



THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND ARMED CONFLICT

A Case Study of South Sudan

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Abstract: This study has been undertaken to establish the relationship between corruption and conflict in South Sudan. Corruption has recently and directly been associated with conflict. Two lines of thought have emerged in explaining the relationship between corruption and conflict, that is, whether corruption fuels conflict or corruption buys peace. Previous studies mainly focused on cross-sectional studies of a group of countries to establish this relationship. A gap existed to contextualise this relationship on a specific society. Using a desk-based analysis and South Sudan for a case study, this research aimed at unravelling the relationship based on South Sudan's context. The study finds the existence of both relationships in explaining conflict in South Sudan: corruption has partly been a cause of conflict in South Sudan and, since 2005, corruption has been used to buy off restive groups to the government until 2013 when it became unsustainable, due to economic downturn and power struggle. The study further finds that it is insufficient to narrow down the understanding of a conflict situation, based on these two theories alone. They do not give a holistic picture of a conflict situation. In South Sudan's context, there are deep seated issues that need to be addressed in order to attain a sustainable peace in the country. These include among others, historical and ideological differences, ethnic marginalisation, weak institutions, a constitution that provides very little or no checks of the President's power, and poor service provision. For a comprehensive, inclusive and sustainable reforms and peace, civil society, regional countries, and international community have to be involved, since they have a stake in the conflict.

Key Terms - Corruption, conflict, peace, relationship, South Sudan

I. INTRODUCTION

Corruption has recently and directly been associated with conflict (Transparency International (TI), (2014). The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) clearly depicts a trend that countries with the highest level of corruption are countries ravaged with conflict. At the bottom of the list of CPI- top corrupt countries in the world from 2013-2015 include: Somalia, North Korea, Sudan, Afghanistan, and South Sudan (Ibid, 2014 & 2015). With Somalia missing in the data, South Sudan and Afghanistan are confirmed in the World Bank (WB) World Corruption Perception Index as the most corrupt countries in the world (WB, 2014).

Two lines of thought have emerged in explaining the relationship between corruption and conflict, that is, corruption fuelling conflict and corruption buying peace. According to Le Billon (2003) - the principal proponent of "corruption fuels conflict"- conflict may be caused by alteration in the pattern of corruption rather than corruption per se. This goes way back in 1995's Mauro's index with finding of a "positive significant correlation between bureaucratic inefficiency and political instability", as a consequence of coordination failure within the regime in power (Mauro, 1995:705). Underdeveloped states tend to have inefficient and complex bureaucratic processes that result into political instability (Ibid). In other indices, political instability and corruption correlate solidly at a regional categorisation, with most corrupt countries also being the most unstable ones. Due to specific country's situations, this correlation is less strong at a state level, but remains important (IMF, (1999), cited in Le Billon, 2003). All these findings corroborate the postulation that corruption fuels conflict.

On the contrary, Fjelde (2009) - the leading adherent of "corruption buys peace"- postulates that governments, especially in oil producing countries, utilise oil revenues to buy support from the dissenting factions of the country, effectually buying off the conflict entrepreneurs. Charap and Harm (1999) finds that corruption partly forms the societal fabrics and can be an organised move. The autocrats can reduce the likelihood of uprising by allowing patron-clientelistic relationship to prevail. Furthermore, a military solution and sharing the proceeds of resources have historically played significant roles in ending conflict in resource rich countries. However, the sharing agreements have engendered more sustainable peace than military solutions (Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007:613). These findings support the proposition that corruption buys peace.

Basedau and Lay (2009) assert that the bi-theories make it ambivalent to understand the role of corruption in either engendering peace or armed conflict. T.I (2014) advances that corruption does not only exacerbate conflict but make it difficult to settle. Fjelde (2009) concludes that her study is based on a general pattern of a cross section of countries in understanding corruption and conflict nexus. She calls for follow up in-depth studies on specific contexts, to further unpack this relationship. This article seeks to further

explain the relationship between corruption and conflict, based on the two theories above- whether corruption fuels conflict or buys peace, using South Sudan (which lies at the bottom of the CPI and an oil producing country) for an in-depth case study. The study examines, using the desk-based review, only up to the outbreak of conflict in the country in December 2013, between the two major factions led by the President and the former Vice President respectively. In order to unpack this relationship, the study asks two distinct sets of questions:

- i. Did corruption play a major role in the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan in 2013? Did it fuel conflict?
- ii. Did corruption play a major role in the resolution of conflict in South Sudan, including the signing of the Compromise Peace Agreement for South Sudan (CPASS) in August 2015?

This study finds correlations between the two theories and the conflict in South Sudan. Corruption and the quest to control the proceeds there in triggered the conflict, when senior officials including the cabinet ministers were dismissed from their offices by the President, on accusations of embezzlement and inefficiencies. On the other hand, since the signing of agreement of secession from Sudan in 2005, the government of South Sudan has co-opted numerous armed groups into the army, promoted their commanders into army generals and many of the bought individuals given key positions in the government ministries until 2013 when this could not be sustained due to high level of corruption, economic downturn and power struggle, and the country plunged back into conflict. The agreement signed in 2015 has accommodated the fired officials back to the government by reinstating them and creating special positions for some for the 30 months' transition period.

However, at a deeper level, the conflict is deeply rooted and transcends 'corruption fuels conflict' and 'corruption buys peace' propositions. The conflict is a result of a long-term ideological unresolved differences, marginalisation, lack of mechanisms to resolve conflict within the ruling party, almost unchecked powers of the President, weak institutions, and failure to provide the basic services in the country. To ensure sustainable peace and a prosperous South Sudan, these issues should be critically addressed.

This research is organised around five chapters. Following this introduction, chapter 2 reviews the literature on the topic, focusing on five themes; governance, resources, ethnicity, small wars, and how they relate to corruption and conflict. Chapter 3 is the methodology chapter. It describes the theoretical framework used in this study, methods of data collection, strategy and design of the study, how the case study fits into the topic, and limitations of this study. Chapter 4 discusses the findings of the research. The findings are grouped according to the research questions, and further according to the different themes emerging from the data reviewed. Lastly, chapter 5 concludes by looking back at the questions, and appropriately giving the final thought on the topic.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses the literature on the debate surrounding corruption and conflict nexus, as a strand of thinking in international development. The chapter is thematically classified on the themes of: governance, corruption and conflict; natural resources, corruption and conflict; ethnicity, corruption and conflict; and small wars, corruption and conflict. These themes help in understanding the prevailing environment within which corruption and conflict interact to create undesirable society to live in. Bad governance is often characterised by state fragility and vague legal provisions, which are taken advantage of by some actors to carry out illegal activities within and across borders, exacerbating corruption and conflict. Ethnicity breeds nepotism, manifested in the form of unfair distribution of benefits/wealth among one or more groups at the expense of other/s, culminating into conflict to a certain degree. Primary resources - oil, diamonds and other minerals - often breed greed and/or grievances. By promoting rent seeking behaviour, the expected impact of abundance is often paradoxical in that, availability of lootable resources like mineral deposits, contribute to slow growth and war not economic growth or peace. This "un-peacefulness" is often in the form of small wars-moderate wars without any proper political agenda. The review begins with the theme of governance.

2.1. Governance, corruption and conflict

This theme highlights governance challenges, characterised by authoritarianism, state fragility, legitimacy challenges, exclusion, poverty, challenges in basic service provision, vague legal provisions, good enough governance and so on. Some actors take advantage of these chaotic societies to carry out illegal activities within and across borders, exacerbating corruption and conflict.

The debate on the nexus between corruption and conflict can be broadly fit within the broader governance agenda. Governance, among its definitions, refers to "the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels" (UNDP, 1997:3), or the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development...encompasses the role of public authority in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled (OECD, 1993:18).

In the same vein, corruption contains multiple connotations. It may allude to a government disproportionately channeling benefits to areas of its stronghold (Rose-Ackerman, 2005:207) or "the misuse of public office/ public power for private or political gains" (Svensson, 2005:20 and Rose-Ackerman, 2005:208). It manifests in the forms of "sale of government property by government officials, kickbacks in public procurement, bribery and embezzlement of government funds, fraud, self-dealing and state capture" (Svensson, 2005:20; Rose-Ackerman, 2005:208).

