



Nuclear Dimensions In Indo-US Relations

Sanjay Kumar

M.Phil. (JNU)

Associate Professor

PG Department of Political Science

A N College, Patna

Abstract

The signing of the Indo-US nuclear pact can open a Pandora's Box of similar deals and accords in the area, which is already engaged in fast-paced proliferation attempts and is also the hot spot of contemporary war and power struggle. This study attempts to grasp the region's geopolitical environment, emphasizing the regional security mechanisms and the nature of the strategic partnership relationship.

The Indian Prime Minister and the U.S. President, on July 18, 2005, issued a joint statement, which is considered to be the day when the process of reaching a nuclear agreement between them began. Following this, there was a great deal of discussion, both in India and the U.S., on the pros and cons of giving India a unique nuclear status and of India joining a camp that supports the U.S. This transaction has been interpreted as marking the start of a unique partnership between India and the U.S. Nevertheless, it took five years until the official launch of the first Indo-US strategic discussion, which took place in Washington in June of 2010. This event took place in 2010. Regrettably, over all of these years, the other aspects of this strategic connection did not receive much press, clearly described in July 2005. In this paper, an attempt is made to examine various nuclear aspects of Indo-US strategic relationship.

Keywords: India, US, Nuclear, Foreign policy, Energy, and National Security

Introduction

The civil nuclear collaboration agreement with the U.S. is simply one component of the broad alliance that the UPA administration aimed to create with the U.S. Before July 2005 joint declaration, the UPA administration and the U.S. inked a ten-year Defense Framework Agreement. The U.S. would not have consented to nuclear cooperation without the military deal. It appears to be a portion of a quid. This study aims to draw attention to the significance of negotiations about India's national security, which are also crucial to the country's overall progress toward its goal of civilian nuclear development. The U.S., a signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), adheres strictly to the guidelines and safeguard mechanism regarding establishing nuclear plants for military purposes. However, it supports the idea of allowing nuclear plants for civilian purposes in countries that want to develop nuclear energy for electrical and medical purposes. India, a longtime ally of the Soviet Union, attempted to modernize its nuclear power plants using the IAEA's safeguard mechanism. However, these efforts were thwarted for nearly a decade by the provisions of the Nuclear NPT, the 123 Nuclear Agreement, and the IAEA's protocols.

In the end, India's organized effort and deft diplomacy successfully overcame the unyielding stance of both the U.S. Congress and the Indian Congress. Even though India withdrew from the NPT in the late 1990s, when Indo-Pakistani competition was at its height, the study also intends to investigate India's efforts to negotiate a contract for a nuclear power facility that would be used only for peaceful purposes. This is because the U.S. Congress stands on stringent technical adherence and stand.

History of the Indian Nuclear Program

Under the Atoms for Peace initiative, the U.S. assisted India in the 1950s in the development of nuclear energy. The U.S. constructed a nuclear reactor for India, supplied nuclear fuel for a while, and let Indian experts study at American nuclear facilities. In 1968, India declined to sign the NPT because it was prejudiced. In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, demonstrating that it could produce nuclear arms with the transfer of peaceful technology. In response, the U.S. inaccessible India for twenty-five years by denying nuclear-powered support and attempting to persuade other nations to do the same. However, the U.S. has endeavored to forge a "strategic relationship" with India, expanding collaboration in areas such as in 2000.

Strategic Partnership with the U.S.

The Manmohan Singh government has accepted the U.S. rhetoric on democracy, following in the BJP-led government. All India-US joint declarations accord "democracy" and "freedom" the highest priority. It implies that India is intellectually and politically aligned with the U.S. in its quest to use democracy and freedom as weapons to achieve regime change, pry open economies, and build U.S. domination in foreign nations and regions. If the administration led by the BJP joyfully joined the democracy bandwagon by co-sponsoring the Community of Democracies, then the government led by the United Progressive Alliance accepted the Global Democracy Initiative proclaimed in the July 2005 joint declaration. The UPA administration has contributed \$10 million to the U.N. Democracy Fund, which was established at the behest of the U.S. During Bush's March 2006 visit to India, a mutual statement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh highlighted two vital economic developments. During Bush's visit, the US-India CEO Forum produced a report titled "US-India Strategic Economic Partnership," which was welcomed in a joint statement "approving to study its suggestions." The US-India Agricultural Knowledge Initiative, announced during Manmohan Singh's official visit to the U.S., was officially inaugurated.

