Grand Strategy to Dismantle the Afghan Taliban

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Abstract

The Afghan government and international community (IC) have been fighting a war against the Afghan Taliban for over 15 years with no signs of weakening them which proves their strategies have failed. In order for them to win the war against the Afghan Taliban, they must re-strategize and cut off their funding resources and win over both sympathizers and the general public by reducing casualties and corruption. Dismantling the Afghan Taliban can be accomplished by taking the war to the Taliban through employing, training, and mobilizing undercover intelligence officers to infiltrate the villages and districts. This will require fewer troops on the ground and mitigate civilian and military casualties while also being cost effective. By focusing on the Taliban that operates and controls part of Afghanistan, research will prove the importance of international cooperation to eliminate the Afghan Taliban’s funding and promote good governance. More specifically, it will provide evidence of how they are able to successfully remain funded without government intervention, and how international cooperation can eliminate their resources and infiltrate their cells which will ultimately diminish their presence. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to explain the necessity for international cooperation to combat Taliban funding and to recruit, train, and mobilize undercover intelligence officers in order to prove what support is needed to be successful.
“Insurgencies are easy to make and hard to stop. Only a few ingredients need to combine to create an insurgency; like oxygen and fire, they're very common and mix all too often. The recipe is, simply, a legitimate grievance against a state, a state that refuses to compromise, a quorum of angry people, and access to weapons.”

Richard Engel

“The word 'insurgency' had connotations that really sent a shiver down the spine of folks in Washington, in the United States - for good reason, because it means this is something much bigger than just a few terrorist cells.”

David Petraeus, Former Director of CIA
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Grand Strategy to Dismantle the Afghan Taliban

What strategies can be utilized by the Afghan government and international community (IC) to dismantle the Afghan Taliban? The Afghan government and the IC have been fighting against the Afghan Taliban for the past 15 years. However, instead of weakening them they have grown stronger which illustrates failures in the strategies that the government has employed. Thus, for the Afghan government and the IC to win the war against the Afghan Taliban, they should re-strategize and take the war to the Taliban by employing, training, and mobilizing undercover intelligence officers in the villages and districts to infiltrate terrorist cells. This will require fewer troops on the ground and will mitigate civilian and military casualties as well as be more cost effective. Along with mobilizing intelligence officers into villages and provinces, other strategies such as cutting off their funding resources, intelligence gathering and sharing information between agencies, win over Taliban sympathizers and the general public by reducing casualties and corruption, and expanding economic development will aid in dismantling the Afghan Taliban.

Research for these strategies will focus on the Afghan Taliban that operates and controls parts of Afghanistan. More specifically, it will provide evidence of how they are able to successfully remain funded without government intervention and how international cooperation with the Afghan government can diminish their presence. The Research will also prove the importance of international cooperation to eliminate the Afghan Taliban’s funding resources and promote good governance. In addition, this paper will answer questions such as whether cutting off the Afghan Taliban’s funding resources, sharing intelligence, reducing casualties and corruption, and smart investing in development projects through a dedicated counterinsurgent unit are vital to dismantling the insurgent group.

Financial support was crucial to the Afghan Taliban’s rise and expansion in the aftermath of their fall at the end of 2001. The rationale for focusing on financial support has been discussed and written about extensively. However, the topic has not gained enough momentum to garner the support needed to quell their array of funneling revenue sources. This research provides potential contributions to counter the Afghan Taliban’s expansion and ultimately dismantle them. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explain the necessity for international cooperation to recruit, train, and mobilize undercover intelligence officers and combat Taliban funding while showing the support needed to be successful. Thus, taking a closer look into Afghanistan’s history will help to
identify root causes of corruption and show how the Afghan Taliban was able to garner financial support. This in turn will help to create a plan to dismantle the Taliban.

**Afghanistan**

Afghanistan was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani who unified the Pashtun tribes. It is located in the heart of Asia with 652,230 sq km of land, almost six times the size of Virginia and slightly smaller than Texas. In addition, it is bordered by six countries, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (The World FactBook, 2016). Afghanistan gained its independence from Great Britain in 1919 after being used as a buffer between the British and Russian Empires (The World FactBook, 2016). In July 2016, Afghanistan’s population accounted for 33,332,025 people and according to some estimates, 42 percent of the total population of Afghanistan lives under the national poverty line and another 20 percent of the population live just above the national poverty line and are “vulnerable to the risk of falling into poverty” (Rural Poverty Portal, 2016). Thus, these poor conditions have made Afghanistan an easy target for insurgent groups.

For instance, Afghanistan has suffered through various coups from different groups over the past 40 years as well as witnessed numerous invasions and civil wars. In 1979 for example, Afghanistan was invaded by Russians due to their fear of invasion by the United States. After a decade of war and foreign interventions, the Russians were defeated and left the country while Afghanistan still remained in a civil war. Then the Mujahidin took over for about five years and the war remained ongoing between the warlords. The Taliban then took over the country and again it suffered from cutting its ties to the West and fighting other groups within the country. Finally, in 2001, the US invasion of Afghanistan led to some stability, but then it led to insurgency (The Telegraph, 2010). Thus, civil wars have been the bane of the Afghan people’s existence for the past four decades. And even though a lot has changed; the leaders of the country are still fighting for power and trying to benefit themselves off of the bloodshed of poor people despite being used as proxies.

**Taliban**

The Taliban was founded in Afghanistan in the early 1990s and resisted the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989 with a strong backing of foreign powers (Laub, 2014). Their movement attracted popular support from the afghan people by bringing “stability and rule of law after four years of conflict (1992-1996) among rival Mujahidin groups” (Laub, 2014, para. 3). Before their collapse in 2001, the Taliban regime had absolute
control over 90 percent of Afghanistan and imposed their brand justice. In 1999, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the Taliban for giving safe haven to al-Qaeda, and many analysts believe that “Islamabad supported the Taliban as a force that could unify and stabilize Afghanistan while staving off Indian, Iranian, and Russian influence” (Laub, 2014, para. 5). This group was led by Mullah Omar, a former anti-Soviet fighter (1996-2001) and was toppled by the United States after 9/11 due to not handing over Osama bin Laden (Laub, 2014). After their collapse, some joined the Afghan government, some returned back to farming, and some escaped to Pakistan. To this day, “the Taliban remain both united around a core ideology and divided by various factors, in particular policy, and, to a lesser extent, access to and use of revenue” (United Nations Security Council, 2014, p. 11).

The Taliban sees Afghans and foreign troops as the sole cause of their collapse in 2001 and identifies Americans as invaders of Afghanistan. Thus, they do not look at the problem objectively but rather subjectively based on their perception of the government and their interpretation of the United States existence in Afghanistan. According to the Asia Foundation survey that was conducted in 2016, 16.7 percentage of Afghans feel sympathy for armed opposition groups (AOGs) which is 10.8 percentage points lesser than 2015 and the reason is that “more Afghans in 2016 perceive AOGs as motivated by the pursuit of power (23.1%) compared to 2015 (18.9%) or 2014 (15.6%)” (The Asia Foundation, 2016, p. 7).