Conflict on the other hand "occurs when the interests of one party come by accident or designed into engagement with those of another or others" (Cooper, 2003:85). This implies that conflict can be intentional or unintentional, planned or unplanned, violent, mild or non-violent. In this dissertation, I am focussing on the violent type.

In light of the above definitions, governance, corruption and conflict are closely linked to state failure (Weinstein, et al., 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Rose-Ackerman 2008). In his summary article, Brinkerhoff (2005) coalesces the contributions of different scholars on the significance of governance in engendering peace, reconstructing peace and preventing conflict. He summarises plenteous causes of state fragility and armed conflict that relate to governance, to include authoritarianism and abuse of power, poverty and no growth of economy; marginalisation of certain groups, disproportionate service provision and employment opportunities; and a weak government unable to contain political and societal disputes. He concludes with a call to address legitimacy to ensure security and effective governance. Furthermore, in the absence of better governance, the probability of conflict and corruption remains high. Attempts in addressing governance weakness have mainly focused on democratic elections, buttressing legislature, building government structure, inclusion of civil society and attempts to address corruption (Brinkerhoff, 2009:3, cited in Doig and Tisne, 2009:375).

Weak governments, especially those coming out of conflict, have vague legal provisions and officials take advantage of them to concoct crimes, collect bribes and extort money from the common citizens. Illicit businesses in drugs and arms are common and dealers collaborate with government officials to continue operating. Powerful military officials within the government threaten or apply violence to perpetuate illegal trade and corruption. If the system is running in their favour, there is seldom violence; victims of extortion and violence fearfully keep quiet, although this affects legitimation, democracy and risks fragility. A seemingly quiet system is not necessarily a connotation for good governance (Rose-Ackerman, 2008:328-329). Peace builders have to be cautious not to sharply attack and deviate from this vicious system, as the beneficiaries fight to keep the system as it is (Le Billon, 2003). In most cases, even though addressing corruption is evidently known to the peace-builders as a vital element in approaching governance, it does not take priority in post-war phase, even though it was recognisably among the factors that fuelled conflict (Doig and Tisne, 2009:382).

Weak states threaten national and international security, especially in providing a vacuum for breeding terrorism. In their security report for United States government, Weinstein, et al., (2004) associate weak and failing states with well-connected trans-bordered criminal activities, impoverishment of citizens, epidemics, humanitarian catastrophes, very poor service delivery, especially in education and health; and the governments' institutional inability and at times unwillingness to respond as the citizens and international community expect them to, as epitomised in Afghanistan, Somalia, Haiti, certain Central African countries, among others. This state of affairs creates a society with impunity and embezzlement by government officials who oppose reform programs and struggle to maintain a violent society (Rose-Ackerman, 2008: 328). Furthermore, bribery and politics are inextricably linked. Certain countries have relaxed regulations to fight bribery, while others use such laws to fight dissenting voices, while corrupt officials frequently engage in gainful state pursuits (Rose-Ackerman, 1997: 93). National, regional and international collaboration that transcends security alone, to addressing the root causes of the problem, including development and institutional challenges are proposed (Koppell & Sharma, 2003; Weinstein, et al., 2004). The aim is having a functional government where violence and politics are rarely infused and where indictment of corrupt officials do not have negative political repercussions (Rose-Ackerman, 2008:328).

According to Doig and Tisne (2009), failures in a pre-conflict society carry through the post-conflict phase. In future, corruption may cause problem like conflict, if it is not well addressed, for example in good enough governance. Addressing corruption and conflict relates to addressing legitimacy problem. Brinkerhoff (2005:5) advances that addressing legitimacy encompasses creating a participatory and inclusive state, improving equity among different groups, tackling accountability problem, organising competitive elections, effective service delivery and fighting corruption. These logically allude to legal reform, political will and institutional building to check the functions of government organs and officials, and supporting the role of civil society. Judiciary requires special focus in post-conflict societies: lack of accountability and corruption in the security sector impede service delivery and legitimacy, and risk the society bouncing back into conflict (Koppell & Sharma, 2003)

The strict concern for addressing corruption in governance is compromised in good enough governance agenda. According to Grindle (2002), good governance as it presents serious problems as a framework for development. It implies overhauling the social and economic institutions of the countries in question; overhauling how human resource, technocrats and administrators operate to provide basic services; changing decision making process, and so on. This aligns with Bräutigam (2000) that third world countries are characterised by undeveloped government institutions that are poorly managed, run by poorly qualified and semiskilled and demotivated technocrats, and the government is characterised by disenfranchisement, political tension, very weak culture of fighting corruption, and is semi-legitimate. Therefore, good enough governance, instead advocates "a condition of minimally acceptable government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development and that permits poverty reduction initiatives to go forward" (Grindle, 2002:2). This relegates any serious dealing with corruption in the background.

Good enough governance approach has been adopted by donors in their operations, even in post-conflict countries. This prioritises stability, protecting people from violence and giving guidance to those societies to support themselves economically, even though corruption may be high and the government is weak (DFID, 2005). It emphasises tailoring priorities to the prevailing conditions and what is workable and likely to achieve results (Grindle, 2007). Good enough governance, however, frustrates the need to fight corruption as noted: "the danger with the approach is that corruption becomes one of the issues to be moved down the timescale and prioritisation of any agenda through, for example, postponing reforms or accepting the need to work with corrupt or potentially corrupt governments to move the wider reform agenda forward" (Doig and Tisne, 2009:384). Ignoring issues of integrity in post-conflict reconstruction, for example, constrained and negatively affected, stalled and delayed post-conflict development in Bosnia, Herzegovina, among other countries. From this perspective, transparency measures have to be incorporated in the reconstruction phase of conflict societies from the very beginning (Ibid).

In a society where the cause of conflict was partly elite capture of power and mismanagement especially at the national level, conflict resolution espouses devolution of power to the local level (Brinkerhoff, 2005). It promotes peace by granting a considerable independence to the local community in resolving communal and ethnic tensions; decentralised areas have more power to control their own resources; checks and balances are instituted to guide the actions of local and national officials and prevent conflict reoccurrence; there is little disagreement on service delivery at the decentralised level compared to national level, and hence conflict is easily manageable; and decentralised areas can be used as learning arenas for political and conflict settlement that can be replicated to other areas.

This section has, hitherto, discussed how governance concerns relate to corruption and conflict. Causes of state fragility are highlighted, issues of vague legal provisions that some actors take advantage of are discussed; the vacuum provided by state fragility and trans-border illegal activities; weak institutions, poor service provision, and so on. These are serious governance concerns that provide opportunities for corrupt practices and conflict. Good enough governance, institutional building, decentralisation... are cited among the possible remedies. The next section discusses how natural resources are interwoven with conflict and corruption. Issues of corruption buys peace, as one part of theoretical lens for this dissertation, are closely associated with resource rich countries, as the preceding literature illuminate.

2.2. Natural resources, corruption and conflict

This section discusses how primary resources - oil, diamonds and other minerals - weave into corruption and conflict. The discussion highlights the concerns of greed and grievance arguments, personal economic benefits, self-seeking attitudes, weak institutions, and the distributions of spoils among individual supporters and groups. All these promote corrupt dealings that culminate into conflict or the proceeds may be used to buy off the belligerents.

The debate around conflict and corruption is closely linked to resources, their management and benefits, particularly in oil producing countries. In her book, "The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations", Ross (2012) investigates the oil curse phenomenon back to 1970s and concludes that since 1980s, most underdeveloped non-oil producing nations have increased in wealth and democracy and peace have prevailed. Yet, oil rich developing nations have experienced the reverse-unstable economically, more conflict, and more autocratic regimes. Using logit models and datasets from databases of political institutions involving 177 states in the period of 1976 to 2006, Wegeast (2013) concludes that with availability of natural resources like oil, states with many political parties are vulnerable to wars. These resources breed sudden riches, inflated values of state currencies, self-seeking attitudes, grievances, incapacitated institutions and autocracy. These findings contravene the line of thought that availability of political parties in a country reduces internal wars, by disuniting and winning over the dissidents into the political establishment, by distributing oil rents to some of them, and the political parties arguably would prefer settling grievances using established institutions and seeking to dislodge the current regime democratically and not violently (Wright, 2008).