Foreign Policy Choices of the U.S. and India

- **Foreign Policy Shift of India and the U.S.**

India requires the support of US to assert itself as a significant global force in Asia and vice versa. India holds a dominant position in South Asia, both geographically and strategically. The fast-growing economic activity, pluralist society, Cultural impact in Asia, and massive regional expenditure. The world's primary focus, particularly that of the U.S., is on India's military and defensive preparedness as an ascending partner in the Asian region throughout the administrations of both Clinton and President Bush. In 2004, India was recognized as a dependable and vital partner in the Asian region. In this regard, many international policy analysts believed that the U.S.' concern about China's rising power was prompted by China's fast ascent in century 21, paying attention to India (Sein et al., 2017). The U.S. and India have been able to deepen their cooperation via combined and collaborative efforts, a military drill, intelligence sharing between the two countries, and the fight against terrorism in the late 2000s.

The U.S. and India's ties have been deteriorating despite India's geostrategic, economic, and security concerns circles and dances. After 2008, India had certain reservations regarding the U.S.' global and regional role. Bilateral Relations had primarily been hampered because of disagreements about the US-Pakistan partnership in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack (Kronstadt and Alan, 2009). India seemed as hesitant to assert its dominance within its regional environment. Subsequently, President Obama hoped the U.S. would one day have a unique partnership with India. Unfortunately, both were unable to problems on the home front, such as those with the federal budget in the U.S. and the major corruption scandal in India.

Between 2008 and 2011, both were forced to concentrate on their domestic difficulties. New Engagement with the U.S. was seen as the top priority for Delhi concerning its foreign policy. This is the reason why the fact that India needs help from the U.S. in order to accomplish its four long-term foreign policy goals. A reliable Afghanistan-Pakistan area. extending their sphere of influence over the Indian Ocean Region, acquiring a position as rule makers inside the international system, and maintenance of global power factors) such as sustainable economic development and military modernization" Before Barack Obama became President, of the U.S. The administration successfully endorsed Japan as an on-track partner for the U.N. Security Council permanent seat (Kronstadt and Alan, 2009).

Simultaneously, the government of India has been looking for a relationship with the Washington administration. It became abundantly evident that a new worldwide alignment evolved, one that included both military alliance and trade. Cooperation centered on the U.S. China has long been loosely allied with the U.S. in Asia (Goldstein and Joshua 2008).

- **Foreign Policy Choices of India and the U.S.**

When it comes to determining what constitutes the national interest, pursuing any choice of foreign policy is a crucial component in achieving the goals of each country's national interests. While India and the U.S. have historically and politically distinct backgrounds, both countries, particularly following the end of the Cold War, have developed efficient methods for pursuing their foreign policies by reasonable means. Pakistan, on the other hand, was China's most trusted friend. However. Since 19905, India has held the title of Asia's most populous democratic nation. This fact attracted the attention of the U.S., its close partner in Asia, mainly because the fundamental value of democracy is the same in pursuing political progress in India. The one notable exception was that India's influence in south Asia's political and economic gross was still very minor, and the country's ties with China, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka had significantly deteriorated throughout Asia.

Remarkably, the shift in global power influenced governments in Asia after the Cold War, mainly because many states were contending for regional supremacy in Asia at the time. Some academics believe that the period following the end of the Cold War would be known as the China Century. In contrast, others argue that India will emerge as a geopolitical and geo- economic continental force along with the shifting global power balance in an international environment.

