"THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN MIDDLE EAST AND TURKEY'S STAND."

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ABSTRACT:-

As the most pertinent issue in the present context "**The growth of Political Islam in Middle East and specially Turkey's position centering it**" is very relevant in the arena of international relations. This assignment deals with the socio-political amalgamation in creating the base of growth for political Islam emphasizing the events may it be extremist reason based or rational political aspects emphasizing the contexts of Middle East based Levantine countries and specially the socio-political dilemma of conservative, fundamentalist and on the other hand secular religious or in between extremist and moderate in Turkey. This work covers the gradual growth of Political Islam through causes and aspects of revolution, Muslim brotherhood issue, revolutions of sometimes party (Ba'ath, AKP etc.) or military and conflict of **Islamization** in countries especially in Turkey centering the Turkish-Kurdish nationalism and ideas.

KEYWORDS:- 'Political Islam', 'Turkey', 'Middle East', 'Revolutions', 'Muslim brotherhood' etc.

INTRODUCTION:-

We must begin with a definition of the term "**Political Islam**," or "Islamism," that is, Islam as political ideology rather than as a religious or theological construct. At the most basic level, adherents of political Islam believe that "Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion." However, this generalization does not get us very far in explaining the political activity undertaken in the name of Islam. A more analytically useful definition is that provided by the political scientist **Guilian Denoeux**, who writes of Islamism as "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition."

Phenomenon commonly referred to as 'Political Islam' emphasizes the Middle East particularly Levantine countries and outlines aspects of Islamist movements that may be considered polar opposites; democracy and political violence. It reviews some of the main theories of Islamic resurgence in Middle East. This idea shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism. However, Turkey has not been immune to the changes that have transformed the **religiopolitical** landscape of the Muslim world in recent decades, which include increase of religiosity and an upsurge in the political expression of Islam. These trends were generated by a variety of factors, including the emergence of a religious entrepreneurial sector and of a dominant political party with Islamic roots, a more open debate about **'Kemalism'** and its relevance to contemporary Turkish society, and a political crisis over the selection of a new president in the spring and summer 2007.Contemporary Turkey is a key test case for the role of Islam in politics and its influence on external policy.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS:-

The growth of political Islam in **Middle East** is known as 'Islamic revival or resurgence'. There is an emphasis on understanding the key aspects of regional diversity, several theories with the prospects of democracy, Islamization process or violence in the growth of Islam centering this region. The resurgence of Islam, now commonly referred to as "political Islam", is generally attributed to the crushing military defeats of Arabic countries suffered at the hands of Israeli forces in 1967. This defeat marked the end of pan-Arabism and the start of an Islamic revival that grew to challenge nation-states in the Middle East. The roots of the revival can be found in the formation of 'Muslim brotherhood (MB)' in Egypt by charismatic **Hasan al Banna** and had been a significant religious and political force. The main aim of this MB was to counter that time's westernized and modern or secular influence in that region and to reclaim the roots of traditional islamization through caliphs and establishments of more numbers of religious institutions. This laid the foundation of a sustainable and largest MB by making it pluralist and populist to fight against the oppression of successive rulers and govt.s after them but ended with Al Banna's assassination in 1949. Despite of **Naser's** breakdown in this movement legacy continued in the offshoots of countries like Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Iran with the ideologues of pan Arabism by making **Sayyid qutb** as chief proponent of this. They later on considered to reclaim the radical islam with traditional **Shariah law**. Qutb advanced more pro- active agenda to overthrown-islamic govt.s and rulers by claiming ideologies of radical Islamic text **'Ma'alimfial-tariq'** and through Quran by Jihad or holy war through the process of extreme violence.

Bewildering conceptual plurality in defining Political Islam relates altogether to the political end of militant islam or radical extremist islam. A general problem with the term political Islam is that it tends to imply "an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition outside of the properly religious domain it has historically occupied". Another

