoke of "the nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, liable to be cut at any moment by madness, accident or miscalculation."³ The objective of the present chapter is to analyse the Soviet strategic doctrine vis-a-vis the "new political thinking" to understand the Soviet perspective of security policy in the Gorbachev era. This chapter attempts to – (a) analyse the new thinking in the sphere of disarmament and arms control; and (b) conceptualizes the substance of change in Soviet national security policy.

Re-thinking in Soviet Approach to Disarmament and Arm Control:

Gorbachev committed himself to a genuine re-examination of the national security policy immediately after assuming power in 1985, which ultimately led to the formulation of a new security policy, which obviously necessitated fresh initiatives in the arms control regime. Securing and establishing peace over a long period of time obviously requires much more than finding ways and designing tools for preventing wars. It requires a world of foresight, which was so aptly demonstrated by Gorbachev, and which his illustrious predecessors so sadly lacked. The various peace proposals and unilateral steps regarding arms control and disarmament were aimed at bringing stability and peace by drawing away intellectual and financial resources which were tied up in the designing of more sophisticated, more pernicious, and powerful weapons and counter- weapons. Underlining the importance of arms control and disarmament, Gorbachev stressed, "Modern weapons have turned military power into a veritable boomerang, a nuclear one moreover, that is as sure to hit the thrower as his adversary. Therefore, concern for national security now demands the most scrupulous consideration of the security interests of other states.

Mutual and equal security of all is imperative. This is our final outcome.”⁴

Gorbachev approached the arms control regime with great faith and tenacity. His series of initiatives made it amply clear that the Soviet Union had come a long way from the days when it was dubbed as an “evil empire”. So great was the influence of his arms control regime that “the Western powers...looked on with bewilderment, construction and, at times, near paralysis as the Soviet government...boldly seized and held center-stage through an impressive array of unaccustomed concessions and ‘Madison Avenue’ public relations.”⁵ Combining realism with diplomacy and foresightedness, he assured correcting that “for the most part, it is the arms race (which) stands in the way of good Soviet-American relation.”⁶ Therefore, making an epistemological break with the past, Gorbachev treaded new paths in the international affairs. This enabled him “to build international confidence and to reach agreements on the reduction of nuclear arms and finally a nuclear disarmament.”⁷ This perspective formed the backdrop of the fundamental principle of the new political outlook which stressed that “a nuclear war cannot be a means of attaining political, economic, and ideological or any other means.”⁸ This enabled both Soviet Union and United States to eschew what Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth⁹ have called “strategic fundamentalism,” in which the conflict was attributed almost exclusively to the malevolent nature of the adversary.

“A journey of a thousand miles, must begin with a single step,” so goes a Chinese proverb. Gorbachev began his long journey on the road to arms control and disarmament by taking that first vital step at the Geneva Summit in November, 1985. To create a favorable atmosphere for the Soviet-American talks in Geneva, Gorbachev in an interview with the edition of the Pravda in April, 1985, “suggest(ed) that the USSR and the USA introduce, for the entire duration of (Geneva) talks, a moratorium on the introduction—including research and development, testing and deployment—of space based weapons, and a freeze on their strategic offensive armaments.”¹⁰ But, unfortunately the hawkish US administration responded negatively to this proposal. Subsequently, on July 29, 1985, Gorbachev declared Soviet Union’s unilateral decision to discontinue all nuclear test explosions from August 6, 1985.¹¹

It was in that perspective that the Geneva summit was held from November 19-21, 1985. In the Summit, Gorbachev offered “an all-embracing complex of measures to the effect of blocking all the paths of arms race, be it in the outer space or on Earth, be it nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons.”¹² The Geneva talks accepted the fact that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Short of concrete results, the summit meeting in Geneva provided a springboard for future talks in arms control. It ushered in a new era in Soviet-US ties as in East- West. Besides, both sides recognized the disastrous effects of any conflicts—nuclear and conventional, and “agreed to accelerate the work at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.”¹³ To concretize this hope Gorbachev also proposed, for the first time, a time-bound programme for complete nuclear disarmament envisaging mutual elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 A.D. It consisted of a step-by-step and consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons by the end of this century.¹⁴

A careful examination of the propositions promoted under the label ‘new thinking’ conjures the vision of the Leninist doctrine: “Disarmament is the ideal of Socialism”,¹⁵ a hallmark of the Soviet Foreign Policy since the October Revolution of 1917. Indeed the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union¹⁶ gave a comprehensive expression to the main directions of the Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev. Deriving its understanding from a realistic re-appraisal of the changed forces of correlations, the Congress made a clear departure from the policies of the preceding leadership by providing several bold and innovative conceptualizations about world politics.... in his report to the Congress, Gorbachev underlined that “nuclear weapons harbour a hurricane which is capable of sweeping human race from the face of the Earth”.¹⁷ Rejecting the thesis that war “(was) a means of settling political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes among the states,”¹⁸ he idealized a “world without weapons and violence.”¹⁹ To this end he underlined the considerations²⁰ which could lead to an improvement of the situation, wherein, inter-alia, he demolished the theory of ‘deterrence’.²¹

Making a positive break with the past, Gorbachev translated theory into praxis. This is evident from the dramatic moments at the Reykjavik summit,²² where Gorbachev took the militarist group in the United States by surprise by proposing for the zero option in the Europe. But, unfortunately, the ‘Star Wars’ programme came in the way of an agreement.²³ The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, signed on December

1987, to abolish Intermediate-Range nuclear missiles in Europe, further convinced the world of the pragmatism of the Gorbachev arms control regime. The INF Treaty envisaged destruction of all American and Soviet ground-based missiles of 500 to 5500 km range and prohibition of their future production. The Soviet attitude to arms control can be gauged from the fact Soviet Union agreed to eliminate to 1752 missiles (including 470 SS-20 and SS -4 missiles) while the United States promised to destroy 859 missiles (including 429 medium- range Pershing -2s deployed in France).²⁴ Albeit, Soviet Union insisted on observing 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, it agreed to drop its insistence on linking Strategic Defense Initiative with Strategic Arms Reduction Talk (START). Moreover, Soviet Union agreed to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. The breath taking 'concessions' offered by Soviet Union was unique in many respects. According to Arnett, "First, the Soviets agreed to major reduction in INF missiles. This was a US objective in the negotiations. Second, the Soviets agreed to asymmetric reductions in forces...third, the Soviet Union...agreed to unprecedented verification measures".²⁵

The series of concessions made by the Soviet Union (thereby disarming the United State and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies) forced NATO to make a long overdue re- assessment of what exactly it wanted from the arms control process. The question arose whether NATO wanted significant arms control and disarmament, once the Soviet Union made it clear that it was prepared to countenance significant reduction and even the total elimination of entire categories of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the INF Treaty, seen from the political standpoint, doggedly engaged both the superpowers in a productive dialogue.²⁶

In spite of the missed opportunities at the Moscow Summit, Gorbachev showed "a surprising willingness to move ahead on conventional arms talks. Asymmetrical reduction were again offered in Ground Forces and tanks stationed in Eastern Europe following Gorbachev's dramatic United Nations speech on 7 December 1988.²⁷ In a follow-up explanation the Soviets made clear that the cuts include the most modern tanks and equipments and also some battlefield nuclear weapons. Following on the heels of his December 1988 unilateral initiatives, Gorbachev unravelled a series of more sweeping arms control proposals:

- (a) On March 7, 1989, the Soviet Union proposed major East-West reduction in troops and armor in Europe, along with negotiations to eliminate all battlefield nuclear weapons from the European continent.²⁸
- (b) The Soviet President, Gorbachev, announced on April 7, 1989, that Soviet Union would halt production of all weapons grade enriched uranium henceforth.²⁹
- (c) On May 12, 1989, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally withdraw 500 tactical nuclear weapon systems from Eastern Europe (by 1989) and underlined that Moscow was ready for total removal of nuclear weapons from Europe by 1991 if US reciprocates.³⁰
- (d) In a radical step Gorbachev for the first time in Soviet history made public the annual military spending (which then stood at 77.3 billion roubles) and announced a 14 percent (10 billion rouble) cut.³¹
- (e) Gorbachev announced Moscow's willingness further unilateral cuts in its short-range missiles if NATO was prepared for talks on reducing them.³²
- (f) The Soviet Union voiced its readiness to "radically reduce or completely destroy " the stock of Chemical weapons.³³
- (g) In keeping with Gorbachev's plans to reduce Soviet forces, the Soviet military was cut by 235,500 men and more than 7,000 tanks and 700 air planes was withdrawn.³⁴

It is evident from the above discussion that Soviet Union under Gorbachev made a series of proposals that go far beyond its former arms control regime. Albeit, it would be incorrect to say that the Soviet perception of the nuclear threat, especially of the US nuclear threat, suddenly shifted when Gorbachev came to power, it is, at the same time, apparent that Gorbachev infused the Soviet arms control diplomacy with a new dynamism and boldness. The Western arms control critics complained in the pre-Gorbachev era that the Soviet Union generally proceeded very cautiously and introduced modifications to its negotiating positions in frequent intervals. However, they acknowledge that after the advent of Gorbachev, Soviet Union led the US in the number of new arms control proposals. Not only that, they conceded the fact that the sincerity of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis arms control became beyond doubt.