Greed and grievance argument is extensively written on by Paul Collier, and this directly resonates with the conflicts that take place in oil and mineral producing countries. In his statistical analysis of the global pattern of wars since 1965, Collier (2000) argues that economic gains appear to be pivotal in starting wars, other than genuine grievances. Logically, if economic goals are largely the causes of wars, then by extension, certain categories of people are gaining from these wars and they are motivated to instigate these wars and have no intention of stopping them. Civil conflicts provide economic benefits for the few in resource rich countries, yet the majority of the populace perish in them. However, further investigation employing a novel data-set from 1960-1999 finds that even though rebel groups use conflict to establish themselves to benefit, civil conflicts may be underpinned by genuine grievances, including widening inequality, infringement on civil liberties, and ethnic and religious differences in those environments. Nevertheless, economic reasons mirrored into grievances have stronger plausibility than social and political grievances (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004 & Stewart, 2008).

Other writers relate the problem of conflict and corruption with regard to resource production, to the problem of institutional challenges in those countries- institutions easily manipulated by elites. Thies (2010) investigates the theory that both state officials and rebel groups benefit from the war, and weak state capacity contributes to this phenomenon. The findings show that the capacity of state insubstantially impacts on conflict instigation, while civil conflict substantially incapacitates state institutions. Secondly, primary goods do not directly instigate conflict, on the other hand, their presence weakens state institutions (Ibid:321). Some authors argue that institutions can be developed to include different factions (O'Donnell, 1988), potentially buying off the belligerents into the existing regime. In another vein, Humphrey (2005:1) unravelled the resources and conflict nexus, using "rebel greed hypothesis" and data collected for both minerals (diamonds) and oil. The study confirms that resource conflicts are not directly related to state capacity, although there is little proof that resource conflicts are compounded when states are not strong enough to contain them. The study further finds that the start of resource wars is more dependent on the past benefits of production not the expected production, and this is correlated to institutionally incapacitated states and not greed. Furthermore, the findings of resource conflicts nuancedly relate to motivation due to frustrated subsistence living; creation of isolated networks; and correlates with short time horizon conflicts that are mainly won militarily, as foreign actors are bent on ending these wars if they affect the production and supplies of resources. The findings resonate with the strength of the organisations, inconsistent with the hardships in negotiations between the state and rebel groups which contravenes the argument that rebels are inclined on perpetuating the wars as they benefit from plundering resources (Malone and Berdal, 2013).

All in all, resource-conflict nexus and the corruption- unfair benefits involved there in- depend on certain features of the resources themselves. These entail among others, the prevailing conditions that allow conflicts to take place; ease or difficulty in extracting the resources, as pertains the technology; availability of the markets to sell the proceeds from the looted resource goods; the time horizons which the payments take to be received; the demography where the resources lie, and the aggregate size of the benefits envisioned; and the loopholes in the policies of extraction- if they encourage patronage-client relationships (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005; Basedau and Lay, 2009; Fjelde, 2009; and Wegeast, 2013: 394).

This section has highlighted how primary resources- oil, diamonds and other minerals- weave with corruption and conflict. The discussion has highlighted arguments about greed and grievance, personal economic benefits, self-seeking attitudes, weak institutions, the distributions of spoils among individual supporters and groups, and buying off the belligerents with the spoils. The next section will discuss how ethnicity relates to corruption and conflict.

2.3. Ethnicity, corruption and conflict

This section discusses how corruption affects ethnically diverse society and culminates into conflict. Corruption in this category is mainly nepotistic, manifested in the forms of marginalisation and unfair distribution of benefits/wealth among one or more groups at the expense of the other/s, creating differences in development indicators like GDP, per capita income, and general standard of living. The less privileged groups feel left out, and may start a conflict when unfairness exacerbates and the unity among the disfavoured group becomes stronger.

The phenomenon of ethnicity, especially ethnically diverse nations are associated with unfair distribution of benefits among one or more groups at the expense of other/s. In economic terms, corruption in ethnically diverse societies affect growth of some groups negatively, in terms of unfair distribution of wealth among groups, in terms of asset ownership like land, uneven per capita income and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), kleptocracy, perceived unfair policies among others (Benabou, 1996). The disfavoured groups save less compared to their counterparts, culminating into self-seeking behaviour, and unequal investment and growth. Corruption and tension become entrenched and social conflict ensues (Benebib, 2003: 329).

In investigating the correlation of economic growth with various factors, Easterly and Levine (1997) advance that low economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa in the facets of "low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits and insufficient infrastructure", are linked to ethnic differences (Ibid: 1203). These unfair differences sow seeds of social conflict traced back, for instance, in the differences in income, land holdings and wealth among social groups, primarily precipitating conflicts among those groups, and causing a massive political chaos (Midlarski, (1988), cited in Chakravarty, 2015; Brockett, 1992). Some authors argue that fractionalisation correlates with conflict, but are principally ubiquitous in a bi-ethnic society (Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2002).

In order to resolve ethnic conflicts, institutions can be developed to include different groups (O'Donnell, 1988), potentially buying off the belligerents into the existing regime. In examining "conditional institutionalist hypothesis", using data covering the period of 1950 to 2000, Schneider and Weisheimer (2008:183) confirm that factionalism is associated with low level conflict, and the

remedial strategy is to develop state institutions that embrace power sharing and curtail the likely occurrences of conflict in ethnically cosmopolitan societies. Allowing diverse representation, multi-partism, devolution of power and strong leadership protect the system from violent prone minorities, and prompt policymakers to enact laws that facilitate the system to win over opposition groups into the system. Using time series data from 1985-1988, Saideman, et al., (2002) buttress this position that democratic institutions and confederation in multiple-ethnic societies help to resolve the conflict, as elites take up political positions in those institutions and in federal or decentralised states. Furthermore, relevant institutional provisions set a platform, like multi-party provision, upon which the belligerents can advance their concerns, thereby dwindling the risk of violent option (Wegenast, 2013: 395; Huntington (1968). However, contradictorily, Schneider and Weisheimeier (2008) using data from 1950 to 2000, conclude that different groups in society construe institutions as a hindrance, and prefer the use of force if they cannot attain their aims through peaceful mechanisms. Polarised nations are inclined on starting conflicts, but the violence unleashed by these groups are always “moderate” and more common in democratic countries other than authoritarian ones (Esteban and Ray, 2008:4).

In summary, this section has shown how unfairness among different ethnic communities in a given society can be construed as a corrupt practice and thereby generating social conflict, and how institutions can be used to co-opt and include different groups to offset conflict occurrence. The next section highlights the type of conflict that is always associated with corruption, whether in a badly governed society, ethnically diverse countries, but most especially in a resource rich countries.

2.4. Small wars, corruption and conflict

The conflict considered to be fuelled by corruption in badly governed societies, ethnically diverse societies and conflict related to distribution of the benefits of resources, resonates with the type of war called small wars. These are wars that normally have no proper political agenda, have multiple armed factions, and the aim of fighting is mainly for personal enrichment, especially in resource rich countries, although also common in ethnically diverse societies. These are moderate wars and fighters are infused with civilians, and all parties are taking the opportunity to extract benefits from the armed and chaotic environment.

Inspired by 1966 Clausewitz’s lecture, small wars refer to the use of moderate, planned and unplanned violence, in most cases by non-state groups but also state actors, to attack a militarised enemy position so that the enemy is worn out and forced into abandoning or changing his plan (Daase, 2005). In small wars, there is no clear demarcation between the warriors and civilians, between conflict and non-conflict areas, “between fighting, looting and plundering, between politics and economics”; are frequently in remote places- “remote mountains and jungles” and big cities; are criminal and re-emerging (Korf, 2011:735). It involves the use of light and less sophisticated weapons, scattered factions, and take place in areas of interests (Mbembe, 2001, cited in Korf, 2011). These moderate wars are common in fractionalised societies (Schneider and Weisheimeier, 2008:183).

These wars resonate with Kaldor (2007) “New and Old wars” categorisation as violence directed to civilians, identity targeting of violence, as the basic elements of new wars. These wars appear to be motivated by greed to exploit primary resources like minerals and oil for personal benefits, as Gregory (2010:167) explains that wars have turned into a phenomenon of private not public benefit- the aim is private wealth not common objective of liberating a country. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) note that grievances as the cause of war have weak arguments, while economic gains in the form of extortion, looting and other corruption practices carry more weight.

