



EPISTEMIC OPERATORS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN

Roitualiana Darlong
Associate Professor,
Department of Philosophy,
Govt. Degree College, Kanchanpur, North Tripura, India

Abstract

Wittgenstein says, “Understanding is effected by explanation; but also by training, *instruction, exemplification, with all tactfulness*” (Zettel §186, *Italics added*). Knowledge and understanding are the ends of epistemic operating system as grounded by Wittgenstein. But the operators are numerous. Or in simple term we may say, the means of looming to true meaning, understanding and knowledge are plentiful. For example, translatability, training, doubting, believing, explaining, capacity of learning (or simply learning), hoping, wishing, willing, presupposing, accepting, thinking, justifying, reasoning, preparedness, calculating, admitting, anticipating, and the like. These human actions, to name a few, conform the true sense of understanding and knowledge, and all these fall within the language-game. This paper tries to outline the human form of actions that work as operators that ultimately lead to the acquiring of knowledge and understanding in the true sense of the term. In other words, all those actions of man, that can be counted as operators as epistemic agencies towards building blocks of knowledge, are to be taken care of from the philosophical point of view.

Key words: epistemic operators, knowledge, understanding, human actions, form of life.

1. Introduction

Epistemic operators refer to a class of operators in formal logic, particularly in modal logic, that deal with knowledge and belief. These operators are used to express statements about what an agent knows or believes to be true. One common epistemic operator is “K”, which stands for “know”. For example, if we say “Kp”, we mean that the agent knows that the proposition p is true. Another common epistemic operator is “B”, which stands for “believe”. If we say “Bp”, we mean that the agent believes that the proposition p is true. Epistemic operators can also be combined with other modal operators to express more complex statements. For example, we can use “→” (implication) to express conditional knowledge: “K (p → q)” means that the agent knows that if p is true, then q must also be true.

Epistemic operators are used in various fields, including philosophy, computer science, and artificial intelligence, to reason about knowledge and belief. They allow us to model and analyze the mental states of agents and their reasoning processes. The Term ‘Epistemic Operators’ was first introduced in Philosophy by Fred I. Dretske, in his *Epistemic Operators*¹ way back in 1970 in the *Journal of Philosophy*. After that, there

¹ Fred I. Dretske, *Epistemic Operators*, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 67, No. 24 (Dec. 24, 1970), pp. 1007-1023

is not much philosophical development to this particular terminology although there is so much development in the field of epistemology. Dretske's theory more or less falls on the entailment theory in order to come to the level of knowing and understanding. This epistemic man tried to show that all epistemic operators do not penetrate in the meanings that can be assumed at all. Let me just put up one example that he cited in his work. "Susan and Bill married each other" entails "Susan got married" and it also entails "Bill got married", but all other circumstances, dispositions are not reflected, like for example, it may be so strange or odd that Susan and Bill got married. Various questions may be raised from friends, relatives, like "How can they get married? I don't believe their marriage will last long". People may have assumed that these two persons will not make it lifelong partners, knowing that both characters are opposite. Here to mention, the epistemic operator towards the entailment of Susan or Bill getting married does not penetrate to all the assumptions that could actually be right.

2. Transitional Development on epistemic operators

Unlike Dretske, the penetrating operators, in the philosophy of Wittgenstein are at work only to show that knowledge is built in the language-use-meaning game theory. Wittgenstein did not address epistemic operators explicitly by using the term. But we can always apply his philosophy of language to understand how epistemic operators are at work to gain their meaning within specific language games and how their significance is derived from their practical use. We mean to say that in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, the knowledge gained, the understanding grasped are rested on the kind of training one has undergone in learning, explanation received, how one is instructed, etc. To understand epistemic operators in the philosophy of Wittgenstein in a broader sense, we are to apply his ideas on language-game, meaning, and rule following. For him, every word acquires its operational meaning in its use context based. The meaning gain from utterance of word is not through any inherent essence or reference to the external world. So, the whole framework of epistemic operators is vested in "know", "believe", "doubt", "certain" and the like at least in the Wittgenstenian sense of the term. He argued that the meaning of these types of words arise from their usage in specific language games. He also emphasized the epistemic operators generate meaning in their practicality within linguistic realm and social context. For example, the meaning of "I know that..." can be gained within the specific language game being played. And we can remind of ourselves that behind every operator of/for gaining knowledge, there is another operator. To present this, Wittgenstein wrote, "A child must have developed far before it can pretend, must have learned a lot before it can simulate." This shows that in the epistemic journey no such definite origin or platform that we can call as first or last or even final epistemic operators. For example in order to be expert how to pretend, one must develop some X upon which one can pretend. And this X pretension may be the episteme in the next journey for Y simulation, and goes on. It is simply, in one way, we are playing with language as game. One may have started the epistemic journey from P (presumption) to get to Z Certainty, another may start from D (debate) to reach to that same Z Certainty. So following Wittgenstein we can illustrate that the concept of knowledge/understanding is embarked on the language-game. In this line, we are somehow to draw that the language-context-game will play as epistemic operator to some of us because, where Wittgenstein talks about use-theory of meaning is more or less the context-theory (convince-ability) of meaning. It is like, without having the meaning of 'context' and 'use' one cannot play language game in the right and appropriate manner which is where the epistemic operators must play the role.