Consequent to these substantive and procedural changes, analysts speculated that a fundamental change in the Soviet approach to arms control regime took place. Apparently, Soviet Union's range of arms control proposals featuring deep cuts in nuclear forces, which previously would have been considered unacceptable,

precipitated this judgment. Though, this in itself, does not necessarily suggest that the Soviet approach to arms control changed appreciably under Gorbachev, unless it is assumed that the essence of the Soviet Union's past arms control philosophy had been to avoid, at all costs, imposing significant constraints on its own nuclear forces. But the Western arms control analysts always stressed that the Soviet Union treated arms control in a very comprehensive fashion unlike the Americans, who tended to deal with arms control in a more discrete manner. The Soviet Union, analysts add, always integrated the arms control regime with the broader spectrum of its foreign policy and defense policy.

Soviet writers opined that any arms control policy could be properly developed only by taking into account the evolving calculus of the international situation (s). "Objective scientific analysis of the (international) situation is essential, on the one hand, in order to work out a correct political line. That, for the communists, is axiomatic."³⁵ Hence, it is obvious that the Soviet arms control positions underwent some changes. These alterations came about by a combination of factors that affected the Soviet arms control agenda, Soviet Foreign and Defence policies, and the internal scenario. As far as the foreign policy was concerned, it was apparent that one of the most potent factor that confronted Kremlin since 1981 (when Ronald Reagan became the President of the United States) was an American administration devoted to pursuing a more vigorous and assertive foreign policy with an anti-communist tilt. This American foreign policy, famously called the 'Reagan Doctrine', envisaged vigorous support to anti-communist causes and movements around the world. The "Reagan administration projected a deliberately exaggerated image of Soviet Power. (It emphasized that) the Soviet Union had acquired a lead in certain crude quantitative categories of power... (and that) the USSR had also acquired some distinct power projection capabilities— air and sea."³⁶

With regard to defense policy, the Soviet Union faced an emerging but fundamental change in the strategic nuclear environment, especially the US interest in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Reagan administration's avowed interest for Nuclear Utilization Theories (NUTS) gave Pentagon an opportunity to procure "programmes explicitly designed to render accumulated Soviet weapons stocks 'obsolete'."³⁷ Another crucial US strategic move was the "procurement of new carriers and naval task force assigned to target the established jugular of Soviet defense systems..."³⁸ This, in turn, led to a fundamental reassessment of the Soviet military doctrine. The leadership succession, as well as Gorbachev's domestic reform,³⁹ also affected the bureaucratic and institutional setting for arms control decisions.

These calculi of factors brought forth different responses in substances and form in Soviet arms control politics. The Soviet arms control efforts, especially after the announcement of SDI, mainly revolved on the vital point, that is, "preventing its development ...identified as the biggest threat to the existing military-strategic equilibrium."⁴⁰ It also brought into focus a major dilemma for Soviet arms control planners. The Soviet Union could not allow the US military and foreign policy measures to go unchecked and, therefore, it had to make some compromises vis-à-vis US arms control policy notwithstanding the muscular diplomacy of the Reagan Administration.

The advent of Gorbachev changed the Soviet mindsets and the style of functioning. For example, many high-ranking American visitors to Moscow (during the Gorbachev era) observed that the Soviets accepted that it made a mistake when it rejected US President Jimmy Carter's March 1977 proposals for deep cuts in nuclear forces. Under Gorbachev Moscow regarded that its interests were best served by exercising caution--a realization which was reflected in the Soviet military policy. Another important aspect in the change was the tenuous signs of a reduction in the growth of the military budget, which informed cuts in military manpower, conventional weapons production, and shifts of important defense industries into the civilian sector. These changes formed the crux of the new thinking in arms control mix. The Soviet military strategy in the post-1985 period realized that the continuation of war-fighting capabilities cannot have a positive influence on the US-Soviet relations.⁴¹ As Gormley observed, "no longer did Moscow appear to insist on an extra margin of security to compensate for her long borders and three other nuclear arm adversaries."⁴²

The arms control regime under Gorbachev entailed such notions as the relative de-emphasis of military power as a means of emphasizing security, importance of political solutions to security issues, and the recognition of the fact that true security could not be unilateral in nature or established at the expense of other parties. Clearly, Gorbachev had an eye for a broader and more comprehensive détente than before. Under him Moscow continued to emphasize that arms control could play the most vital role by fostering predictability in US-

Soviet relations. Gorbachev firmly believed in what some Soviet analysts like Timerbayev said long ago, "...without the concomitant efforts and without the (arms control) agreements, the arms race would have developed still more feverishly, and the whole world would have been less stable and less secure."⁴³ Indeed, Gorbachev understood the importance of this fact in the context of the overall dynamics of international politics. But the puritans among the Soviets still expressed the fear that arms control merely provided the Americans with a convenient smokescreen behind which to conduct an aggressive foreign policy designed to check Soviet influence.

Western Sovietologists allege that Moscow's interest in arms control could be due to its search for superpower legitimacy. This thesis failed to appreciate the sincere approach of Gorbachev and also, perhaps, betrayed signs of Western, especially, American jingoistic attitude. Because, the Soviet arms control mechanism had also in mind the West European considerations. Sherr emphasized that "(Moscow was interested in) decreas(ing) the likelihood (of) Britain and France aggressively pursu(ing) incentives for the creation of an independent West European nuclear force structure...eliminating nuclear weapons from Europe, and...paving the way for cost- saving reductions in non-nuclear European forces"⁴⁴ Moscow was interested in framing its proposals in order to make them attractive to European audiences to elicit more favorable responses from the West and also to silence the American 'hawks'.

Skepticism in the West vis-à-vis the Soviet arms control regime reached new heights when some analysts started arguing that Moscow was trying to break the NATO and was allegedly using Western Europe as a tool to pressurize the Americans into making Arms control concessions. But, undoubtedly, the general public opinion in Western Europe against proliferation of nuclear weapons started gaining strength, especially after the INF Treaty. This was taken advantage of by Gorbachev who turned a new page in the foreign policy aspect of the Soviet nuclear arms control by trying "to forge new economic and political relationships with the capitalist states."⁴⁵ Therefore, he stressed 'de-ideologization', wherein class struggles or confrontation between states as opposing social systems was practically ignored. Through the arms control mechanism Gorbachev wanted to convey the message that the relationship between the two systems – socialism and capitalism – can remain agreeable and stable in the long term. It was obvious that intensive cooperation with the developed capitalist world would ensure lasting benefits for the Soviets, besides getting access to Western technology and markets. These ties necessitated friendly political atmosphere. Hence, arms control became a crucial factor.⁴⁶ Moreover, from the Soviet point of view arms control played an important role in encouraging the 'progressive' forces in the capitalist world and blunted the impact of 'militaristic' forces. Gorbachev also believed that the US 'militarists' were especially worried both about a loss of profits due to disarmament and the possibility that perestroika would lead to "a rebirth of... socialist ideas and an upsurge in the prestige of socialism as a society of working people."⁴⁷ Hence, he underlined that even anti- Soviet capitalists could be turned from their militaristic course if they could be informed of the fact that perestroika was not a threat, but would rather open the way to mutually advantageous economic relations.⁴⁸ It was of utmost importance for Gorbachev to demonstrate tangible successes in his arms control dealing with the US to silence his critics at home.

On many counts, Gorbachev's arms control positions exhibited many of the traditional Soviet arms control stand-by. In keeping with the Soviet tradition, Moscow continued to propose a plethora of various arms control proposals for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, freezes, various bans, etc. "Gorbachev opened a new public relations campaigns of arms control in January 1986, with a call to eliminate all nuclear weapons by A.D. 2000."⁴⁹ The conceptual underpinnings of Soviet arms control policy remained unchanged. But there was a visible shift "in his new ways of thinking from 'equality and equal security' to the broader concept of ' mutual security' which include(d) the notion that the adversary's insecurity work to one's advantage."⁵⁰ Soviet arms control goals were fundamentally based on the desire to attain and formalize both political and military parity. Under Gorbachev the Soviet commitments to agreements serving these goals were more or less maintained because, obviously the Soviets were not expected to agree to military inferiority as the price for an agreement.

Western critics allege that Gorbachev's arms control diplomacy notwithstanding, the Soviet posture, remained unchanged. But amidst this continuity certain substantive changes can be perceived in various areas, especially concerning INF. The earlier Soviet position on INF was rather ambiguous. Moscow, in the pre-Gorbachev era, insisted that there was rough parity in theatre nuclear forces in Europe. The advent of Gorbachev changed all these assumptions—the Soviet acceptance of Reagan's so-called 'zero option' was an index of change towards the arms control regime. Radical change can be fathomed in the context of verification. The pre-

Gorbachev Soviet Union believed that arms control verification did not constitute an independent objective, in itself; rather it was an instrument to ensure strict compliance with existing agreements. However, after 1985, Soviet Union showed enough maturity by agreeing to verification measures. Not only did they show their willingness to accept national technical means of verification, but also agreed to adopt other suitable means of verification measures so as to guarantee compliance with arms control agreements. Overall, this represented a definite change in Soviet approach to arms control. Also, his policy showed greater energy and flexibility than his predecessors. Indeed, arms control became “the focus of his foreign policy.”⁵¹

To invigorate the arms control planning in the Soviet Union, he appointed Anatoly Dobrynin – veteran of SALT-I and SALT-II – to look after the powerful International Department in the Communist Party apparatus and established a new arms control section within the department. Gorbachev also set up, in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, a corresponding organization to deal with arms control, thereby adding to the civilian expertise available on the subject.⁵² The Soviet arms control policy had to confront not just the US, but also Great Britain, France and China who boasted of “independent strategic nuclear forces, and some smaller states (who) might have join(ed) the nuclear club.”⁵³ With this reality in mind, Gorbachev successfully maneuvered the Soviet arms control mechanism to the advantage of not only Soviet Union but also the world as a whole. This was evident in the epoch-making flexibility in the form of the asymmetric reduction of the INF Weapon systems. George Shultz, then US Secretary of State, spoke appreciatively about it in his testimony before the US Senate foreign relations Committee on 25 January 1988. He observed that “It achieves US-Soviet equality by eliminating substantially more Soviet Weapons than American ones. It accomplishes the goals we and our allies set for ourselves eight years ago... In short, the treaty is an achievement – as our allies proclaimed last December— without precedent in the history of arms control”.⁵⁴