Small wars can be viewed from the resource curse perspective. The prevalence of resources that can be looted and other war benefits, provided motivation for individual economic gains, especially in the late 20thC onwards (Keen, 1998). Availability of resources has ironically promoted “rent seeking” behaviour, corruption, resource plundering, slowed economic progress, exemplified in the “Dutch Disease” when natural gas was discovered (Klem and Hilderink, 2005:25). The assumption beneath “resource curse” proposition is that conflicts are fuelled by prospective economic gains. Three issues come into prominence: resources and controlling its production incentivise the onset of war; resource exploitation is a vital mechanism of funding wars; and state reliance on resources may lead to bad governance, low economic progress, disparity, insurgency, and chaos in the country (Ibid). In spite of the negative argument of resource abundance, some models postulate that corruption, especially in resource abundant countries, engenders peace. This debate is ongoing (Le Billon, 2003 and 2005; Fjelde, 2009). This study, therefore, uses two theoretical propositions: corruption fuels conflict versus corruption buys peace, as theoretical frameworks for analysis in this research. Details are expounded in the next chapter- the methodological chapter.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the methodology used in this research. It discusses the theoretical framework of the study, research design, methods of data collection and limitations of the study.

3.1 Criteria for choosing the case study

The criteria are based on the recency of the conflict, the degree of corruption in the country, and the dependency on oil as a source of state funding. South Sudan conflict is a recent phenomenon. The conflict started in December 2013 and lasted for more than a year (Astil-Brown, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014; United Nations (UN) Security Council, 2014), peace agreement was signed in 2015 and, although there have been several breaches in the agreement with resumption of conflict, it has provided the framework for building peace in South Sudan, and the warring parties relying on it to hold the unity government. I am therefore, contributing to the subject area of my research, and to the case study.

This research is about the connection between corruption and conflict. Corruption is associated with conflict occurrence and resolution, as already discussed in the literature review and the theoretical framework. South Sudan fits this criterion as it lies at the bottom of the rankings of corruption indexes, implying it is among the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2014), and it is emerging from conflict as identified above.

Lastly, the theory used in this research, especially the strand that corruption buys peace, mainly applies to oil producing countries (Fjelde, 2009 & Basedau and Lay, 2009), and South Sudan economy is predominantly dependent on oil. Over 60% of its GDP comes from oil, and oil revenues have since contributed 98% of government expenditures (African Development Bank, 2012; Nyak, 2015; Global Witness, 2016).

3.2 Research Design

This research takes multiple designs: deduction, case study, and some element of internal validity. It is deductive in a way that the two theories- corruption fuels conflict and corruption buys peace- are used as guiding lenses of the study, in order to understand where South Sudan conflict lies. Secondary data are collected in order to explain if corruption contributed to fuelling conflict or buying peace, as the two theories claim. The internal validity as a research design investigates the causal claim of a phenomenon (De Vaus, 2001). This is applicable here as one of the hypothetical claims of the theories of this study is that corruption fuels conflict. This is a causation which falls within the lens of internal validity. Finally, the research design of this dissertation is case based. It does not take cross sectional studies of different countries to generate general patterns, as the proponents of the theories did. Instead, this research is specific and narrowed down to a case of South Sudan, in order to investigate the two theories postulated above. Conclusion is made based on the findings from the perspective of the case study.

3.3 Data and Sources of Data

This is a desk-based study. No field study is conducted to collect primary data, mainly due to the instability in the country of case study. The study exclusively relies on review of secondary data (although some of the secondary data are direct interviews of certain would be respondents) to answer the research questions. The data covers a variety of sources like books, journal articles, grey literature, depending on their availability and relevance to the study. These are triangulated, synthesized and analysed, through the lenses of the two theories used in this research, and appropriate conclusion derived.

3.4 Theoretical framework

The theoretical debate of corruption either fuelling conflict or buying peace is exhaustively discussed in Le Billon (2003). Corruption is directly connected to instability. In applying “corruption indexes”, the relationship between corruption and conflict holds more at a combined regional level than at a country level. Regions that are highly corrupt are also highly ravaged with conflict. At a country level, the correlation is important but less strong, although this varies with the region (Ibid:417).

3.4.1 Corruption fuels conflict

The theoretical proposition that corruption fuels conflict is linked to the fact that corruption positively affects the onset of war, including a high-level planned violence. When there is no legitimate political system to control the use of public office for private gains, diverting a public office for private gain breeds conflict, especially when one social group is more dominant in directing the allocation and use of resources. This widens inequality, and “fuels both grievances among marginalised groups and greed-driven jockeying within dominant ones” (Le Billon, 2003:417). Corruption fuels conflict at three interlinked levels, summarised in consequent three paragraphs below.

Firstly, corruption fuels conflict by creating grievances. Corruption negatively affects “investment and economic growth”. This injustice aggrieves the affected population and culminates into violently trying to change the government. Economic growth slows down due to low level of tax collection, low government budget, consequentially leading to ineffective execution of government programmes. Budget is apportioned more in areas like defence and infrastructure with high chance of corruption, while sectors like education with a narrow chance of corruption get less budget. Other effects include widening disparity, insensitively high taxation with no reciprocal reinvestment into public services, uneducated youths joining the rebel groups, damage of the country’s reputation. These negativities are used by the belligerents to justify violent actions against the status quo (Ibid:417 & Marquette and Cooley, 2015:2-3).

Secondly, corruption breeds greed. The prevalence of spoils of corruption to the regime breeds motivation for the controlling elites to capture the states, especially when the spoils are very profitable. Besides the desire to maintain the collaborators and buying off opponents, the system uses corruption to remain in power and have assurance of their security after their tenure. These breed a parallel greedy motivation by the side-lined political groups to violently rise up for change against the current system. The marginalised groups may include opposition leaders and their supporters, a section in the army, relatives, friends and ethnic groups (Le Billon, 2003: 418-419).

Finally, “political corruption and the concomitant corruption of politics undermine institutionalised public affairs, including processes of political change and conflict resolution mechanisms” (Ibid:419). These are exemplified in the manipulated election processes and unjust, untrusted and partisan judicial system for seeking redress. Both those in power and the dissenting factions may resort to violence to protect and affirm their standpoints. Corruption may in another vein incapacitate the security sector and water down their “ethics”, debilitating the effectiveness of state defence, but also culminating into greater interference by the affected “vested interests” in the security sector (Ibid).

Conclusively, even though corruption is an insufficient factor to fuel conflict, conflict is often fused with corruption whether it is “greed” led or “grievance” led. The status quo uses force to sustain corruption, and using it beyond the lawful provision to further their political tenure. The side-lined groups compelled by the prevalence of corrupt spoils, violently attack the system for a change. The corruption of the present regime can provoke the populace or “economic interest groups” to either collaborate or involve in violent uprising (Ibid: 419).

3.4.2 Corruption buys peace

The theoretical proposition that corruption buys peace states that corruption helps in engendering a political system where by the leadership in power can win over the dissenting factions and as such, a strategy for circumventing political instability and conflict. Put another way, “corruption is able to satisfy the greed and reduce the grievances of politically restive groups by extending clientelistic circles”. In such an order, the practice of “political corruption” can create stability in those societies, from the privileged strata to the less privileged strata, widely legitimising the existing corrupt political system (Le Billon, 2003:420).

According to Fjelde (2009), political corruption does not always cause conflict, especially in countries whose wealth depends on oil. Political corruption is used to win over the dissenting factions by providing them personal “privileges” in quid pro quo for “political loyalty” (Ibid: 199). Oil wealth provides a wide financial source for lucrative spoils deposited in state accounts, and gives the state enough resources to extend the client patronage relationship to certain opposition groups (Ibid). Political systems rich in oil use funds outside the budget to co-opt major dissenting factions in the country, offering more to conflict entrepreneurs,

who, in turn, choose to side with the government, due to alluring economic benefits (Ibid). I have summarised the issues raised in the theoretical framework in the table below.