3. Contextual Understanding of Epistemic Operators

Manuel Rebuschi and Frank Lihoreau in their paper "Contextual Epistemic Logic" mentioned that 'epistemology has undergone two major "turns" – new linguistic turn and logical turn. For them, epistemic operators are expressions that indicate the speaker's or thinker's state of knowledge or belief about the truth of a proposition. They are often used in modal logic to analyze knowledge and belief. Some common epistemic operators include "knows", "believes", "doubts", "is certain", and so on. These operators allow us to talk about what someone knows or believes about a given proposition. For example, let's say I have a proposition like "It is raining outside." If I say "I know it is raining outside", the epistemic operator "knows" indicates that I am certain or have evidence to support the truth of the proposition. And if you say "I believe it is raining outside", the epistemic operator "believes" indicates that you have a lower level of certainty or evidence, suggesting that your belief might not be entirely certain.

Epistemic operators help us to express our level of confidence or certainty in our knowledge or beliefs. They also allow for nuanced discussions about varying degrees of belief or knowledge. They also play an important role in philosophical debates on topics such as knowledge, skepticism, and the nature of belief. By analyzing how epistemic operators function, we can gain a deeper understanding of these concepts. Epistemic operators provide us with a language to talk about what we know, what we believe, and how certain we are about different propositions. They enable us to explore the complexities of human knowledge and belief. It's fascinating to observe how language reflects our understanding of the world around us.

In the light of the above standpoints of epistemic operators we can boldly enlist in the field of epistemic operators – the Strawson's *On Referring*, Frege's *Sense and Reference*, Russell's *Theory of Descriptions* (*On Denoting*), and many more. Let us look at Frege's *Sense and Reference* as an example (as we cannot take all) into consideration to add clarity the whole concept of epistemic operators. Frege's theory of sense and reference is a foundational concept in philosophy of language. It provides a distinction between the sense (or meaning) of a linguistic expression and its reference (or the object it refers to). This distinction is particularly important in understanding the meaning of names and definite descriptions. In the context of Frege's theory of sense and reference, the introduction of epistemic operators has certain implications. Firstly, they can help clarify the distinction between sense and reference. For example, when someone says "I know that the morning star is the evening star," they are expressing their knowledge about the reference of these two expressions. The sense of "the morning star" and "the evening star" may be different (as they have different meanings or descriptions), but their reference is the same (as they refer to the planet Venus). Epistemic operators help highlight this distinction.

Additionally, epistemic operators can also shed light on issues related to propositional attitudes and intentionality. Propositional attitudes refer to mental states like beliefs, desires, and thoughts that involve propositions. Epistemic operators are often used to express these attitudes. For example, "John believes that it will rain tomorrow" or "Sarah knows that the sun rises in the east." In both cases, the epistemic operators are used to indicate the belief and knowledge about the truths of the propositions. Frege's theory of *sense and reference* helps distinguish between the meaning of linguistic expressions and the objects they refer to and allows for a clearer analysis of propositional attitudes and intentionality. In a sense, epistemic role playing is done by connotation, denotation, description, reference, sense-making, etc. and the whole process of epistemic operation is relied on Wittgenstein's *certainty*. Now I see that Wittgenstein's epistemology, so to say, falls more or less in the new linguistic turn. In his *On Certainty*, he talks about the epistemic operators as determinants. Now Manuel and Frank also talked about Formal and Informal approaches to knowledge and context. We can now talk about the different approaches to knowledge and how they relate to the context in which they are used. However, both formal and informal approaches have their merits depending on the context. Formal approaches usually involve structured and systematic methods of acquiring knowledge, such as through academic research or scientific studies. They often rely on established theories and rigorous methodologies to ensure objectivity and accuracy. Moreover, formal approaches definitely provide a solid foundation for knowledge. They allow for peer-reviewed and evidence-based findings, which are important for advancing various fields. Informal knowledge can be gained through personal experience, observation, or insights from others, and it often provides a more subjective perspective. Informal approaches can offer unique and valuable insights that may not be captured by formal methods. They are often context-dependent and can take into account the nuances and complexities of real-world situations. Informal knowledge is especially useful in areas where formal approaches may struggle to capture the full picture, such as the social sciences or certain aspects of arts and humanities.

