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European Union foreign Policy

Dr. Venkatesha H S

Department of Political Science, Mangalore University, Konaje 574199

Abstract: This study has been undertaken to investigate the development of European foreign policy. The EU has started to play an active role not only in economic and political issues among its member states, but also to address international issues through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992. The Treaty represents an important milestone for the EU and its institutional arrangements. This policy marked a significant leap forward in attempts to transcend the EU's minor political role in international political affairs compared to its growing economic strength. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to provide the historical background of the formation of European foreign policy

Key words: European Union, Common foreign and security policy, ESDP, Lisbon Treaty

I. INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The beginning of the European Union, which began with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was proposed by Robert Schuman. This was the first of a succession of supranational European entities that evolved into the European Union we know today. The ECSC was based on supranational principles and was, through the establishment of a common market for coal and steel, intended to expand the economy, increase employment, and raise the standard of living within the Community¹. Following the successful establishment of the European coal and steel community, the member countries proposed an ambitious proposal was made to introduce a common European army within the framework of a European defence community. Member's countries proposed that European defence

¹ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0022&from=EN>

community must include the German army and try to be placed under a single military and political European Union authority.

EDC was rejected by the French Assembly in August 1954. The main reasons of the EDC rejected by the French assembly are: The EDC threatened France national sovereignty, constitutional concerns about the indivisibility of the French Republic and fears about West Germany's remilitarization; French Communist opposed a plan trying France to the capitalist United States and settings it in oppositions to the Communist bloc; EDC debate was taken in August 1954, some four years after the Plevin Plan had been announced and more than two years after it had been signed; After further delays, during which time the government of Pierre Mendes-France announced that it would abstain, EDC was suddenly brought to vote after only two speeches; EDC opponents then introduced a motion to adjourn debate, a procedural motion which has immediate precedence; Public opinion was divided between those who favored ratification and the opposed, and as a consequence the treaty failed to pass a vote in the National Assembly on August 30, 1954².

Thus, the EDC was an important step in the evolution of European States to cooperate in the areas of foreign and security policy. Through this EDC, European countries learned to further efforts to cooperate in the areas of foreign and security policy. And failure of the EDC demonstrated that it was not right time to cooperate in areas of foreign and security policy.

During the Cold War period, the efforts of European union foreign policy with in EU was not succeeded, because France has often played the role of the driving force in the foreign and security policy, but received far less enthusiastic support from Germany here than on other issues. And Britain has been particularly skeptical to the development of an independent security and defence role for the European Union³. Britain's skepticism must be seen as a consequence partly of the country's close ties to the United States and partly as a consequence of British reservations about developing a strong political dimension of EU⁴. And also as we aware of that after the Second World War Europe was divided between Western and Eastern Europe. Western European countries were supported by the US and Eastern European countries

² Elisabeth Dureau, "Defense in the construction of Europe the stakes of security and problems of co-operation", in Chopra H.S, Robert Frank, Jurgen schrider, ed. "National Identity and regional cooperation Experience of European integration and south Asian perceptions", New Delhi ,Monohar, 1999 pp. 225-35

³ Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, "The foreign policy of the European Union", New York; Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. P-4.

⁴FederigaBindi, note 1 p 32

supported by the Soviet Union both US and Soviet Union would play the dominant roles in European security.

After De Gaulle, the European Community initiated European political co-operation to push foreign policy closer to the gradual importance of economic and political events beyond the European borders. But security and political issues had limitations in the framework of the European Community; however, the discussions could take place outside the European Community Platform. This resulted; the European community not came to finalize the European foreign policy.

Single European Act had its major impact on economic integration, and also gave a new impetus to EPC for the first time in its history. The main provisions of the SEA Act are as follow as; to strengthen the EU's foreign policy co-operation framework reflected the growing demands on the EU to respond collectively to the pressures on the common market from the international political economy; in a limited way the SEA sought to strengthen the institutional capacity on EC it introduced co-decision procedure that reality increased the of the EP in decision making structure; still retaining the intergovernmental structure, the SEA provides for majority voting in EPC in limited areas; it also had an effect on the decision of a member of countries to apply for membership Cyprus, Malta, Austria and Turkey feared being left outside the reinvigorated common market; it allowed the Council to confer implementation powers on the Commission; this act established a Court of first instance to assist the European Court of Justice in its work; also it gives formal recognition to the European Council and EPC, the latter being the forerunner of the CFSP; In addition, the SEA imposed an obligation on EC Member States to refrain from any unilateral action that impair their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international organizations.