Strategies to Dismantle the Afghan Taliban

There are multiple strategies that can be utilized to dismantle the Afghan Taliban. The first strategy is cutting off the Taliban’s revenue resources to mitigate their operations. Strategy number two is to initiate intelligence sharing between agencies in order to detect warning signs. Third, reducing casualties and corruption to win over the general public’s opinion of the Afghan government and weaken the Taliban. Last but not least to increase education, employment opportunities, and economic development for the Afghan people to stop supporting the insurgents. Each of these strategies will help in weakening the Taliban and lessen the chances of new attacks being made while working towards permanently dismantling the group.

First Strategy: Cutting the Afghan Taliban Revenue Sources

The Afghan Taliban generates revenue through an array of illegal operations such as actively taking part in the drug trade, stealing Afghanistan’s natural resources, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and support from the
Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). These resources are imperative for their survival and expansion. In the past, certain actions have been taken to cut off the Taliban’s revenue resources but have failed due to a lack of international cooperation and a lack of an eclectic approach. Thus, a grand strategy using an eclectic approach must be used to cut off revenue sources and dismantle the Taliban to make Afghanistan prosperous.

Afghan Taliban’s Core Revenue Sources

The Afghan Taliban receives cash from an array of illegal operations. The top four funding resources include: the drug trade, illicit extraction of natural resources, ISI support, and kidnapping for ransom.

I. Funding from Drug Trade

The Taliban receives funding from an array of resources; however drugs are the primary source of their revenue stream. Over the past two decades, Afghanistan has been the top producer of heroin around the globe which accounted for up to 90% of the world's supply. Even though the Taliban are not directly involved in the cultivation poppy or its conversion to heroin; they are increasingly involved in protecting heroin factories, the smuggling of chemicals such as acetic anhydride that is required for producing heroin in Afghanistan, the smuggling of heroin out of Afghanistan, and avoiding government interference by either bribing or coercing government officials (Micallef, 2017).

Furthermore, some believe that the Taliban’s yearly budget is around $500 million. However, according to international and domestic intelligence agencies, their budget is far greater and believed to be around one to two billion dollars a year (Micallef, 2007). According to Micallef (2017), the Afghan government sources estimate that the total heroin trade generates about “two billion dollars” where one-third of that is going to “the heroin producers, one-third going to the Taliban, and the balance going to expenses including paying poppy farmers, running the heroin factories, and bribes to government officials and security personnel” (para. 4). This shows that drugs are the primary source of the Afghan Taliban’s funding.

Poppy Cultivation. South and southeast Afghanistan is poppy-rich which has played a key role in the Afghan government’s corruption and the revival of the Taliban as well as changed the nature of insurgency. In the past, key government leaders were involved in smuggling narcotics and protecting poppy fields for farmers in return for fees and now the Taliban is using the same techniques to fund their operations (Peters, 2009). Growing poppy has been an issue for generations. While working for military officials from 2005 – 2008 in Afghanistan, I told numerous officials...
that fighting insurgents without cracking down on their funding resources from poppy sales was impossible. I told the commanders that poppy is the key driver of insurgents’ survival and if we go after the poppy, there will be more Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and we will suffer even more casualties. In fact, every poppy harvesting season, we did suffer more casualties, witnessed more IEDs, and more attacks while doing normal patrols as in the past and not destroying the farmers poppy fields.

Illicit opium cultivation from poppy in 2013 was 296,720 hectares around the world where Afghanistan accounted for 209,000 hectares which witnessed an increase of 36 percent from 2012 while at the same time a very small area of poppy was eradicated. In other words, “the opium production in Afghanistan accounts for 80 percent of the global opium production (5,500 tons)” (UNODC, 2014, p. 21).

The following figure shows that the opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased gradually from 1997 to 2013 while eradication was minimal.

Figure 1: Poppy Field in Afghanistan

Figure 2: Opium poppy cultivation and eradication in Afghanistan, 1997-2013
The following figure shows the opium production from 1998-2013 where Afghanistan is the leading producer of opium compared to the rest of the world.

**Figure 3: Global potential opium production, 1998-2013**

Source: 1997-2002: UNODC; since 2003: National Illicit Crop Monitoring System supported by UNODC.

**Acetic Anhydride.** Since acetic anhydride is a vital chemical ingredient in producing heroin, anytime the production of opium goes down, there is also a decline in the production of heroin which ultimately leads to a decline in the demand for acetic anhydride. At the same time, the price of illicit acetic anhydride over the years went up due to a higher production of heroin “at times reaching peaks of some $430 per liter (2011), up from $8 in 2002” (UNODC, 2014, p. XVI). Thus, acetic anhydride had an impact on the production costs of heroin where “the
proportion of acetic anhydride in total production costs of heroin in Afghanistan rose from 2 percent in 2002 to 26 percent in 2010 before falling to some 20 percent in 2013” (UNODC, 2014, p. XVI).

Thus, the harder it is to export acetic anhydride from neighboring countries to Afghanistan, the harder it gets to produce heroin and export it to the neighboring countries. According to the UNODC (2014); a “reduction in the availability of drugs may be brought about by seizing drugs or reducing the availability of the raw materials used in their manufacture” (p. 81). Thus, cracking down on the acetic anhydride flow to Afghanistan from neighboring countries is vital for reducing the production of heroin from poppy.

**Smuggling Routes to and from Afghanistan**

Most of the drugs from Afghanistan are smuggled utilizing different routes into neighboring countries and from there to other countries around the globe. At the same time, acetic anhydride is smuggled into Afghanistan from these different routes to keep the supply going. For example, heroin has been smuggled from Afghanistan via Iran and Turkey to Western and Central Europe through a long-established Balkan route. Heroin has also been smuggled northwards to the Russian Federation via Central Asia and smuggled to China and other countries in South-East Asia via Pakistan. While heroin and acetic anhydride have been smuggled through land routes to and from Afghanistan, they also have access to water routes from Pakistan to the Indian Ocean and Iran in the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman provided a greater opportunity for the traffickers to smuggle larger quantities of drugs over long distances. Thus, it is imperative that the international community aid in cutting off these routes and put pressure on these neighboring countries to implement security protocols making smuggling efforts harder to accomplish.

**Recommendations**

Disrupt the Taliban’s funding resources. Interrupting their funding could be hard to achieve due to powerful drug networks such as village leaders (Khans), local law enforcement officers, and some high level government officials. In most cases, farmers and some of these powerful groups voluntarily try to grow poppy and make money while in other cases; they have no choice but to cooperate to survive the Taliban’s brutality. Thus, employing strong national and international counternarcotic units will be key to infiltrating these groups and bring them to justice which will also increase the locals’ confidence in the government.
Cracking down on the acetic anhydride flow to Afghanistan from neighboring countries is pertinent because acetic anhydride is a key chemical in producing heroin. This could be accomplished through better cooperation among the international committee which would ultimately reduce the production of heroin from poppy.