Informal knowledge can fill in the gaps and provide a more holistic understanding of complex phenomena. It can also be more accessible and relatable to everyday life. However, we should be cautious of its limitations, as it can be prone to biases or lack of systematic rigor. Informal knowledge should always be critically evaluated, especially when making important decisions or drawing conclusions. It's important to find a balance between formal and informal approaches, leveraging the strengths of both to gain a comprehensive understanding. The integration of formal and informal approaches allows us to embrace different perspectives and deepen our understanding of the world around us. It's crucial to be aware of the context in which knowledge is acquired and applied, as different situations may call for different approaches.

By recognizing the strengths and limitations of both formal and informal knowledge, we can navigate the complexities of various contexts and make more informed decisions. It's an ongoing process that requires intellectual humility and an openness to different ways of knowing.

4. Epistemic Operators embedded in Wittgenstein's philosophy

However, for Wittgenstein, in terms of acquiring knowledge, use-theory of meaning plays a crucial role. He holds that there is no knowledge gathering without use-meaning. That, one is not to claim knowledge until he can use by himself that he knows – how to use it in its correct sense. So it is sided as one single approach i.e. formal approach. In this way he prescribed that the expression “I Know” may not be misused. Furthermore, he holds that ‘know’ and ‘certain’ are identical. You know or you are certain means you are under assurance that your knowing describes state of affairs, and guarantees what is known and guarantees a fact. If I know something and I know that I know, Wittgenstein would say that “I am incapable of being wrong”. If that is so, then the epistemic operators, or determinants, in Wittgenstein's terminology, defines how one would have use it so, so as to be certain that one is in the right track in order to achieve knowledge or certainty. From the perspective of epistemology, (I don't know if I will do justice or not), if I say that knowledge and certainty are interchangeable or somehow identical to each other or even with understanding for that matter. We mean to say that one cannot claim to be having knowledge until and unless there is certainty in his knowing. In the philosophical works of Wittgenstein, certainty is often regarded as a crucial tool for understanding the world and the limits of language. Wittgenstein was concerned with the way language functions and how it relates to the world. He believed that, by examining the certainty of our beliefs, we can gain a deeper understanding of ourselves and the world around us.

Wittgenstein argued that certain propositions are considered “grammatically certain” or “necessarily true” because they are the foundations upon which language and communication are built. For example, the proposition “I am in pain” can be considered grammatically certain because the individual expressing it has direct access to their own subjective experience. However, Wittgenstein also recognized the limitations and complexities of certainty. He understood that what seems certain to one person may not be certain to another, and that language is often insufficient to capture the full meaning and complexity of human experiences.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein emphasized the importance of the “language game” - the rules and conventions that govern the use of language in specific contexts. He argued that understanding the language games we are engaged in can help us navigate the limits of certainty and uncover the meaning behind our words and actions. For Wittgenstein, certainty is not an absolute standard but rather a tool that assists in exploring the nature of language, meaning, and understanding. By questioning and examining our certainties, we can deepen our understanding of ourselves, others, and the world. Wittgenstein urged that one should be careful in attempting to analyze the epistemic operators as separate and independent entities. Each operator is devoid of underlying essence, such that we can count the meaning of the words taken as epistemic operators only by following in the language game and not by its referent. He vehemently suggested that the understanding of the meaning of epistemic operators should be derived from their usage and the rules governing their applications.

In this small philosophical work of mine, I tried to outline that the human form of actions (generated from language) that works as epistemic operators ultimately lead to the fulfillment of knowledge and understanding in the true sense of the term. In other words, actions of man, those that can be counted as operators as epistemic agencies towards building blocks of knowledge, are to be taken care of from the philosophical point of view as depicted by Wittgenstein.