Indeed, Gorbachev’s diplomacy transcended Machiavellianism in a positive sense, for there was something humane and moral in his technique of bringing round the opponents to his view point. This was amply demonstrated in the Soviets willingness to go beyond the expectations of the West, and very often unilaterally too. Moreover, the USSR had clearly expressed its intention on reduction of chemical/conventional weapons as well as elimination of Short-Range Missiles (SNF). In the latter case, the Soviets seemed to have been prompted by the US President’s refusal to acquiesce into the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) proposal on the superpower negotiations on this issue. Besides, Soviet Union proposed for the establishment of a zone of reduced concentration of armaments in Europe: creation of a European Centre for reducing the dangers of war, and preventing a surprise attack, along with the introduction of a system for the preliminary notification not only of launches of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) but also of massive take-offs of strategic and tactical aviation. All these were initiated to provide a safeguard against Blitzkrieg.⁵⁵ It was thus clear that the Soviets in order to convince the West and the World, in general, of their earnest commitments to peace, went a long way in dispelling the West’s psychological fears and apprehensions by taking the first step of showing readiness to do it in almost all disarmament measures. This, in itself, was a stupendous task. And, in so doing, Gorbachev showed how extraordinary courageous he has been while playing his role as a peace-crusader.

The analysis of Gorbachev’s arms control and disarmament policy would remain incomplete without alluding to the Soviet arms control regime before Gorbachev, which would allow us to understand better the importance of Gorbachev’s measures to ease the burden of nuclear weapons. Soviet Union’s attention towards arms control and disarmament can be traced back to the year 1921.⁵⁶ Since then, the Soviet authorities have made numerous proposals for the banning, limitation, or even elimination of almost every type of means of warfare⁵⁷. Albeit, the Soviets believed that “the struggle for disarmament was not propaganda rhetoric, but a serious and important matter,”⁵⁸ the West was of the opinion that the Soviet leaders realistically expected very little from arms control and disarmament proposals except for the propaganda value. Indeed during the late 1930s as the threat of a World War considerably increased and until the end of World War II, Soviet interests in arms control and disarmament decreased to a great extent. After 1945, Stalin’s main interest in arms control was to check the US build-up of nuclear weapons. Moreover, for the first time, (and that time till date) the Americans actually used nuclear bombs in World War II. Hence, the Soviets obviously were at their wit’s end to develop their own nuclear arsenal. But at the same time, the Soviet authorities were busy telling the world about the necessity to ban nuclear weapons. On June 19, 1946, Soviet Union submitted a “Draft International Convention on the Prohibition of the Production and Use of Weapons Based on Employing Atomic Energy for Mass Destruction” to the United

Nations Atomic Energy Commission.⁵⁹ This were followed by other proposals, as well.⁶⁰

The early years of Khrushchev (till about 1959) at the helm of affairs in Soviet Union saw Kremlin echoing the past as far as the main objective and role of Arms control in Soviet national security policy was concerned. Indeed, Soviet arms control mechanism during 1921-59 was actually limited to supplementing Soviet diplomatic efforts to influence the opinions of Western media and leadership. Moreover, Soviet authorities also used this opportunity to camouflage the research and development (R and D) of their nuclear arsenals. Between 1959 and 1985 the politics of arms control began to play an important role in Soviet national security policy.⁶¹ Soviet leaders signed eighteen arms control treaties, agreements and protocols. It had dawned on the Soviet leaders by now that arms control measures had intrinsic military and economic values and having potentials to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The West, especially the United States, had also started to view arms control measures in the same light. But it was not until the early 1970s (when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I, (SALT-I) agreements were signed) when the Soviet leaders understood the gains in military value from arms control. According to a former Soviet Official,⁶² Soviet leaders were afraid of all-out race at that time because of US economic, technological, and military advantages.⁶³ According to the Soviet official, "There was... serious interest in getting an agreement on SALT. The Soviet leadership craved parity with the United States. Additionally, the Politburo's anxiety about the uncertain outcome of a spiralling competition for strategic advantage was paralleled by increasing concern about the costs entailed in its military program.... Moreover, America's unquestionable lead in vital computer technology had aroused Soviet fears that the United States might emerge the winner in the arms rivalry".⁶⁴ At the same time, Soviet leaders also pointed to the military advantages of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (as part of SALT-I). Marshal Viktor Kulikov, then Chief of the General Staff stated that, "The ABM Treaty signed on May 26 this year (1970) halts the further build-up of ABM defense systems in the USSR and the United States, which prevents the emergence of a chain reaction of competition between offensive and defensive arms."⁶⁵

Therefore, the participation of the Soviets in SALT Agreements was one indication of their recognition of the military value that could be achieved through arms control. It also helped the Soviets to avoid widespread ABM deployments when it was not conducive, and was able to curb offensive system deployments according to their military plans. Albeit, the Soviet leaders were always stressing the point that the defense of the country is the most important concern and, therefore, gained precedence over all other things, they were also aware of the fact that the armaments industry was indeed a costly affair. Khrushchev in his memoirs very frankly disclosed the 'cost' of building up Soviet defense. He observed that "When I was the leader of the Party and the Government, I decided that we had to economize drastically in the building of homes, the construction of commercial services, and even in the development of agriculture in order to build up our defenses".⁶⁶ Soviet officials were aware that arms control measures would obviously result in both direct and indirect economic benefits. This was made possible by the SALT-I agreements in 1972, which provided the Soviets with the initial opportunities to cut their defense expenditures. The direct economic advantages accruing from the agreement was realistically put by V. Kuznetsov, then first Deputy Foreign Minister, when he argued that huge (and unnecessary) expenditures could be decreased considerably by avoiding an ABM race (with the US) and the large build up of offensive weapons which would likely result from the defensive system deployments. He argued that "The mutual renunciation of the deployment of ABM systems on a nationwide scale for by the treaty places both sides in the same position from the view point of security and makes it possible to avoid the large expenditures in which the sides would have been involved in developing ABM systems. Moreover, a race in the field of ABM defense would inevitably cause both sides to suffer additional expenditures on offensive strategic forces with a view to increasing their ability to overcome the other side's ABM defense".⁶⁷

Shevchenko points out that even Georgii Arvatov⁶⁸ in 1976 called for the need to spend up the SALT negotiations. The latter even "reiterated arguments about the connection between arms- spending and the failing health of the Soviet economy."⁶⁹ Apart from the direct economic benefits from arms control, the Soviet leaders were also aware of the indirect advantages in the form of better relations with other nations which helped Soviet Union to increase their volume of trade and also in getting access to latest technologies in different fields. Kremlin was also fully aware of the fact that a nuclear war would be nothing short of a catastrophe and nuclear bombs cannot differentiate between the boundaries of different nations. No wonder then the Soviet leaders stressed the fact that a nuclear war might be triggered by accident or as result of a misunderstanding. Such a fear became almost a reality during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. Therefore, in June 1963, Soviet Union and the

United States signed the “Hot Line” Agreement, which established a means of rapid communications between the leaders of the both countries. This was following another agreement between two superpowers, which were signed in 1971. The agreement – “Measures to Reduce the Risks of Outbreak of Nuclear War” – had several risk reduction measure including “advance notification of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party.”⁷⁰

Historically, before Gorbachev, the arms control policy of Soviet Union had more of propaganda than its intrinsic worth. Petrovskii points out that in the 1920s and 1930s “though Soviets failed to bring tangible results, they nonetheless, had a tremendous political effect in promoting sympathies toward the USSR in the remotest parts of the globe.”⁷¹ He further notes that in the late 1940s and early 1950s “the strength for banning the new weapons of mass destruction was not waged in vain. It mobilized democratic public opinion, with which the US Government had to reckon.”⁷² Even Khrushchev admitted that his proposals to dismantle both the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances “was intended to serve a propagandistic, rather than a realistic, purpose.”⁷³ Khrushchev also impressed upon Shevchenko (when he was an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) the importance of the propaganda value of arms control. Shevchenko quotes Khrushchev as saying, “Never forget the appeal that the idea of disarmament has in the outside world..A seductive slogan is the most powerful political instrument. The Americans don’t understand that. They only hurt themselves in struggling against the idea of general and complete disarmament”.⁷⁴

Moreover, it needs to be emphasized here that “in contrast to the American tendency to deal with arms control as a discrete exercise, the USSR has always treated arms control in a comprehensive fashion, integrating it within the overall context of Soviet foreign and defense policy.”⁷⁵ It was in this context, that the alternations in the arms control regime under Gorbachev were noticed. But, of course, continuity in Soviet arms control policies during the post 1985 period could be seen in the series of proposals for disarmament, total elimination of nuclear weapons, moratoria, etc. This apart there was greater transparency in the arms control proposals under Gorbachev which became a central concept to his approach to international affairs and helped to justify reductions in the secrecy of military matters. Significantly, this transparency took place at a time when the cold warriors in the Reagan Administration argued that “arms control was more of a problem than a solution. Arms control was blamed for lulling public opinion in Western democracies into accepting Soviet superiority.”⁷⁶

The foregoing review of the Soviet approach to arms control under Gorbachev makes it apparent that the Soviet arms control diplomacy was infused with dynamism and boldness. Faith in the efficacy of the new arms control mechanism helped in demolishing most of the psychological barriers which grew during the cold war years. For once arms control mechanism became a daring political strategy of faith for survival, and old clichés symbolic of national distrust and hatred— such as ‘dead or red’, ‘holocaust or humiliation’, ‘suicide or surrender’, etc.—started finding their way to the dustbin of history. Skepticism and suspicion which bedeviled arms control agreements earlier, gave way to hope and a sense of fulfillment. It is small wonder, then, that arms control appeared to have played a greater role in the overall Soviet national security policy under Gorbachev.