Discourage farmers from cultivating poppy by air spraying the fields to eradicate them cannot be done alone. Thus, the international community’s support and cooperation with the Afghan government is key to eliminating the drugs. Thus, destroying poppy fields and preventing people from growing poppy cannot be done by a small force, but will require mass military and psychological operations. Drawing support from both the local and international communities will be key in extinguishing current poppy fields as well as preventing further production. In addition, eliminating drugs needs the general public’s support which cannot be accomplished by just telling them to stop without offering them an alternative such as cash awards or better crops and fertilizers.

II. Funding from Illicit Extractions of Minerals

The Taliban’s second largest revenue stream comes from illegally commandeering Afghanistan’s natural resources and selling them. Afghanistan is rich in natural resources such as minerals and hydrocarbon deposits estimated to be worth $1 trillion dollars. Unfortunately, the Taliban exploits these resources by illegally mining in “at least 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 Provinces and earn as much as $200 to $300 Million annually” which is about 10 to 15 percent of Afghanistan’s mining business and their involvement in the industry will continue to grow (DuPée, 2017, p. 32). In fact, “the Taliban’s increased footprint in Afghanistan and their efforts to formalize their role in the mining sector by creating the Dabaro Comisyon, or “Stones Commission”, have substantially enhanced their war chest” (DuPée, 2017, p. 31). The creation of this commission has given them more ammunition to use against locals. For instance, they use organization to tax miners and make them purchase their own “official” Taliban excavation licenses. Thus some miners will carry both a legal government mining license as well as the “Stones Commission” license in order to continue working in peace.

The Dabaro Comisyon, “operates under the authority of the Maali Comisyon (the Taliban Financial Commission) and reportedly came into existence around 2009 as the Taliban began to experiment in diversifying their revenue streams” (DuPée, 2017, p. 31). In addition to abusing local miners, they also manage funding that they earn from “taxing mining companies and those tasked with transporting the stones throughout the country. It also maintains relations with Pakistani businessmen who help facilitate the black-market sale of Afghanistan’s illegally
excavated natural resources” (DuPée, 2017, p. 34). The revenue that this fake commission brings in for the Taliban by illegally obtaining and selling Afghanistan’s natural resources is far more than the government is able to make due to their corruption. Thus, it is important to cut off these major revenue sources in order to dismantle the Taliban and restore law and order to the country.

There is a steady revenue stream from the numerous natural resources being illegally excavated, smuggled, and taxed out of Afghanistan to benefit the Taliban. Some of these resources include talc, marble, coal, limestone, and gemstones such as jade and rubies. This illegal operation brings in annual revenues of $200 to $300 million a year. A good example of one of the more lucrative minerals is talc. “The Afghanistan Anti-Corruption Network (AACN) reported in February 2017 that ISIS-KP and the Taliban earned $46 million last year from illegally extracting talc, a soft mineral used in the manufacturing of cosmetics” (DuPée, 2017, p. 31). In addition to talc, marble brings in approximately $18.5 million to $21.9 million per year for mining and transporting, taxing coal trucks brings in approximately 1.1 million per year, and the World Bank estimated that 90 to 99 percent of Afghanistan’s gemstones are illegally smuggled out of the country and sold. The Afghan Taliban has masterfully exploited these natural resources and must be immobilized.

**Recommendations**

Utilize the international community because their involvement is crucial to stopping these operations. Unfortunately, thus far international involvement has not been able to maintain stabilization in Afghanistan over the past 15 years. “The Afghan government remains vulnerable and continues to suffer from inadequate security, a lack of modern infrastructure, corruption, and belligerent neighbors that undermine Afghanistan’s economic potential and directly threatens its physical security” (DuPée, 2017, p. 34). However, with today’s technology and a unified support system, the international community can support the Afghan government and make them strong. When other countries come together and get involved, such as helping to cover more territories and tighten security as well as help build community support, the government can take back leadership and citizens will begin to stand with the law which will help to overturn these illegal operations. In addition, a stronger international presence will help to overpower corrupt neighboring countries and help bring Afghanistan to a modern infrastructure and build their economy.
III. Funding from Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is Pakistan’s premier military intelligence agency which was created by an “Australian born British Major General Robert Cawthome of Pakistan Army in 1948” (Datta, 2014, p. 1). The ISI’s primary job is to protect the best interests of the Pakistan Army whose job is to dictate Pakistan’s foreign policy for India, Afghanistan, and other neighboring countries in the region and not the politicians. According to Riedel (2013), ISI has more control over the Taliban than any other intelligence agency or country around the globe because the ISI provides the Afghan Taliban leadership with a safe haven including “assistance with fund raising” and “advice on military and diplomatic issues” (para. 1).

Pakistan has been on the Taliban’s side from its birth and helped their former leader Mullah Omar during their fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, their fight against other Jihadi leaders in late 1990s, and then the revival of Taliban after 2001. In fact, “Pakistan was one of only three countries” that officially recognized “the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in the late 1990s (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the other two)” (Riedel, 2013, para. 2). In an interview that was conducted by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor, Council on Foreign Relations with Ashley Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in 2008; Ashley said that the Taliban continue to be supported by the Pakistan ISI because their leadership seems to be seen as a “strategic asset, hedge”, and stable “back-up force in case things in Afghanistan go really sour” (Tellis, 2008). Even in a 2006 interview with NBC news, Pakistan’s President, Pervez Musharraf, said that there are some dissidents and retired ISI people who are assisting Taliban but they do not have any active links with the Taliban (Musharraf, 2006).

Furthermore, According to Micallef (2017), Afghan government sources “estimate that the value of ISI’s assistance to the Taliban has been” between 200 to 400 million dollars a year (para. 17). This clearly shows that the ISI is funding the Afghan Taliban but to what extent is still unknown. The Pakistan ISI not only provided the Afghan Taliban with weapons, advisers, trainers, soldiers, safe havens, and sanctuaries but also with money to fund their war machine despite numerous “United Nations Security Council resolutions calling on all countries to cease aid to the Taliban because it was hosting al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden” (Riedel, 2013, para. 2). A study done by NATO in 2012 shows that:
Based on the interrogations of 4000 captured Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other fighters in Afghanistan over 27,000 interrogations concluded that ISI’s support was critical for the survival and revival of the Taliban after 2001, just as it was critical to its conquest of Afghanistan in the 1990s. (Riedel, 2013, para. 3)

**Recommendations**

The international community should stop sending foreign aid to Pakistan until they agree to stop supporting the Taliban with weapons, advisers, trainers, soldiers, and safe havens. In addition, the Afghan government should also work closely with Pakistan to reach a consensus where both sides will benefit from peace in Afghanistan.