problem with the term is that Islam fuses religion and politics **(din wa dawla),** which is not captured by the term political Islam. A final point is that there is tendency to condemn all forms of social protest as illegitimate and conflating legitimate protest and the use of militancy and violence. As **K.Karamé** (1996) points out, because of the many shortcomings of the term political Islam there is increasing resort to the term "Islamism" (and Islamists), which also conforms to the common Arabic reference to the Islamic movement **(al-harak al-Islamiyya)** and its adherents as Islamists **(Islamiyyun).** There is hence a shift from a more abstract approach to one that considers the broader goals of the Islamist movement and the Islamist awakening **(al-sahwa al-Islamiyya).** A wide range of movements may fall within this general category but according to **B.O.Utvik**, the Islamist movement can be delimited by the three following traits. First of all they refer to themselves as the Islamic movement, secondly they call for an Islamic state ruled in accordance with Sharia and finally they organize themselves for the purpose of achieving these goals. The charismatic period of political Islam can be placed around 1970–82 and the high point of the period was the revolution in Iran (1977–78) with Ayatollah Khomeini as the charismatic and messianic leader. In a twist on the old Orientalist debate (Said 1978), Sabet (2000) argues that much of the scholarly work on political Islam is written within the confines of Western social theory and has to obey what he terms its "discursive parameters". As an example of this problem Sabet includes the tendency to fix the label "fundamentalist" to any regime that seeks to apply the Sharia in accordance with Islam. An understanding of the concept of jihad is vital to understanding the ideological legitimisation of political Islam. The concept has a complex and contested history (evident **in Quran and the Hadith**), which reflects that it was interpreted according to changing socio-political circumstances.This made the true meaning of the term ambiguous. Nonetheless, there is a tendency to reify jihad, making it synonymous with armed struggle **("holy war").** This has caused it to become perhaps the most used (and abused) term in the political Islam vocabulary.Thus, the term is now often used as a conventional shorthand not only for the Islamic revival in the Middle East (considered a **"jihadist backlash"**), but also for the alleged threat this represents to Western democracies in Islam's quest for world hegemony ("global jihad"). While the notion of a "global jihad" can easily be discounted, a more difficult question is whether the Islamist movement is premised on an armed **("jehadist")** struggle against opponents and enemies. The importance of jihad to the Islamist movement can be traced to the radical ideas of Sayyid Qutb and the radicalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1960s. The revolutionary ideology of Sayyid Qutb tied the concept to the struggle to overcome *jahiliyya,* a Quranic term which refers to the pre-Islamic condition combining ignorance and savagery. The relation between islam and democracy is complicated with arguments in middle eastern region are firstly although some Islamists have seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosen this method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones. Secondly, Islamists seek to impose Sharia, but considering that Sharia itself is discriminatory (against women, non-Muslims etc.) it follows that Islamists will seek to impose undemocratic policies. The failure of liberal democracy in most of the Arab world has been attributed to Islam's inadequate conception of 'individual rights' and 'public participation' in legislative and administrative process. However positive guidance regarding that is provided in classical islam theory by rightful caliph to depose tyrannical ruler as well as containing the conceptual elements of democracy. In general, there is considerable scepticism as to whether Islamists are committed to democracy. The historian **Elie Kedouri** has even claimed that "democracy is alien to the mind-set of Islam". The same goes for the question of popular vote, where some claim that Islamists only believe in "one man, one vote, one time". However, there are many examples that prove the opposite, in particular the recent Turkish Welfare party experience and leading Islamists claiming that Islamisation is best achieved through **democratisation.** Most of the Middle Eastern states are run by autocratic regimes bent on keeping Islamists from gaining power, both through denying them a popular vote and by brutal suppression of their leaders and followers. To many analysts, it is exactly the prevalence of autocracy in the Middle East that has given rise to Islamist movements, which are seen as a way of expressing popular sentiment against illegitimate rulers. The countries in the Middle East have pursued different strategies vis-à-vis the Islamist threat. They have either tried their best to suppress them periodically as in Egypt (Alterman 2000) or permanently (as in many Gulf states) or tried to prevent them from gaining power through participation in the popular vote. As Vicky Langohr notes, "what is actually on offer to most Islamist movements, as well as other opposition movements, is participation in electoral contests for political office within regimes that remain highly authoritarian". Still, the reasons for embracing democratic elections among Islamist movements vary from country to country. Islamic organisations such as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the Welfare Party **(Refah or RP)** in Turkey all "accept a pluralist political system and an electoral path to power". While these organisations have always sought political power using peaceful methods, only rarely are Islamist organisations transformed from violent to non-violent ones. An especially interesting case in this regard is the gradual pacification of the **Lebanese Hizbollah**. Likewise we can say the cases of 'hamas'in Palestine and 'FIS' Party in Algeria whose political dominance were never

accepted due to future expected obstacle sin several accords and due to conflict with Israeli forces they disrupted their self welfare system. So there are causes and outcomes of growth of political islam. In general, Islamist parties have fared badly in popular elections and referendums since 1960s,70s.

