



The African State: Understanding Development And Underdevelopment.

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Abstract

The paper examined the African States and the understanding of development and underdevelopment. With dependency theory, the paper noted that the nature and character of the State which was bequeathed by African colonialist, with poor development of productive forces, labour power, objects of labour and means of labour with corresponding poor social relations of production coupled with negative role of Africans, both leadership and followership after independence is central to the understanding of development and underdevelopment of States in Africa.. The paper recommended among other things, development of States, the leadership role of states in establishing the framework of economic strategy, and the collaboration between the States, state enterprises and commercial companies as a road to development. Corruption and bad governance must be drastically reduced if not completely eradicated through the installation of a visionary, honest and democratic leadership. This kind of leadership is achievable through free, fair and credible elections.

Key words: State, Development, Underdevelopment, Dependency

INTRODUCTION

The crisis of development and underdevelopment in Africa has attracted a copious attention all over the world. It is a paradox that while the continent can boast of huge amount of domestic resources, both human and natural, the economy is nose-dying. The poverty and suffering of the people is overwhelming intensifying. Apart from the popular, ideological and enduring "dark continent", a recent more realistic label sees Africa as an "island of want" (Alex, 2002).

The mystery of the underdevelopment of Africa has been linked by the dependency school to the incorporation of the African economy into the world capitalist system, under which the development capitalist countries have employed certain mechanisms to exploit and subjugate the region. The liberal school on the other hand, sees nothing wrong with the incorporation of the African economy into the world capitalist system and believes that once internal obstacles are removed from the African domestic scene, the sky will be the limit to the development of the region (Ogbu, 2004).

In this imaginary, post colonial Africa is recognized as being confronted with a dilemma of absences; on the one hand, one needs to recover the self-esteem that suffered from the attempt by the colonizers to foist on Africans a different world view and cultural mindset, on the other hand, Africans need to develop and be a meaningful part of the global processes and flows. The third critical absence is that of a tradition of leadership that will confront the dilemma of state and thus take Africa out of its debilitating condition. The consequences of these absences, especially the third, are daily the focus of western broadcast journalism and the inevitable summary of Africa as a faraway place where good people go hungry, bad people run government, and chaos and anarchy are the norms". (Adeshina 2009) of course, one must make allowance for the process of journalistic selectivity that is concerned with the effect rather than the cause of the African situation.

Nevertheless, these effects seem to give us enough justification for concluding that the fundamental problem of African states is that of leadership (Wanan 2013). We can of course mention the likes of Mobutu, Bokassa, Samuel Doe, Abacha, Mugabe, Gaddafi, Kibaki, Eyadema, Omar Bongo and so on. This conclusion is interesting to the extent that a leader has significant influence on how any state or society effectively answers the question of development and underdevelopment at a point in time.

This paper is therefore; set out to investigate the African State and the understanding of development and underdevelopment. It will be divided into five sections. The first section is the introduction; second section will clarify key concepts of state, development and underdevelopment. Section three will look at the colonial state and the fourth section will analyze the post colonial state and its effects on development and underdevelopment in Africa, finally, conclusion and recommendations.

Clarification of key Concepts

The basic requirement for debating anything according to Chaf (1994) is to first and foremost understand the actual thing being talked about. Hence they needed to define the concepts of state, development and underdevelopment.

State

The Western liberal (bourgeois) scholars have maintained that the state is not an instrument in the hands of the ruling class; but an organized group of individuals in a defined territory responsible for secular common welfare, the maintenance of law and order and creation of the enablement that could lead to societal development (MacIver 1966; Laski, 1967; Jackson and Roseberg, 1985, Cassese, 1986).

In the words of MacIver, when we speak of the state we mean the organization of which government is the administrative organ. A state has a constitution, a code of laws, a way of setting up its government and a body of citizens... as association acting through laws as promulgated by a government, endowed to this end with coercive power, maintain within a community territorially demarcated, the universal external conditions of social order (1966).