Finally, the United Nations Security Council should pass a resolution that will pressure Pakistan to comply with their request to stop their support for the Taliban. Therefore, by the international community taking away its support from Pakistan, the ISI will also deny the Taliban a major funding resource. With the IC’s support, awareness will be heightened and will put pressure on the ISI to stop supporting the Afghan Taliban. It is much harder for an organization to defy the international community versus defying one weak government.

**IV. Funding from Kidnapping**

The Taliban receives a large sum of money from kidnapping both Afghan and foreign nationals. While Western and other nations do not want to pay ransoms, they usually do covertly while denying the payments. According to Jack Cloonan, the president of the U.S. crisis-management firm Clayton Consultants, “nobody—no government—wants to acknowledge ransoms, but you gotta do what you gotta do” and he further states that “everyone talks to [kidnappers], either directly or through back channels. And everyone pays ransoms” (Yousafzai, 2008, para. 6). Most of the kidnapped foreign nationals are journalists, diplomats, contractors, and aid workers while a large number of kidnapped Afghans are rich, high ranking government officials, and those who have family members in the West. According to Aikins (2010), “there is a burgeoning kidnapping industry in Afghanistan, part of the conflict economy that has been fed by tens of billions of dollars the international forces and community have pumped into the country since 2001” (para. 5). However, since most of the abductions and payments are never disclosed or publicized, it is hard to determine how much money the Taliban receives from these tactics. According to Micallef (2017), kidnappings and extortion of westerners, NGOs, and others probably contributes around” $50 million to the Taliban coffers yearly (para. 11).
The number and the types of people that are kidnapped or abducted vary. In 2011, Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MOI) reported abductions of 162 people which were from different nationalities and different organizations. For instance, the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) reported 19 kidnappings of aid workers and the United Nations Secretary General reported 134 abductions of the non-governmental organization (NGO) employees “between June and the end of October” in 2010 (U.S. Department of State, 2011, para. 87). With regards to the ransom, in the first quarter of 2016, a Canadian national that was held hostage by the Taliban was released. Even though, the deal was not really disclosed but some believes that the Canadian government paid the ransom to release him. In the same quarter, an Iranian driver was kidnapped and released for a ransom of $87,500. According to the local sources, from March 2015 to April 2016, over 100 truck drivers “which include a number of Iranians, have been abducted” (Olive Group, 2016, p. 11). The cases of kidnapped foreign nationals are numerous such as the kidnapping of Johan Freckhaus, French national who was released in return for $1.5 million dollars; and the kidnapping of an Italian photojournalist Gabriele Torsello who was released for about 2 million Euro in 2006 (Yousafzai, 2008).

**Recommendations**

Refuse to negotiate with terrorists on a global level to help alleviate the Taliban’s revenue stream from kidnapping innocent victims. Through international cooperation, the Afghan Taliban will come to realize they lost their negotiation ploy and will be forced to look for funding elsewhere. This in turn will lead to fewer kidnappings and less revenue resources. Therefore, the international community must tighten security and agree as a whole to stop negotiating and stop paying ransoms.

**Second Strategy: Intelligence Sharing and Attention to Warning Signs**

The Afghan government has failed to foil Taliban plots due to the lack of proper intelligence sharing, enhanced security, and intelligence gathering. Even though it is very difficult to know all of the warning signs of Taliban attacks; it is possible to find out whether someone is in the process of committing a brutal attack. In fact, failing to deal with the warning signs in a timely manner could lead to catastrophic events as it did in the United States on 9/11, and more recently on May 31, 2017 in Kabul, Afghanistan (Rasmussen, 2017). Thus, knowing the warning signs for insurgent attacks are vital in preventing attacks which gives the general public more confidence in regards to their security and trust in their government’s capacity. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the American people were discouraged by their government due to them not being able to prevent those horrific attacks
The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Thus, the Homeland Security Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 resulted from the lack of domestic security and lack of information sharing that could have prevented the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States of America. The government was compelled to come up with a new set of laws and policies to counter terrorist activities which could also be pragmatic in Afghanistan.

To elaborate further, the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 by Ramsi Yousef could have been prevented if the transaction of large scale chemicals was flagged. The attack could have also been prevented if the intelligence agencies would have put their differences aside and gathered and shared information amongst each other as well as with law enforcement agencies. If the hijackers’ information would have been shared among the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, the 9/11 attacks could have been prevented since some of the individuals were previously flagged when passing security checks. Thus, The Homeland Security Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 have clearly improved the U.S. government’s border security, infrastructure protection, WMD counter-measures, information sharing, counterterrorism, and cooperation efforts which have foiled terrorist plots by enhancing national security and counterterrorism activities. Therefore, knowing more about these acts can aid in coming up with a solution in Afghanistan by promoting goodwill between governments and agencies so they will share intelligence information and win the war against the Taliban.

The Homeland Security Act

The focal point of The Homeland Security Act passed in 2002 by Congress in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was to “consolidate the 22 disparate agencies and bureaus responsible for disaster preparedness, prevention, and response into one Department of Homeland Security with the unified purpose of protecting the homeland” (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, n.d. para. 3). This legislation was very successful and led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security which resulted in one of the largest changes to the U.S. government in almost 50 years. Even though the U.S. government faced major challenges due to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in terms of organizational realignments and budgeting; it assisted the government’s counterterrorism efforts such as border security, infrastructure protection, WMD counter-measures, and more (McEntire, 2009).
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

The fundamental intent of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was to create the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to “coordinate the work of 15 federal intelligence agencies and established a National Counter Terrorism Center to analyze intelligence information – “connecting the dots” so the government could take effective action to detect, prevent, and disrupt terrorist activity” (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, n.d. para. 4). It was hard at the time to bring these intelligence agencies together under one umbrella because they were yet to be successful in cooperating with one another to protect the United States. Therefore, establishing the IC and putting it under the leadership of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has helped U.S. government intelligence agencies become united and share their findings with each other in order to foil terrorist plots (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Thus, collaboration between the intelligence agencies has made a difference nationally and internationally in terms of countering terrorist activities which did not exist before 9/11 due to differences between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Furthermore, knowing the warning signs for insurgent attacks is imperative in foiling plots. It is important to know what the warnings are and how they can be dealt with in a timely manner while still addressing the challenges to their implementation. For instance, money laundering in large amounts from/to unknown individuals, carrying fake passports while passing borders, buying a large amount of explosives and chemicals, taking pictures of restrictive areas, a strong hatred for the government and the general public, and showing sympathy towards terrorist causes are key warning signs of terrorist attacks which should be taken into full consideration when countering terrorism.

Therefore, the Afghan security agencies should work with other partners to gather data on people who show behaviors that could lead to conducting vicious acts. Furthermore, “the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works with a broad range of partners to gain a better understanding of the behaviors, tactics, and other indicators that could point to potential terrorist activity within the United States, and the best ways to mitigate or prevent that activity” (Department of Homeland Security, n.d.). Not only has the US proven that these tactics work, but many of their policies reflect Russia’s proven counterterrorism policies.