The United India Congress has significant sway regarding India's foreign policy possibilities, especially when vital national interests are considered. The "Look East Policy" was the first significant movement in India's foreign strategy after the conclusion of the Cold War. This proclaimed expanding regional economic cooperation, interacting with geopolitically significant allies not just in Asian countries but also in western nations. AlthoIndia's economy was expanding rapidly, and it was a fact that the country's infrastructure, market access, and possibilities for foreign investment were in a constrained position. During his first trip

to Asia in 2009, President Obama paid a state visit to Japan. During that trip, he made it quite apparent that the U.S. of America is the country of the Pacific and that the twenty-first century is the century of the Pacific. Emerging nations in Asia aspired to establish a footing as a regional power, while the U.S. prioritized focusing its attention on Asia concerning its foreign policy (Sinha et al., 2014).

India's rapid economic expansion amid internal factors was one of the prominent influences in India's foreign policy. The conclusion of the Cold War also had a role in making India's global diplomacy more prominent. Since India represents a significant potential market in international commerce, India has garnered much attention worldwide. In the year 2000, it is estimated that the retail industry alone was worth 450 billion dollars in the U.S.

The U.S.'s foreign policy has made it a priority to achieve global dominance using a variety of strategies after the end of the Second World War. One of the ways was through democratic elections, which were held to choose general administrations in many different nations before the 9/11 attacks. Both the U.S. military campaign against Iraq in 2002 and the U.S. military action against Iraq in 2013 were attempts by the U.S. to impose democratic governance in Iraq based on a conspiracy regarding WMD (Kronstadt and Alan, 2009).

The advancement of nuclear technology emerged as one of the most pressing concerns for U.S. foreign policy. Even though Russia and China opposed the U.S. effort in the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.S. requested that the IAEA probe and question Iran's nuclear facilities when Iran began developing peaceful civilian nuclear energy programs. On the other hand, India and Pakistan stated that they would withdraw from the NPT, followed by North Korea sometime later. In light of these circumstances, India was asked to respect the international provisions outlined in international treaties and accords for developing its civilian nuclear technology. In order to ensure that it had an adequate supply of electricity, India had to modernize its nuclear power facilities, while the U.S. was only beginning to show off its capabilities. India was the only country that consented to have an international inquiry conducted on its nuclear power facilities following the criteria established by the IAEA.

Finally, pursuing rationale, although India and the U.S. have foreign policy institutes based on foreign services, the two countries comparative approaches to international affairs differ significantly. Think tanks, educational institutions, and reliable media access. India's insular and reactive international relations and its commercial model dominated strategic and political concerns among Indians for a long time. India's political culture is one of the determining factors in alternative foreign policies. Conversely, the U.S. is highly effective at pursuing a sensible foreign policy that serves its national interests in Asia and across the world (Gopalakrishnan, 2005).

- **National Security Strategy of the U.S. and India after 9/11**

When pursuing national security strategies using various tactics, the primary focus should be on the national interests of both nations. The National Security Strategy of the U.S. of America has been developed based on four national interests. These interests include the protection of the nation's core territory, the promotion of economic growth, and the maintenance of political stability. Over the past two decades, a concerted effort has been made to advance U.S. worth and good world order. The U.S. has placed a large amount of emphasis on Asia, both in terms of its military presence and its national security strategy as a consequence of the cold war (Hussain et al., 2018).

Maintaining triangle connections—that is, relations between India, China, and the U.S.— through bilateral commerce, foreign investment, and innovation in science and technology was India's preference for international affairs. When determining national interests and security, the U.S. considers many factors as essential backgrounds, including the strength of its military, the cutting-edge technology it has developed, its capacity for power, and the effectiveness of its people resources.

China views the U.S. and India as strategic adversaries in their efforts to limit China's dominance in Asia, whereas India has historically regarded the U.S. as its most significant strategic partner in the region. In addition, the U.S. no longer considers India a danger in terms of force projection in the Indian Ocean, except for the support that the U.S. provides to Pakistan. This interest came from the international community and domestic institutions (Kronstadt and Alan, 2009).

The U.S. security concerns in Asia brought attention to India, and in the process of forging a strategic partnership with India, the U.S. pushed aside India's nuclear test. The expansion of markets that support sustainable economies and the maintenance of unrestricted transportation through the Indian Ocean are essential capabilities for the calculation of U.S. power.