5. Establishing Epistemic Operators in Wittgenstein

To continue our mission of establishing epistemic operators in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, let us take up with the word that ascertains knowing i.e. “I know”. If ‘I know’ is seriously uttered that shows that the utterance made is from the possession of proper grounds for that statement. That means I possessed the determinants that is what I claim to be knowing of it. Possessing all possible determinants and then statement puts one to a state/position that you cannot further demand any other determinants in order that your statement being made/uttered is already with certainty. The degree of certainty has reached its highest level. Although it is not possible to have an exhaustive list of determinants what other people can possess,

one is determined that he knows the determinants available with the context and concept, for a specific period at least. In a sense one cannot be more intense into the meaning of what he means with all the determinants available to him than possible worlds with what is unavailable. So determinants (operators) rest on the context and concept. In one way we can say that Wittgenstein has worked on the reconciliation of notions of **context and concept** in his epistemology as a means to define proper determinants of epistemic system. According to Wittgenstein, the proper determinants of epistemic systems are primarily determined by language and the social practices and rules that govern its use. Here are some key elements laid down in the philosophy of Wittgenstein:

1. Language games: Wittgenstein emphasizes that knowledge and belief are not isolated mental states, but are embedded within language games - social practices and rule-governed activities that give meaning to our words and concepts. These language games determine the standards of justification and the criteria for what counts as knowledge within a particular context. Wittgenstein's concept of language games refers to the idea that language is a part of a larger social practice and is defined and used within specific contexts. He argued that the meaning of words is derived from their use within these language games.

Wittgenstein's work on language games was primarily explored in his later philosophical period, especially in his book *Philosophical Investigations*. He rejected the idea of a fixed set of rules or meanings for words, and instead emphasized that meaning is fluid and relies on the context in which it is used. According to Wittgenstein, language games are not limited to simple everyday conversations, but also encompass more complex activities such as science, mathematics, and even philosophical discussions. Each language game has its own rules, norms, and conventions that govern the use of language within it.

Although Wittgenstein did not directly associate language games with epistemic operators, it is possible to view them as connected. Epistemic operators are linguistic expressions that modify or indicate our knowledge or beliefs about a proposition. Examples of epistemic operators are words like "know," "believe," "doubt," "assume," etc. In the context of language games, epistemic operators can be seen as part of the rules and norms that govern language use within a specific game. They are the tools through which we express our knowledge, beliefs, doubts, or assumptions within that specific game. For example, if we consider the language game of science, the epistemic operator "believe" may play a crucial role. Scientists use the term "believe" to express their acceptance of a theory or hypothesis based on the available evidence. In this context, "believe" acts as an epistemic operator that reflects the epistemic practices and norms within the scientific language game.

Overall, the connection between language games and epistemic operators lies in the way language is used to express our knowledge, beliefs, doubts, and assumptions within specific social practices. Language games provide the framework within which these epistemic operators operate, and they shape the way we understand and communicate knowledge within different contexts.

2. Rule-following: Central to Wittgenstein's philosophy is the idea that understanding language involves following rules. Epistemic systems are determined by the rules that regulate our use of language, including the rules for making claims, justifying beliefs, and engaging in rational discourse. Rules are not fixed or universally determined but are shaped by social practices and conventions. Wittgenstein's concept of rule following can indeed be seen as serving as an agent for epistemic operators.

In Wittgenstein's philosophy, the idea of rule following is central to understanding how language and meaning are established within a community. According to Wittgenstein, language and meaning are not grounded in fixed, essential definitions, but rather emerge from the shared practices and behaviors of a community. Epistemic operators, on the other hand, refer to the ways in which we express and evaluate knowledge claims. These operators include phrases such as "I know," "I believe," "I am certain," etc. They are used to convey our epistemic attitudes towards propositions.

Wittgenstein's idea of rule following can be understood as providing the basis for these epistemic operators. When we use an epistemic operator like "I know," we are not appealing to a fixed set of criteria or rules that determine what constitutes knowledge. Instead, we are engaging in a social practice of language use, where the meaning and significance of such operators are established by the norms and conventions of the

community. For example, when I say “I know that it will rain tomorrow,” I am not making an objective claim about the future, but rather asserting my confidence in the belief based on my understanding of the community’s standards for knowledge. The meaning and force of the epistemic operator “know” in this context are determined by the shared practices and expectations of the community.