Soviet National Security Policy under Gorbachev:

Fundamentally speaking radical transformations occurred in the Soviet security arena after Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. The Soviets agreed to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles, allowed ‘intrusive’ measures to verify arms control agreements, started to re-examine the dominance of military in Soviet economic planning, withdrew troops from Afghanistan, etc. William E. Odom characterized the changes envisaged in the 1970s Soviet national security policy, as “a third revolution in military affairs in its history....Each (revolution) has had a major impact on Soviet economic, social and scientific policies...”⁷⁷ The present change in Moscow’s national security policy serves to underscore certain assumptions in the theoretical literature on the conditions and constraints of international cooperation.⁷⁸ Gorbachev’s subtle diplomatic strategy in ushering a new security regime in Soviet Union was quite similar to Charles Osgood’s proposal of Graduated Reciprocation in Tension- Reduction (GRIT), which requires repeated unilateral ‘friendly’ initiatives in order to reassure the other side about one’s own peaceful intentions.⁷⁹

To appreciate the nature and magnitude of the changes in the national security policy of Soviet Union under Gorbachev, it is essential to posit the plausible explanation for the same. The decisive factor was the change in the Soviet leadership, as a result of which a new coalition became responsible for Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev accelerated a trend which had already begun during the Brezhnev years, and which loosened military influence on Moscow's foreign and security policy.⁸⁰ First, the foreign ministry assumed full control over Soviet arms control policy. Second, new thinkers such as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Gorbachev's personal foreign policy adviser, Alexander Yakovlev, moved into key decision-making positions as the Gorbachev coalition consolidated its power in the politburo. Third, civilian experts from various institutes of the Academy of Science-- the "*institutchiks*"-- assumed advisory roles and served as a counterweight to the military expertise in the policy-making process. The 'old guards' in the military leadership was gradually eased out.⁸¹

The decay of the Soviet economy halted the Soviet authorities' ability to maintain the same commitment to defense and national security. Thus, the traditional national security doctrine and policy was put under review by Gorbachev.⁸² Besides, external influences and conditions also affected policy outcomes. Lack of success in the Third World, Afghanistan crisis, inter alia, are generally seen as contributory factors in Soviet national security shifts.⁸³ The fast paced developments in the national security policy regime of Soviet Union in the post-1985 period virtually challenged some of the essential pillars of the post-1945 European security system. The orthodox Western assumption of a Soviet conventional threat to Western Europe, which had persisted throughout the 1960s and 1970s, was challenged. They also began to challenge some of the military structures of the Soviet state as it had evolved over a long period of time. The concept of national security underwent modifications in the post-1985 period. Soviet security, as conceived by Gorbachev, increasingly depended on political and economic, as well as military factors. Earlier national security meant only military security. This view was popular during the Brezhnev regime and also that of his predecessors, with its roots in the Tsarist history. No wonder, then, the shifts in the Soviet position (under Gorbachev) on arms control negotiations – especially concerning verification – seemed to indicate a new commitment to negotiation that coincided with the broadened view of security.

Gorbachev's approach to national security was reflected in his concept of "reasonable sufficiency" (*razumnaya dostatochnost'*) which, at least with respect to Soviet military policy, was intended to be an affirmation of 'new political thinking' and was clearly intended to embrace Soviet national security policies as a whole. This concept proposes for a reduction of nuclear and conventional forces to the limits sufficient for defense which would eliminate their use as offensive potentials. This new approach was in sharp contrast to the old one. Explaining the difference between the old and the new approaches, L. Semeiko underlined that "The old thinking proceeds in principle from the idea of "the more, the better", the idea that gaining military supremacy over an opponent can almost automatically guarantee a victorious outcome in a potential war. The new thinking denies this confrontationist approach. It favors a minimum and not a maximum of military might for both and favors excluding the idea of seeking a military solution to disputed international problems".⁸⁴

Nevertheless, most of the Soviet spokespeople were very vague on the meaning of "reasonable sufficiency". According to Semeiko the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" is orientated to the future and carries a charge of ideas of long term action", which, however, will not become a reality until "nuclear weapons and other types of mass destruction are eliminated."⁸⁵ He further says that "Sufficiency does not preclude but, on the contrary, presupposes the presence of strategic parity: that decisive factor in preventing war. It is necessary to have within the framework of parity a reasonable sufficient military potential capable of reliably ensuring the security of the USSR and its allies. This means that under contemporary condition we are obliged to have a guaranteed potential for nuclear retaliation designed to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack under any, even under the most unfavorable, nuclear attack scenarios. In any suggestion, an answering strike must unacceptably damage the aggressor".⁸⁶ On the other hand, then Minister of Defense, D. Iazov, in July 1987, defined the concept as it related to the present stage. He said: "When we speak of maintaining the armed forces and our military potential at a level of reasonable sufficiency, we have in mind that at the present stage the essence of sufficiency regarding the Soviet Strategic nuclear forces is determined by the need to prevent anyone getting away with impunity with a nuclear attack in any, even the most unfavorable, circumstances. As for conventional means, sufficiency amounts to a quantity and quality of armed forces and armaments capable of reliably ensuring the collective defense of the socialist economy".⁸⁷

Confusing definition of the concept reasonable sufficiency was also coming from Gorbachev. For, example, in 1985 at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet (just eight months after assuming the post of General Secretary), Gorbachev said that “The USSR and the US will have to reach a common understanding of what level of weapons on each side could be considered relatively sufficient....We are convinced that the level of this sufficiency is much lower than that which the USSR and the United States in fact possess at the moment. This means that weighty practical steps for the limitation and reduction of weapons are perfectly possible, measures that not only will not lessen, but will strengthens security both for the USSR and the US, and the strategic stability of the world”.⁸⁸

It is clear that, in 1985, Gorbachev himself was not sufficiently sure about the concept of reasonable sufficiency. Rather, he talked of “relatively sufficient” and strategic parity. In other words, though Gorbachev was interesting in reducing the nuclear arsenals, he was still not prepared for Soviet Union’s unilateral and asymmetrical cuts. But in a report to the 27th Party Congress (1986) he gave a detailed explanation of reasonable sufficiency. He said, “Our country stands for.... restricting military potentials within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency. Security... can only be mutual, and if one considers international relation as a whole, it can only be universal”.⁸⁹

The absence of a ‘definite’ definition of the concept of reasonable sufficiency aggravated the elaborated word game about it, which gave rise to a new vocabulary defensive sufficiency, defensive defence, necessary sufficiency, etc. The concept also came to be widely debated and discussed.⁹⁰ Unfortunately, it also created a division of opinions in the Soviet military. One group which supported Gorbachev articulated “a version of reasonable sufficiency somewhat similar to that of Gorbachev,” while a second group advocated “a variant of the concept by referring to ‘sufficient defence’ (dostatochnaia oborona) rather than reasonable sufficiency.”⁹¹ Top ranking Soviet military officials like, Vladimir Lobov, Makmut Gareev, Mikhail Moiseev et al voiced their differences with the concept of reasonable sufficiency.⁹² The differences, in the main, arose because these military officials were convinced that there was still a growing threat to Soviet union from imperialistic forces, whereas, Gorbachev and his supporters were convinced that the threat had decreased considerably and hence, there was a declining utility of nuclear weapons. Therefore, Gorbachev believed that military potential was required to accomplish only defensive tasks and nothing more. Reasonable sufficiency as envisioned by Gorbachev had also political and economic aspects beside the military aspect. The political aspect consisted in increasing the emphasis on the metaphor of political solutions to international disputes while strengthening strategic stability through arms limitations and reductions to reasonable limits; economic aspects revolved around the acceptance of the fact that there was a diminishing return from the increasing levels of military spending and the savings of resources that can result from the concept.⁹³

Reasonable sufficiency became the bedrock of Gorbachev’s attack on the excessively high level of nuclear arsenals. At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February 1986, he warned that a continuing race in nuclear arms would inevitably escalate the danger from nuclear weapons and would ultimately be ineffective as a factor of military-political deterrence. He also stressed the fact that real security is guaranteed not by the maximum level of strategic balance but by a minimum level of the same. At the same time, he underlined that security could be achieved primarily through political means.⁹⁴ S.F. Akhromeev, then Chief of the General staff, in May 1987, also forcefully echoed the sentiments of Gorbachev vis-à-vis nuclear weapons. He said that “From military standpoint colossal quantities of nuclear weapons are becoming useless, since they cannot be used without catastrophic consequences for all of mankind... The desire to further increase and improve weapons is both absurd and criminal”.⁹⁵