Russia’s Counterterrorism Policies

In connection to Russia’s counter insurgency campaign in Chechnya and North Caucasus regions in the early 2000s, the country has witnessed numerous catastrophic attacks such as: the siege of Dubrovka Theater in Moscow...
by armed Chechen insurgents in 2002 which resulted in 129 casualties, a number of suicide bombings in the Moscow subway in 2004 which killed 80 civilians, a successful attack on the Russian interior forces in Ingushetia and Nazran which resulted in the killing of 80 Russian soldiers, and the simultaneous demise of the two Russian passenger planes. The most horrendous attack was when the Chechen and Ingush militants took “1,100 hostages in a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, on 1-3 September, 2004” which resulted in over 300 deaths, including 186 children who perished during the rescue operations (Omelicheva, 2012, para. 1). These vicious terrorist attacks have forced the Russian government to make changes to their counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies that were made in 1998 due to failures in intelligence management and incident command (Omelicheva, 2012).

In the aftermath of these terrorist attacks, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) was given the authority to conduct counterterrorism operations in North Caucasus in 2003 while a special inter-departmental center was created in the region to enhance coordination and information sharing between Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Since there was not a central command, it resulted in further failures in intelligence gathering and coordination. Later, a new policy was formulated with the intent of bringing all agencies and resources that were engaged in the counterterrorism operation under one command to better implement counterterrorism policies. These different policies led to the creation of the National Counterterrorism Committee (NAK) by President Putin in 2005 and were “tasked with the coordination of counterterrorism policies and operations among 17 federal agencies” (Omelicheva, 2012, para. 5).

It is obvious that Russia’s counterterrorism policies have influenced the U.S. government to come up with a new set of policies. For instance, the Russian inter-departmental center was created in 2003 to enhance coordination and information sharing among the FSB and MVD while in the United States the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, and more were encouraged to coordinate and share information with one another regardless of their agencies missions (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Secondly, Russia established the National Counterterrorism Committee (NAK) to bring 17 different federal agencies under one command in February 2005 (Omelicheva, 2012) while the United States established its Intelligence Community (IC) consisting of 16 agencies under the leadership of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to help them become united and share their knowledge and findings with each other in order to foil terrorist plots (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2015). Therefore, it is clear
that U.S. counterterrorism policies and legislation were influenced by Russia’s counterterrorism policies and legislation which also shows that they can be effective in Afghanistan.

**Recommendations**

Promote intelligence gathering and share information to help Afghanistan identify the warning signs of terrorist attacks which will lead to stopping them. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Senators Lieberman and McCain created the 9/11 Commission Committee to investigate failures on the U.S. government side and make recommendations to enhance security procedures and protect the United States against foreign and domestic terrorists. As a result of establishing the 9/11 Commission, numerous legislations have been crafted and signed into law by the Congress in a bipartisan manner such as the Homeland Security Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Thus, the same can be done in Afghanistan with the aid of the international community.

**Third Strategy: Reducing Casualties and Corruption**

Security and corruption in Afghanistan has deteriorated which led to a lack of confidence in the government from the general public. According to Graeme Smith, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG) in Kabul, many Afghans trust the Taliban’s judicial system more than the Afghan government’s court system due to a disregard of ethnic or tribal bias and bribes (Laub, 2014, para. 12). Meanwhile, civilian casualties caused by either the Afghan government or Taliban attacks have led to greater instability and insurgency over the past 16 years. In fact, civilian casualties by Afghan and international forces are strategic recruiting tools for the Afghan Taliban. Thus, reducing civilian casualties and decreasing corruption are key factors in diminishing insurgency and galvanizing the general public’s support for the Afghan government.

**Corruption**

Some of the significant elements that led to the creation and empowerment of the Taliban in 1996 was their ability to put a stop to war and violence between different groups, reduce corruption, eradicate opium, punish rapists, and gave voices to those who were forgotten in almost 96 percent of the country. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) launched by Transparency International (TI) noted that “Afghanistan scored poorly with just 11 points out of 100 and reached a low rank of 166 out of 168 countries. Afghanistan was ranked the third worst on the global list” (Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2016, para. 2). According to another report from Integrity Watch, in 2016 “Afghans
paid an estimated $3 billion in bribes” which registers “an almost 50 percent increase compared to 2014” and those who were involved in the court system reported that “they were asked for bribes an astounding 55 percent of the time (GlobalSecurity, 2016, para 1). In figure 4, Afghanistan is second to Yemen when it comes to transparency, accountability, and corruption (World Bank Group, 2015) and according to figure 5, a large percentage of Afghans considered corruption a more important problem than any other issue including insecurity (UNODC, 2012). Thus, it is important for the international community to focus on reducing corruption in Afghanistan because “one of the central goals of counter-insurgent forces is to secure the loyalty and support of the population to their government through good governance and positive administration” (Green, 2011, p. 23).

Figure 4: CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating (1=low to 6=high)

![Figure 4: CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating (1=low to 6=high)](image)


Figure 5: Percentage of adult population considering selected issues to be the most important for their country, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)
It is worth noting that corruption is more than just “the abuse of power by a public official for private gain” (Miller, 2011, para. 2). In fact, it could also be in the form of neglect, killings, abuse, and theft. Green (2011) argues that if official corruption is unchecked, it “can slowly erode the support of the people to the point where they no longer defend the government against insurgent incursions, or, more ominously, join with the insurgents to fight the state” (p. 23).

**Human and Budgetary Cost of War**

Security has gotten worse in Afghanistan where the government controls about 70 percent of the country, the Taliban controls about 6 percent, and the other 23 percent is contested. Since 2001, about 111,442 people have been killed and about 116,603 people have been wounded (Crawford, 2016) which shows the need to reduce casualties before it is too late.

Table 1: Summary of Deaths and Injuries in Afghanistan, 2001 – 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Civilians 2001-2015</td>
<td>29,818</td>
<td>37,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Civilians Jan-June 2016</td>
<td>1,601</td>
<td>3,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Military and Police</td>
<td>30,470</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban and Other Militants</td>
<td>42,100</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Forces (through 26 July 2016)</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>20,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Allies (through 26 July 2016)</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>3,800**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractors Reported by US DOL</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>15,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreported Contractor Estimate</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NGO Humanitarian Workers | 382 | 299
Journalists | 24 | Unknown

| Total | 111,442 | 116,603 |

Source: Costs of War Project, Brown University

*Incomplete
** Only including UK, Canadian, French and German wounded, through 2014

Figure 6: Coalition Military Fatalities by Year

Source: http://icasualties.org/OEF/Index.aspx

Figure 7: Number of Civilians Killed in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2015

Source: Cost of War Project, Brown University

In terms of cost, “wars cost money before, during and after they occur” and from 2001 through fiscal year 2016, the United States has already appropriated, spent, and willing to spend over $3.6 trillion on the wars in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and on Homeland Security (Crawford, 2016, p. 1). From that amount, $783 billion has been spent on Afghanistan and another request for $43.7 billion has been submitted for Fiscal year 2017.

