ISSN: 2320-2882

IJCRT.ORG



# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CREATIVE RESEARCH THOUGHTS (IJCRT)

An International Open Access, Peer-reviewed, Refereed Journal

# Convergence factors of India Relation with Afghanistan

**Ahmad Shoaib Mehrpor** 

Student of M.A (political science)

Lovely Professional University; Jalandhar, Punjab\_India

Abstract: India is a regional power in South Asia that has had friendly relations with Afghanistan since the years of independence. These friendly relations have been able to get closer to Afghanistan since 11 September 2001in terms of financial assistance in the areas of infrastructure, higher education, counter-terrorism and military assistance, making it the fourth largest donor after the West, and So far, it has provided more than \$ 2 billion in unpaid aid to Afghanistan. The central question of this article is "what factors led to India's convergence with Afghanistan". And the results of the study show that India needs the full cooperation of Afghanistan in order to gain regional power and access to vast energy resources in Central Asia, as well as to fight and control terrorism and fundamentalism in the region. In this regard, India is more inclined to converge with Afghanistan in order to obtain the mentioned items. And methodology of this paper is qualitative research which a library system that has been compiled based on second hand sources in English and Persian languages.

# **Key words**

India, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Terrorism, Fundamentalism

#### Introduction

After independence from Britain in 1947 and the establishment of an independent state in that country, India began diplomatic relations with all nations of the world, of which Afghanistan is one of them. Historically, India has established friendly relations with Afghanistan since the early years of independence. They strengthened these friendly relations by concluding a "friendship pact" between the two countries in 1950, and this series of good and friendly relations continues to this day, with the exception of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001). In recent years, India, as an emerging power in the region, has made extensive efforts to be able to establish a strong presence and influence in the countries of the region and to communicate with them in various ways, and from the existing potentials in these countries should make the most of their goals.

India's grand foreign policy doctrine divides countries into three concentric circles, that Afghanistan within the first circle. Therefore, this country is of special importance in India's foreign policy. India, which had lost its influence in Afghanistan during the Taliban's rule, has taken a positive and cooperative approach to the country since 11September. In this regard, he participated in the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Financial Assistance to Afghanistan in 2002 and provided \$ 40 million in assistance to Afghanistan, and this assistance increased annually. However, the volume of this assistance has increased significantly in recent years, and due to the numerous investments that India has made in various sectors of the Afghan economy, this figure reaches more than \$ 2

billion. By playing a greater role in Afghanistan's internal development and helping to rebuild and integrate with India, India seeks to reduce the issue of terrorism and fundamentalism, which has eradicated insecurity and violence in the region, and the influence of its longtime enemy, Pakistan, to deal with the "political siege" of this country. And also align with Afghanistan to achieve Central Asia's vast energy resources, regional macro-interests, and international power. Therefore, Afghanistan is one of the most important countries in the region in various political, security and economic dimensions for India. And they have a special view of this country. And the present study examines the factors that led to the convergence of India with Afghanistan in the region after 2001 and examines the areas of greater commonality between the two countries.

## Convergence factors influences in India's relation with Afghanistan

Historically, India has enjoyed excellent cultural and economic relations with Afghanistan, except for five years of Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001. (Sengupta, 2005). The rise of the Taliban in the early 1990s prompted India to slowly engage with the anti-Taliban alliance in Afghanistan and to withdraw its diplomatic mission from Kabul after the Taliban took control. India saw the rise of the Taliban regime as fundamentally opposed to its regional security interests, and also linked the rise of Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan to the rise of fundamentalist groups in Indian-led Kashmir. Thus, India's security and political incentives led it to coordinate with Iran and Central Asian countries to extend its military and development assistance to the Northern Alliance, including humanitarian and medical assistance, the establishment of a hospital, and an air base with the assistance of Indian staff in Farkhar, Tajikistan. Another important issue is that if Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan further develop, it will usually have detrimental effects on the internal social structure as well as on India's internal security, apart from the known problems in Kashmir. (Fair, 2010).

