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Critical Reflection On Naiyayika's Objection To The Buddhist View Point Of Valid Cognition

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Logic defines as the science of the laws of thought and it is clear that any investigation into the laws in which actually thinks belongs to the field of psychology. The laws of thought have three principles- the principle of identity, the principle of contradiction and the principle of excluded middle which have been taken as the necessary, and some time as the sufficient condition for valid thinking. The nature of logical implication from the point of view is which regards it as an element in all proof or conclusive evidence. Logic deals with the principle of valid reason and argument. The classical or traditional logic was formulated by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B. C) who developed rules for correct syllogistic reasoning. He was most famous achievement as logician in the history of inference and traditionally called syllogism. But in Indian perspective *pramāṇa-vidyā* study of logic does not associate only inferential knowledge other sorts of knowledge is associated. Indian logic deals in the field of epistemology.

In *ṣardha-darshan* (six systems of Indian philosophy) logic promotes in Nyāya Darshana founded by Akṣapāda or Maharsi Gautama (150 A. D). It has a great important for its analysis of logic and epistemology and is being advocated of realistic convey that knowledge is always dealt with the object. Knowledge or cognition may be either valid or invalid (*yatārtha* or *ayatārtha jñāna*) where as valid knowledge is called *pramā* and *apramā* is invalid. Right knowledge is the true and right demonstrate of an object is advocated by the Nyāya school. But in the Buddhist perspective a metaphysical idealism have influenced in their logical circumstances. Idealistic perspectives are in two categories: Subjective idealism which suggests that a mental object exists only to the extent that a person distinguishes the object. Objective idealism is which suggests the existence of an objective consciousness that be present earlier to and independently of persons consciousness, thus the existence of the object is independent of the person perception.

In the history of all Indian school of logic promotes the *pramāna* or science of reasoning. *Nyāya-sutrakāra* Aksapāda started his *sūtra* on sixteen categories¹ and *pramāna* is the first in that categories. It is said to lead to the attainment of supreme felicity (*nishreyasa*). Bhāsakāra also represent in his commentary the importance of *pramāna*. He started that *pramānatohartha pratipattau pravṛtti sāmāthyādartha vat pramānam*² There can be no object of knowledge or cognition apart from the *pramāna* would not fruitful exertion be aroused and when objects and it must be regarded as right successful in producing desire or intending result. It has a power to emerge fruitful and effective activity. The nature of *tattva* (object) is based on its own reality (*sat*) or existence. *Pramāna* examine the existence of the things which is exist or not (*sat* or *asat*). *Pramāna* possesses a systematically way of truly determining the nature of object. Actually *pramana* means the source of valid knowledge. Bhasakara clearly distinguished the meaning of *pramāna* of its etymological viewpoint. It is clearly said that *artha vati ca pramāne pramātā-prameyam pramitirityarthavanti bhavanti* ³ the word *pramāna* is different from *pramiti*, *pramātā*, *prameya*. *pramāna* is the source of valid knowledge or means of cognition where as *pramiti* or *pramā* is valid knowledge, *pramātā* is the knower of knowledge and *prameya* is the object of valid knowledge. In this respect, the nature of *pramana* is not same between the Nyāya and Buddhist view point. In Buddhist view point there is no distinct between *pramā* and *pramāna*. In Tibetan rendering of word *pramā* and *pramāṇa* is *tshad ma* only which means measure referring to the evaluating of the knowledge.⁴ There are no separate Tibetan rendering for the words *pramā* and *pramāṇa*. These two are same in the sense of valid knowledge or *samyag jñāna*.⁵

In Indian tradition according to *pramāna saṃkhyā-viprapatipatti* disagreement of number of *pramānas* are different: Cārvāka, who are the foremost materials, accepts only one *pramāna*- perception (*pratyakṣa*). The Vaisheshika and Buddhist admit two *pramānas*- perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). The Sāṃkhya and a branch of Naiyayikas add one of above two- word or verbal testimony (*śabda*). The Naiyāyika accepts four *pramānas*- analogy (*upamāna*) along with the above three. The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā School of Prāvākara recognizes five *pramānas*- implication (*arthāpatti*) in addition to the above four. The Purva Mimamsa School of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and the Vedānta accepts six *pramānas*- absence or negation (*abhāva*) together with the above five. The Paurāṇikas admits eight *pramānas*- possibility of inculcation (*saṃbhava*) and historical traditions (*aitihya*) along with the above six. In the case of Vaiyākaraṇa accepts two *pramānas* which are perception (*pratyakṣa*) and word or verbal testimony (*śabda*). According to the Jains there are two which are *pratyakṣa* direct and *parokṣa* indirect. In their view point there are five kinds of

¹. *Pramāna-prameya-samsaya-prayojana-daiṣṭānta-siddhāntāvyava-tarka-nirya-vāda-jalpa-vitandā-hetvābhāsacchala-jāti-nigrasthānānām-tattvajñānānni-shreyasādhigamah. Nyāya Sutra: 1.1.1.*