Figure 8: Annual Appropriations by Major War Zone/Overseas Contingency Operations for DOD and State/USAID, FY2001-2016, in Billions of Current Dollars

Source: Cost of War Project, Brown University

Recommendations

Reduce both casualties from the war and corruption. The Afghan government and the international community should not only try, they have an obligation to pay close attention to how they can reduce casualties and corruption. More civilian casualties cause more people to join Taliban and become insurgents. Similarly, corruption causes the general public to lose confidence in their government which lead them to turn into the Taliban for fair and swift actions against injustice. Thus, investing more money in reducing corruption and casualties are key for both the Afghan government and the IC to stabilize the country, increase the general public confidence in their government, and prevent more people from becoming insurgents. Some key items to put into place right away are:

- Prioritize the investigation of corruption cases for swift prosecution
- Monitor high level corruption cases by the Attorney General and the President for quick action
- Publicize corruption cases for future deterrence on a monthly basis
- Good partnership with communities and institutions

Fourth Strategy: Increase Education, Employment, and Development
Afghanistan has not only suffered from an economic downturn due to its long history of civil war with the Taliban, but also due to its root causes of poverty such as its fiscal trap, governance failures, cultural barriers, and demographic trap. All of these areas have aided the Afghan Taliban’s rise. Thus to alleviate these problems, there must be an increase in education and employment in order to develop the country to help Afghanistan’s economic crisis which will in turn restore faith in the Afghan Government and help in diminishing the Taliban’s hold on the Afghan people. Taking a closer look at these issues will prove that a system needs to be in place to lessen these issues through the new government policies with help from the international community. Therefore, the impoverished nation has the chance to better its citizens by diminishing barriers, alleviating corruption, and improving its overall economy. Even though Afghanistan may have to overcome resistance to change, the overall success that can be achieved will make the nation better as a whole.

**Root Causes of Poverty**

The significant problem for Afghanistan’s economic growth is poverty itself. Long civil wars made it harder for the poor to fight poverty. In fact, civil wars have led to an extreme lack of capital per person where in 2002, the GDP per capita was $895.6 which was lower than most other poor countries around the world such as Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Bangladesh (Figure. 1). Over the years, and especially in 2015, Afghanistan’s GDP per capita went up to $1,934.2 which is still extremely low compared to other countries in the developed world (World Bank Group, 2016). Thus, the lack of human capital, ruined transportation infrastructures, shortages of electricity, and illiteracy have left people in a state of poverty and made it harder for them to save money which keeps them living in poverty.

Figure 9: Comparing GDP Per Capita for 2002
Furthermore, the lack of resources to pay for the infrastructure that a country needs is a fiscal trap and makes it hard for the government to manage despite a better economy (Sachs, 2015). The Afghan government has been unable to invest in public goods and services such as health care, power grids, roads, ports, and educational systems for the past four decades due to the lack of financial means. In addition, Afghanistan is unable to provide security for those who could invest in its future and economic development due to civil wars and insurgency. This in turn has left Afghanistan’s power in the hands of corrupt leaders and the Taliban who control everything from government affairs to private businesses which led to extreme bribes and discouraged other domestic and international investors from investing and doing business in the country. Therefore, the lack of rule of law, civil wars, corruption, and bribery in Afghanistan are key issues that have paralyzed the government from taking actions that could lead to economic development.

Afghanistan is a male dominated country where women primarily stay home to raise children and having more kids is strongly encouraged. In 1960, the fertility rate was 7.5 and after 2001 it sharply fell to 4.8 which is still very high compared to other developed countries (The World Bank, 2016). Thus, having more children due to cultural and religious norms led to a demographic trap which left the country in a very poor economic state.
Moreover, due to cultural norms, Afghan women are discouraged from working outside the house and also, in some instances, not allowed to pursue an education. Minority groups have also been given less access to public services compared to dominant groups which makes it hard to enter universities and obtain better jobs in both private and public sectors. Thus, depriving women from work and education, having more children, and excluding minorities from private and public services due to cultural and religious norms have left the country in a very poor economic state.

**Recommendations**

Enhance transparency and put into place an accountability mechanism right away. Working with the international community to set up security protocols will weaken corruption. Once security is maintained, it will be easy for foreign governments and investors to invest in Afghanistan and will make it easy for the Afghan government to use foreign aid money to invest in human capital, build better transportation infrastructures, and strong electric grades which will galvanize the economy and bring people out of poverty. This will also bring many job opportunities which will help alleviate poverty. Since security is a precursor for economic growth, it is important for the Afghan government to weaken the Taliban in order to allow more people to invest in Afghanistan which will ultimately reduce the poverty levels and rapidly build economic growth. The more transparent a nation is, the more trust they can gain which in turn will lead to a more prosperous nation by showing its citizens they are honest and have zero tolerance for corruption.

Afghanistan must create an equal access policy to services for all individuals including minority groups, women, and those from different cultural backgrounds. Overcoming cultural barriers will be hard to achieve in the short term, but it can certainly be achieved. Afghanistan has been a male-dominated country throughout history and will require a deep thought process and well laid out plan in order to achieve equal rights. In addition, the country will face resistance due to its cultural norms and may cause some people to lash out against the new policy. However, in order for Afghanistan to achieve a successful economy, it must afford its citizens equal rights to services which consist of educating everyone regardless of gender and allowing them to work and help the country. Thus, by creating a policy for equal rights and following through will bring citizens together as well as allow more individuals to be educated, which in turn will help with the success of Afghanistan’s economy. It will allow all citizens to have the opportunity to help their nation and build it up for future generations and long-term success. Therefore, by helping...
the country gain employment and become more educated, it will restore the citizens’ faith in the Afghan government and help to overcome their fear of the Taliban.

**Proven Methods that Afghanistan can consider**

The Afghan government has the opportunity to come up with a strategy that could stop people’s misery by mitigating drug trafficking, saving Afghanistan’s natural resources, stopping support form Pakistan’s ISI, providing more security for both local and foreign nationals from the Taliban’s brutality, and bringing about economic stability. These goals can be achieved through an eclectic approach by bringing in international assistance. For instance, even though there are some disagreements on the approach that the Sri Lanka government used against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); the collective approach that they used certainly worked. The Sri Lankan government’s victory over the LTTE in May 2009 suggests some lessons on how war on terrorism and insurgency could be won.