The growth of extreme political violence in the Middle East is often attributed to the tendency to suppress democratic expression and freedom of speech. The use of extreme violence is often considered a defining feature of the Islamist movement in general, whereas in actual fact, it remains an aberration. The level of political violence naturally depends on how it is defined, and especially how to separate terrorism from acceptable political violence (the concept of just war, in Islam and in Christianity). At present, a normative problem is that there is no readily accepted definition of terrorism. This problem becomes especially acute when violence targets innocent victims and bystanders. An example of this problem is a recent report by the Human Rights Watch, which caused an uproar because it concluded that the Palestinian suicide bombers belonging to the armed wing of **Hamas (the Qassam Brigades**) were systematically targeting civilians, and therefore committing war crimes. A review of the reasons why terrorism occurs shows that they can be grouped into the following broad categories: *psychological explanations* (pathology, deprivation), *societal explanations* (economy, governance) and *state explanations* (sponsorship, hegemony, failed states) **(Lia and Skjølberg 2000**). It might seem that the most common explanations of so-called "Islamic terrorism" (in itself a misnomer) often combine these three explanations. In short, it is argued fundamentalist beliefs make adherents psychologically predisposed to use violence and surrender their lives (Taylor and Horgan 2001), that abysmal social conditions and frustration promote extremism, and that authoritarianism and secularism as well as political persecution have spurred a violent backlash from Islamist movements. We find here a contradiction between explanations which consider the use of violence a result of *internalizing* Islamist beliefs and those that locate them in the *externalizing* socio-political conditions. Nonetheless, there is often a general assumption that fundamentalist beliefs predispose a person to violence (act violently, seek violent means). It has been claimed that Islam is based on a "binary world view" where the "Land of Islam" (***Dar al-Islam***) is contrasted with "The Land of War" (***Dar al-Harb***) or the "Land of Unbelief" (***Dar al-Kufr***). In important ways, it is argued, this particular world view predisposes Islam and believers of the faith to defeat the latter in order to promote the former. An important reason why such attacks are not condemned is that from an Islamic perspective, the terms "suicide missions" and "suicide bombers" are inappropriate. Islam forbids suicide (***intihar***), therefore the perpetrator is considered to have been a martyr (***mujahid, shahid***) who will embrace martyrdom (***shahadah***). Etymologically the term ***mujahadid*** is related to the jihad, hence the act of sacrifice needs to be understood within the context of jihad itself. We can illustrate this by considering how jihad was interpreted by Palestinian Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which are perhaps the most prominent perpetrators of extreme political violence. Hamas was formed in 1987 in the wake of the Palestinian uprising (***intifadah***) as an outgrowth of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. Thus scenarios for political islamic violence or militant **islam** were seen through other organizations like **'AL QUAEDA','GIA'** (**groupe islamique armee**) etc.

Now there are several theories for this revival of Islam in Middle East as faces or events like Turkey (democratic Islamism), Iran (Islamic revolution), Egypt (Islamist opposition) and Algeria (Islamist terror). Range of theories (or rather, theory clusters) are presented under three broad headings**: Civilisational**, **Social and Textual**.

The first theory cluster is made up of macro-sociological theories aiming at explaining the dynamics of Islamic civilisations internally (***dynastic theories***)**,** and externally vis-à-vis an external power (*civilizational theories*). Next, a second cluster of theories that focus on social processes locate the Islamic revival not in religion but in the social and political context in which it embedded (*crisis theories*, *cultural duality theories, state culture theories* and ***resurgency theory***)*.* The third theory cluster locates the Islamic revival in Islam's founding texts and doctrine as well as religious worship. In the first instance, Islam is considered a shared discourse (beliefs, rituals and symbols) that is shaped by local socio-political conditions (*discursive theories*). Alternatively, the starting point is that Muslim activists are united by a shared belief in Islam as an alternative to secular ideologies, creating a potent socio-political force *(textualist theories*). Mainly these theories show how history of nomadic conquerors, spiritual prowess, combating popular force of MB against evil external power influences contingencies and economic crisis along with socio-political amalgamation of traditional and modern islamic practices helped in growth of political islam in Middle East. What has been widely dubbed the "Arab Spring" or "Arab revolution" is, in many respects, a misappellation. The protests and, in some cases, revolts that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and swept through much of the Middle East and North Africa would be more accurately described as postcolonial, national revolts against the regimes of the largely Arab nationalist revolutions or, more accurately, the **military *coup d'etats* of the 1950s and 1960s that brought these republican regimes into power**. To begin to understand the nature of the recent protests, we need to examine three major events or shifts in the history of the Middle East and North Africa. First is Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798—