In addition, the U.S. and India grew extremely worried about China's expanding military capabilities, which was a primary factor in the U.S.' ability to forestall the rise of a hegemonic force in Asia. Collaboration between the navies of different countries appears to be at its strongest when it comes to exercises and the exchange of people. September 11 presented the U.S. and India with a first test and a chance to cooperate further in the fight against terrorism.

In addition to aiding in the fight against terrorism, the U.S. has assisted India in investigating terrorist acts, such as the extensive bombings in Mumbai in 2006 and 2008. The strategic alliance between the U.S. and India envisioned by former President George W. Bush for the 21st century is quickly becoming a reality. The U.S. of America expressed its satisfaction with India's rise to global prominence. It acknowledged that both nations must cooperate to protect our mutual interests and advance our close ties. On May 3, 2005, India and the U.S. began what is known as an Energy Dialogue to expand upon the significant amount of energy cooperation that already existed and develops new channels of cooperation (Kronstadt et al., 2013).

In a nutshell, when it comes to New Delhi's considerations about defense imports, the autonomy of the country's foreign policy is of the utmost importance. During the Cold War, ideological considerations had a preponderant role in determining India's foreign policy. Indian foreign policy choice has shifted to a domestic political context since the late 1990s when successive governments in India began to focus on the country's domestic attitudes toward its international relationships. Despite this, India has made a significant move toward the U.S.

capital to accelerate a more liberal international agenda for advancing its nuclear technology and improving the energy efficiency of its domestic economy. On the other hand, the military strike that the U.S. carried out on Afghanistan as part of the "War on Terror" brought to light India-US ties significant significance (Kronstadt et al., 2013).

The Indian Administration under Manmohan Singh was involved in acquiring dependable military systems not subject to onerous end-user criteria that might limit the country's ability to make operational judgments. The radioactive leak resulting from the Bhopal Incident was a big obstacle for the Indian authorities to overcome to convince the harsh domestic attitude. Consequently, India has exhibited a long-standing reluctance to sign any documentation or agreements that it believes will infringe upon its right to self-government. Following extensive strategic discussions, the U.S. of America and India concluded that they were interested in a democratic, safe, and stable Asia

- **Defense Agreement**

In June 2005, the Defense Framework Agreement was signed for 10 years. Three weeks later, a united statement will be published in July. Since independence, India has not inked such a comprehensive military partnership deal with any nation. The agreement delivers for joint actions by the two armed services in military operations conducted outside the supports of the United Nations; the agreement aims for the "interoperability" of the armed forces; the two sides will cooperate on missile defense; the sale of U.S. weapons to India and co-production are also included. Under the terms of this treaty, India and the U.S. will negotiate a Logistics Support Agreement and Maritime Security Cooperation between their respective fleets. Indian officers are already participating in systematic mutual exercises, and military training in the U.S. This Defense Framework Agreement alone is enough to transform India's complete security and strategic perspective.

- **Energy and Nuclear Agreement**

The primary argument made by the UPA administration is that the nuclear accord is necessary for India to end its nuclear-powered isolation, deprived of which it will be impossible for the nation to satisfy its future energy needs. This disregards the sub-3% contribution of nuclear power to our entire energy production. Even if the ambitious ambitions to expand to 20,000 MW by 2020 are achieved, it cannot reach 7%. The

cost of nuclear energy must be considered when discussing energy security. Following the three-phase program, we should continue to develop nuclear technology. However, expanding nuclear power cannot be the primary priority of energy security. There will be an unacceptably high cost. While simultaneously negotiating the nuclear agreement, the U.S. blocked India's pipeline project with Iran. They have completed the civil nuclear trade between the U.S. and India also.