After the 11 September 2001 attacks and the overthrow of the Taliban by the United States, India was able to renew its ties with the Northern Alliance and re-enter politics with the new government in Kabul through development aid. The motivation for converging and re-acting with this country has several factors. One factor is the commonality of internal and regional security reasons, such as the resurgence of terrorism and fundamentalism that India and Afghanistan face on a daily basis. In this regard, India wanted to support a democratic, secular government in Afghanistan and prevent the re-emergence of a fundamentalist Islamic regime. That's why these increases insecurity in India and the region during the 1990s has been attributed to the Taliban regime.

Access to Central Asia was to reach India's largest energy sources and ambitions for showing power. The most important factor in India's convergence with Afghanistan is connecting India to Central Asia. This means continental access (Marjani, 2018) and finding a route that is favorable in terms of cost, security and shipping time, which has been a constant concern of Indian government and businessmen. In this path with the aim of increasing exports to Central Asian countries and importing energy resources from that region through Afghanistan help to India.(Gupta, 2012). Economically, it is a gateway to the oil and mineral-rich republics of Central Asia. Also, extensive reconstruction programs for this country provide many opportunities for Indian companies. (Marjani, 2018)

Gaining the trust of the international community as a government that supports development and democratic values in Afghanistan and the region is another factor in India's integration with Afghanistan. Another advantage of this approach is that India's interests in the region are not affected by the performance of regional (Pakistan) and supra-regional (China) actors. Together, these factors led India to become more active after 2001 through the Afghanistan Development Assistance Program. India's foreign policy interests in Afghanistan became apparent when he was able to gain political representation in the December 2001 Bonn talks, which outlined Afghanistan's political roadmap, and was in an economic position pursuing his own regional and national strategic interests in Afghanistan. (Mullen, August 2017).

#### India pursue its interest in central Asia through Afghanistan

Given India's foreign policy goal in the region, Indian leaders are trying to gain access to Central Asia through Afghanistan in order to achieve their national interests, and in this regard, Afghan government is the only country that can help India in this goal. Overall, the Government of India has for many years warmed up its relations with the Government of Afghanistan and has taken valuable and important steps towards establishing a stable government in this country. One of the factors of India's convergence with Afghanistan can be defined as India's access to Central Asia; Foreign policy makers have divided India's major interests into politico-security interests and access to energy resources in the Central Asian region.

#### 1. Political-security interests

Given its foreign and security policy doctrine, India is strategically seeking to go beyond the restrictive environment of South Asia to become a regional power. According to this policy, it is trying to make new friends among other sensitive and strategic regions of the world with the ideal goal of gaining regional superiority. Indian leaders believe that accepting this hegemony is the cornerstone of the country's ability to become a global player; because without regional hegemony, it is not possible for India to seek its actors beyond this region. And Afghanistan has been given special attention by India in this regard, especially after 11 September. The main goal of India's "strategic joint" with Afghanistan is to achieve regional hegemony, as India's strategic partnership with Afghanistan extends its strategic depth to Central Asia and achieves the great interests of India, a key player in Asia. (Nasiri, 1391).

India's entry into Central Asia is one of the most important foreign policies of this country, which can prevent the siege of China and Pakistan and cause a political siege of the enemy. It thus enables India, under its military bases in Central Asia, to put pressure on Pakistan from Afghanistan and Central Asia in the northwest and Pakistan's borders in the east by India itself. Indian military bases in two Central Asian countries, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, could facilitate this process. The Ayani base in Tajikistan is a very important strategic base for India, as it enables India to respond quickly to any threat on the unstable Afghan-Pakistani border. The base also provides India with an important capability to deploy Special Forces into the battlefield when an emergency arises. In such a situation, India can use these existing military bases against Pakistan, depending on the mentioned situations. This program is one of the methods envisaged by the Indian Security Doctrine in the context of the political siege of Pakistan (Mohib, 2012). And in this regard, Central Asia has an important place for India.