The above discussion makes it clear that defensive strategy became the most vital part of Soviet security policy. Soviet military officials agreed that the purpose of Soviet military might must be to prevent war, rather than waging it. Yazov wrote in 1987 that, Soviet military doctrine viewed the ‘defense’ as “the basic type of military action” for repelling aggression; it would also halt the opponent’s offensive, “bleed him dry”, prevent the loss of territory, and defeat enemy groupings that have breached the defense.⁹⁶ In other words, security was to be based upon armaments sufficient for defense and insufficient for offence. Gorbachev himself, in support of the concepts of reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense, had proclaimed the revision of military doctrine as a positive step towards the “establishment of a comprehensive system of international system.” Such mutual security was intended to be based upon “...a structure of armed force of a state...sufficient to repulse a possible aggression but would not be sufficient for the conduct of an offensive action.”⁹⁷ Soviet analyst Vitaly Zhurkin of the Academy of Sciences echoed this vision. He believed that the concepts basically meant that security was

primarily a political problem. Therefore, the political task of realignment of doctrine would involve “unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures.” Zhurkin further outlined the potential economic benefits of this stance. Reasonable sufficiency, he said, would have its greatest impact in the conventional realm, since the strategic rocket forces absorb only 15 to 20 percent of the military spending burden.⁹⁸

Concurring with the above analysis of Zhurkin, Lev Semeiko observed that “Such an orientation (of reasonable sufficiency) must be borne out by the scale and development of one’s armed forces, their structure and the nature of their weapons, the military operations they carry out...”⁹⁹ However, Semeiko also noted the importance of strategic parity in deterring the outbreak of war. Here its needs to be emphasized that any marginal improvements in military power come at a greater cost to society. Yet, as Primakov explained, the imperative of “...optimizing the ratio between productive expenditures and military expenditures...” as provided by reasonable sufficiency has become an indispensable part of overall economic restructuring.¹⁰⁰

The foregoing discussion on reasonable sufficiency makes it clear that Gorbachev was disillusioned with the increasing proliferation and lethality of the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals. This paved the way for Gorbachev’s concept of reasonable sufficiency in national defense. Indeed, Gorbachev’s reform went a step further in stopping the unfortunate historical pattern, as aptly described by Mathew Evangelista, “The United States typically originates technologically innovative arms system; the Soviet Union first counters them, then imitates and produces them in large numbers. As a result, weapons that are initially touted as offering the United States a major advantage end up rebounding to both sides’ disadvantage when the Soviets adopt them as well”.¹⁰¹

Purge of Senior Military officials:

The implementation of the changes in strategic doctrine obviously necessitated radical purges to accommodate like-minded people in the Soviet national security policy body—the Defence Council (DC), the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat. Even before the advent of Gorbachev there was a marked decline in the power of the military vis-à-vis the political decision makers in the national security policy making at the highest level. The brief Andropov- Chernenko interregnum also saw a determined effort to control defence policies and budgets by placing in the critical military policy posts (Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff) military leaders amenable to Party control. Gorbachev swiftly accelerated the power shift, and strengthened his personal control over the entire defence establishment. Gorbachev went ahead to increase the Party’s control over the military leadership in the Politburo and the Defence Council. What Gorbachev wanted to do basically was to change the ossified Soviet military’s outlook, which “on most substantive issues (were) fundamentally and perhaps irrevocably conservative.”¹⁰²

Gorbachev changed the entire military nomenklatura by appointing his favorites in charge of it. In January 1987, “he brought Anatoli I. Luk’ianov, Chief of the Central Committee (CC) General Department, into the CC Secretariat and gave him a key defense task : to oversee the work of the CC Administrative Organs Department” which made appointments and promotions in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee for State Security.¹⁰³ Gorbachev was provided with a useful alibi to mastermind his purge at the top level after the Mathias Rust affair.¹⁰⁴ “Marshal Sergei Sokolov, the incumbent minister of defense, and Marshal Alexandr Koldunov, Deputy Minister for Air Defense Force, were promptly relieved of their duties.”¹⁰⁵ Later on several Generals and even low-ranking officers in the Air Defense Force were relieved. Marshal Viktor Kulikov was relieved of his post of Commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces and several Deputy Ministers were also dropped.¹⁰⁶ Sokolov was replaced by Dmitrii Yazov,¹⁰⁷ Ivana Tretiak was appointed in the place of Koldunov¹⁰⁸ and Petr Lushev replaced Kulikov.¹⁰⁹ The “real generational change” came for the military when Marshal Akhromeev was ‘retired’ as Chief of Staff and in his place Mikhail A. Moiseyev was appointed.¹¹⁰ Akhromeev must have precipitated his removal by opposing unilateral cuts by Soviet Union. Moreover, on December 6, 1988 (one day before his ‘removal’), he wrote in the Bulgarian Press that the “Errors in evaluating the likely nature of aggression and in forecasting the possible results of such an aggression are always dangerous and, especially given the defensive nature of our strategy, may entail serious consequences”.¹¹¹ Furthermore he stressed that “The limits of defense sufficiency are not set by us, but by the practical actions of the United States and the NATO bloc and their attempts to have a military capability that would ensure military superiority over us”.¹¹² After his ‘retirement’, Akhromeev was appointed as advisor to the President of the Supreme Soviet¹¹³ – a post which did not exist in the Soviet political process before.

Such radical changes in military leadership makes it clear that Gorbachev wanted to break the shackles of bureaucratic intransigence and the passive resistance of the military vis-à-vis his reforms. It must have been necessary for Gorbachev to undertake this massive operation to bolster his own position within the Party and to cut off any dissent from elements in the Soviet military who could digest the reform of Soviet military doctrine. Furthermore, this was clearly an attempt by Gorbachev to silence the Soviet 'Cold Warriors' who were refusing to accept the new defensive doctrine of Soviet Union.

In an effort to further bolster his position and bring greater cohesiveness in the Soviet strategic policy, Gorbachev replaced Andrei Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze as the new Foreign Minister. As Adams points out, this act proved "Gorbachev's serious determination to pursue a new policy line, cutting defense expenditures, reducing dangers of US-Soviet conflict, and seeing ways to use arms control negotiations to achieve military objectives by political means."¹¹⁴

The dynamics of the new strategic policy called for the inauguration of two new departments for arms control. One department was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the other, an Arms Control sector in the International Department (ID) of the Communist Party of Soviet Union Central Committee. This could have been a game plan also by Gorbachev to assert the Party's role in shaping the national security policy. Albeit, the senior functionaries of MFA¹¹⁵ and senior military personnel continued to play an important role in arms control negotiations, the establishment of the new state and Party arms control department had a tremendous impact in institutionalizing arms control regime as an enduring concern of the state and Party. It also helped in the extensive participation of civilians in the arms control decision-making process, thereby offering a means to improve the coordination of policy formulation. As Condoleezza Rice argued this might have been a step in creating an institution to permit "civilian experts to devise options for Soviet strategy and force posture, and to debate these issues with the General staff."¹¹⁶

The New Security regime and the Warsaw Pact-

Warsaw Pact was a potential cord in Khrushchev's game of summit diplomacy with the US and became virtually an instrument of Soviet security policy vis-à-vis Western Europe. The Red Army saw the alliance as a potent vehicle of military integration to ensure that no power on earth could tear one country (of the alliance) from the road to socialism. It became an instrument of socialist consolidation in Eastern Europe, military preparedness and defense. On the other hand, the pact virtually included military security of Eastern Europe and the Soviet national security regime. Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty (1955) committed Moscow to respond militarily in the event of an Eastern European member of the Warsaw Pact, "In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed forces...."¹¹⁷

With fresh wave blowing in Soviet Union, the Warsaw countries could not have remained indifferent to it. No wonder, therefore, the Warsaw Pact formally incorporated Gorbachev's thinking vis-à-vis the Soviet strategic policy into its military doctrine at a meeting of its Political Consultative Committee in June 1986. The 'new' military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) proposed for the maintenance of equilibrium in "military forces at the lowest possible level and reducing military potentials to the limits of 'sufficiency' necessary for defense".¹¹⁸... Proposing for decreasing the danger of "a surprise attack by reducing the tactical strike aviation of both blocs and troops," the WTO also called for "additional measures to increase the confidence of the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and all European countries that surprise offensive operations would not be mounted against them."¹¹⁹ These propositions were itself revolutionary given the fact that the Warsaw Pact always stressed the threat of a surprise conventional attack by the West.

A major confidence building measure in line with the spirit of the new thinking concerning their military doctrines was announced by the WTO at a meeting of their Political Consultative Committee in Berlin from May 28 – 29, 1987. The Soviet delegation to the meeting was led by Gorbachev, which included, then

President Andrei Gromyko, Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzkhov and Eduard Shevardnadze. The Berlin declaration (entitled “On Military Doctrine” in the Soviet Press) contained six major proposals:

1. “A moratorium on nuclear testing as the first step to later moratoria on development and production and finally to liquidation of all nuclear weapons and consequently to a halt to SDI.
2. “Liquidation of all chemical weapons ‘and other types of weapons of mass annihilation’.
3. “Reduction of forces in Europe to levels at which neither side can successfully execute a surprise attack ‘or begin offensive operations in general’.
4. “Creation of a workable arms control regime, including verification both through national technical means as well as on-site inspection by international bodies.
5. “Creation of nuclear and chemical-free trust building zones on land and at sea, disbanding of bases on foreign soil, withdrawal of troops to national borders, and the mutual renunciation of force as an instrument.
6. “Eventual liquidation of the WTO and NATO, as an extension of the view that the ‘continuing division of Europe into opposing military blocs is abnormal’, and supplementing them with an ‘all-embracing system of international security’.”¹²⁰

These proposals are evidence of the fact that Gorbachev expanded the struggle for perestroika in national security regime to Eastern Europe so as to create healthy Eastern European partners for his new strategic doctrine. The Warsaw Pact doctrine clearly indicated a very important message to the West, and that is, change was under way in the WTO countries as much as it was in the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact doctrine was truly revolutionary because it repudiated offensive doctrine: emphasis was no longer on winning the war but on how to prevent it. Implicit in this declaration was the belief that nuclear militarism was not a functional prerequisite of a socio-economic system. Hence, the declaration proposed for the dissolution of military blocs, which was no longer a functional necessity owing to the ‘end’ of cold war. Further, the Berlin declaration was an indirect attack on the nuclear world—that it was not a fait accompli which occurred silently over a considerable period of time, but was the creation of political minds that came about not in response to any external demand rather due to irrational fears and mutual hatred.