². *Nyaya-bhasya: 1.1.1.*

³. *Nyaya-bhasya: 1.1.19.*

⁴. *Prameya ca tula pramanya vat II Nyāya- sutra: 2.1.16*

⁵. *tadeva ca pratyakṣam jñānam pramānaphalam II Nyāya-Bindi; sutra-18 First chapter.*

knowledge: ordinary cognition obtained by sense perception (*mati*), Scriptural knowledge (*shruti*), knowledge of things even at a distance of time and space (*abadhi*), knowledge of thoughts of others (*manah-paryaya*) and lastly omniscience (*kevala*). *Pratyaks* or direct deals the knowledge of *manah-paryaya* and *kevala* on the other hand *poraksa* or indirect contracts with the knowledge of *mati*, *shruti* and *abadhi*.

Buddhist concept of *Pramāna*:

The Buddhist classifies the object of knowledge as either desirable or undesirable and they claim that valid cognition leads a knower either to successful attainment of the desirable Dharmakirti in his treatise Nyāya Bindu clearly indicates some characteristics of valid cognition which can be described as follows, one of the characteristic of *pramāṇa* is its being *avisamvādaka jñāna* i.e. non-contradictory cognition. Dharmottara explain *samyag jñāna* as *avisamvādaka jñāna* and by *avisamvādaka jñāna* he means contradicted cognition which can be explain as follows. The *pramāṇa* or *samyag jñāna* has the ability to produce a *pravṛtti* in the knower which can prompt the knower either to receive the object or avoid the object. If the man attains or avoids the object in question then, the said cognition is to be taken a non contradicted cognition. In the case of illusory cognition is contradicted by later experience and it is not valid i.e. *visasmvādaka*. or to get it of the undesirable. *Arthasārūpya* is another characteristic of *pramāṇa*. *Arthasārūpya* is explained in detail by Dharmakirti in his discussion about the identity of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa phala* in both *Pramānavartika* and Nyāya-Bindu. Dignāga also refers this correspondence or similarity as *arthasārūpya*.⁶ Cognition is not valid simply because of its producing successful volition (*saphalapravṛttijñānakatva*). It has been noted earlier, even an erroneous cognition of taking the lustre as the jewel itself may lead to the successful attainment of the jewel. This is not a valid cognition precisely because the forms (viz the spatial location) of the object perceived and the object attained are different. Dharmakirti insist, there must be an exact correspondence between the form of the object presented in the initial cognition and the object ultimately attained.⁷ *Anadhigatarthajñāna* is another characteristic of *samyakjñāna* or *pramana*. Dharmakirti clearly introduce it in his *Pramānavārtika* and Nyāya- Bindu. He says that a valid cognition must have novelty as a necessary characteristic. A valid cognition reveals an object that is not already informed before. It provides us with additional information.⁸

6. *arthasārūpyamasya pramāṇam* II *sūtra*-20. Nyāya-Bindu.)

7 . *Arthena saha yat sārūpyam sādṛśyam asya jñānasya tat pramāṇam I iha yasmād viṣayād vijñānam udeti tadviṣayasadṛśm tad bhavati I yathā nilād utpadyamānam nilasadṛśam* I *Sūtra* commentary-20. Nyāya-Bindu.

⁸ . a. *tato anadhigata viṣayam apramāṇyam* I Nyāya-bindu: *Sūtra* commentary-1. P-3.

b. *ajñātārtha prakāśo vā* I *Pramānavārtika*. P-8.

Criticize the Buddhist *pramāna*:

Buddhist *pramāna* or valid knowledge had been strongly challenged by the chief rival Naiyāyika. Vācaspati Miśhra seems to have criticized this view without mentioning the name of the Buddhist logician. He says in his *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā* that *na copekṣānupādānatayā hānapakṣe nikṣisā, ahānatayopādānapakṣe nikṣepaprasaṅgāt I upādānaprayatnāprasavahetutayā nopādānamiti cet ? Kimiyam hānaprayatnamapi prasute hānam syāt ?*⁹ It means as follows. There are three kinds of action or states of mind and these are *heya*, *upādeya* and *upekṣā* (avoidable, desirable and negligible). Accordingly there are three kinds of objects avoidance, acceptance and neglecting. When he attain the object is called desirable. He may ermine without effort to take the thing or to avoid the thing and feel in

Now Buddhist philosophers don't accept this last kinds of feeling i.e. indifferent or *upekṣā*. They opposed to this saying that it may be included in the division of *hāna* because it is different from *upādāna*. Vācaspati Miśhra criticized this position of Buddhist. He says *upekṣā* cannot be included in the division of *hāna* on the ground of its being different from *upādāna* because in that case the situation may be explained reversely i.e. *upekṣā* may be included in the division of *upādāna* for its being different from *hāna*, (*ahantaya upadanapakse niksepa prasanigat*). We cannot say that it is different from *upādāna* because it does not yet have the effort fair for *upādāna* and the same question may be raised about *hāna* also. It is different for *hāna* because it does not yield effort favorable from *hāna*. So in both the sides the same argument may be offered. Hence Vācaspati Miśhra thinks that we should accept rather another division like *upekṣā* to explain the fact. It may be reminded that Jayanta Bhatta is also of this opinion and forwarded this with example like male, female and *napumsaka*.