After the few years of EPC came into force, in global level Cold War was ended and Soviet Union was collapsed. Many of Eastern European countries took freedom from Soviet Union and they were interested join the EU community. Moreover, in Middle and Eastern Europe, were facing several problems like, economic and political instability, ethnic and nationalist conflict terrorism, migration, organized crime, cross-border terrorism, spread of nuclear weapons and massive violation of Human rights had emerged as main security threats towards European Security.

As a result of these challenges and new security environment in Europe, it was externally and internally expected and demand from the European community to play an active role in global politics. However, during the four events which broke out in the early 1990's, the Gulf war, the tragedy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and Yugoslavian conflict are shows that European community states failure to act as a coherent actor undermined their international credibility and effectiveness⁵. Because Europe was busy with itself. EU began with the process of transformation and process of creating a common European Currency, all member states were busy with themselves and Germany involved in his process of unification of both East and West Germany but France and Great Britain did not look too favorably of the German unification⁶.

the Yugoslavia crisis the member's countries were lack of the coordination on the issue of military intervention in the Yugoslavia conflict. The France proposed the sending of a peacekeeping force, but the UK, Denmark, Germany and Portugal opposed this. In this situation at the emergency meeting of the WEU council on September 1991, the Netherlands Presidency proposed the dispatch of a lightly armed force under the auspices of the WEU. The UK opposed military intervention in Yugoslavian conflict, because the UK believed that it was difficult and dangerous to involve into a long-term anti insurgency operation which required more tropes and high casualties were likely. Therefore the EU member's countries could not agree on a common position both on military intervention and recognition of the breakaway republics, so EU member's countries were not able to stop the conflict⁷. Their lack of coherence during the crisis undermined their effectiveness and credibility. These events are create a space for launch the effective common foreign and security policy to make the EU as a coherent and effective foreign and security actor in global politics. Therefore, European member countries lunch a common foreign and security policy an intergovernmental model by Maastricht Treaty in 1993.

⁵Michael Smith, "European foreign and security policy", Simon Bromley Ed... *Governing the European Union*, New Delhi; Sage, 2001, p - 276.

⁶DejanMarolov, "The EU policy towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia: Special emphasis on the EU policy towards the Republic of Macedonia", *Analytical Journal*, Research gate.net, 20th May 2014. p- 2.

http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dejan_Marolov/publication/235672055_The_EU_policy_towards_the_dissolution_of_Yugoslavia_Special_emphasis_on_the_EU_policy_towards_the_Republic_of_Macedonia/links/00b7d523700b1553e6000000.pdf

⁷Simon J.Nuttall, *European Foreign Policy*, United States: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 15.

Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on the European Union, was signed by all the member states of the European Economic Community on the 7th February 1992 and came into full force on the 1st November 1993. By this treaty all members' states establish among themselves a European Union, hereinafter called the Union. Alongside this treaty was the creation single currency. The changes that were a result the member states desire to supplement the Single European Act and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. This treaty consisted of three main pillars: Economic and Monetary Union, Common foreign and security policy and Justice and Home affairs.

The Maastricht treaty recognized the political vocation of the alliance but sought to reinforce, through the WEU, the European identity given to the defence⁸. Before the signature of the Maastricht Treaty formally known as Treaty on European Union, the two separate intergovernmental conference of the autumn of 1991 had taken into account the modification that had occurred within the alliance. The heads of 12 member states could consider the emergence of the European identity of defence favorably. "The assertion of a European identity of security and defense will show that Europeans are ready to assume a large share of responsibility for their security and will help to strengthen transatlantic security"⁹.

The CFSP operation was started in November 1993, European Union members states efforts to the end war in the former Yugoslavia and assistance in monitoring in Russia and South Africa. But Yugoslavia crisis exhibited the breakdown of the EU in international influence actions. Many of the EU countries expected to stop the conflict, but the CFSP did not have effective involved in to stop the conflict because European foreign and security policy not a full pledge policy and facing a lack of cooperation on security and defence within the members states. And the major countries of the EU, Britain and France actively took part in the United Nations peace keeping mission in the Balkans. The Balkan crisis could not facilitate the community to a common position in the Balkans would indicate problems of structure and political will¹⁰. Therefore the EU' involvement through the CFSP was not succeeded to stop the Conflicts in Balkan and need to be reform.