Wittgenstein’s concept of rule following emphasizes that meaning and language use are inherently social and contextual. It highlights the role of community norms and practices in shaping our epistemic attitudes and expressions. By recognizing that epistemic operators are not objectively grounded but emerge from shared practices, Wittgenstein’s rule following supports the idea that our knowledge claims are inherently embedded in social and linguistic contexts.

3. Social context: Wittgenstein emphasizes the role of social context in determining epistemic systems. The meanings of words, concepts, and beliefs are not fixed or inherent but are shaped by our shared practices, norms, and language-use within a particular social and cultural context. Our understanding and knowledge are shaped by our interactions with others and the social structures and institutions in which we are embedded. The role of social context in determining epistemic systems in the philosophy of Wittgenstein cannot be understated. Wittgenstein believed that language and meaning are fundamentally shaped by social practices and the context in which they are used.

According to Wittgenstein, language is not a private, individualistic phenomenon, but rather a communal activity that is deeply integrated into our social practices and ways of life. The meaning of words, concepts, and statements is determined by their use within specific social contexts. Therefore, understanding how language functions requires analyzing the social practices in which it is embedded.

Epistemic systems, which are systems of knowledge and belief, are also shaped by social context. Wittgenstein argued that our beliefs and knowledge are determined by the linguistic and social practices we engage in. Different communities or social groups may have different epistemic systems, as they have different rules and norms for what counts as knowledge or justification. In this sense, epistemic systems are not fixed or objective, but are instead contingent on the social context in which they are developed and used. Wittgenstein’s notion of language games also highlights the role of social context in shaping epistemic systems. Language games are communal activities that involve using language for specific purposes within specific social contexts. The rules, norms, and practices of these language games determine what counts as knowledge, truth, and justification within that context. Different language games may have different epistemic systems, as they involve different rules and norms for evaluating knowledge claims.

The philosophy of Wittgenstein vividly emphasizes the importance of social context in determining epistemic systems. Language, meaning, and knowledge are all deeply intertwined with social practices and the specific contexts in which they are used. Understanding epistemology requires analyzing the social context in which knowledge claims are made and evaluating them within their respective language games.

4. Forms of life: Wittgenstein argues that language, knowledge, and belief are inseparable from the forms of life - the complex network of shared practices, norms, and values that determine our way of living. Epistemic systems are not abstract systems of formal logic but are grounded in practical activities and ways of being in the world. In the philosophy of Wittgenstein, forms of life refer to the shared practices, beliefs, and language-games that constitute a particular community or culture. These forms of life play a crucial role in shaping the epistemic systems, or systems of knowledge and understanding, that individuals within that community have access to. Here are a few ways in which forms of life can shape epistemic systems:

a. Language and meaning: Wittgenstein argued that meaning is determined by the use of words within a particular form of life. Words derive their meaning through their connection to specific practices and activities within a community. Different forms of life can have different language games and use words in distinct ways, resulting in different epistemic systems and ways of understanding the world.

b. **Shared beliefs and norms:** Forms of life are characterized by shared beliefs, norms, and values. These shared beliefs contribute to the construction of an epistemic system within a community. These systems determine how individuals within the community come to know and understand the world. For example, a scientific community may have different epistemic norms and methodologies compared to a religious community.

c. **Social practices:** Epistemic systems are intimately tied to the social practices within a form of life. The way individuals acquire knowledge, verify claims, and evaluate evidence is shaped by the social practices they engage in. For instance, scientific communities have strict empirical methods of inquiry, while religious communities may rely on religious texts and principles.

d. **Linguistic games and rule-following:** Wittgenstein proposed that following rules is an inherent part of language and meaning. Forms of life establish specific linguistic games with their rules and conventions. The ability to follow these rules is essential for participating in the epistemic systems of a particular community. The rules and conventions differ across forms of life, leading to different epistemic practices and systems.

e. **Contextual understanding:** Epistemic systems are highly contextual and shaped by the specific context of a form of life. Wittgenstein emphasized the importance of understanding language and meaning within a specific context. Therefore, the epistemic systems within a community are influenced by the historical, social, and cultural factors specific to that form of life.

It is important to note that Wittgenstein's philosophy emphasizes the diversity of forms of life and the notion that there is no privileged or universal epistemic system. Different forms of life can have their own valid and distinct ways of knowing and understanding the world, which are deeply embedded within their specific cultural and social contexts.