# 2. Access to energy resources

India is one of the world's largest consumers of energy with high economic growth and 15% of the world's population, and in 2009 was the fourth largest consumer of oil in the world after the United States, China and Japan and in 2019 the third largest consumer of oil. Despite the global financial crisis, India's energy demand continues to rise. Demand for energy consumption in the country's transport sector is expected to rise as estimates suggest that vehicle ownership will increase rapidly in the coming years. According to some studies, just the number of road vehicles in India will reach 200 million by 2030. Its dependence on oil imports will also increase by 65 to 90 percent by 2030, and India will not have sufficient energy resources at home and will import most of its growing energy needs. (Mohammadi, 2019). India's total crude oil demand is about 4.6 million barrels per day, making it the world's third largest consumer after the United States and China. India is in dire need of energy due to rapid economic growth, rising middle class and increasing purchases of motor vehicles. The International Energy Agency predicts that by 2040 India will consume a quarter of the world's energy production. (Irna, 1398).

The growing mismatch between global energy production and consumption has brought energy security, which has been on the sidelines of international security issues for years, into the context of these issues. The symbol of this issue is the repetition of concerns about energy in the summits of industrialized countries in recent months and its inclusion as the main agenda of these

summits. India is in increasing need of energy as its broad economic growth. In 1999, India drafted a document entitled "Hydrocarbon Vision 2025" in 1999 to formulate its long-term energy strategy. The document was finally officially released in February 2000 to guide India's macro energy policy. This document details the supply and demand of oil and gas until 2025, as well as important issues related to energy security, including: energy resources, energy conservation, environmental pollution, technological advances, pipeline security and paves the way for regional and global dialogue and participation.

India's rapid economic development in the last decade, population growth, rising living standards, has led to a rapid increase in energy demand in India; In a way, this country is now one of the largest consumers in the world. The country is in dire need of energy imports in order to continue its economic growth. And it is in a worse position than its competitors. India, for example, imports two-thirds of its oil, while China imports one-third. In addition, China's oil reserves are 18 billion barrels, but India has only 5 billion barrels. The NPI also invested \$ 3.5 billion in exploration projects in 2000, but the NPC invested about \$ 40 billion overseas that year. Accordingly, India relies on increasing oil and gas imports in the short to medium term to meet its energy needs. In this regard, India pursues its energy diplomacy in the countries of South Asia, Central Asia, Russia, the Middle East and even further afield, Latin America and Africa. (Mohammadi, 2019).

Energy diversification is at the heart of India's energy policy. Due to the economic growth of that country, the government is trying to supply its oil and gas from various and reliable sources. The country's energy security is directly related to its foreign policy. (shakary, 2019). India, the world's third-largest oil consumer, imports 84 percent of its demand for the product, and is seeking to reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. According to India Shipping, India's oil imports from the Middle East in 2019 reached their lowest level in four years, with considered to report of Mani Control publications. Ehsan al-Haq, an analyst at Infinitive organization, said: The continued decline in OPEC oil production, along with the support of Saudi Arabia and its allies for this reduction, as well as the reduction of oil imports from Iran due to US sanctions, have been among the factors affecting India's oil imports from the Middle East. (Irna, 1398).

India's diplomatic relations with Afghanistan have not only been aimed at further weakening Pakistan, but the Indians have sought to use these friendly relations to enter Central Asia and connect with oil-rich countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan from the resources available in those lands to take advantage and improve the economy of his country. (Mohammadi, 2019). Central Asia does not share a border with India, although it is geographically one of the closest oil and gas resources to India. Afghanistan and Pakistan are located between Central Asia and India. India has to compromise with the two countries to gain Central Asian energy resources. Establishing stability and security in Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism is part of India's strategic policy in the region. India is expected to face particular problems in meeting its gas needs. Economic expert says India's economic gains will lead to more investment in Central Asian energy.