In a similar vein, Laski (1967) defined the state as "a territorial society divided into government and subjects claiming within its allotted physical area a supremacy over all other institutions". According to Jackson and Roseberg (1985), state is a political constitution of sufficient organized authority and powers to govern a defined territory and its population to remain independent to power to govern a defined territory and its population to remain independent of other states". While Cassese (1986) viewed the state as legal person separated from society.

A synopsis of the western liberal scholars' arguments and submissions about the definition of the state emphasizes the concept of population government, territoriality, benevolence and impartial arbiter, coerciveness for maintenance of law and order, provision of secular common welfare and above all, the description of the state as a legal personality and its separation from society.

According to the Marxist scholars led by Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, "the executive of the modern state is not but a committee for managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. Put differently, a state is essentially a class structure; it is not just an organization of one class dominating over the other classes, but a machine used by the capitalists to keep the working class and the poor in subjugation (Miliband 1969; Ake, 1985; Anifowose and Enemu, 1999). Thus, Miliband (1969 P.7) argued that: The state is not a thing..... it does not as such exist. What the state stands for is a member of particular institutions which together constitute its reality which interacts as part of what may be called the state system.

To Ake (1985), the state represents a specific modality of class domination, one in which class domination is mediated by mechanism is differentiated and dislocated from the ruling class and even the society and appears as an objective force standing alongside society. From the Marxist's analysis or perspective, it therefore means that under capitalism, the state represents the interests of the dominant capital. Miliband (1969) observed that the reason why the capitalist state represents the interest of the bourgeoisie or the dominant class is because in capitalist society, the well-being of private corporations and financial institutions are and indeed, must be perceived as the equivalent of the national interests.

After thorough scrutiny of both the bourgeois and Marxist conceptualizations of the state, one is convinced that the latter perspective represented reality more than the former even though it may equally have some shortcomings. Indisputably, it is the capitalist class that controls the state using its economic power because it owns and controls the means of production, distribution and exchange. The argument of the bourgeoisie scholars that the

state is neutral and objective is not water-tight because a study of all the modes of productions have always shown that the dominant class in every mode is usually the dominant political class. For instance, in the slave mode, the slave masters were in charge, while in the feudal mode, the lords were always in power. This also applies to the capitalist mode of production. This explains the rationale behind the iron law of oligarchy which emphasizes minority rule in human organizations.

Essential Characteristics of the State

There are many features of state but the following are regarded by all political scientists as essential characteristics of statehood.

- a. **Territorially:** a state has a definite territory. According to Appadorai (2004), territoriality is not essential to a tribe but is to a state". Anifowose and Enemuo (1999) maintained that "while territoriality is essential to a state, no limit or uniformity can be prescribed in respect of the size of states"
- b. **Population:** It has been defined as including citizens or subjects who enjoy full right and are full allegiance to the state (Ibid).
- c. **Government:** It is the machinery that carried out the will of the state, or an agent of the state that controls individuals' behaviours to ensure internal and external peace and security as well as collective welfare.
- d. **Sovereignty:** It deals with supremacy and independence of the state in decision making, decision mediating and decision implementation. Sovereignty is the distinctive mark of the state, distinguishing it alike from individuals and associations within the state (Appadorai, 2004).
- e. **Permanence:** No change of rules or form of government alters the continuity of the state existence, and no time limit on its activities. However, a state may cease to exist if it becomes merged or disintegrated. For example, the merger of Senegal and Gambia in 1981 that became known as Senegambia and its subsequent disintegration in 1983 that became separate independent nation-states (Www.csmonifor.comn).

Purpose of the State

According to Plato, the just state is one in which individuals have voluntarily contracted in order to cooperate and provide for their various needs, the one in which each individual does the job he is best suited and such a state has three specialized groups of people namely; producers, soldiers and rulers" (Anifowose and Enemuo, 1999).

The purpose of the state according to Aristotle is "to ensure good life", while Hobbes wrote that the man without a= state was obviously "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". Like Aristotle, Aquinas held that the state arose out of man's social nature and that the promotion of the good life is its purpose.

To Locke, "the great and chief end of men uniting into commonwealth and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property that is lives, liberties and estates" (Appadorai 2004).