**The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a terrorist group in Sri Lanka which was formed in 1976 and was also known as the Tamil Tigers (Vaughn, 2011). This group was known “for having pioneered the suicide bomb jacket, as well as the use of women in suicide attacks” (Bhattacharji, 2009, para. 1). The LTTE was responsible for high-level assassinations, more than two hundreds suicide attacks, and war against the Sri Lankan government which cost the lives of more than seventy thousands people. In May 2009, the Sri Lankan government and the military announced that they defeated the LTTE and killed their leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran while at the same time the LTTE “conceded defeat and in a statement said it had decided to lay down its arms” (Bhattacharji, 2009, para. 1).

**Tactics used by the Sri Lankan Government against LTTE**

There were numerous reason behind the defeat of LTTE; and the 9/11 attacks on the United States were one of the many reasons which led to their collapse in 2009. Furthermore, Sri Lankan government before employing any tactics, it first transformed its military and assigned the role of defeating LTTE to its Army which led to the largest military campaign against the LTTE (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2010).
First: Military Reforms. The election of Mahinda Rajapakse as the President of Sri Lanka in 2007 was key for defeating the LTTE because in the immediate aftermath of his election, he appointed his brother Gotabaya Rajapakse as a Defense Secretary who was a retired Lieutenant Colonel and a pragmatist. Gotabaya instantly started working on restructuring the military, appointing tested battlefield commanders, purchasing new weaponry, and increasing recruitments and training for military personnel. Subsequently, large infantry units were downsized to smaller “eight-man” Special Infantry Operation Teams (SIOTs) and were provided with basic one month commando training, 18 weeks of warfare training in jungles, alongside explosive handling, signals communications, and medical trainings. These measures transformed the army doctrine and ethos which ultimately led to their success in battle field against the Tamil Tigers (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2010).

Second: Cooperation with Foreign Governments. The United States trained the Sri Lankan counterterrorism forces and in the meantime, the Sri Lankan government “cooperated with the United States to implement both the Container Security Initiative and the Megaports program at the port of Colombo” (Bhattacharji, 2009, para. 22). Moreover, Sri Lanka also received help from India by patrolling the seas and providing the government with intelligence information besides the other government.

Third: Cracking down on the LTTE Supplies. The Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) played an important role in going after the LTTE’s supplies by destroying “11 LTTE trawlers and six warehouse ships, containing large consignments of weapons, ammunition and equipment” (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2010, p. 4). Moreover, the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) also started sealing the coastlines that were vital for LTTE logistical operations which put a lot of pressure on LTTE to receive their supplies. Finally, “the SLN defeated the Sea Tigers, killing nearly one thousand of guerrillas and destroying over 300 enemy boats” (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2010, p. 6). This was a big blow to the LTTE which weakened its operational capabilities.

Fourth: Adoption of Security Measures. To prevent LTTE from carrying out suicide attacks or assassinations against politicians, military officers, and government officials; the Sri Lankan military adopted tougher “security measures to contain and intercept LTTE cells, aided by increasingly successful intelligence gathering operations, which drastically reduced the incidence of suicide terrorism” (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2010, p. 4). Moreover, the Sri Lanka Special Forces reconnaissance teams have also used various complex tactics to pressure the LTTE from all side to be defeated and put their arms down.
Fifth: Withstanding Foreign Pressure. After the LTTE realized that they were not going to win the war or survive, they lobbied heavily for the outside world to come and intervene but despite the pressure from the international community, the Sri Lankan government and military stayed focus on diminishing the LTTE. Due to the large presence of civilian in the LTTE last stronghold, the SLA tasked 70 highly trained snipers to neutralize LTTE and mitigate the collateral damage (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2010).
In the aftermath of the LTTE defeat, the Sri Lankan government was criticized by outside sources for violating human rights and engaging in abductions, extrajudicial killings, and extortion (Bhattacharji, 2009).

According to the Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (2011), LTTE used civilians as a human shields and the government shelled “no-fire zones”, hospitals, and food distribution lines (Vaughn, 2011, p. 3). Thus these methods were successful, but needed to be managed more closely. Thus, for these methods to be used again and be successful in other countries such as Afghanistan, they must learn from Sri Lanka’s mistakes. This means that Afghanistan must ensure that they, along with the international community, are upholding the law which can be accomplished through properly recruiting and training candidates to oversee and fulfill missions to defeat the Taliban and make Afghanistan prosperous for the long-term.
**Implementation**

**Recruiting, Training, and Mobilizing Intelligence Officers**

Dismantling the Afghan Taliban has become a nightmare for the Afghan government and the IC. It is time to change the rules of engagement and deal with them through intelligence. The implementation of these strategies could be a complete game changer by preventing military and civilian casualties that the Afghan Taliban uses as key recruiting tools which will aid dismantling them overtime. Therefore, in order for the Afghan government and the international community to be successful and finally put an end to Afghan Taliban’s insurgency for good; they must employ, train, and mobilize intelligence officers and send them into the villages. This could be done by establishing a Counterinsurgent Unit (CIU) under the umbrella of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS). The National Directorate of Security (NDS) is the primary intelligence agency of the Afghan government domestically and internationally. This agency has worked effectively in the past and could be utilized for more than what it is doing. Lately this agency has taken part in some military type operations, but for it to stay relevant and effective; it should only conduct covert and high value operations. Thus, creating the Counterinsurgent Unit (CIU) under the NDS umbrella will be vital for dismantling the Afghan Taliban.

**Counterinsurgent Unit (CIU)**

People in this unit should be independent of any other group or agency in the country and only report to the Director of the NDS and the President. The job of this unit is to be proactive and take the fight to the Taliban instead of being reactive and depend solely on military force. When discussing the Taliban, they had less manpower, equipment, and weapons than the government and international community; but they got away with having fewer people by instilling fear in the local population. Therefore, the CIU could be the power needed to deal with the Taliban who force the local population to support them and provide them with the food and shelter to stay operational. Having CIU officers in villages, districts, and provinces is essential to gather information on the Taliban and expose them before they take any merciless actions against the locals or the government. Even just the existence of this type of hidden intelligence force could instill fear in Taliban and will limit their operations which would be a huge success for the Afghan people and the international community. It is also important to point out that instead of spending a lot of money on other types of conventional war; the CIU would be more cost effective and lessen civilian and military casualties.
Recruiting Procedures

Potential recruitments for this unit should be drafted from all over the country and strategically chosen. The key leadership team should be trained and equipped with advanced warfare and technological weapons and tools that is useful when conducting covert operations.

**Key Leadership.** These recruits must be strategic thinkers and independent of any political or ethnic affiliations. They should also be highly knowledgeable of the country’s history, culture, terrain, geography, and opium fields. This recruitment group could be teachers from universities, Afghan Commando groups, and individuals from other intelligence agencies within the country.

**Trainers.** This group of people should be the ones who know how intelligence works, how skills could be gained, and how to work well with other government and non-profit agencies to gather data.

**Operatives.** Operatives should be hired from the best of the best with critical problem solving skills and mainly from the NDS, Afghan Army, Afghan Airforce, and Afghan National Police. Once recruited, they will go through an intensive training to make sure they are a good fit and loyal to the mission.