Technical Discussions in the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement

- **Discuss ramifications for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the nuclear membership club**

The historic U.S. - India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was a vital indicator of the new bilateral cooperation. This agreement was reached after a lengthy procedure involving both parties' technical considerations. The fundamental truth or reason behind the Indo-US Nuclear Dispute was as follows:

The agreement was subject to various prerequisites to become effective, including the parties' separation. IAEA safeguards and removal of nuclear facilities from the civilian list. Several standard Congress's inabilities to approve the Hyde Act, India's exit from the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, and the U.S. government's inaction have slowed progress. The U.S. insists that India install three distinct types of "reactors" - Power Reactors, Cirus Reactors, and Breeder Reactors - under NPT and IARA safeguards must be classified as civil lists (Sein et al., 2017). President George W. Bush signed the Henry Hyde Act on December 18, 2004. The implementation will predate 2005. India has to negotiate a separate agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on examining civilian nuclear-powered amenities plants.

Both Agreement and Deal were given to the 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. (NSG) After receiving NSG clearance and consensus support, the complete package, including the Agreement, Deal, and NSG Endorsement, had been delivered to the President. President must obtain final approval from the U.S. Congress to implement the legislation. Institutional political considerations were essential for the success of the Indo-US nuclear negotiations deal. There were several steps in reaching the agreement. The first phase began in July 2005. President Bush launched the civilian endeavor with India while Congress pressed for further clarification on India's nuclear restrictions. In the second phase in 2006, the governments of the Indo-US negotiated (Restrains affecting the separation of civil and military nuclear plants in India.)

In the third phase, President Bush sought legislative authorization for a nuclear initiative, which was the signature of the Hyde Act. The fourth phase sought to strengthen the non-proliferation clause in legislative law through American enterprise. The Hyde Act must be implemented for Indian Americans. The sixth phase of Indian India's government won a confidence vote because leftist parties averted a no-confidence vote. Advancement of the nuclear agreement is the sixth step. India signed a safeguard accord. The Nuclear Suppliers Group removed restrictions on India's nuclear trading with the IAEA.

In conclusion, President Bush urged Congress to adopt the 123 Agreement formally) between the U.S. and India Step-by-step advancement of the nuclear agreement by nations India's nuclear establishment has been historically less interested in international negotiation. The initial phase was with the Hyde Ace, U.S.-based aircraft cooperation. In reality, domestic legislation in the U.S. adjusted Section 123's requirements. U.S. Atomic Energy Act to allow for nuclear cooperation with India. The Hyde Act further allowed negotiating a 123 Agreement to effect the 2005 Joint Statement. But the Hyde Act may not bind the Indian sovereignty.)) As a multilateral agreement, the 123 Agreement could not be substituted by intramllaw such as, for example, the Paris Climate Change Agreement Statute of Hyde.

- **India and NPT**

Internationally, the NPT has become synonymous with nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation. Access to nuclear fuel and technology can only be obtained in exchange for signing the NPT after adopting all of its commitments and joining the regimes.

The civil nuclear accord proposed by India was an attempt to circumvent the Nuclear NPT because India withdrew from the NPT in 2004 following competing for nuclear tests with Pakistan. India desperately needs energy security for development purposes, and its exit from the NPT was a move to explore the possibility of obtaining civilian nuclear energy usage. India, unlike Pakistan, has a solid non-proliferation record. India is committed to building a state-of- the-art facility. IAEA surveillance and a new nuclear export control framework. IAEA intended to restrict the development of nuclear weapons via IAEA Safeguards, which was not India's vehicle for indirectly negotiating ratification of the NPT. There were three dimensions to U.S. Nuke Deal. The first aspect is the strategic-political one (Paddock, 2009).

Second is the nuclear dimension, followed by the energy dimension. This agreement allowed India, a non-signatory to the Nuclear NPT, to engage in civil nuclear trade with the U.S. and the rest of the world. The U.S. Congress and Indian Congress have been discussing the limitations and benefits of ratifying the deal for quite some time. The agreement permitted India to deploy or utilize its indigenously generated uranium solely to construct bombs, which may be increased by a factor of four. Pakistan, India's long-standing competitor, and neighbor, requested a similar agreement, which the U.S. and the Nuclear Suppliers Group categorically rejected.