Appadorais (2004) quoted Adam Smith as identifying three purposes of the state to include the following:

- i. The duty of protecting society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies.
- ii. The duty of protecting subjects from injustice, that is, the duty of establishing a system of justice, and
- iii. The duty of creating and maintaining certain public works and public happiness of the greatest number of individuals under its jurisdiction.

Interestingly too, the utilitarian school led by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mills submitted that the purpose of the state is to provide the greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals under its jurisdiction.

From the above intellectual analyses, one may broadly summarize the purposes or aims and functions or roles of the state as being the maintenance of law and order, promotion of individual well-being and development, provision of general welfare to its citizenry, aggregation of diverse interests of group for national cohesion and development, participation in international state system and defence of citizens against internal and external aggressors. Most importantly therefore, the major role of any state including Nigeria is to ensure peaceful co-existence between and among members of the society and development opportunities. As we may later see in this paper, the failure of the state to discharge this responsibility makes the society underdeveloped.

Development

The concept 'development' is both elusive and fluid. The principal obstacle to a universally accepted notion of development has been the ideological disposition of most scholars who look at development from a preferred position of certain ideological underpinnings. Akin, (2012) conceived development as a socio-economic transformation, which has three important implications. First, it emphasizes that development is essentially a human issue, a concern with the capacity of individuals realize their inherent potential and effectively to cope with the changing circumstances of their lives. Rodney (1972) also posit that "development in human society is a many-sided process, At the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well being" Development is encompassed within the idea of the ability of a society to be able to tap its natural resources in order to cater for the material and social lives of the generality of the people.

This is simply a reference to the manner of production of goods and services in a society.

A scientific definition of development starts from the mode of production which tantamount the existing economic system in a society. The mode of production comprises of two components, productive forces and social relation of production. The component of productive forces focuses on the forces that propel production to higher levels like manpower or labour science and technology and industrialization or means of labour. The level of development of these three forces of production is central to the determination of the level of development in any society. For bourgeois scholars industrialization equals development.

The second component of production in the scientific analysis of development has to do with the social relations of production. According to Vander, (2003). This connotes the kind of relations people get into with each other in the course of production, In other words, the social relations of production are synonymous with the class structure of a society that usually depicts two dominant classes in the presence of many classes, These two classes are usually an ownership and non-controlling class (The bourgeoisie) and a non-ownership and non-controlling class (the proletariat), the latter on the receiving end of the iniquities unleashed by the former. These two classes are full of antagonisms and conflict due to the quest to maintain the status quo and change respectively. This component of development therefore involves progressive changes that involve the sharing of the products of an economy that go to bring quality in the basic needs that accrue to the majority of the people.

This paper therefore, conceived development as the adequate utilization of resources for the advancement of the generality of mankind in the society.

Underdevelopment

Many factors have been offered to explain the apparent underdevelopment in Africa, the colonial legacy, social pluralism and its centrifugal tendencies, the corruption of leaders, poor labour discipline, and the lack of entrepreneurial skills. Poor planning, incompetent management, inappropriate policies, the stifling of market mechanisms, low levels of technical assistance, the limited inflow of foreign capital, deterioration of commodity prices and unfavorable terms of trade, and low level of saving and investment. These factors are not irrelevant to the problem. Alone or in combination they could be serious impediments to development (Ake, 1999). Akin (2012) observed that the concept of underdevelopment is relative or, more accurately, relational. It is a state of societal wellbeing which, in relation to conditions elsewhere, is far from satisfactory.

The state reflects certain absolute and concrete conditions, notable among which is the loss of self-reliance and the inability to be the master of one's own fortunes. This loss of self-reliance especially, in countries described as underdevelopment, can be shown to be an inevitable concomitant of the undermining of their traditional socio-economic formation by the international capitalist system.

Rodney (1972) also opined that "it makes it easier to comprehend the concept of underdevelopment. Obviously, underdevelopment is no absence of development, because

every people have developed in one way or another and to a greater or lesser extent. Underdevelopment makes sense only as a means of comparing levels of development. It is very much tied to the fact that human social development has been uneven and from a strictly economic view point, some human groups have advanced further by producing more and becoming wealthier".