Overall, Wittgenstein's view is that the proper determinants of epistemic systems are embedded within language, social practices, and the forms of life in which we participate. Our understanding of knowledge, belief, and truth is not separable from our use of language and our participation in social activities and contexts. He argued that language is not simply a neutral tool for expressing pre-existing concepts, but rather that our use of language actually determines the concepts that we have.

6. Concept and Context – 2 Key terms of Epistemic Operators

In terms of the reconciliation of context and concept, Wittgenstein argued that meaning is not something that is fixed and can be universally applied to all contexts. Instead, meaning is inherently tied to the particular language game or context in which it is used. This means that concepts are not abstract entities that exist independent of their use in specific contexts, but rather they are dynamically created and modified through our interactions with others. Wittgenstein used examples such as the "game" and "family resemblance" to illustrate this point. Wittgenstein's language game and family resemblance theory are two important concepts in his philosophy that can help in establishing epistemic operators.

Wittgenstein's language game refers to the idea that language is not a fixed and rigid system of rules, but rather a dynamic and context-dependent activity. According to Wittgenstein, meaning is not derived from a set of definitions or criteria, but rather from the way language is used in various social activities or "games." These language games involve the use of words in specific contexts and actions, which give them their meaning. In the case of epistemic operators, one can establish their meaning and use through specific language games that involve knowledge claims and epistemological discussions. By engaging in these language games, participants can understand and establish the rules, criteria, and contexts associated with epistemic operators.

The family resemblance theory, on the other hand, suggests that categories or concepts do not have a single defining feature but rather a set of overlapping similarities or "family resemblances." According to Wittgenstein, there is no single characteristic that all members of a category must possess, but rather a network of similarities and connections between them. This theory can be applied to epistemic operators by recognizing that different operators, such as "know," "believe," or "doubt," may not have a single,

universally applicable definition. Instead, they can be understood in relation to each other through their shared similarities and overlapping features. By identifying and exploring these family resemblances, one can establish a more nuanced understanding of epistemic operators and their relationships.

In summary, Wittgenstein's language game and family resemblance theory can be used to establish epistemic operators by engaging in specific language games that involve knowledge claims and by recognizing the overlapping similarities and connections between different operators. This approach allows for a more nuanced and contextual understanding of epistemic operators, moving away from rigid definitions and towards a more flexible and dynamic interpretation. He argued that just as different games have different rules and criteria for what counts as a win, different language games have different criteria for what counts as meaning. Similarly, he suggested that concepts are not defined by a fixed set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather they have a family resemblance to each other, with overlapping similarities and differences.

In this way, Wittgenstein's philosophy seeks to reconcile the importance of context in shaping our understanding of concepts with the idea that there are no fixed and universal meanings. Our concepts are not simply given to us, but are actively constructed and refined through our ongoing engagement with language and the world around us. We have to remind ourselves that it is not possible to enter oneself to all possible worlds to determine what an action or word can mean. Also a statement being used by two different persons can mean (can be understood) two different things. Like our example of Susan and Bill being married. Although the same is uttered by two different persons, intonation involved may also determine the meaning of their marriage with all present and future marriage circumstances.

7. Conclusion

I want to conclude in saying that Wittgenstein has taken care of both the context and concept in case of determinants in his epistemology. Wittgenstein's conception of epistemic operators offers a valuable perspective on the nature of knowledge and certainty. His focus on the practical aspects of language allows us to consider how language is used to assert knowledge claims and make authoritative statements. Additionally, his recognition of the limitations and complexities of language highlights the inherent difficulties in ascribing certainty to any knowledge claim.

Wittgenstein's notion of uncertainty as inherent in language challenges traditional conceptions of knowledge as absolute and objective. Instead, he emphasizes the contextual and subjective nature of knowledge, suggesting that our understanding of the world is shaped by our language games and the particular contexts in which we use language.

The epistemic operators that Wittgenstein introduces, such as 'I know' and 'I am certain', highlight the linguistic practices through which we express our level of confidence or certainty in our claims. These operators are not just linguistic tools but also embed social and cultural dimensions, as they are used to establish authority and negotiate trust within a given community.

By drawing attention to the role of language and its limitations in representing knowledge, Wittgenstein encourages us to question the certainty of our own beliefs and to approach knowledge claims with a more nuanced and contextual understanding. Moreover, his ideas suggest that the recognition of uncertainty is not a weakness but rather an essential part of the human experience, reminding us to be more open to alternative perspectives and to engage in productive dialogue rather than seeking definitive answers.

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