Another point is that on the function of valid cognition. Knower is the maker (*kartr*), a person possessing the knowledge as the agent *prajojya* and a thing the object (*karman*) but the question is that how can the Buddhist call knowledge a *pramāna* if sometime does not make a man reach an object and thus it unable to cause him to attain it. In the case of momentaryness *ksanikatva* we acquire the knowledge of object in first time but we do not get the object immediately after we get that object. We cannot attain the same thing which we have seen and the rules of *prāpakatva* would not apply.

Jayanta Bhatta in his *Nyāya Mañjuri* strongly criticized the Buddhist position of holding two kinds of object of knowledge. Before criticizing it, Jayanta Bhatta presented the Buddhist view in an elaborate form. Dharmakirti says that there are two kinds of cognition and both of them present the object to a knower. According to him that the initial cognition is later on interpreted by the concepts and thus *svavikalpika jñāna* originates. The initial cognition is real perception. Whereas, *svavikalpaka jñāna* is not valid cognition. In case the object of knowledge is desirable there arises in the knower a volition (*pravṛtti*) to obtain it. The

⁹. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā* –P-52.

knower then proceeds to take the object and finally succeeds to obtain it, because his cognition is valid. In case the object of knowledge is destable there arises in the knower a volition to avoid it finally in the said manner succeeds avoid it. The volition leads in the said manner successfully to either of it's it's avoidance. Thus the validity of a piece of cognition is invariably linked to the uncontradictness (*avisamvādikatva*) in experience. While the Buddhists are in this position Jayanta Bhatta asks whether it is the object of presentation (*pradarśana*) or judgmental awareness (*adhyavasāya*). In Jayanta's view the perceived object cannot be the object of both presentation an attainment. For the Buddhist considers everything is momentary, the object perceived would not endure at the time when the object is supposed to be attained. In the case of inference object is known only indirectly.

Now the Buddhist cannot claim that the object attained is the object of judgmental awareness because according to the Buddhist object of judgment is conceptual and every conception is the result of imaginary construction. So its object cannot be real and it is not possible to attain it.

Now the Buddhists may answer the first objection as follows. They may say that *svlakṣaṇa* is momentary and hence it cannot be attained at a point of time. But it produces a similar momentary real *svalakṣaṇa* which can be attained. A series of *svalakṣana* is possible and that can be attained.

Jayanta Bhatta thinks that this constancy is untenable. The hypotheses of a series cannot be established because there are some dielama which are very difficult to solve. A question may be raised as follows. Is the series identical with the members? If it is identical with the member then the series would be momentary like the member and the problem will be remaining as before. Again if the series is not identical then it would be enduring or permanent which is quite unfavorable for the Buddhist theory of momentariness *kṣanikatva*. Again about the nature of *svalakṣana* thing in itself, it is very difficult to designated of it, it the knowledge of *bāla mukādi* deaf and dumb as well as *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* also.

Now the question arises weather there are two kinds of object only. If the Buddhist insists upon uncontradictedness (*avisamvādikatva*) or attainable (i.e. leading to attainment *prāpakatva*) as the characteristics of a valid cognition. Then Jayanta Bhatta thinks that there is another difficulty. The Buddhist classifies that the object of knowledge is either desirable or avoidable and in this way Buddhist claims that the valid cognition leads a knower either to attain the desirable or to avoid it. Jayanta Bhatta thinks like Vacaspati Miśra that there is another category for object of knowledge which may be termed as *upekṣāniya*. Jayanta Bhatta says that besides the desirable and the non desirable there is also the object about which we feel indifferent. In that case the knower is neither incline to attain them or to avoid them. So far as these objects are concerned about otherwise those two divisions will be ruled out. So if the Buddhist attempts to analysis the source of valid cognition in terms of attainment of the object and his effort is donned to be failure. So, the definition of valid cognition as uncontradict (*avisamvādikatva*) fails to apply the valid cognition of an object in the case of difference and hence the definition is too narrow. It is said that the object

of inference may be included in the category of *heya* then that will be untenable equally because as being different from *hāna* one may propose to include it in the category of *upādeya* also. So the Buddhist does not stand to reason. Again Vacaspati Misra said that *svivakalpaka pratyakṣa* is also caused by the power of object and is also verbal expression. Buddhist cannot reject the *svivakalpaka pratyakṣa*. He does not agree with the Buddhist philosophers who hold that the *svalakṣana* alone is the real object of perception. In his opinion universal which qualifies the objects are also real with verbal expression.

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