Dependency Theory

According to Dos Santos, (1979) Dependency relates to a situation which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of the other to which the former is subjected. The relation of inter dependence between two or more economies, and between these and the world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries the dominant ones which are the capitalist nations like America can expand and can be self-sustaining while other countries the dependent ones like Nigeria can do this only as a reflection of expansion which can have either a negative or positive effect on their immediate development.

There basic assumption is that there is a dialectical relationship between development and underdevelopment, in other words according to Andre Frank (1975) "Development and under development are two different sides of a universal historical process." To him what causes under development in third world is as a result of what brought about development in Europe and America.

This dependency concerns the centre which refers to the technological advanced countries of the world and the periphery refers to the third world countries, also, when looking at this theoretical framework we talk about the centre of the centre which refers to the urban areas of the world. Centre's of the periphery refers to the urban centre of the developing countries like Nigeria; periphery of the centre refers to the rural areas of the industrialized countries while the periphery of the periphery refers to the rural areas of the developing country.

This is a relationship where the centre of the developed countries dictates the terms of their co-existence economically, socially and politically. There is an exploitative and vertical relationship between the centre of the centre and the centre of the periphery in this setup. Looking at this case the periphery is subordinate to the centre. In this, the centre is assigned the role of manufacturing industrial products while the periphery produces primary goods a materials and needed resources, the periphery now depends on the centre for her economic survival and consumption of the already made products.

The Nature and Character of the Colonial State

Colonialism in Africa was markedly different from the colonial experiences of the Americans, Europe and Asia. To begin with it was unusually statist. The colonial state redistributed land and determined who should produce what and how. It attended to the

supply of labour. Sometimes resorting to forced labour. It churned out administrative instruments and legislated taxes to induce the breakup of traditional social relations of production, the atomization of society and the process of proletarianisation (Ake 1996).

The type of education that the colonial masters introduced was a brain wash type of education that deemphasized the use of skills, but could only qualify Africans to serve as interpreters, housemaids, gatemens and messengers. Ake, (1996) submitted that "it went into the business of education to ensure that workers could do the jobs, they were required to perform and would remain steadfast in the performance of their often tedious and disagreeable task".

The skeletal and disarticulated infrastructural facilities that were provided, were made available to ease the exploitation, it built roads, railways and ports to facilitate the collection and export of commodities as well as the import of manufactured goods. An interesting view has also been expressed that is it sold commodities through commodity boards. Indeed, it controlled every aspect of the colonial economy tightly to maintain its power and domination and to realize the economic objectives of colonization (Ake, 1996). The GRAs were provided with the best of facilities which served as residence for Europeans who administered over the African territories. There was little or no regard for Africans.

Since the colonial state was called upon by the peculiar circumstances of the colonial situation to carry out so many functions, indeed to do everything, it was all powerful. It succeeded to be all powerful not only to carry out its mission but also to survive along with the colonial order in the face of the resentment and the hostility of the colonized, a hostility that occasionally broke out into rebellions such as the Mau insurrection in Kenya and the Aba women riot of 1929 in Nigeria to mention but a few.

Ake, (1996) stated that the power of the colonial state was not only absolute but arbitrary. For instance, the colonial governments made the colonies produce the commodities they need. When the Gold Coast (now Ghana) was colonized, it did not farm cocoa. The colonial government decided that the country would be suitable ground for farming cocoa and duly introduced the crop. In 1865 the country started exporting cocoa, and by 1901 it was the leading producer of the commodity in the world. It quickly became a monoculture cocoa economy, by 1939 cocoa accounted for 80 percent of the value of its exports.

In Kenya, the Coffee plantation registration ordinance of 1918 forbade the growing of coffee, the country's most profitable commodity by Africans. The purpose was to make Africans available for wage labour by keeping them from becoming independent producers as well as to prevent them from stealing coffee from European farms by ensuring they could not legally possess coffee. Other examples of arbitrary in Kenya for European farmers and the marketing of native produce ordinance of 1935, which restricted wholesale marketing to Europeans and barred Africans (Ake, 1996).