⁸ Elisabeth Dureau, Note, p. 232

⁹ibid p. 232

¹⁰Christopher, S. Raj, "European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy", in Rajendra K .Jain ed, European Union in a changing World, New Delhi; Radiant, 2002, p. 89

European Security and Defence Policy

The Maastricht Treaty in favour of the first time controlled necessities on the EU's accountability for everyone asks questions relating to its security. There was not a serious attempt to organize security and defence policy at that time, because several member states, particularly Great Britain, wished towards refuting the EU a significant role in the security and defence field. And also the CFSP action was also not satisfactory to the other member states of the European Union. Therefore, the member states urged to bring about changes in, leadership of foreign and security policy, decision-making process, cooperation, political/defence issue, member states' disagreements, the need for military power to mitigate the Kosovo conflict, the beginning of European security negotiations, finance and so on. A step forward in this direction was the Treaty of Amsterdam, which gave the EU a recognizable European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) for the first time.

The European security and Defence policy was started through the St Malo agreement on European Union. And this is an integral body of the Common foreign and security policy. Saint Malo was a watershed and the first successful European security cooperation outside the transatlantic framework, after the failures of the European Defence Community and the limited success of the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) with the Western European Union.

The UK had traditionally avoided discussion of defence issues in the EU, insisting on the primary role of the US and NATO in European defence¹¹. Therefore, Tony Blair was taking initiative to developing the defence cooperation the EU. This was an initiative to prevent the French, Italian, and Spanish governments from forcing military and security into the agenda in a way that disadvantaged British Interests. But Saint Malo has to be seen in a more general Political context, this was led by the UK and France.¹² In this situation, Tony Blair put out a call to the cabinet ministers to find policy areas in which the UK could further advance Integration. The Minister of the Defence department responded to this call, with a proposal for European defence integration without undermining NATO's role¹³. The direction of the Ministry of Defence department, Tony Blair, at the informal EU summit at Pörschach in October 1998 signalled a significant shift in British attitudes to European defence issues.

¹¹ Mark Oakes, "European Defence: From Pörschach to Helsinki" House of common Library Research Paper 00/20, London; International Affairs and Defence Section, 21 February 2000. <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP00-20.pdf>.

¹²Robert Dover, "From CFSP to CSDP: the EU's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies", in Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez- Solorzano Borragan.ed., European Union Politics Third Edition, New York; Oxford University press, 2010. p.247.

¹³ibid. p.247.

One week after Saint- Malo the European heads of state and government met in Vienna on 11-12 December 1998. The European Council welcomed the new impetus given to that debate on a common European Policy on Security and defence. The European Council considered that for the EU to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible capabilities. It welcomed the Franco-British declaration made on 4 December 1998 in Saint Malo. Both countries stated that “Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis¹⁴.

The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states, including the obligations of some member states to NATO.¹⁵ The EC invited the incoming German presidency to further this debate in the wake of the discussion and examine the issue in Cologne on 3 and 4 June 1999. At the June 1999 European Council debate in Cologne, the member states declared their determination that the EU shall play its full role on the international stage and to that end they intended to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense. The Union must have the capacity for autonomous active backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to intentional crisis without prejudice to action by NATO.¹⁶

The European Council met in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999. In this meeting member countries agreed to, the Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and recognizes the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. It underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.¹⁷ In Continuation, the European Council's meetings in Helsinki, Cologne and Sinatra aimed to extending the EU importance in

¹⁴European institute for Security Studies, “Joint Declaration Issued at the British and French Summit, Saint Malo, France 3-4 December 1998” France; February 2000. Access date 10-02-2015

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>.

¹⁵Presidency Conclusions, “European Council Vienna 11-12 December 1999” in MaartjeRutten, “From St-Malo to Nice European Defence: core documents”, Chaillot paper 47, France; The institute for security studies of Western European Union, May 2001.. p- 9 <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp047e.pdf>.

¹⁶Jean Yves Haine, “Historical Perspective” in Nicole Gnesotto, ed. EU Security and Defense Policy the First Five Years (1999-2004), Paris; Institute of security studies, 2002 PP. 33-55 <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/5esdpen.pdf>.

¹⁷Conclusions of the Presidency, “Helsinki European Council 10-11.12.1999”, Pittsburgh; Archive of European Integration, 1999. Access date 11-02-2015. http://aei.pitt.edu/43338/1/Helsinki_1999.pdf

internationally with the effective implementation security and security policy. Consequently, the European security and defence policy created platform to EU as credible political actor.