CORRUPTION FUELS CONFLICT	CORRUPTION BUYS PEACE
Corruption influences the occurrence of conflict, including large scale violence.	Political corruption is not necessarily associated with a higher risk of civil war in oil-rich states- higher levels of corruption seem to weaken the harmful impact of oil on the risk of civil war.
The absence of political regime to legitimise public functions for private interests, causes clashes in achieving private interests.	Oil wealth is deposited in state treasuries, providing economic foundation to buy support from key segments of society, effectively outspending other entrepreneurs of violence.
Economic grievances	Political corruption can be used to accommodate opposition and placate restive groups by offering private privilege in exchange for political loyalty.
Corruption negatively affects investment and economic growth: slows down the rate of public tax collection, allocation of public expenditure, and implementation of government programs.	Political corruption is able to satisfy the greed and reduce the grievances of politically restive groups by extending clientelistic circles.
Over taxation and less investment in the public services.	Political corruption creates stability in the society when it is shared with both the privileged and less privileged class, legitimising the existing corrupt political system.
Corruption deepens inequality: resource control is organised along social identity fault lines, sharpening inequality.	The populace finds rent-seeking more efficient than political unrest as a way to induce redistribution.
Corruption undermines the national prestige and legitimacy of the ruling group, leading to legitimised accusation by coup leaders.	
Greed	
Availability of rents for leadership constitutes the price for capturing the state by the ruling elite, motivating the marginalised groups to violently act for change.	
Others	
Corruption undermines the functioning of public institutions, for example the process of political change and conflict resolution mechanisms, rigged elections, flawed constitutional and judicial processes.	
Corruption weakens the capacity and ethics of security forces, making the force unable to effectively defend state sovereignty, and interventions by the vested interests in the security sector become prominent.	

Source: Quotes from the works of Le Billon (2003) and Flede (2009).

3.5 Limitations

The research may have been constrained by the availability of data, especially primary data. The available data is, however, utilised maximally. The research is largely dependent on the secondary data and lacks complementary primary voice. However, I have triangulated as many secondary data as possible, in order to offset this bias. Some secondary data like magazines are based on first hand interviews.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter puts the conflict into perspective, briefly describing chronologically, the occurrence of events in South Sudan. It then goes onto analysing in details, the causes of conflict in South Sudan, based on the theoretical strand that corruption fuels conflict. After this, the analysis extends to the second theoretical strand that corruption buys peace. However, the analysis finds that these two analytical strands are not sufficient to understand the causes and resolution of conflict in South Sudan. The analysis then extends beyond these two analytical strands, to digging out the root causes of conflict and how it could be resolved, beyond corruption phenomenon.

4.1. Putting the conflict into perspective

South Sudan had its celebration for a second year of independence on 9th July, 2013. However, the celebration took place in the face of worrying sharp differences among the ruling party (SPLM/A) members. On 23rd July, 2013, President Kiir removed the entire cabinet, including the Vice President, Riek Machar, plus 17 brigadiers from the police. In August, a new cabinet was formed, but only five members of the former cabinet were reinstated, excluding the former Vice President, Machar (UN Security Council, 2013:1).

The attempts from other stakeholders, including the UN in South Sudan, for the ruling party members to reconcile their differences before the scheduled assembly for the National Liberation Council at the end of 2013, were futile. When the meeting was held on 14th December, there were heated discussions and sharp differences between the party big wigs came to the fore, with opposition sharply criticising the government for state failure. Riek Machar and his supporters and other opposition leaders did not turn up for the 2nd and 3rd day of the meeting. The division took a violent dimension, with fighting on 15th December, 2013 between the presidential guards (between the guards who supported either Kiir or Machar), spreading to military installations and the homes of civilians in Juba and other areas, with attacks on civilian supporters of different sides, mainly between Dinka (Kiir's tribe) and Nuer (Machar's tribe). President Kiir announced that the violence was an attempted coup, but the former Vice President (Machar) initially rejected the claim that it was a coup (UN Security Council, 2014:1-2; Blanchard 2014:4). On the night of the conflict start, the presidential guards that were supposedly loyal to the former Vice President were disarmed, when President Kiir had suspicion about his political dissidents (NOREF:2014:1). The fighting went on and quickly spread to other states, including Jonglei, Upper Nile State and Unity state- the oil producing states. Different factions joined in the fighting as noted:

SPLA, into which various militias had been loosely integrated, broke up: commanders defected and members of the rank and file took up positions against those loyal to the President and their SPLA comrades. Large numbers of civilians were killed by forces from both sides, as the defections continued and the fighting spread (UN Security Council, 2014: 2).

The conflict took an ethnic turn. On December 15, 2013, tensions between factions loyal to President Salva Kiir of the Dinka ethnic group, and those aligned with his former Vice President, Riek Machar, of the Nuer ethnic group, exploded into fighting on the streets of Juba, the capital city (Enough, 2014).

On 19th December, Machar told the press that he urgently asked SPLM/A to unseat President Kiir. Two days on, he told the media that he was rebelling against the government and that he had organised an armed group to do so (UN Security Council, 2014: 2). The conflict is mainly a "power struggle". SPLM has never fully and genuinely united. Machar has a history of defection, initially in 1991. They united just for the sake of secession in 2011 (NOREF, 2014:1; Blanchard 2014:2-3). Accumulated political tension/power struggle- in party fighting- turned violent and got mixed up with long-term ethnic tension, and spread within the capital and beyond, as a full blown civil conflict (Blanchard, 2014). From 16th to 18th of December, 2013, over 600 people from Nuer tribe in Juba were killed. Conflict in the ruling party stirred up ethnic violence, with ethnic attacks and counter attacks and thousands seeking refuge internally at UN bases or in the neighbouring countries. The in-party fighting turned into a full blown civil conflict, but mainly concentrated in the oil rich states (Hutton, 2014:6). The following three sections analyse this conflict in light of the questions and theoretical framework for this research, beginning with corruption fuels conflict.

4.2 Corruption fuels conflict: Did corruption play a major role in the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan in 2013? Did it fuel conflict?

Competition for power and profits among the ruling elites

The conflict in South Sudan was chiefly instigated by the continued struggle for power and financial gains inside the circle of the ruling elites. Since independence in 2005, the central government has had a lump sum share of the budget than state governments, and the rebel leaders were fighting to be part of the central government to control this big budget. The budget allocation for states' governments and rural development comprise merely 10% to 20 % of the country's total expenditure, and the remaining percentages are spent in the capital Juba by the central government (Sudan Tribune, 2012). This has turned out to be the treasure worth fighting for among the varied armed entities and elites (The Sentry, 2015). Corruption has been at the centre of South Sudanese politics, with spoils used to pacify and win over different armed groups, building political might, and sponsoring patronage circles. Illicit economic transactions prevail, in spite of economic downturn. Billions of dollars are surmised to have been mismanaged by officials. In 2012, President Salva Kiir wrote to over 75 senior government officials, both previous and present, blaming and urging them to return the allegedly stolen 4 billion dollars of public funds, or they faced prosecution. However, only \$60m dollars was regained by the anti-corruption unit of South Sudan (Aleu, 2011; BBC, 2012; & Ferrie, 2012). Moreover, only a small amount of the stolen funds regained was invested back into government programmes, just like funds from oil sales are seldom allocated to vital areas of the economy, as witnessed by unwillingness to implement "The Petroleum Revenue Management Bill, 2013", that would see the investment of oil revenues in other sectors of the economy, and "provides for a future generations fund that could ensure that the people of South Sudan enjoy the benefits of the country's oil wealth long after the oil is exhausted" (Deng, 2015:1; The Sentry 2015:4). If these were implemented, South Sudan could save up to \$50 billion by 2036 (Ibid). While the government is finding it hard to secure funds from oil revenues to invest in other sectors, corruption is widely spread and the country is plunging more and more into poverty. South Sudan's President remarked in his letter while accusing government officers of stealing enormous amounts of government funds-\$4b: "We fought for freedom, justice, and equality. Many of our friends died to achieve these objectives,"... "Yet, once we got to power, we forgot what we fought for and began to enrich ourselves at the expense of our people" (Ferrie, 2012). Furthermore, while the government is seemingly running bankrupt, can hardly fund development programmes, and over half of its citizens are absolutely poor, the elites on both warring factions- the government and the rebels- possess the necessary "resources to sustain an armed conflict that began in December 2013 and has since killed tens of thousands of people, displaced over 2 million, and has left 4.6 million, or around 40 percent of the population, food insecure" (The Sentry 2015:4; WFP, 2016; and UNDP, 2014). These explanations show how huge chunks of oil revenues have been stolen or diverted into personal enrichment and financing the conflict. The conflict is a fight to maintain their relevance in the government, in order to control financial benefits and power.