In struggling to advance their interests, the colonial subjects did not worry about conforming to legality or legitimacy norms. Colonial politics was thus reduced to the crude mechanics of opposing forces driven by the accumulation of power. The result was an unprecedented derived for power; power was the top priority in all circumstances and sought by means. As the rulers and subordinates extended their powers, the idea of lawful political competition became impossible, and politics was inevitably reduced to a single issue the determination of two exclusive claims to ruler-ship. This politics hardly encouraged moderation and compromise. These were some of the characteristics of the colonial state. In the next section an examination of its implement on development and underdevelopment will be made.

State: Development and Underdevelopment in Africa

One remarkable feature of the discourse on the state and development in Africa is the disjuncture between an analytical tradition that insists on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa and a prescriptive literature that presupposes their existence. States whose capacity to pursue any national project is denied at one level (theoretical or diagnostic) are exhorted, at the prescriptive level, to assume roles that are, *ex definicione*, beyond their capacity or political will. Such states are urged to "delink", to reduce themselves, to stabilize the economy, to privatize the economy, to engage in "good governance", to democratize themselves and society, to create an "enabling environment" for the private sector, etc. In other words, to do what they cannot do. What we then have is, to paraphrase Gramsci, the pessimism of the diagnosis and the optimism of the prescription. Obviously such a contradictory position is unsatisfactory. To attain some congruence between diagnosis and prescription, we need to retrace our steps back to the diagnosis. We shall argue that neither Africa's post-colonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by successful "developmental states" rules out the possibility of African "developmental states" capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto.

This assertion has to contend with a whole intellectual tradition on the prospects of capitalist accumulation in Africa and the nature of African states and societies—a tradition characterized by the casualness with which assertions about such prospects are made, and the deterministic and aprioristic nature of the discourse rarely based on analysis of the actual experiences, but merely on first principles, ideological conviction or faith.

We shall also contend that most of the analyses about African states that have led to so much despondency about prospects of development are based on invidious comparison between African states in crisis and idealized and tendentiously characterized states elsewhere. This invidious comparison has occulted the African state, making concrete analysis of its character less important than the normative statements about what it should be. The "ought" has proved more interesting than the "is"; turning debates on the state in Africa into the most pontifical and teleological of any theme in Africa.

If the state was given a central role in earlier views of the process of development in Africa, the situation changed dramatically in the late 1970s and 1980s. The African state is today the most demonized social institution in Africa, vilified for its weaknesses, its over-extension, its interference with the smooth functioning of the markets, its repressive character, its dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity, its absence, etc. The state once the cornerstone of development is now the millstone around otherwise efficient markets. It is now the "rentier state", the "overextended state", the "parasitical state", the "predatory state", the "lame leviathan", "the patrimonial state" the "prebendal state", the "erony state", the "kleptocratic state", the "inverted state", etc. Although this inflation of epithets has reached high proportions in more recent years, the tradition itself predates the "crisis" years.

Early criticism of the state in Africa came from the neo-Marxists whose own epithets to describe the pathological condition of the African state included the "petty bourgeois state", the "neo-colonial state" and the "dependent state". The many epithets underscore the fall from grace of the African state. It is now argued that not only has the state become dysfunctional in terms of the management of larger societal issues, but also a real nuisance in of its citizens, as evidenced by the "withdrawal" from state-dominated economic and social spaces (Chazan, 1988, Chazan, 1988, Rothchild, 1994). Some even go so far as to conceive developmental schemes that completely circumvent or marginalize the state as non-governmental organizations, the private sector and local communities proceed almost surreptitiously with addressing issues of poverty and development without the encumbrance of the state (Sorkaa, 2003).