Overall, a voluntary cooperation was sought to be created in the Soviet-Eastern European coalition politics as a part of Soviet security policy under Gorbachev. It could be seen as a constructive step taken towards reconciliation in East-West relations and also as a commanding ground on which the nuclear powers could overstep the nuclear shadows and enter a nuclear-free world, thus ending the alienation of politics from the accepted norms of human ethics. Also, the motive behind this declaration was to remove the Western perceptions of the USSR as a threat to world peace, particularly in Europe. As Gorbachev pointed out, “Europe is indeed a common home where geography and history have closely interwoven the destinies of dozens of countries and nations...it is only together, collectively, and by following the sensible norms of coexistence that the Europeans can save their home, protect it against a conflagration and other calamities, make it better and safer, and maintain it in proper order”.¹²¹

This assumption by Gorbachev stems from the brief that war (whether conventional or nuclear) would be catastrophic for Europe. It is evident from Gorbachev’s various arms control measures that Gorbachev worked indefatigably to denuclearize Europe and at the same time to reduce the military confrontation as well. Thus at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union he put forward the Concept of “an all-embracing system of international security”. In the ‘military sphere’ this concept called for:

- (i) renunciation by the nuclear powers of war – both nuclear and conventional – against each other or against third countries;
- (ii) prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and the total destruction of such weapons, a ban on and the destruction of chemical weapons, and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation;
- (iii) a strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to limits of reasonable sufficiency;
- (iv) disbandment of military alliances, and, as a stage toward this, renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones; and
- (v) balanced and proportionate reduction of military budgets.¹²²

This concept was put forward especially with a view to attract West European Countries, mainly the nuclear powers – Britain and France – within the matrix of Soviet national security policy which was geared more to the aims of defense. Thus, as Gorbachev said, ‘Every apartment in the ‘European home’ has the right to protect itself against burglars but it must do so without destroying its neighbor’s property.’¹²³ This defensive doctrine, as Gorbachev envisaged, was to be the forerunner of peaceful cooperation and competition in new areas—“including the need to search for new forms of cooperation, such as the launching of joint ventures, the implementation of joint projects in third countries, etc.”¹²⁴

A conclusion that can be drawn from this concept of ‘European home’ is that the motive of Gorbachev was not only to cleanse Europe of sharp ideological, political and military confrontation, but also to develop a common and viable economic order thus reducing, at the same time, the non-productive drain on the Soviet economy due to armed forces’ privileged position in the process of resource allocation. But, unfortunately, “Western European leadership, faced at least with real prospect of Europe being made once again safe for conventional war, seemed to be clinging to their nuclear security blankets hardly daring to imagine that Gorbachev might be serious about negotiating real conventional war, seems to be clinging to their nuclear security blankets hardly daring to imagine that Gorbachev might be serious about negotiating real conventional force reduction throughout the European area.”¹²⁵ Margaret Thatcher even “claimed that for Britain nuclear weapons are the sole means of ensuring its security in the event of a conventional war in Europe.”¹²⁶ This mind-set was typical of the cold warriors in the West, who refused to believe that the world could actually be freed of nuclear weapons and war (s) can be a thing of the past.

It is manifest that Gorbachev and his foreign policy leadership attempted to put the relative mix of Soviet national security policy on ‘mutual security’ as an essential foundation. This is a direct departure from the concept of ‘unilateral security’, which believed that security was to be unilaterally determined. This traditional assumption was based on fear and hatred, and did not address to the basis question: How much defense was sufficient (or enough)? No wonder, therefore, arms kept on multiplying unimpeded— quantitatively and qualitatively. On the other hand, the concept of mutual security was “based on the premise that meaningful, stable, and psychological reassuring security can never be achieved in the nuclear era through efforts by individual states to attain effective deterrence....(but) the only way to increase security....is through cooperation on a broad front....(and not) at the expense of the other.”¹²⁷

Gorbachev’s arms control regime addressed this concept of mutual security with emphasis on the reduction of the sources and manifestations of threat.¹²⁸ The INF Treaty—an important milestone towards mutual security—increased the sense of security in both Soviet Union and the United States. This change of attitude posited from the rejection of deterrence by Soviet Union. It is common logic that the level of security is inversely proportional to the rate of accumulation and improvement of weapons, above all, nuclear weapons. Thus, the security paradigm of deterrence ensured nothing but equal danger. Central to Gorbachev’s idea of mutual security was the belief that reduction of nuclear weapons and conventional forces would eliminate the capability for offensive actions and would also decrease unnecessary economic burden.

The foregoing discussion makes it clear that radical and surprising changes occurred in the Soviet security regime under Gorbachev. The new perception posited from a new thinking and a fresh look at the domestic and the international order. New thinking, in a broader canvas, became inevitable because, as Gorbachev succinctly put it, “People are tired of tension and confrontation. They prefer a search for a more secure and reliable world, a world in which every one would preserve their own philosophic, political and ideological views and their way of life”.¹²⁹ The changes envisaged by Gorbachev were deeper and broader than his popular images suggest. It envisioned radical changes not only in the strategic doctrine but also in the economy and society at large. The new strategic regime sought to be created by Gorbachev were founded on the following assumptions:

- (i) Nuclear war will catastrophic for all, irrespective of nations;
- (ii) Nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, and ideological or any other goals;
- (iii) The arms race, like nuclear war, is unwinnable and will increase mutual threats to the point that nuclear parity will no longer guarantee deterrence;
- (iv) A new dialectics of strength and security follows from the impossibility of a military- that is nuclear- solution to international differences. Security can no longer be assured by military means- neither by the

use of arms nor through deterrence; the only way to security through political decisions and disarmament;

(v) The new political outlook believed that security is indivisible. It is either equal security for all or none at all;

(vi) Political positions should be devoid of ideological intolerance. Ideological differences should not be transferred to the sphere of interstate relations, nor should foreign policy be subordinate to them.

Soviet security, as conceived by Gorbachev, was increasingly dependent on political and economic, as well as, military factors. The shifts in Soviet position on arms control negotiations, and the creation of sections responsible for arms control within the Ministry of foreign Affairs and the International Department, indicated a new commitment to negotiation that coincided with his broadened view of security. Indeed, the new security paradigm provided for a soft landing from the cold war confrontation.

Gorbachev's Soviet national security policy questioned two important assumptions. First, the Soviet National security did not mean military security only. Domestic and world economic and political issues shared the same priority (and concern) in the new security regime. This posited from the fact that security cannot develop in isolation and also from the rejection of war as in instruments of politics. As Gorbachev argued, "Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy only by different means, which was classical in his time, has grown hopelessly out of date."¹³⁰ Second, the reliance of nuclear weapons as the basis of Soviet military strength was rejected on the ground that it was founded on faulty assumption. Rather, Gorbachev introduced the concept of reasonable sufficiency. This concept was the product of new doctrinal thinking. It was desired as a tool of policy to help achieve Gorbachev's political objectives, viz., reducing the threat from the West, especially the nuclear threat; reducing the need to compete by retarding Western force modernization and the development of new weapons of mass destruction; assisting resource allocation within and from the military; facilitating military restructuring for greater efficiency; and establishing confidence building measures (CBMs).

The changes unleashed by Gorbachev clearly meant the emergence of a new procedure vis-à-vis the outside world. There was a new dynamism in the revision of the official ideology and, thereby, creating a new basis for a new definition of 'peaceful coexistence'. The change posited from the need to save the world from destruction. Therefore, the Twenty Seventh Party Congress (1986) adopted a new definition of peaceful coexistence. As Gorbachev said, "...we deemed it no longer possible to retain in it the definition of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems as a 'specific form of class struggle'."¹³¹ The new definition, while avoided the mention of class struggle, "put the emphasis on proper and peaceful interstate relations with all foreign countries, regardless of their politico-economic.... (and emphasized that) cooperative interstate dealings are to be order of the day."¹³² A natural concomitant of this 'new' world outlook was the development of defensive military doctrine which negated the offensive character of the Soviet military. Defensive operations were envisioned as the basis method of action of the Soviet armed forces for repelling aggression.

Indeed, Gorbachev waged a veritable peace blitzkrieg leading to Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated all US and Soviet land-based medium range missiles. Step by step, Gorbachev turned Moscow's INF policy around completely. Soviets did not, unlike earlier, insist on including British and French nuclear force in a US-Soviet agreement. More importantly, Gorbachev accepted NATO's 1981 'zero option', to eliminate the entire SS-20 force, and offered to eliminate short-range missiles with ranges above 500 Km.¹³³ The success of the Soviet INF policy shows that Gorbachev and the new thinkers concluded that Soviet Union desperately needed a new approach to security.

Arms control analysts have argued that arms control agreements are most likely to succeed under conditions of a stable military situation. When the military balance favors one side, the weaker side will refuse cooperation as long as it can restore parity unilaterally.¹³⁴ This argument when posited with the Gorbachev revolution in Soviet foreign policy proved to be the decisive factor in the INF Treaty. The INF policy was a glaring example of perestroika in security policy, which re-evaluated the security policy of the Brezhnev era. Hence, it was decided that SS-20 build up decision was politically incorrect.¹³⁵ The military importance of SS-20 was regarded to be minimal compared to the political advantage that was to accrue from its withdrawal from INF talks as a bargaining factor. Gorbachev and his team of new thinkers in Moscow thus transcended the typical mind-set of the cold war era, and gave a positive turn to Moscow's security policy, which was shorn of bellicosity.