South Sudan, since independence, has been ruled by a narrow circle of elites, moving around and changing posts and ranks in governments and rebel groups, depending on the political dynamics. President Salva Kiir in July 2013 overhauled the cabinet, and got rid of some notable senior officers, including the Vice President, Riek Machar. Loss of positions by cabinet members partly instigated the conflict in December 2013, in order to regain those positions (Doki, 2014 & The Sentry, 2015:4). The fired officers had been at the forefront of taking socio-economic and political decisions of the country in the aftermath of independence, and, after being relegated from the government, most of them teamed up with the opposition groups that culminated into an armed faction. Although there are other smaller tribes and armed factions, the conflict polarised the country between mainly the two

dominant tribes: Dinka- President Kiir's tribe, and Nuer- the leader of the rebels- former and fired Vice President- Riek Machar's tribe (Joselow, 2015 & Sudan Tribune, 2015). While the President has strengthened his power by installing loyalists, most of whom from his home state, Warrap, the common people (93% of households surveyed) from this area are found to be starving (Tappis, et al., 2013). The armed faction, on the other hand, had been attacking oil installations and focusing the fighting in oil-rich states, to temporarily stop the production, in order to weaken the government, so that they could secure a rewarding deal at the negotiating table (AFP, 2015; Okech, 2015; and Coastweek, 2016). The above explanations bring to the fore tribal favouritism- nepotistic corruption- and greed as part of the causes of conflict.


Struggle to control oil industry: the main source of the country's income

South Sudan depends on oil revenues to finance over 80% of its total budget (Olingo, 2015). According to The Sentry (2015:5), "oil wealth is central to South Sudanese conflict; the government needs these funds to sustain the war effort and the armed opposition recognises that choking oil supply is their strongest point of influence". Consequently, strategic oil areas have been the centre of fighting, including "Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile and gateway to the oil fields in Paloch; and Bentiu, the capital of oil-rich Unity State have both changed hands multiple times, with several rounds of massacres, and key towns being razed to the ground" (Ibid). Production operation was halted for more than a year as the fighting raged on (Sudan Tribune, 2015). Insecurity prompted the Chinese owned company- the main operator- to remove its 400 employees at Paloch oil fields, and this resulted into a drastic slowdown in oil operation, to the tune of 150,000 barrels less production (\$15 million revenue to the government and the producing companies) in a day, by March 2015 (Klare, 2014 & Sudan Tribune, 2015). Further threats to the government controls of other oil fields loomed, as the rebels advanced and shelled the oil-rich town of Melut and claimed they had captured Malakal- the capital of Upper Nile oil-rich state (Sudan Tribune, 2015 & Small Arms Survey, 2015). Fighting to control oil-rich areas depicts the economic motive- greed- envisioned in the conflict.

High military expenditure, high level of corruption.

South Sudan has the largest military spending in East Africa, an area where huge corruption practices take place. Marquette and Cooley (2015:2-3) and Le Billon (2003:417) note that corruption deteriorates growth, investment and welfare of citizens, as resources are channelled away from social service provision like in education and health to areas like defence, where there is secrecy and little supervision, always in the name of security reasons. According to Mauro (1998:264), "The illegal nature of corruption and ensuing need for secrecy imply that corrupt officials will choose goods whose exact value is difficult to monitor... high-technology goods", mostly in the defence ministry. Anecdotal evidence confirms this corrupt practice in security spending (Gupta, et al., 2001). In South Sudan, the graph below corroborates this situation.

ESTIMATED MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN EA (2010-2014)




Source: Alan Olingo, 2015.

The military expenditure increased from \$982 million in 2013 to \$1.08 billion in 2014. South Sudan has been fighting an armed rebellion, led by the former Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar, from December 2013. The disproportional spending in the military and corruption there in, is negatively affecting the allocation and growth of other sectors (Olingo, 2015).

The UNDP Chart below shows the budget allocation to different sectors of South Sudan's economy. The chart shows that the government skews the allocation of the budget in favour of security sector at the expense of basic services like education, health and infrastructure. The total budget for security is more than the combined allocations for education, health and infrastructure (UNDP, 2014).

Sectoral Allocation (percent share) in the Annual Budget for the 2012/13 FY [Total budget = SSP 6.7 billion]



Source: UNDP, South Sudan Discussion Paper, 2014.

Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and other security agencies always spend beyond their allocated official budget. In the first 3 months of 2014-2015 budget allocations, the President's office ("Off President National Security"), went beyond its allocated budget by 349%, the defence ministry by 150%, and the Veteran Affairs Department by 113% (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Republic of South Sudan, 2014:16). According to the 2008 government audit released in 2013 by National Audit Chamber, 60% of the government payroll goes to SPLA, and yet "only 7 out of 40 divisions shared the pay roll details with the Audit" (National Audit Chamber, 2013:248). No reasons were given for this non-compliance, although this is usually attributed to security secrets, even though illegal deals are involved in the transactions (Ibid). This shows a high degree of corruption and impunity within the security sector, where army officers issue orders of financial transactions without following the laid down regulations. The rebel factions do not want to lose this privilege. This confirms a theoretical proposition for this **dissertation** that big monies are spent in areas with high chances of corruption, partly fuelling the conflict as fighting erupts to control this large sums of money. It is also consistent with Mauro (1998) and Gupta, et al., (2001).

The price for capturing the state by elites and spending in areas with high chances of corruption

Extravagant, fraudulent activities, and public mismanagement have virtually permeated the entire South Sudan official dealings at various levels. Constitutional processes are largely neglected in public procurements and contract awards. These are usually awarded above market prices to companies with link to public officials, including the President. Over spending is common in road and bridge constructions, and importing public vehicles, at the expense of unpaid public servants. The most notable one is the millions of dollars spent in expanding Juba air-port and is yet to be completed (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2012 & Radio Tamazuj, 2013). The President pointed that a lot of money has been spent in the construction since 2005, and former/fired ministers swindled some of its money (China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), 2014 & Radio Tamazuj, 2014). South Sudan has formal regulations on setting up companies, documentation processes, reporting regulations procedures, among others (WB, 2016). However, these standards are largely ignored when it comes to sharing profits and benefits, and sometimes the owners of companies are not known. The long procedures are also taken advantage of by officials to cause delays and unduly benefit from the process through extortion. According to The Sentry (2015:9), "South Sudanese elites, including politically exposed persons, are widely believed to hold undocumented shares in companies and receive payments in exchange for facilitating business transactions". Even the President rarely discloses his spending and assets to Anti-Corruption Commission and claims not to hold a bank account, and he is linked to certain road construction companies. Oil companies and food supply contracts are also used to divert public finances (Radio Tamazuj, no date & Misuk, 2013). These show how elites have economically captured the country, the price worth violently fighting for to maintain.

Money laundering is widespread. Dollar access is difficult due to inefficient allocation, and this has been exacerbated by the conflict. Business people are expected to process a letter of credit to access the dollar, and only well connected people and companies are getting this letter, the rest are turning to black market, which is more than thrice the normal rates (Foltyn, 2015). High shortage of foreign exchange reserve exists in South Sudan's Central Bank and well-connected people are enriching themselves by selling the dollars at exorbitant amounts (Radio Tamazuj, 2015). Trading in foreign exchange has become very lucrative. The Central Bank diverts large amounts of foreign reserve to personal bureaus, most of which are owned by individuals in the government or they have stakes in them (IMF, 2014). All of the above discussions demonstrate how rampant corruption is in South Sudan, controlled by elites at different levels and sectors of government. To continue controlling this corrupt practices, one has to be in the system, and when some officials were fired on allegations of corruption, they took up arms to fight their way back into the system. The next section explains the attempts to use corruption to buy peace in South Sudan.

4.3 Corruption buys peace: Did corruption play a major role in the resolution of conflict in South Sudan, including the signing of the compromise peace agreement in 2015?