Consequently, the development of the ESDP since its lunch at Saint Malo, varying interest and views of member's states problematic about the future development of the EU as a credible actor. Disagreements among member's states in defence matters make enhanced cooperation only viable solution for preserving the cohesion among EU member's states concerning the CFSP. As a result, in order to preserve the coherence among EU member's states, keeping civilian character of the EU and strengthening of civilian capabilities of the CFSP on which Member States agree and the application of enhanced cooperation in defence matters in which willing Member States participate and flexible ad hoc coalitions emerged for military operation is more appropriate¹⁸.

The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and was expected to enter into force on 1 January 2003 following ratification by each of the fifteen member states. The Treaty of Nice opened the way to the institutional reform for the EU enlargement with the accession of countries from eastern and southern Europe. The Nice facilitates the establishment of enhanced cooperation: the right of veto which the Member States enjoyed over the establishment of enhanced cooperation has disappeared (except in the field of foreign policy), the number of Member States required for launching the procedure has changed from the majority to the fixed number of eight Member States, and its scope has been extended to the CFSP¹⁹.

Enhanced cooperation in any of the areas referred to in this title shall be aimed at safeguarding the values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene. It shall respect: the principles, objectives, general guidelines and consistency of the common foreign and security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy; the powers of the European Community, and consistency between all the Union's policies and its external activities²⁰. Therefore the CFSP process has been continuing and the European Union member states have been furthering their efforts in reforming the CFSP and making the EU more coherent and effective global actor in global politics.

¹⁸ Taylan Ozgur kaya, "the common foreign and security policy: the European Union's quest for being a coherent and effective actor in global politics, middle east technical university, June 2004

¹⁹European Council, "Enhanced cooperation", EUR-Lex- Access to European Union Law, Brussels; Publications office, 2001. Access date 11-02-2015. Available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:xy0015>

²⁰European Council, "Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European communities and certain related acts", Brussels; Official Journal of European Communities C80/3, 10 September 2001. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_nice.pdf.

Since the launch of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has developed new structures and instruments for the crisis management. Moreover, the EU had strengthened the role as a force for peace. Most of the objectives set out in the Maastricht treaty were accomplished by the Treaty of Amsterdam and Treaty of Nice. Therefore, the EU continuing the conducting of crisis-management operations in global politics

After the Nice Treaty implementation of the EU, an 11 September 2001, Terrorists belong to Al-Qaeda hijacked air planes destroyed the World Trade Center in New York and a wing of the Pentagon in Washington. This attack was major impact and changed the security perceptions in entire World. President Bush made this speech to the public on September 12, 2001, “today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America, with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could”.²¹ However, the USA calls upon all Members States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizer and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting would be punished. In addition it also gave call to the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation²².

The EU’s initial response to the terrorist attack of September 11 was immediate and practical. The European Commission, as, for instance, activated its system for civil protection unit very next day of the USA attack. The aim of this unit was to coordinate intervention in case of disasters. On the same day, the NATO council declared that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. More interestingly which states that armed attacks against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all²³.

After this attack USA attack on Taliban, USA took decision military action in Iraq without an explicit UN mandate and with only some members of the EU. Bush had to claim that Saddam Hussein was linked to Al- Qaida and was actively developing weapons of mass destruction which he might turn over to terrorists or use on their behalf, and hence Iraq posed a threat to the USA. These claims have not only been discredited but, additionally, there is strong evidence that the war party in Washington deliberately exaggerated unreliable claims and knew Iraq was no threat to the USA. At any rate, the threat was not that

²¹ George W. Bush, “Address to the nation on the terrorist attacks 11th September 2001”, online by Gerhard Peters and John Woolley, the American Presidency Project. Access date 12-03-2015. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057>.

²² UN Security Council, “Resolution 1368 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th meeting, Department of Secretary General, 12th September 2001. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n01/533/82/pdf/n0153382.pdf?openelement>.

²³North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Statement of North Atlantic Council”, New York; NATO press release reference, 2001 (124), updated 15th September 2001. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>.

the weapons of mass destruction would be used in the USA but that they could constrain US freedom of action in the Middle East or threaten Israel²⁴.