The shift in attitudes is attributable not only to the dismal performance of African states during the current social and economic crisis, but also to a number of ideological, paradigmatic and structural shifts in both the domestic and international spheres. First, on the ideological level there has been the dramatic ascendancy of neo-liberalism partly as a result of the rise and political triumph of the neo-conservative movements riding on the discontent with welfare state and the inflationary impact of Keynesian solutions. To the extent that perceptions of welfarism and state interventionism spilled over into the aid business, it is not surprising that the aid discourse has embraced some of the anti-statism of neo-liberalism. Second, at the structural level, the process of globalization has forced all governments to rethink and restructure the state market relationships in their respective countries and to pay greater homage to "market forces"

The Developmental State

In the literature, the "developmental state" has two components: one ideological, one structural. It is this ideology-structure nexus that distinguishes developmental states from other forms of states. In terms of ideology, such a state is essentially one whose ideological underpinning is "developmentalist" in that it conceives its "mission" as that of ensuring economic development, usually interpreted to mean high rates of accumulation and

industrialization. Such a state "establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote sustained development, understanding by development the steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy" (Castells, 1992). At this ideational level, the élite must be able to establish an "ideological hegemony", so that its developmental project becomes, in a Gramscian sense, a "hegemonic" project to which key actors in the nation adhere voluntarily.

The state-structure side of the definition of the developmental state emphasizes capacity to implement economic policies sagaciously and effectively. Such a capacity is determined by various others institutional, technical, administrative and political. Undergirding all these is the autonomy of the state from social forces so that it can use these capacities to devise long-term economic policies unencumbered by claims of myopic private interests. It is usually assumed that such a state should, in some sense, be "strong" and enjoy "relative autonomy" from key social actors.

The quest for a "strong state" in the development process was a strong feature of the "modernization" literature. Such a state was contrasted to what Myrdal (1968) referred to as the "soft state" that had neither the administrative capacity nor the political wherewithal to push through its developmental project. And, finally, the state must have some social anchoring that prevents it from using its autonomy in a predatory manner and enables it to gain adhesion of key social actors.

As formulated, the definition of the "developmental state" runs the risk of being tautological since evidence that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from the performance of the economy. This produces a definition of a state as developmental if the economy is developing, and equates economic success to state strength while measuring the latter by the presumed outcomes of its policies. It has led to myopic concentration of analysis around success to the neglect of the "trial and error" nature of policy-making even in the most successful cases. If a developmental state is not be deified into some kind of omnipotent and omniscient leviathan that always gets what it wants, then the definition must include situations in which exogenous structural dynamic and unforeseen factors can torpedo genuine developmental commitments and efforts by the state. This allows room for poor performance due to exogenous factors, miscalculation or plain bad luck. At times, a government's political will and technical capacity may simply prove inadequate to fend off exogenous forces.

In Africa, we have many examples of states whose performance up until the mid-1970s would have qualified them as "developmental states" in the sense conveyed by current definitions, but which now seem anti-developmental because the hard times brought the economic expansion of their countries to a halt. Recognition of episodes and possibilities of failure leads us to a definition of a developmental state as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development. Proxies such as

"tax efforts" and public expenditure patterns can be used to measure such "seriousness". The main force behind the developmentalist ideology has usually been nationalism, inducing nations to seek to "catch up" with countries considered as more developed, to firm the resource base for national defence and security, etc. It is essential to stress these ideological underpinnings of state policies for it is these that provide the rationale for some of the "policies" and give legitimacy to otherwise unpalatable "sacrifices", not only because they serve as the "opium of the masses", but also because they knead together the ruling class.

The centrality of ideology also points to the naiveté of the de-politicized quest for technocratic "governance", now pushed by international financial institutions (IFIs), in which a technocracy is supposed to carry out policies that are good for the nation for no apparent reason, not even self-serving ones.

Lessons for African States

Not only has the spectacular success of the East Asian "Four Tigers" led to a re-reading of the role of the state in the development process, but it has also raised the question of replicability of their policies and experiences in other developing countries. The lessons drawn from these experiences differed and were often shaped by the pre-analytic predisposition of the observer. Earlier recognition of this performance of the "Four Tigers" was refracted through the prism of neo-liberalism so that the experience appeared shorn of all dirigisme and was cited as irrefutable evidence of the superiority of essentially laissez-faire policies. More specifically, reliance on market forces and the adoption of market-driven export-oriented development strategies was said to have led to efficient exploitation of the comparative advantage of these countries in cheap labour (Balassa, 1971).