John Garang, the founder of SPLM, had the vision of uniting South Sudan and Sudan on a fairer term. But when he died in 2005, his successor who is the current South Sudan's President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, had a contrasting goal for South Sudan to secede from Sudan. Kiir was afraid that in the aftermath of Garang's death, Omar al-Bashir- the Sudan's President- would abrogate his promise in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for South Sudan self-governance, and Kiir has since spent exorbitant sums of money on the military salaries, to make it very expensive for Sudan to hire South Sudan's militias. Leaders of numerous military groups are appeased with big monies for personal enrichment (Waal, 2014:348), facilitated by the finance ministry, as noted: "the former SPLM Secretariat of Finance, which managed resources of around \$100,000, has transformed itself into a ministry responsible for managing over one and a half million dollars annually" (World Bank (2007:67). The budget has rapidly increased- 11 billion South Sudanese Pounds (SSP) in 2014/2015- but due to the ongoing war and the shutdown of oil production because of unresolved issue of sharing with Sudan, a 10.3 billion SSP budget was passed for 2015/2016, a reduction of 6 percent from the previous year (Reuters, 2015). Out of this, 4 billion SSP (45%) is allocated to security, and the remaining 55% for all other sectors of the economy (Jok, 2015). The army generals, and not the technocrats are responsible for the actual budget allocation, as noted:

The fake ministry is the one working with the donors and technical advisors on technical allocations, promoting the outward appearance of high functionality, while the real ministry is operated through backdoor dealings between South Sudanese officials concealed from donor view... The technical advisors help prepare budget allocations, but the army generals wheel into the minister's office, and they make the real allocations (Larson, et al., 2013:21).

South Sudan signed an agreement for self-governance from Sudan in 2005, and its budget has since increased from \$120,000 in 2004 to \$18.2 billion (Larson, et al., 2013 and Kompuok, 2015). Foreign aid has been flowing in, contributing up to \$130 in per-capita terms in 2013, enabling South Sudan to spend thrice more than Kenya, in spite of its economy being 5 times smaller than Kenya's. Unfortunately, the government has been kleptocratic and substantial sums have been used to co-opt and reward opposition groups (WB, 2016; Deng, 2015; Waal, 2014; The Sentry, 2015).

By 2005, when the CPA was reached between Sudan's government and SPLA, providing for a six-year period to a referendum of secession, there were other armed factions in South Sudan, around 50,000 followers rivalling SPLA (Warner, 2013). These were 18 different factions, including "paramilitaries, militias, and conventional forces" (The Sentry, 2015:6). With the looming instability posed by these groups, SPLM government instead opted to reintegrate, offer amnesty, and co-opt them into the system instead of fighting, but this has led to springing up of several other groups, to access the financial benefits of co-optation (Warner, 2013:40). These militia groups were incorporated into government forces without dealing with why they revolted in the first place (NOREP, 2014). Consequently, "the security force payrolls expanded from an estimated 40,000 in 2004 to 240,000 soldiers in the army alone in 2011, augmented by an additional 90,000 paramilitary reserve of policemen, prison warders and wild life guards" (The Sentry, 2015:6). Commanders of armed groups were promoted into SPLA generals and incorporated into pay list of the government, bringing the number of SPLA generals to 745 (the second largest in the world after Russia) with their respective circles of control (Waal and Mohammed, 2014).

With the exception of 2013/2014, there has been a yearly increase in the security budget: "2012/2013- 28percent, 2013/2014 17.8percent and 2014/2015- 35percent" (UNDP, 2014:4-5). From 2008-2013, 73% of government payroll went to "security and veterans" with minimum supervision (The Sentry, 2015:7). Security related ministries spend money without following financial regulations. They rarely report to the Audit Chamber, even when urged to do so (National Audit Chamber, 2013:248).

Kiir's government is kleptocratic and loyalty is exchanged with rewarding financial benefits (Waal, 2014:358). In attempt to appease the soldiers and avert rebellion, South Sudanese soldiers are paid better than other soldiers in the region. For instance, the lowest paid Uganda's soldier is \$93, while the South Sudanese one is \$107, although commanders at times steal soldiers' money, on top of creating ghost soldiers (Arinaitwe, 2013; Global Security, 2016; and Waal, 2014). These soldiers consist largely of militia groups that are incorporated into government forces without dealing with why they revolted in the first place (NOREP, 2014:1).

Outside of the security sector domain, senior positions in other government ministries are given to the SPLM senior officials and former commanders of other armed factions, who prefer to maintain their military titles (which intimidate civilian officials) in lieu of official titles for those jobs. While maintaining army titles and ranks for these former army officers is strategic for SPLM leadership, this presents a challenge to civilian management who prefer meritocracy and experience (The Sudd Institute, 2014:6). These former soldiers normally defy procedures, especially in financial dealings, as noted: "the technical advisors help prepare budget allocations, but the army generals wheel into the minister's office, and they make the real allocations" (Larson, et al., 2013:21).

Uncontrolled greed, compounded by the shutting down of oil production in 2013- the major source of national revenue- implied the government could not maintain the kleptocratic establishment, and it crumbled into conflict (Waal, 2014:349). With the guise to recover the \$4 billion stolen by government's senior officials, including ministers, over 75 officials were dismissed from their jobs. The ousted officials, among them former army commanders and former Vice President Machar, mobilised support from tribal militias in the name of tribal marginalisation, for a conflict that was essentially about power control and its concomitant benefits (Waal and Mohammed, 2014). The international community believes the crisis is of a political nature and calls for a political solution (Blanchard, 2014:12). President Salva Kiir, under the UN Security Council pressure, signed the agreement although with reservations (Radio Tamazuj 2015 & VoA, 2015). The Compromise Peace Agreement for South Sudan (CPASS) - 2015, signed on 17/08/2015, accommodated the former Vice President and his allies back to the government, while incumbent leaders have maintained their positions for a period of 30 months, starting 90 days after the signing of the agreement. Elections are to be held 60 days, before the end of this period (CPASS, 2015:5). The excerpt of the agreement is in the appendix of this dissertation.

All in all, the plunging of the country back into conflict as discussed above, explains the limitation of buying peace. It promotes impunity, greed, corruption and unsustainable peace, due to limited resources for buying peace. As highlighted above, the agreement has been signed following negotiation after the reoccurrence of conflict. The agreement has ensured relative peace, at least until the end of the transitional government, however, for a few days in July 2016, there was renewed fighting in South Sudan. Nevertheless, CPASS, military spending, state capture as discussed previously, demonstrate how restive groups have been

accommodated- bought back into the government- but for a realisation of sustainable peace, fundamental reforms need to take place, as discussed in the next section.

4.4 Further Analysis outside corruption fuels conflict or corruption buys peace prepositions

In spite of the corruption fuels conflict argument, the actual cause of the conflict in South Sudan is deeply rooted. Several militia groups with their respective loyalists were co-opted into the army without settling their grievances. When fighting began in Juba, factions ensued along these lines. The problems have for long been accumulating: “A weak but centralised government, scarce resources, patronage politics, the legacy of war, and a lack of peace dividends have provided a recipe for crisis and collapse for years”, and resolution has to deal with these issues (NOREP, 2014:1). Even though the conflict was instigated by ill-managed clash among the SPLM top leaders, “the history of liberation, ethnic rivalry, internal SPLM structural problems, socio-economic and military factors, drove and compounded the conflict” (The Sudd Institute, 2014:19). The structural problems include high centralisation and unchecked powers of the President, for example, the President dismissed the entire cabinet, triggering the conflict; split up the number of states from 10 to 28 by decree; directed loyal state governors to appoint delegates to SPLM national convention, instead of constitutionally designated SPLM state coordinators (Hutton, 2014:12; Dong, 2015).

There is legitimacy crisis. The authority of the regime is under challenge. The relevance of the regime in directing the allocation of state resources is under challenge. However, in the centre of the chaos is fundamental concerns about “democratic values, about accountability and justice, and about overcoming narratives of marginalisation, impunity and ethnic bias” (Hutton, 2014:4). There has been flawed transition- SPLA is still the same as in bush war days- it is less of a political party, has flawed constitution with no mechanisms for checks and balances of power, and so members have to fight to get ahead in the party ranks. In fighting is coupled with poor service provision and constant interference from Sudan over oil sharing. Citizens appear to have lost trust in the government (Enough, 2014). International community and UN had been overshadowed by chaos in other areas like Syria, Ukraine, ISIS terrorism, and the looming violence in South Sudan was overlooked. Continued dialogue is suggested as a hope for South Sudan’s peace (Global South Development Magazine, 2015; Peace Direct, 2016).