Gas expert says, with the signing of the TAPI contract, India has taken a big step towards entering the Central Asian energy market. The length of the TAPI pipeline will be 1700 km. It is estimated to cost up to \$ 7 billion. Its gas transmission capacity from Turkmenistan's Dolatabad to India's Fazilik is projected to be about 33 billion cubic meters per year. (Talayee, 2011). India is working to expand the opening of the Chabahar port with Iranian police capacity as soon as possible and to open a waterway for India to expand its exports and imports to Afghanistan and Central Asian countries, paving the way for access to these resources and marketing of its goods; what the President of Afghanistan has called "the end of Afghanistan's drought". India's emerging economy needs vast energy resources which Resources on the other side of the Afghan border in Central Asia. (Maroof, 2016). The most important factor has led to the convergence of India with Afghanistan.

# India and Afghanistan cooperate to counter similar issue of fundamentalism and terrorism

Afghanistan and India are two countries that have always suffered from terrorism and fundamentalism in the South Asian region. The Afghan government launched the fight against terrorism after the formation of a Taliban group in 1994 led by Mullah Mohammad Omar and their supporters (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) who waged war and raisins to gain control of Afghanistan. And in the years that followed, various terrorist groups entered the war and conflict in Afghanistan, the region, and the world in order to pursue their own interests. In the regional context, India was not spared the entry of terrorist groups in some of its states. The arrival of these groups dates back to the separation of India and Pakistan in 1947 and the declaration of independence from Britain and the creation of the border between Kashmir. These issues led to the spawning of hostile and opposite the relations between India and Pakistan in the region. Disputes erupted over the predominantly Muslim area of Jammu and Kashmir, part of which is include Pakistan territory and part in India territory, and both claim ownership of the entire area, and this is one of the main reasons for the both countries' differences and support of the terrorist groups (voice(AVA), 1393). Various terrorist groups in the Kashmir area began their activities with the cooperation and financial support of countries in the region to disrupt this area and other Indian states.

Extremism in Afghanistan is exacerbating the threat of terrorism that India faces at home. India has the second largest Muslim population in the world, and the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan acts as a stimulus for extremist Islamic movements. Traditionally, Islamic extremists are mostly trained in Pakistan before returning to India and planning terrorist attacks against the Indian government and military targets in this country. (Jin, 17,7,2018). Pakistan has established and supported several militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al-Mujahideen / Al-Ansar Movement, Jihad-e-Islami Movement and other groups operating in India and Afghanistan. All of them have been trained with the Taliban and with the spread of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Lashkar-e-Taiba is one of the terrorist groups with most of its activities in Afghanistan, India and Kashmir. This group has many terrorist activities in the region and is considered one of the bloodiest and most dangerous terrorist groups in the region. The group has carried out many terrorist operations against India and its interests in the region, encouraging Kashmiris to revolt against India. A few years ago, the group hijacked an Indian airliner from Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, and brought it down to Kandahar, where it was exchanged with India for the release of Maulana Elias, one of the group's leaders. In 2001, the group launched an armed attack on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi and advanced to its entrance gates. A few years later, the group carried out a terrorist attack on the Taj Mahal in Mumbai-India, creating the largest and deadliest terrorist incident in the country, and since then, the group has repeatedly planned and carried out terrorist operations against India's security and interests in the region. (etilaatroz, 2014).

Various terrorist groups carried out numerous bombings in Kashmir between 2000 and 2005, killing a large number of Indian security forces. The Islamist group Jaish-e-Muhammad carried out its last major attack in front of the parliament building in Sringer in 2001, killing 40 people. (SoniaPalinkar, 2019). The September 18 attack on India's Yuri Jammu and Kashmir regions which killed 19 Indian citizens, that was planned by terrorists based in Pakistan. (SeyedJavidHakimi, 1397). However, after the "Arab Spring" of 2011, especially the emergence of the "Islamic State" in Syria and Iraq, some Indian Muslim youth went to Iraq and Syria to join the "Islamic State" and they were trained there. These Indian youth are from several different states of India including Telangana, Maharashtra and Karnataka and some other states. Further evidence of Indian nationals in the "Islamic State" has been provided through social media such as Twitter and Face book, or by jihadist supporters or the group's own media outlets. (Jin, 17,7,2018). The security vacuum created by US forces led to the emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K), a branch of the self-proclaimed Islamic State operating in South Asia and Central Asia. The group's ability to recruit radicals from India, and to recruit well-trained forces from the Taliban and Pakistani militant groups, poses a real threat to India's future in Afghanistan and the region. The March 2020 attack on a Gurdwara shrine in Kabul - claimed by IS-K - is the clearest example of the real security threats to India's footprint inside Afghanistan. One in four people who stormed the Gordwara complex were from Kerala, India, and these kinds of threats are putting more and more pressure on the Indian authorities. (Rudra Chaudhuri, Shreyas Shende, 2020).