**University Students.** This group should be chosen by their areas of expertise and by geographic locations. Once these recruits are secretly trained done with school, they will be automatically brought on board and sent back to their villages without being detected as government employees or intelligence officers.

**Local Militias.** Since most of the Afghan districts have their own militias, these recruits must be the brightest and will remain with their current militias undercover and will be paid as informants.

Training Procedures

The people in these units must be highly confident and trained by successful intelligence officers whether current or former employees. They should also work closely with other countries intelligence officers to become experts in their fields of operation and be successful in their careers.

Organizational Structure

The CIU Director will report to the director of the NDS in Kabul and the President. Under the Director of the CIU, there should be at least five different divisions for different purpose. The Counter Taliban Narcotic Division (CTND) will be responsible for focusing on narcotics that benefit the Taliban which will be consist of five teams located in major cities such as Khost, Jalal-Abad, Mazar, Qandahar, and Herat. The Counterintelligence Division
(CID) will be responsible for gathering intelligence to protect against any attacks that the enemy may plan. The Anti-Corruption Division (ACD) will be responsible for cracking down on corruption whether committed by governmental officials or other locals who make deals with Taliban for money. The Clandestine Service Division (CSD) will be responsible for taking actions via covert operations against Taliban operatives. Finally, the Command and Control Division (CCD) will be responsible for gathering and sharing each division’s intelligence and logistics. The size of these teams may vary depending on necessity, but they should start with about 10-15 people in each of the central locations where they can also easily direct their people to other neighboring provinces to operate. Finally, they can also work closely with the other teams, share intelligence, and support one another with their operations whether directly or in a supporting role.

Table 2: CIU Organizational Structure

Conclusion

The Afghan Taliban’s revenue stream comes from an array of illegal operations such as actively taking part in the drug trade, stealing Afghanistan’s natural resources, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) support which are key for their survival. By undertaking an eclectic approach and gaining
international support to alleviate the Afghan Taliban’s funding resources, the Afghan Taliban will be able to be dismantled. Once there is no revenue sources, the group will not be able to function and will die over time. In addition, once the Taliban collapses, it will help the Afghan economy to rise up and thrive with long-term stability and continued support from the international community. Lastly, it is worth researching the Pakistan ISI to find out exactly how much monetary support they provide to the Afghan Taliban, and how much money they receive from selling and smuggling Afghan minerals. Furthermore, defeating the Afghan Taliban through the support of international cooperation is possible and proven through methods taken by Sri Lanka which demonstrates how important such cooperation is needed to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. Cutting the Afghan Taliban’s revenue streams cannot be achieved unilaterally or by just employing one method at a time; but instead must be dealt with multilaterally and by employing an eclectic approach. Thus, with the aid of the international community, the Afghan government can accomplish its goals.

First, Insurgency and the drug trade must be dealt with simultaneously by both the military and police force and since Afghanistan depend on foreign countries help especially for monetary funds, troops, and trainings, they should all work together to deal with this phenomenon collectively. Developed countries should put more pressure on Afghanistan’s neighboring countries to employ new measures to block the outflow of acetic anhydride into Afghanistan and the inflow of heroin into their countries which will reduce the illicit drug trade. This will require an honest discussion among the international community and will help them in the long term due to the current rise in the number of drug addicts in the region and around the world. Thus, cracking down on the acetic anhydride outflow to Afghanistan from neighboring countries is essential to quash the production of heroin from opium and vice-versa. In addition, better alternatives such as subsidies, better crops, fertilizers, and development programs should be offered to the farmers to stop growing poppy and build the economy in a positive long-term way. This should be a priority for the Afghan government and the international community so that they can avoid a backlash from the farmers.

Next, continued international involvement is crucial to stopping the illegal extraction of natural resources. Upgrading technology at mining sites and tightening security will create a unified support system. This can be accomplished with the combined support of the international community and the Afghan government. In addition, mitigating corruption and the support received from Pakistan’s ISI will also deny the Taliban a major funding resource. This can also only be accomplished with the backing of the international community. With their support,
awareness will be heightened and it will put pressure on the ISI to stop supporting the Afghan Taliban. It is harder for an organization to defy the international community versus defying one weak government. Furthermore, being transparent and cooperating on a global level against the demands of the Taliban will also deny them a steady revenue stream from collecting ransoms. As a result, the Afghan government must avoid negotiating with the Taliban for any reason unless they weaken them first. This will strengthen Afghanistan and the international community while also making it safer for individuals because when other countries come together and get involved, the host government can rebuild its strength and community support which will lead to long-term success by not allowing the Afghan Taliban to exploit them any longer.

Afghanistan should also reduce casualties and corruption through the aid of the international community. Decreasing casualties and corruption will help to alleviate one of the major recruiting tools that the Afghan Taliban uses to persuade individuals to join them. If the government can prove that they are eradicating corruption within their ranks while holding people accountable to the rule of law, it will begin to restore people’s faith in them. In addition, as more people start to believe in the government, less will sympathize with the Taliban which will continue to weaken their position. And with the international community backing the government, it will make them appear stronger and more credible which will result in the Taliban losing support and manpower. Therefore as the Taliban weakens and loses manpower, citizens will grow stronger and the amount of casualties will be reduced due to a lesser chance of attacks.

Furthermore, Afghanistan has suffered an economic downturn due to its long history of war and corruption; hence the recommendations made will help the country become more prosperous build its economy for the long-term. The impoverished nation has the chance to take down the Afghan Taliban, better its citizens, diminish barriers, alleviate corruption, and improve its overall economy by sharing intelligence, and increasing education and employment opportunities. Even though the country may have to overcome resistance to change, the overall success that can be achieved will make the nation better as a whole. Afghanistan cannot continue on its current path and must change its policies to compete in today’s global economy and be successful. Thus, the Afghan government must follow the recommendations to employ, train, and mobilize intelligence officers and send them into the villages to overcome its war against the Taliban. Once the officers infiltrate the communities, they will be able to report their findings and combat the Taliban’s hold on the residents by providing needed security and empowering citizens to
become educated and provide for themselves. This will in turn make Afghanistan more prosperous and open up investment opportunities which will increase job opportunities. Therefore, transparency and policy changes through the help of the international community is imperative to achieve a prosperous economy, restore faith in the Afghan Government, and alleviate the citizens’ fear of the Taliban to truly achieve long-term success for Afghanistan.
Figures

Figure 10: Breakdown of the Taliban’s Annual Revenue

![Breakdown of the Taliban’s Annual Revenue](image)

Figure 11: Net cultivation of opium poppy in selected countries, 1999-2013 (Hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>South-West Asia</th>
<th>South-East Asia</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
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Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014
Figure 12: May 31, 2017, Kabul Afghanistan

Source: The New York Times

Figure 13: 9/11, NYC, NY

Source: Business Insider
References


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<td>Counterintelligence Team</td>
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