the backdrop to much of the region's modern history—which ushered in modernity to what would, in time, become the territorial nation of Egypt and, more broadly, to the Muslim world. The second is the"Arab liberal age,'or "Arab renaissance"(**al-nahd.a, which the Tunisian Islamist party and movement took as its name),** namely, the vibrant intellectual period of (Arab) Muslim thought about the challenges posed and opportunities offered by Western modernity, particularly in the socio-political, constitutional, and economic realms, extending from 1798 to 1939. This assimilation of Western thought and of the rethinking of Muslim tradition laid the intellectual foundation for much of the modern Middle East and North Africa, without which the recent protests and revolutions—and more importantly their demands for ending autocratic rule and for democratic, representative government—may not have been possible. And the third is the postcolonial context of nationalism and nation states in the Middle East and North Africa. The political discourse—or, more accurately, the grievances and demands of the protesters—has, in terms of language and political goals, markedly shifted away from the various strands of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism that dominated much of the region's history in the second half of the twentieth century to a nationally—namely, Tunisian, Egyptian, etc.—based agenda with clearly defined, and in their eyes achievable, goals. After discussing these historical phases, I will outline three current political models in the Middle East that indicate possible future trajectories for political Islam today. Five years after the start of the Arab uprisings, mainstream Islamist groups—which generally seek to operate within the confines of institutional politics—find themselves brutally repressed (Egypt), fallen from power (Tunisia), internally fractured (Jordan), or eclipsed by armed groups (Syria and Libya). Muslim Brotherhood and Brotherhood-inspired movements had enjoyed considerable staying power, becoming entrenched actors in their respective societies, settling into strategies of gradualist democratic contestation, focused on electoral participation and working within existing state structures. Yet, the twin shocks of the Arab Spring—the Egyptian coup of 2013 and the rise of ISIS—have challenged mainstream Islamist models of political change.

Also in case of Syria being influenced from Tunisia Palestine, Egypt etc. states Syrian Muslim Brotherhood or SMB organization with the help of **SNC (Syrian National Council)** fought against the secular nationalistic and social partly western modernized influenced Ba'ath(Renaissance) party led by **Hafeez al assad,** in two consecutive revolutions of economic liberalization with **their shia and hezbolla Iran** alliance to reclaim glory of caliphate through traditional and radical islamic idea in 1979 and again in 2011 during **B.A.Assad** regime Arab spring. But later on Ba'ath party having consolidated socio cultuaral conglomerated support and some major powers backings took over the control of this region and as an outcome till now the relations in between these two parties in this region has turned out as fighting like militant islam causing the Shia-Sunni muslim dilemma based conflict. Michel Foucault described the Iranian Revolution as **"the first postmod- Ali Mirsepassi- ern revolution of our time,"**' and as "the spirit of a world without spirit."Ashtiani Anthony Giddens deems it "a signal of the crisis of modernity."We may begin to appreciate the perplexing meanings of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 by exploring such de-familiarizing statements. This essay is an attempt to go beyond prevailing interpretations that explain the revolution as an extension of the historical tensions between "tradition" and "modernity."Instead, we will look at the rise of Islamic politics as a new attempt to come to terms with the challenge of modernity in Iran. The Iranian Revolution represents a historical turning point in the crisis of modern secular politics in that country. Impeded by the autocratic rule of the Pahlavi state for more than two decades (the 1960s and 1970s), secular democratic politics in Iran was effectively challenged and contested, and a new theocratic state power ascended in post revolutionary Iran in the absence of any other viable political alternative.