The issues of flawed governance, corruption, lack of service provision, economic and power struggle and oil governance control, kleptocracy, are reiterated in many other literature, including Innovation for Peace, 2015; Nyak, 2015; Global Witness, 2016; Peace Direct, 2016; Dhelbeny, 2016, among others. Accountability should be comprehensively addressed in the agreement. Suggestions include establishing independent courts, independent constitution that inhibit individuals from personalising the system, and reforming security sector to criminalise formation of militias. Reforms should make powerful positions unattractive to power seekers (IRIN, 2015). These imply reforms should create conditions that discourage people from merely seeking power for greed, but to serve the nation. The next chapter will wind up this research with some concluding remarks and recommendations.

V CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study aimed to establish the relationship between corruption and conflict based on two theoretical strands, that is, corruption fuels conflict or corruption buys peace. The study confirms the existence of both relationships in South Sudan- in causing conflict and buying peace- but they are insufficient to understand the whole picture of the conflict situation in a society like South Sudan. In terms of corruption and the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan, the correlation is as outlined in this summary.

Grievance: Corruption caused grievance in South Sudan and opposition leaders, later armed opposition, sharply criticised the government of President Kiir for failing the country, especially in terms of service provision. The government spends more money in the security sector than in social service sectors, for example, in 2012/2013 budget in South Sudan, military spending was more than the combined budget allocations for education, health and infrastructure. It is in the military where high level of corruption occurs in South Sudan, and both parties seem to be fighting to control that budget, even though armed factions claim to be fighting for the people of South Sudan.

Greed: The prevalence of spoils of corruption to the regime breeds motivation for the controlling elites to capture the states, especially when the spoils are very profitable. These breed a parallel greedy motivation by the side lined political groups to violently rise up for change against the current system, as it happened in South Sudan in 2013. When opposition figures were dismissed from ministerial positions and other key government positions on corruption claims, they mobilised themselves under the leadership of the former dismissed Vice President to form the rebel armed faction that rebelled against the government from December 2013 to 2015.

Finally, political corruption undermines the functioning of institutions of public affairs, including institutionalised conflict resolution mechanisms like the judiciary. It also undermines the effectiveness of state defence, leading to unnecessary interference of vested interest. A lot of unchecked power has been invested in the person of the President of South Sudan. Without following due procedures, the President dismissed the alleged corrupt opposition individuals in the cabinet and at the federal governments; he decreed to increase the number of federal states from 10 to 28, futilely challenged by the opposition in court. Cabinet dismissal has particularly triggered the conflict.

As regards the second strand of analysis- corruption buys peace- corruption helps to engender a political system where by the leadership in power can win over the dissenting factions and as such, circumvent political instability and conflict. It started in 2005 after signing the comprehensive peace agreement. Many groups were bought off, including “paramilitaries, militias, and conventional forces” (The Sentry, 2015:6), which increased the number of soldiers from 40,000 in 2004 to 240,000 in 2011. Many armed factions’ commanders became generals, increasing the number of army generals to 745, the second in the world, with very costly salaries. Many were absorbed in key positions in the government. However, this crumbled in 2013 when the budget reduced due to economic downturn, and it became impossible for the government to maintain the system. Power struggle took the centre stage and buying peace strategy became unsustainable, and conflict ensued.

Notwithstanding the above confirmations, it is insufficient to narrow down the understanding of conflict occurrence and its resolution based on corruption alone. To have a comprehensive resolution, deeper causes of conflict must be understood and resolution should address the root causes, and not just try to buy off the opposition groups. Opposition groups can be co-opted in the government for sometimes, given special positions in the government as it happened in 2015 CPASS, but the unity government should use that time to bring real socio-economic and political transformations to address deeper concerns affecting the country. In South Sudan’s case, these issues include: weak institutions following independence- institutional building is highly desirable to aid in resolving the conflict within the government and the country as a whole; power struggle is a major cause of conflict in South

Sudan- they seceded, but the post-conflict government did not concentrate on building institutions, but co-opting the different armed groups. Lack of democratic values, checks and balance of presidential power, accountability, justice system, and marginalisation among tribes, need to be addressed. Provision of services, most notably education and health, and physical infrastructure like roads is vital- the citizens are complaining of not experiencing the real fruits of secession. For a comprehensive, inclusive and sustainable reforms, relevant stakeholders, including civil societies, regional countries and international communities, have to be involved, specifically as recommended below.

Sustainable peace requires a forward looking strategy. Sharing power without political reforms will just postpone the crisis. Reasonable reforms have to incorporate opposition parties and civil societies' opinions, including "dismantling warlordism, clarifying an overarching vision for the country, embarking on a process towards national healing, good governance- all-encompassing political reform through constitutional democracy" (NOREP, 2014:3; The Sudd Institute, 2014:18).

Regional countries should be involved. Uganda has been militarily supporting Juba, Sudan has interest in oil, while South Sudan wants to build alternative pipelines either through Kenya or Ethiopia (NOREP, 2014:4). Bad neighbours like Sudan that has interest in seeing a weak South Sudan, is displeased with South Sudan's interest in building a new pipe line to pass either through Kenya or Ethiopia. It wants South Sudan to keep on depending on Sudan's expensive pipe line, otherwise there will be economic downturn and insecurity in the Sudan, so they have to meddle in South Sudan's stability, by supporting militias within South Sudan (Development Magazine, 2015; Peace Direct, 2016). These countries are vital in reforming South Sudan's future.

The international community had greatly supported South Sudan government, especially in capacity building and in basic service provision. However, when the conflict began, South Sudan government openly accused US government and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) of supporting the rebels. To offset this bias, the international community should positively pressurise the warring factions on ending the war, and engage constructively and diplomatically with the government, instead of using forceful means like sanctions. Partisan media campaigns pro or against the rebels are unhelpful in this case and will compound the conflict (The Sudd Institute, 2014:17). The transitional government to be headed by the President and former Vice President should jointly strive for reconciliation, enacting pro-people and inclusive constitution, encourage state-wide dialogue, develop systems and institutions and conduct democratic elections (Ibid:18).

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APPENDIX

Highlights of a compromise peace agreement for South Sudan- 2015

Executive positions

The power sharing ratio in the Executive of the Transitional Government of National Unity (Transition Period) (TGoNU) are as follows: Executive body as 53%, 33%, 7%, and 7 % for the GRSS, the South Sudan Armed Opposition, Former Detainees and other political parties respectively (Ibid). Power sharing extends to the conflict affected oil rich States of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile and others (CPA, 2015:5).

The Executive of the TGoNU shall comprise the President, the First Vice President (special position created), the Vice President, the Council of Ministers and the Deputy Ministers'' (Ibid:6); the Council of Ministers shall comprise the President, the First Vice President, Vice President, and the Ministers (Ibid: 6).

The incumbent President of the Republic shall serve as President and Executive Head of State for the Transitional Period (Ibid); For the duration of the Transition, there shall be established the office of the First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan, to supervise the implementation of the reforms outlined in this Agreement and exercise the powers, functions and responsibilities

outlined in this agreement. The office of the First Vice President shall cease to exist at the conclusion of the Transition Period unless otherwise decided in the permanent Constitution; The First Vice President of the TGoNU shall be selected by the South Sudan Armed Opposition (Ibid:8).

The incumbent Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan shall serve as Vice President for the Transitional Period (Ibid: 9).

Council of Ministers:

GRSS: fifty-three (53) per cent of Ministerial portfolios (16 Ministers); South Sudan Armed Opposition: thirty-three (33) per cent of Ministerial portfolios (10 Ministers); Former Detainees: seven (7) per cent of Ministerial portfolios (2 Ministers); Other Political Parties: seven (7) per cent of Ministerial portfolios (2 Ministers) (Ibid: 11).

Expanded National Legislative Assembly

The expanded Assembly... the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA), comprises of four hundred (400) members, including the prior three hundred and thirty-two (332) members and an additional sixty-eight (68) representatives appointed according to the following criteria: South Sudan Armed Opposition: fifty (50) members; Former Detainees: one (1) member; Other Political Parties: seventeen (17) members (Ibid:14).

Members of the National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States unseated from the National Legislative Assembly or the Council of States following the crisis in the Republic of South Sudan on 15 December 2013, shall be reinstated to their seats, and shall continue to serve for the duration of the term of the Assembly or the Council of States, respectively during the Transitional Period (Ibid: 15).

Position of the state governors and council of ministers of the oil rich states are also shared by the transitional government during the transitional period (Ibid: 17). The agreement extends to other areas of resource, economic and financial management, oil management, wealth sharing and revenue allocation, public expenditure and other areas (CPA, 2015).