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6. M. S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the World* (London, 1988), p.218.
7. Nikolai Nikolsky, *The Philosophy of New Thinking and the Soviet Initiatives* (New Delhi, 1988), p.2.
8. Yuri Gvozdev, *New Thinking and the Initiative of the Six* (New Delhi, 1989), p.31.
9. For details see N.J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, "Beyond the Security Dilemma: Technology, Strategy and International Security," in C.K. Jacobsen (ed.), *The Uncertain Course* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 313-337.
10. Quoted in *The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s-1980s)*, (Moscow 1986), p.324.
11. Albeit it was to remain valid till January 1, 1986, its extension was made conditional on US attitude towards similar moratorium. But the silence in the Soviet nuclear test ranges for nearly eighteen months was answered by explosive sounds in the Nevada deserts in USA. Soviet Union even unleashed a series of public campaign aimed at putting pressure on Washington. The Soviet moratorium was time limited and subsequently extended twice up to December 1986. On January 15, 1986 Gorbachev proposed for a comprehensive nuclear test ban for the two superpowers and subsequently to all nuclear powers.
12. M. Shemlyov, *Soviet Peace Initiatives: 1946-1987* (New Delhi, 1987), p.95.
13. F. Burlatsky, *From Geneva to Reykjavik* (Moscow, 1987), p.90.
14. For details see Shemlyov, n.12, pp.96-97, and the "Statement by General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union", in Gorbachev, n.4, pp.110-113.
15. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol.23 (Moscow, 1982), p.95.
16. The Congress, held in February 1986, marked a break with the past. See XXVII CPSU Congress: Documents and Speeches (New Delhi, 1986).
17. *Ibid.*, p.81.
18. *Ibid.*, p.82.
19. *Ibid.*, p.82.
20. For details see, *ibid.*, pp.82-85.
21. Nuclear deterrence is a threat which expresses a condition choice to kill non-combatants--- a choice that is being condemned by traditional morality. It accepts the arms race as a tool to make this threat 'credible'. At the same time, the doctrine undermines confidence by putting a premium on creating uncertainty in the minds of the other side, which must fear that a credible deterrent might actually be used. This concept had grown beyond the traditional concept of deterrence. The high priest of Cold War and arms race, the United States of America regard deterrence to be system that preserved peace, as it were, between the two superpowers for more than four decades. "Gorbachev attacked the notion of nuclear deterrence on four ground: first, deterrence was not 100 per cent effective, as the number of nuclear weapons grew, deterrence could fail at any time because of human failure, technical malfunction or malice; second, a strategy based on military intimidation cannot reduce military conflict; third, deterrence assumes that war is the 'perpetual concomitant of human existence', a view that cannot be accepted by civilized people; and fourth, deterrence is based on 'rationality', but what is rational in the context of one culture or of one country with a particular historical and political background may not be rational from the perspective of another country," in Alan B. Sherr, *The Other Side of Arms Control--- Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era* (Boston, 1988), p.104.
22. In the Reykjavik summit, held in the autumn of 1986, Soviet Union put forward a set of drastic measures: (a) the first proposal concerned Soviet Union's readiness to cut strategic offensive weapons by fifty per cent with a reciprocal cut by the United States also; (b) the second proposal was the completed elimination from Europe of medium range missiles by both the Soviet Union and the United States; (c) the third proposal was regarding the strengthening "the regime of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and achieve a nuclear ban." See Gorbachev, n.6, pp.236-244, and M.S. Gorbachev, *Speeches and Writings*, vol.2 (Oxford: 1987). Pp.37-73.

23. The 'Strategic Defense Initiative' (SDI), popularly known as the Star Wars' programme, was announced to the world public in the famous 'Star Wars' speech on March 23, 1983 by Ronald Reagan. SDI was envisaged as a means by which nuclear weapons could be rendered "impotent and obsolete" from the outer space. The critics of 'Star Wars' regarded it to be a euphemism for mass destruction direction from the outer space, notwithstanding the thesis put forward by Ronald Reagan that SDI would act as a shield against Soviet attack of the United States or its allies.
24. V.P. Dutt, "A Second Détente", Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 6 September, 1988.
25. Robert L. Arnett, "Arms Control in Soviet National Security Policy Under Gorbachev," in George E. Hudson, (ed.) Soviet National Security Policy Under Perestroika (Boston: 1990), p.286.
26. This 'productive dialogue' further enabled Gorbachev and Reagan to move more closer to each other at the Moscow Summit held from May 29 – June 2, 1988. The Summit, though disappointing in its specifics, made a progress towards a treaty on strategic arms. The Soviet Union and the United States signed nine minor agreements in the course of their talks in Moscow. It included, inter alia, agreements on: (a) to notify each other at 24 hours in advance of future strategic ballistic missile launches; and (b) joint verification experiments to increase the confidence in each other's ability to verify the yield of underground nuclear test explosions. In keeping with the "new thinking" the Soviet Union agreed to discuss drastic cuts in conventional weapons in Europe.
27. Kirsten Amundsen, Soviet Strategic Interests in the North (London: 1990), p.121.
28. "Soviet Proposals on Arms, Troop Cuts in Europe," Times of India (New Delhi), March 8, 1989.
29. "Gorbachev Vows to Stop Arms-Grade Uranium Production", Times of India (New Delhi), March 8, 1989.
30. "Soviets to Remove 500 N-Missiles", Times of India (New Delhi), May 13 1989.
31. "USSR Cuts Defense Budget by 14 per cent," Times of India (New Delhi), May 31, 1989.
32. "Gorbachev Offers Further Arms Cut," Times of India (New Delhi), July 7, 1989.
33. "USSR Offers to completely Destroy Chemical Weapons," Times of India (New Delhi), September 27, 1989.
34. "USSR Cuts Military by 235,000 men", Times of India (New Delhi), November 7, 1989.
35. Vadim Zagladin, "The Working Class Parties and the Anti-War Struggle," in Peace and Disarmament: Academic Studies 1984 (Moscow: 1984), p.144.
36. G. Jacobsen, "International Dynamics: Arms Defiant," in Carl G. Jacobsen, (ed.) The Uncertain Course: New Weapons, Strategies and Mind-sets (Oxford: 1987), pp. 3-4.
37. Ibid., p.5.
38. Ibid., p.5.
39. Domestic reform consisted of introducing perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). Perestroika consisted of an unprecedented revolution in the social, political and economic sphere. The crisis in the very concept of socialism and the socio-economic stagnation in Soviet Union led to the emergence of the Perestroika regime, which consisted of the democratization of the society, introduction of regulated market economy (thereby dismantling the fossilized command economic structure) and Glasnost. For details see, Gorbachev, n.6; M.S. Gorbachev, Selected Speeches and Articles, 2nd ed., (Moscow: 1987); XXVII CPSU Congress, n.16; M.S. Gorbachev, "On the Party's task in Fundamentally Restructuring Management of the Economy: Report by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Committee, June 25, 1987", (New Delhi: 1987), M.S. Gorbachev, "To Advance Further Along the Road of Perestroika" in XXVIII CPSU Congress: Report of M.S Gorbachev, July 2, 1990 (New Delhi: 1990); Zhores Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York, 1986); Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (California: 1988); and Padma Desai, Perestroika in Perspective (London: 1989).
40. Zdenak Kavan, "Gorbachev and the World-The Political Side," in David A. Dyker, (ed.), The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Prospects for Reform (New York: 1987), p.176.
41. Some Western analysts read too much in the changes brought about by Gorbachev in the field of arms control. For example, Gormley believed that there was an "apparent decreasing role of the military in defense and arms-control decision making," see Dennis M. Gormley, Double Zero and Soviet Military Strategy: Implications for Western Security (Guildford, 1988), p, 40.
42. Ibid., p. 134.
43. R.M. Timerbayev, Control of Arms Limitations and Disarmament (Moscow: 1983), p.5.
44. Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era (Boston, 1988), p.166.
45. Ibid., p. 30.
46. See Sherr, n. 44, pp. 30-32.