Now in this context of growth of political islam in **Turkey** was quite contrasting. Turkey's interpretation of political islam is more or less based on it's internal changing in political administrations along with their assimilation of ideas. After the demise of Ottoman empire Mustafa Kemal Attaturk eradicated all bars of turkey in practicing radical ,traditional islamic attitudes by making Turkey modernized with the influence of western orientation and practices, like- secularism in western manner, traditional dresses only in religious places, no strict regulation in practicing islam, power and authority in several cases to Military and a complete transformation of the state as 'revolcution from above.' During his regime since establishment of Republic of Turkey in 1923 his ideas of Western practicing, religious secularism were condemned strictly by his opponent parties like **'Kurdish people's party','milli gorus' etc,** ho were radical islam oriented. During Kemal **Attaturk's** reign this complete modernized moderate islam orientation was possible only due to one party dominance of 'Republican People's Party(CHP). After the end of Second World War in 1950 for the first time in Turkish republic multi party domain was established, With Democratic party with some kind of conservative islam orientation. During Attaturk's regime the urban elites also reduces bars in practicing conservative islam orientation and even after his demise his party successors were strictly committed to contain the moderate, secular religious islamic atomosphere in the country. Since 1950 renowned political leader N.Erbakan emerging in Turkish politics emphasized on traditional

islamic practices. In 1970s and 80s with the infiltration or intrusion of left wing ideologies in Turkish politics Military got activated to eradicate those ideas causing several military coups till 1990s. As a matter of fact, by that time military authority started imposing traditional conservative islamic practices by setting up of second new constitution in 1982 with ideas of it instead of implying Kemalist moderate ideologies. Civil-Military relation centering this growth of new islamic politics was at stake with some supporting and some annoyed. Since this time several political parties with more or less radical, traditional islamic ideologies came in legislative power to rule, like- **'Motherland party' by Trgut Ozal,'MSP', 'NOP', 'MNP','Welfare' along with 'Justice and democratic alliance or AKP' etc.**

These traditional islamic ideologue's parties started campaigning for reclaimation of Turkey's golden islamic past in a democratic way by assimilating Turkish-Islamic cultural tradition and during 80s-90s due to several political, economic crisis and particularly not getting membership of EU these parties raised **anti western** bias and condemned western orientation as cause of critical political situation. During this time defeating NOP, **Milli gorus** MSP with coalition of CHP came to power and concentrated in some sense of making moderate islamic atmosphere with kemalist ideology. Later on they broke this coalition and emerged as pro radical islamic ideology based party who supported and was tolerant to Kurdish rebells and their ideas of nationalism and ethnic identity issue. Later on the welfare party initiated the growth of political islam mostly in a anner of democracy. Many scholars have pointed the supporting of Kurdish rebellions anti 80s -90s to now on some anti-western bias by islamic traditionals as the loss of Turkey's EU membership. Afterwards in 2011, AKP under leadership of Erdogan took over Turkey's politics. Now Akp's policy of spreading political islam throughout the country has been quite interesting with the assimilation of radical-modernism. In one hand it is trying to establish moderate islamic tradition in a democratic and kemalist way, on the other hand it is permissing urban islamic conservative elites to establish religious radical islamic institutions to get people in touch of ideologies in societal levels**. Urban Anatolian elites** under AKP's rule reduce bars in conservative cultural practices and AKP also claimed secular nationalism with some western orientation in a very conservative way inside the country. Under the AKP, Turkish policy toward the Middle East has witnessed a new dynamism.10 After decades of passivity and neglect, Turkey has begun to emerge as an important diplomatic actor in the region. Ankara has established close ties to Iran and Syria, two countries with which it had tense relations in the 1970s and 1980s. It has also adopted a more pro-Palestinian attitude in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and this has put pressure on its traditional ties with Israel. This new activism in the Middle East represents an important departure in recent Turkish foreign policy, which, except for a brief period in the 1950s, has been characterized by caution and aloofness from deep involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. However, since the 1990–1991 Gulf War, Ankara has been increasingly drawn into Middle East crises. For example, it was the host country to hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurdish refugees after the 1991 Gulf War and to U.S. operations to enforce the no-fly zone in northern Iraq.

Ankara's response to the Lebanon crisis in the summer and fall of 2006 provides an important example of Turkey's greater readiness to play a more active role in the Middle East. The Erdogan government's decision to send 1,000 troops to participate in the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon represented an important departure from Turkey's traditional policy of avoiding deep involvement in Middle Eastern affairs and provoked a heated internal debate. The debate between **Sezer** and **Erdoğan** highlighted the difference between the traditional Turkish policy of avoiding deep involvement in Middle East crises and the more activist approach of Erdoğan and then Foreign Minister (now President) **Abdullah Gül**, who view engagement in the Middle East as essential to shaping developments on Turkey's periphery in directions conducive to Turkish interests.