The first presentation for African consumption of the lessons from Asia from the neo liberal perspective was the "Berg report" (World Bank, 1981), which has been the definite document on adjustment for 17 years. There have been amendments, subtractions, additions and refinements of the argument, but as Adjustment in Africa (World Bank. 1994) clearly suggested the World Bank was almost congenitally tied to the core argument of the Berg report with its faith in the market and a minimalist view of the state. The 1994 report insisted on the dichotomy made in African policy-making between state and market in which these appeared as rival forms thus reviving Manichean discourse that had for years vitiated "development planning" in Africa.

Subsequent analysis has shown that neo-classical reading of experiences of development in Asian has been tendentious, deliberately downplaying the role of the state in the "success stories." Revisionist literature on the Asian experience presents a picture quite different from that projected by neo-classical interpretation of that same experience. These countries were far from paragons of laissez-fairism and, instead, were highly dirigiste economies in which the states had "governed markets" to ensure high levels of accumulation, technology absorption and conquest of foreign markets.

The general conclusion of this literature is that "market failure" so prominent in development economics is still a problem that warrants government intervention and that since such "failures" differ in intensity, scope and location, a selective set of interventions is required. The most significant lesson has been the central role played by a "developmental state" in the process of development. This "dirigiste" Asian experience and theoretical developments in economics have revived interest in some of the issues that were central to development studies, unleashing what Krugman (1992) has called a "counter-counter revolution". These issues include problems of human capital; possibilities of the state "arousing in" private investment market imperfections and failures, industrial policy, etc. In the African case, the failure of structural adjustment programmes (SAP) has compelled even the most dogmatic institutions to recognize the positive role the state can play in the process of development, beyond acting as a "night watchman".

In its book, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, the World Bank, (1989) acknowledged the importance of the state in managing development and social change and brought back on the agenda the pro-active role of the state in development. However, the return of the state was now premised upon a whole series of proposals about "good governance" In *Adjustment in Africa* (World Bank, 1994) and *Bureaucrats in Business* (World Bank, 1995) the World Bank retreated to its more familiar ideological terrain in which a developmental state borders on an oxymoron. One sees in the tortured logic of the presentation of the Asian miracle, especially with respect to industrial policy and its reduction of a complex set of pro-active state policies into a vacuous "market friendliness". The lesson drawn for Africa by the World Bank was that, in the best of cases, development strategies or, more precisely, industrial policy was either superfluous or, where useful, merely simulated the market, which, in the opinion of some, would have done better without the interventions anyway. In the African case, two additional arguments were added-first, even if industrial policy had worked in the successful economies, African states were too weak and too prone to "capture" by vested interests, so that the pursuit of such policies would produce perverse outcomes. And, second, in any case in the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade régime most of the policies central to industrial policy were no longer acceptable.

Lack of Ideology

One argument often advanced by Africans themselves relates to the lack of an ideology to development anchored in some form of nationalist project. This is a recurring theme in political discourse in Africa. Frantz Fanon's (1966 and 1967) tirades against the ideological numbness of the emergent ruling classes in Africa remain among the most sustained statements of this position. Many other political leaders and analysts have elaborated on this lacuna.

Onimode talks of the "ideological vacuum" that he attributes to petty bourgeois commitment to their class interests and their fear of "revolutionary pressures", to the

obscurantism of imperialist powers and to mass illiteracy "which imposes a culture of silence and passivity and inhibits popular demand for ideological discourse" (1988). Thus Ake states: "The ideology of development was exploited as a means of reproducing political hegemony; it got limited attention and served hardly any purpose as a framework for economic transformation" (1996).

For some, the lack of ideology is inherent to personal rule under which loyalty is not to some overriding societal goals but to individuals, often holding highly idiosyncratic ideologies that they themselves flout with impunity and with no moral qualms (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Sandbrook, 1986). Consequently, such leaders are said to have no moral basis on which they could demand enthusiastic and internalized compliance to whatever "national project" they launched. In the more extreme versions the lack of ideology of development is evidence of the cultural rejection of development by African leaders and their followers.