The understanding of the invasion of Iraq is a grand strategy of the US and the leadership of Bush they decided to undertake a coercive assertion to continue and maintain the unilateral global hegemony. USA decision was agreed by only Spain, Italy, Britain, Portugal but other EU member countries not agreed the military action against Iraq. Therefore the EU was split between Old and New Europe and highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion at EU level.

In this situation, European Union started to negotiate the common strategic vision through the European Security Strategy (ESS). This ESS was under the tile of the A Secure Europe in a Better World.²⁵ The ESS strategy was focusing the proliferation of weapons in mass destruction, international terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. The ESS is extremely important because it identifies and defines the root causes of and the extent of the security threat as the EU sees them. The ESS articulated precisely this idea when it calls upon the Union to make use of the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military, and civilian, trade and development activities. The effectiveness and coherence of ESDP missions are clearly linked to the diplomatic and foreign policy institutions deployed to deal with the comments of a given crisis²⁶.

Lisbon Treaty

After the European Security Strategy, the EU was ready to share in the responsibility for global security. It affirmed the role it wanted to play in the world, supporting an international order based on effective multilateralism within the UN. Member States' strong commitment to give the enlarged EU the tools to make a major contribution to security and stability in a ring of well-governed countries around Europe and the world is stronger than ever. But after the involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq the EU need more coherent and effective foreign policy along with defence. However, EU member states aware about the needed the civilian and military framework to face the multifaceted security threats.

²⁴North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Statement of North Atlantic Council", New York; NATO press release reference, 2001 (124), updated 15th September 2001. Access date 13-03-2015. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>.

²⁵ European Council, "A Secure in a Better World", Brussels; 12 December 2003. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

²⁶Quaker Council for European Affairs, "The EU's Response to the Threat of Terrorism", Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Counter- Terrorism Coordinator, Brussels; Briefing Paper 4, PP. 1-4. <http://www.qcea.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/bp-terror4-cfsp-en-2005.pdf>

Therefore, the EU member countries signed the Lisbon Treaty on 13 December 2007. It came into effect on 1 December 2009. The treaty does not constitute another treaty but amends the Maastricht Treaty (1993), known in updated form as the Treaty on European Union (2007) and the Treaty of Rome, known in updated form as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 1(b) of the Lisbon Treaty provides “those two Treaties shall have the same legal value”.

The Lisbon Treaty was important and significant of the European Union. This treaty was given importance to economic and political issues. The treaty was launched the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), past ESDP. This Treaty was recommended to the member states to adjust and to adapt to the new situation, especially in the field of external relations. The creation of European External Action Service offers new opportunities to coordinate better between traditional external policy instruments and internal instruments.²⁷ Lisbon Treaty introduced several innovations intended to make the CFSP more coherent and, as a result, to strengthen the EU’s role as a global actor.

Conclusion:

CFSP is one of the most sensitive issues in EU activity. This policy is directly linked with member countries national sovereignty. The long histories of many member states as world powers in their own rights and the wide range of bilateral relationships between member states and other parts of the World. That is why it has always been facing unwillingness of member states to limit their power in this area in favour of the Union. The EU was started the security and defence policy through the EDC after the formation of the ECSC.

This was an important step in the evolution of European States to cooperate in the areas of foreign and security policy. The end of the Cold War pushed the twelve member’s states to further institutionalize the EPC and think about defence. Indeed the end of the Cold War was leaving the further of NATO uncertain. During the conflict of the Yugoslavian crisis, the European Union showed the great interest to resolve the conflict. This interest displayed was clearly a result of the Maastricht treaty, which incorporated new norms and the roles for the European Commission as well as the genesis of the CFSP. The EU throughout the Yugoslav wars its unwillingness to use military force in order to convince the warring parties to sign a peace agreement

²⁷Council of the European Union, “EU Action Plan on combating terrorism”, Brussels; Council Presidency Conclusions 15893/1/10 Rev 1, 17th January 2011.p-2.
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=en&f=st%2015893%202010%20rev%201>

After the series of development, European leader attempts to build a common foreign policy debating between two directions in which to take. One option being that they will have greater international power and persuasion if they act as a Union, while the second is that strengthening the power of the EU will sacrifice more of member states national sovereignty²⁸. In the end, the TEU was established with the intention of adding strength and a stronger common approach to foreign policy, resulting in the creation of the CFSP.

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²⁸ John McCormack, *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction* (4th Ed), UK; Palgrave MacMillan 2008. P-190

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