The Kurdish issue has been an important driver in the intensification of Turkey's ties to both countries. Iran and Syria have substantial Kurdish minorities and share Turkey's interest in preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. This shared interest has provided an important incentive for both countries to cooperate more closely with Ankara lately. Turkey's relations with Syria have also improved significantly. As with Iran, the improvement began before the AKP came to power, but it has gained greater momentum since then. The rapprochement has been driven in particular by a common concern about the threat posed by Kurdish nationalism. Like Turkey, Syria faces an internal problem with its Kurdish minority, which has shown increasing signs of restlessness. The Ba'athist leadership around President Bashar Assad is concerned that the emergence of an economically robust Kurdish government in northern Iraq could stimulate pressures for economic and political improvements among Syria's Kurdish population and could pose a challenge to the regime's stability. Turkey's relations with Israel have also undergone a shift under the AKP. The Erdoğan government has pursued a more active pro- Palestinian policy than its immediate predecessors did. Erdoğan has been openly critical of Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza, calling its actions "state terror." Erdoğan also sharply criticized the Israeli

invasion of Lebanon in response to Hezbollah's cross-border attack. At the same time, the Erdoğan government has sought to establish closer ties to Hamas. A few weeks after the elections in the Palestinian territories, it hosted a delegation led by Khaled Mashaal, Hamas' Damascus-based hard-line political leader, in Ankara. The visit was arranged without consultation with Washington and Jerusalem and greatly irritated both capitals because it directly undercut U.S. and Israeli efforts to isolate Hamas until it met a series of specific conditions, including acceptance of Israel's right to exist. The shift in policy toward Israel, however, has largely been one of tone and style. While Erdoğan has been more openly critical of Israeli policy than most previous Turkish leaders, this has not seriously affected the core of the relationship. Beneath the surface, cooperation in the defense and intelligence areas—which are handled by the Turkish military—has quietly continued and has been little influenced by the sharper public tone in Ankara's rhetoric. Finally, Turkey has sought to improve ties to key Arab countries. Relations with Saudi Arabia have been strengthened, as highlighted by the visit of King Abdullah to Turkey in August 2006, the first visit of its kind in 40 years. Both countries have also tried to invigorate the Arab-Israeli peace process, as well as contain Iran's rising power. Ties to Egypt, another regional power, have also been strengthened. This enhanced cooperation between Turkey and Sunni Arab states in the Middle East reflects the growing recognition on the part of the Turkish leadership that stability on Turkey's southern border requires active engagement with its Middle Eastern neighbors and deeper participation in regional peace efforts. Thus we can see how political islam has waved through the Middle East and particularly Turkey through its several policies and foreign relations and Turkey's stand in being a contrasting political nature is quite sustainable in relation to Middle East.

CONCLUSION & EVALUATION:-

Last but not the least it should be said that Political Islam as a vibrant ideology is a very pertinent issue in analysing Middle eastern and Turkey based discussions. Starting from 1960s-70s to till now it has been developing by gradually turning it's ideological dimension from **'Old islam' to 'New Islam'** with its new idea of establishing a rich,consolidated islamic world. For getting towards this idea most of the time it was seen there several disappointing event happened in islam community worldwide, like- ideological divide between **Shia and Sunnis**, for establishing Radical Islam in several places like Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Iran, Turkey instead of western secular or social or some other moderate ideologies emergence of militant islam by radical groups and organizations like- Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, ISIS , Military coups and revolutions in countries like Turkey, Iran, intra state civil uprising like in Syria etc. Some of these activities are more often considered by peaceful democratic world systems as act of Terrorism.

Also it should be said abuse of the tenets of ideas of 'holy war' and holy texts of Islam religion is making this resurgence of Islam or its growth as seemingly fragile and mockery to the International Relations scholars. In Turkey it has also been under a big question since its turmoiled, unorganized political idea based systems. AKP's ambiguous policy is under question. Military authority is wanting to get rid of this govt. In one hand AKP's little bit western incumbency following EU oriented path and inside the country trying to radical islamization have brought Turkey under question of it's withering away from world order. Most of Turkey's rural and urban poor population are still accustomed with traditional conservative Islamic practices. Also the existence and demands fulfillment of Kurdish and non islamic minority population are also questionable. So the growth of Political Islam in this region ,Turkey through its course of socio-political causes and events is a matter of debate-Whether it is a Resurgence or a Fragile demise.

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