However, as I have argued elsewhere (Mkandawire, 1997), for most of the first generation of African leaders "development" was certainly a central preoccupation. Indeed some writers characterize the post-colonial state as "developmentalist" almost by definition. African leaders have always been aware of the need for some "nationalist-cum-developmental" ideology for both nation building and development. The quest for an ideology to guide the development process inspired African leaders to propound their own idiosyncratic and often incoherent "ideologies" to "rally the masses" for national unity and development. If such ideologies are still absent it is definitely not for lack of trying. The centrality of "development" was such that it acquired the status of an ideology ("developmentalism") that provided the ideological scaffolding of "development plans" and the authoritarian scaffolding given to it.

For some, such an ideology has essentially served purposes of mystification and obfuscation. Thus Gavin, writing about the ruling class in Nigeria, states "The Nigerian bourgeoisie lacks the commitment of a religious socialist or nationalist character of the rationalising, capital accumulating, surplus expropriating classes of Britain, Russia, Germany, or Japan during their period of industrialisation. Perhaps it is this which lies behind the repeated call for a national ideology', which seeks to subordinate the energy of the people behind single national goal. In fact the Nigerian bourgeoisie do have an ideology, in the sense of a theoretical legitimisation of the status quo. It is found in the concept of 'development'..." (Gavin, 1977).

My own view is less cynical. By political commitment and social origins most of the leaders were deeply committed to the "eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease", which formed an "unholy trinity" against which nationalist swords were drawn in the post-colonial era.

And even today, some view of development conditions African policy-makers' perception of policy. The exigencies of political legitimacy impose "development" on any meaningful political agenda. Although the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) have managed to

convince many that African leaders' objection to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) was because these would undermine their rent seeking and clientelistic *chasse gardée*, there are well-documented developmental arguments against SAPs, advanced by African bureaucrats, on the need to maintain public investment in infrastructure and education, on the need for some form of credit rationing to stimulate private investment, etc. The Economic Commission for Africa has over the years regularly codified these positions, which were often dismissed peremptorily by the BWIs.

In conclusion, one should note that, if the first generation of African leaders concentrated their energies on the politics of nation building, there are signs of a new leadership whose focus is on the economics of nation building. These new leaders swear by economic growth and seem to view good growth indicators as the main source of their legitimacy. In addition, if the earlier nationalist leaders associated capitalism with foreign control, the new leadership seems much less preoccupied with that. They have embraced privatization and attraction of foreign capital as centerpieces of their policy initiatives. Ominously, these leaders are more attentive to the apprehensions and appreciation of international organizations than to their domestic capitalists. While assiduously cultivating a good image in the eyes of international financial institutions (IFIS) and seeking out foreign capital, they tend to have a jaundiced view of domestic capitalists, whom they hold in spite and incessantly vilify for parasitism, failure jointly to set up modern enterprises able to compete internationally, etc.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen that to fully understand the relationship between state, development and underdevelopment generally in Africa and particularly in Nigeria, we need to have a deep sense of history- a history of the development of international capitalism and one of its changing phases, colonialism. A colonial state was created in such a way that both her economy and policies were designed to satisfy the interest of the colonial power at the detriment of the vulnerable African poor. The mode of production of the colonized states was not able to ensure cohesiveness and complementarities in the colonial economy which has a spillover effect on the post-colonial state. Whereas, the state in the developed nations is strong due to high level of development of productive forces and social relations of production, the post-colonial states in Third World experienced low level of development of productive forces and as such, incapable of providing goods and services that would cater for the needs of the people.

The way forward:

- a. Emphasis should be placed on developmental state: the leadership role of government in establishing the framework of economic strategy. This has to do with the improvement of both the productive forces and social relations of production through industrialization and its model of protectionism.

- b. The forgoing can be achieved through collaboration between the state, state enterprises and commercial companies. After all, Asian countries including Japan, South-South, Malaysia, Singapore and China, have pioneered this model of public-private sector collaboration.
- c. The state and its leadership should create the necessary condition of service of public and private officials that would foster and promote ethics and accountability in governance, this can be done through de-emphasizing the norms and values that encourage idleness; laziness, money politics, thurgery, systematic begging (the God increases you syndrome) and gossips.
- d. Corruption and bad governance must be drastically reduced if not completely eradicated through the installation of a visionary, honest and democratic leadership. This kind of leadership is achievable through free, fair and credible elections.

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