Consequently, the situation in South Asia has become increasingly turbulent. Indo-US. deviated from their previous policy on the NPT of nuclear material. The U.S. continues to view nuclear non-proliferation as a requirement for civilian nuclear technology, but India rejects the international safeguard position for domestically built nuclear reactors.

The Indian government, under internal political pressure, sought to resolve tough negotiations with the U.S. without joining the Nuclear NPT. At the same time, India opposed the separation of civil and military nuclear facilities. In December 2005. They addressed safeguards and the civil list for India's nuclear reactors. "There are a total of twenty-two nuclear reactors. Under Safeguards, India offered just fourteen nuclear reactors.

New Delhi established a joint working group to examine the separation of nuclear power stations. However, the Indian government opposed the U.S.'s idea to separate nuclear facilities and reclaimed management of India's Circus Reactors. The Indian government submitted a proposal to the U.S. government to move further. Placed outside IAEA Safeguards, India's Circus Reactors generated sufficient plutonium for twenty-three nuclear bombs. In December 2005, the India separation plan omitted the Circus Reactors from the civilian list.

Breeding Reactor. All of India's breeder reactors were meant for the electric city grid, while the remaining reactors were civilian. India removed all breeder reactors from safeguards because it believed that breeder was a research and development program, a view that the U.S. did not accept. On March 2, 2006, India committed to making a significant pledge after a binding agreement between the two parties. It is a comprehensive accord that would ensure the safety of future civilian breeder reactors.

After the successful implementation of safeguards for many reactors, a compromise was reached. India subsequently accepted the standard of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity, despite its early efforts to get safeguards comparable to those of nuclear-generating states that were not permanent. It was a one-of-a-kind deal since IAEA safeguards accommodated India's view that permanent safeguards should be connected to fuel supply guarantees.

The Nuclear Supplier Group was primarily concerned with the commercial aspects of the deal. NSG was a continuing technical topic of discussion in the Indo-U.S. Agreement. At the NSG, the U.S. vigorously advocated for the nuclear accord. Due to their political and economic links with India, countries who oppose the 123 Agreement may choose to abstain rather than vote against India. The Indo-US nuclear accord also indicates that changes in nuclear supplier regulations would not be limited to bilateral nuclear trading between the U.S. and India (Paddock, 2009).

Then, in February 2007, negotiations restarted, which was followed by many discussions in New Delhi. In an effort to achieve an agreement, Cape Town and Washington omitted specific points of contention. On June 9, 2007, the national security advisors of both parties reached an agreement on a negotiation solution based on an Indian reprocessing plant. President Bush outlined the deal to examine the fuel reserve issue for India's reactors.

Four fundamental themes influenced the Section 123 Agreement negotiations between the U.S. and India. First, Washington demanded stringent restrictions on regions that bolstered India's nuclear arsenal. Second, New Delhi demanded a gasoline supply guarantee.

Thirdly, the Indian parliament underlined that India would only accept the Joint Statement and its plan to separate civil and military nuclear installations.

Finally, Indian officials reviewed the U.S. Section 123 Agreement with other nations and requested similar terms in the U.S. and Section 123 Agreement," "The Indo-US Nuclear Deal proved that changes in the NSG will not be limited to bilateral nuclear commerce. Multiple nations' nuclear enterprises are already vying for the opportunity to negotiate a commercial nuclear contract with India inside the IAEA Safeguards framework.

Thus, the nuclear deal between the U.S. and India was condemned due to its possible influence on global non-proliferation regimes, its impact on the Indian strategic nuclear program, and the stability of South Asia since Pakistan, too, had nuclear power. India nevertheless acquired credit and clearance for nuclear commerce from the NSG and was required to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Triumphant Indian Indian success in negotiating a civilian nuclear deal with the U.S. was primarily attributable to the country's bureaucratic mechanisms and substantial economic growth (Paddock, 2009).