47. M.S. Gorbachev, "Revolutionary Restructuring Requires Ideology of Renewal". Speech by Gorbachev at CPSU Central Committee Plenum, February 19, 1988, p. 55.
48. Ibid., p. 56.
49. William B. Voegelé, "Tough Bargaining and Arms Control: Lessons from the INF Treaty," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (London), vol.12, no.3, September 1989, p.262.
50. Sherr, n.44, p.170.
51. Morris McCain, "Allocation Politics and the Arms Race: A Soviet Constituency for Arms Control", in Thomas F. Remington, (ed.) *Politics and the Soviet System* (London, 1989), p.135.
52. Ibid., p.135.
53. Peter Zwick, *Soviet Foreign Relation: Process and Policy* (New Jersey, 1990), p.254.
54. Department of State Bulletin, "The INF Treaty: Strengthening US Security," *Arms Control* (Washington, D.C.) March 1988, p.31.
55. See Mikhail Moiseyev, *The Soviet Military Doctrine: Orientation Towards Defense* (Moscow, 1989).
56. V. Petrovskii, *The Soviet Concept of Disarmament* (Moscow, 1984), p.6.
57. See, Peter Vigor, *The Soviet View of Disarmament* (New York, 1986).
58. *The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s-1980s)*, n.10, p.9.
59. For details see *ibid.*, pp. 106-108.
60. For details see *ibid.*, pp.109-114. In spite of such proposals Soviet Union, in 1953, successfully detonated a hydrogen bomb for testing purposes, which could said to have effectively started the famous 'arms race' between the two superpowers.
61. For an extensive analysis of US-Soviet relations from 1969 to 1984, including Soviet perspectives on arms control, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.,1985).
62. Arkady N. Shevchenko was in service with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1956 to 1978. During his tenure he had the opportunity to tour with Khrushchev and also serve as personal advisor to former Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko. Shevchenko defected to the United States in 1978. In 1985, he published *Breaking with Moscow*, a book about his experiences on working in the Soviet government.
63. Shevchenko stated that, "General Nikolai Alekseyev, Ogarkov, and other 'sophisticated' military officers approached SALT as a means to achieve by negotiations what the Soviets feared they could not attain through competition: a restraint on America's ability to translate its economic and technological strength into military advantage and a breathing space during which the USSR would work to narrow the gap", Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: 1985), p.204.
64. Ibid., pp.201-2.
65. Quoted in Yu. Barsukov, "In the Interests of Strengthening Peace," *Izvestia*, pp.208. Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, August 25, 1972, pp.1-2.
66. Strobe Talbott, ed. and trans., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston, 1970), p.516.
67. "An Important Contribution to the Strengthening of Peace", *Pravda*, p.2. Translated in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, October 2, 1972, p.CC5.
68. Arbatov was a Central Committee member and the Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada.
69. Shevchenko, n.63, p.47.
70. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations* (Washington D.C., 1982), p.110.
71. Petrovskii, n.56, p.29.
72. Idem.
73. Strobe Talbott, ed., and trans., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston, 1974), p.410.
74. Shevchenko, n.63, pp.101-2.
75. David B. Rivkin, Jr., "The Soviet Approach to Nuclear Arms Control: Continuity and Change", *Survival*, vol.29, no.6, Nov/Dec. 1987, p.483.

76. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Arms Control and International Politics", *Daedalus*, vol.120, no.1, Winter 1991, p.146.
77. William E. Odom, "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions," *Problem of Communism*, vol.34, no.4, 1985, p.1.
78. See, Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York, 1984); Alexander George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.) *U.S. Soviet Security Cooperation* (New York, 1988); Kenneth Oye (ed.) *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton, N.J., 1986).
79. See Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War and Surrender* (Urbana, 1962).
80. For a lengthy review of Soviet security policy (post 1985) in general and Europe in Soviet foreign policy, in particular, see, Gorbachev, n.6, pp.190-209.
81. For details on the transformations of Soviet security policy-making process, see, David Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military Under Gorbachev." *International Security*, vol.14, no.3, Winter 1989/90, pp.5-24; F. Stephen Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Military," *Foreign Affairs*, vol.66, no.5, Summer 1988, pp.1002-1026; Allen Lynch, *Gorbachev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences*, Institute for East-West Security Studies Occasional Papers (Boulder, Colo., 1989).
82. See, for example, Marshall I. Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology* (New York 1989); Charles Wolf, Jr., and Henry S. Rowen (eds.) *The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden* (Santa Monica, 1990); Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), *The Soviet Defense Enigma: Estimating Costs and Burden* (Oxford 1987); A.S. Becker, *Sitting on Bayonets: The Soviet Defense Burden and the Slowdown of Soviet Defense Spending* (Santa Monica, 1985).
83. See Jack Synder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security*, vol.12, no.3, Winter 1987/88, pp.93-131, Jack Synder "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change", *World Politics*, vol.42 no.1, 1989, pp.1-30.
84. Semeiko, "Instead of Mountains...: On the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency," *Izvestia*, p.5., August 13, 1987. Translated in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, August 21, 1987, pp. AA2-AA5 (Lev Semeiko, a retired Colonel, was on the Faculty of the Frunze Military Academy and was also a member of Dr. Georgi Arbatov's Institute of the USA and Canada).
85. *Idem.*
86. *Idem.*
87. D. Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Is the Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism" *Pravda*, Translate in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, July 27, 1987, pp.BBI-BB7.
88. Quoted in Thomas Nichols and Theodore Karasik, "Civil Military Relations Under Gorbachev: The Struggle over National Security", in William C. Green and Theodore Karasik (eds.) *Gorbachev and His Generals: The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine* (Boulder, Colo., 1990), pp. 42-43.
89. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.43.
90. In May 1987 Gennadii Gerasimov, then Chief Spokesman of the Military of Foreign Affairs made a startling revelation regarding reasonable sufficiency. He noted that former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had reasoned that "to deter another country from attack, there was no need to adhere to the principle of the more the better.... We are returning to this not particularly complex idea for searching the possibility of a destructive retaliatory strike in Russian an aggressor." Gennadii Gerasimov, *Moscow Television Service in Russian*, May 24, 1987. Translated in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* June 25, 1987, pp.AA10-AA11.
91. See Nichols and Karasik, n.88, pp.41-42.
92. Vladimir Lobov, then First Deputy Chief of the General Staff advocated for "sufficient defense", Makmut Gareev, than Deputy Chief of the General Staff, called for "reliable defense", Mikhail Moiseev, then Chief of the General Staff, also advocated "reliable defense". For details see, *ibid.*, pp.46-55.
93. For details see Semeiko, n.84, AA2-AA5.
94. See XXVII COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION Congress, n.16, for details.
95. S.F. Akhromeev, "The Great Victory" *Krasnaia Zvezda*, May 9, 1987, pp.1-2. Translated in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, May 15, 1987, pp.V4, V5.
96. Quoted in Mary C. FitzGerald, "Gorbachev's Concept of Reasonable Sufficiency Defense", in Hudson, n.25, p.186.
97. Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World", *Pravda*, September 17, 1987, pp.12. Translated in FBIS, *Daily Report Soviet Union*, September 17, 1987, p.1.
98. See Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov and Andrei Kartunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency – How to Break the Vicious Circle", *New Times*, October 12, 1987, pp.13-15.
99. Semeiko, n.84, p.AA4.

100. Y. Primakov, "New Philosophy of Foreign Policy," Pravda, July 9, 1987, p.4. Translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, July 14, 1987, p.CC5.
101. Mathew Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach to Security", World Policy Journal, vol.3, no.4, Fall 1986, p.580.
102. Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, 1979), p.288.
103. Jan S. Adams, "Institutional Change and Soviet National Security Policy" in Hudson, n.25, pp.154-55.
104. Mathis Rust, a Young West German, flew a Cessna aircraft from Finland and made an unimpeded landing in Red Square on May 28, 1987. The State Security Police, incidentally, allowed onlookers to talk freely with the pilot.
105. William E. Odom, "The Soviet Military in Transition," *Problem of Communism*, vol.39, no.3, May-June 1990, p.57.
106. *Ibid.*, p.58.
107. Randall E. Newnham, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military: A Chronology" in Green and Karasik, n.88, p.220.
108. *Ibid.*, p.221.
109. *Ibid.*, p.224.
110. *Ibid.*, p.223. His "retirement" on health ground was announced on December 7, 1988.
111. Quoted in Nichols and Karasik, n.88, p.46.
112. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.47. In 1987, Akhromeev himself advocated for defensive sufficiency. Also see Bernard Trainor, "Soviet Split Seen on Military Cuts," *New York Times*, December 8, 1988.
113. Fred Wehling, "Old Soldiers Never Die: Marshall Akhromeev's Role in Soviet Defense Decision Making", in Green and Karasik, n.88, p.69.
114. Adams, n.103, pp.157-58.
115. American officials said that during the arms control talks at Reykjavik (1986) and Washington, D.C. (1987), Marshal Akhromeev, and not the MFA officials, who negotiated and made key decisions (*New York Times*, December 8, 1987, p.9).
116. Condoleezza Rice, "The Party, the Military and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union," *World Politics*, vol.40, no.1, 1987, p.79.
117. Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, 1971), p.201.
118. *Idem.*
119. *Idem.*
120. Nichols and Karasik, n.88, pp.38-39. Also see Theodore Karasik, "Current Perspectives on the Warsaw Treaty Organization," *Current World Leaders*, vol.31, no.8, December 1988, pp.899-910.
121. Gorbachev, n.6, p.195.
122. *Ibid.*, p.231.
123. *Ibid.*, p.204.
124. *Idem.*
125. Robert W. Clawson, "Changes in Soviet National Security Policy towards Western Europe under Gorbachev," in Hudson, n.25, pp.200-1.
126. Gorbachev, n.6, p.245.
127. Philips D. Stewart and Margaret G. Hermann, "The Soviet Debate Over 'New Thinking' and the Restructuring of US-Soviet Relations," in Hudson, n.25, p.51.
128. See Evangelista, n.101, pp.561-99.
129. Gorbachev, n.6., p.139.
130. *Ibid.*, p.141.

131. Ibid., p.147.
132. Odom, n.105, p.53.
133. See Gromley, n.41, for details.
134. See, for example, Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haas, (eds.), *Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Records Straight* (Cambridge, 1987); Gert Krell, "Problems and Achievements of Arms Control", *Arms Control*, vol.2, no.3, 1981, pp.247-83; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization*, vol.41, no.3, Summer 1987, pp.370-402.
135. The SS-20 missile deployment in Europe (during the time of Brezhnev) was viewed as a serious threat to Europe. Jonathan Haslam argues that the decision to deploy SS-20 was primarily made in response to the US refusal to accept constraints on its forward-based medium-range aircraft during the Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT) in the early 1970s. See Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-1987* (London, 1989), pp.58-69. For a critical discussion on SS-20 see Jacques Sapir, *The Soviet Military System*, trans., David Macey (Cambridge, 1991), pp.162-72.