Nuclear Deal Benefits for India and the United States

Under the new civil nuclear contract, India has decided to separate its civilian and armed programs and to place two-thirds of its existing reactors and 65 percent of its generating capacity under permanent safeguards with transnational confirmation. The U.S. would be obligated to provide India with nuclear fuel and technology. This is extremely important for India, as the lack of energy is one of the most noteworthy hindrances to the continued development of its rapidly rising economy. Nuclear energy, which now accounts for less than three percent of India's total electricity output, is an enticing option to coal and costly imported oil and gas. The fourteen nuclear power stations India has committed to place under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have a combined producing capacity of around 3,000 megawatts or 3 gigawatts. India wants to enhance its nuclear capacity by an additional 12-16 gigawatts by 2020. Global Energy Prospects. As nuclear power now shows a relatively minor part in its economic growth, it is believed that even by 2020, nuclear power would account for less than seven percent of India's total producing capacity, hence having a negligible impact on the country's electrical landscape. It is also suggested that, although nuclear power may assist India in solving its energy issues to some degree, it would not significantly impact the energy sector and would contribute only little to its transportation sector's demands (Carter and Ashton B. 2005)

However, some other academics believe that India's strategic liberalization was foreshadowed by the July 18 2005 civil nuclear deal with the U.S., which also resulted in considerable advantages such as the import of nuclear fuel, etc. They believe that an empowered India, liberated from technology denial restrictions and the label of strategic pariah, would not only emerge as a significant state in the twenty-first century but also contribute to the realization of multipolarity on a global scale. (Jangir, 2012)

Conclusion

India is economically and geopolitically dynamic for the U.S. It is in a precarious position to adhere to international regulations and gain access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. After the Cold War, India realized it must retain connections with the world's lone superpower. The U.S. has taken India's role in Asia, particularly fostering stability and peace in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. "Concurrently, there is a great deal of worry over the impact and future of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. Despite this, India and Pakistan withdrew from the NPT, and India sought a method to establish civilian nuclear facilities under the partially international agreements of IAEA Safeguards. This indicated that India did not embrace the full scope of safeguards. China and Pakistan are the two most important causes of India's acquisition of nuclear technology in South Asia. However, India was required to abide by international norms because it aspired to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council under U.N. Reform. There are four primary reasons why the U.S. should join the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal.

First, India was a nuclear weapon state, but there is a trend for a "state (India) with advanced nuclear technology" to re-designate India. This was a strong point for the U.S., which exploited India's vulnerability due to severe shortages of natural and low-enriched uranium for its nuclear reactors. It became the best alternative for restricting the number of nuclear reactors that may be employed for military and weapon-related purposes.

Second, in the long-term strategic vision of the U.S. in Asia, India was the best alternative to China. Thus, President Bush referred to India as an indispensable nation in Asia.

Thirdly, India's democratic structure was the best approach for the U.S. to reach an agreement in such a security-sensitive dialogue, allowing the U.S. to solidify its national interests with the world's greatest democracy. India's economic development was gaining steam, with an annual growth rate of eight to nine percent. Despite its inadequate infrastructure, it was projected to become the third-biggest economy in the world within a few years.

Fourth the diverse society and a poor history of competent administration hampered India's economic development prospects. The Bush Administration was also motivated to negotiate the Indo-US Nuclear Deal by the allure of having privileged access to India's expanding market and its high-tech requirements, notably for military and nuclear power equipment.

The successful conclusion of the nuclear agreement was a testament to the political leadership of Prime Minister Singh and the expertise of the Indian top officials and nuclear experts on the negotiation team. It cast doubt on India's new foreign strategy. PM Singh in particular was no longer preoccupied with merely political matters. Consequently, it was recognized that the broader range of Indian national interests covered security, commerce and investments, energy, and climate change. The Indo-US Nuclear Deal impacted energy sufficiency, security perspective, and India's international standing. In addition, the US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) and the US-India Business Council devised a plan to have the

most influence on the Deal's Outcome through their intensive lobbying. As a result of a successful transaction, India was enjoying and expanding its international standing, as it was willing to develop India's friendship and additional seats were made available for India in the G-8, East Asia Summit, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

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