Indian media recently reported that more than 20 Islamist extremists had left India for Afghanistan to join ISIS. These people could be as troublesome to India in the future as other extremist insurgents. (Maroof, 2016). All this evidence shows that terrorism is active in the region and is carrying out programs to achieve their demands. Given the fact that some Islamic extremist groups, such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, have already begun to establish an "independent monarchy" inside Afghanistan, especially in southern Afghanistan, India fears spread of Islamic extremist groups in Afghanistan Not only complicates Kashmir issue more than ever, but also reinforces Islamic extremism and terrorism inside India (Jin, 17,7,2018). The deadliest attack was in July 2008, when a suicide bomber truck at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing more than 40 people, including an Indian defense attorney. Afghan and Indian officials said ISI was involved in the attack. "We have no doubt that ISI is behind this," said India National Security Adviser MK Narayanan in an interview with New Delhi Television. (Bajoria, 2009). "US media reported that Washington believes the ISI provided support for the attacks," Mira McDonald argued. Given the close ties between the ISI and the leadership of the Haqqani network, it is likely to continue its anti-India program. (Rudra Chaudhuri, Shreyas Shende, 2020).

India and Afghanistan face similar threats. The threat of terrorism is one of them. The threat of terrorism is very serious and will remain serious. Terrorism does not stem mainly from social crises and ideological tensions within Afghanistan. This terrorism is a government tool used by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan against Afghanistan and India. The Talibanization and the re-establishment of Pakistani rule in Afghanistan will be a threat to the democracy and independence of our country and an increase in threats against the region and the Republic of India. (Dr.RanginDadfarSpanta, 2018). India has a vested interest in Afghanistan as well as growing concerns about limiting Islamabad's influence in the country to ensure that Afghanistan is no longer under the control of extremist elements like it was in the 1990s and that democracy is firmly rooted in the country. Many experts believe that the reason for more Indian aid to Afghanistan is to reduce the need for Pakistan in this country. In fact, by limiting Islamabad's influence in Kabul, it seeks to prevent extremist elements such as the Taliban from regaining control of Afghanistan, because with the re-integration of the Taliban in the country, any radical prospect of Islam has a negative impact on India's security, influence militant groups and Increases their attacks in Indian Kashmir. On the other hand, destroy a pro-Pakistan government and Islamic fundamentalism, which has always been a threat to India's security. After the events of September 11 of 2001 and the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, India continues its policy of siege of Pakistan and does its best to play the least role played by Pakistan in Afghanistan, It also seeks to eliminate the formation of a radical government in Afghanistan in any way possible, as Islamic radicalism in any form is a threat to India's national security. (AhmadYasin, 2020).

The signing of a strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan on October 4, 2011 during the visit of Afghan President Hamid Karzai to India was a historic event and had many implications for India-Afghanistan relations. India has for the first time introduced a plan that includes "training, equipping and capacity building programs for the Afghan National Security Forces". This reflects a deep and long-term commitment of Indian cooperation in Afghanistan. (Gupta, 2012). On the other hand, India is strengthening its military ties with Afghanistan by deepening defense cooperation, from training Afghan military personnel to sharing intelligence and providing military equipment to Afghan security forces. India's concern about terrorism stemming from the influx of Pakistan-Afghanistan border into its territory is very real and imminent. A strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan acts as a bulwark to reduce the risks of extremist violence and terrorist instability in the region. Bilateral security relations have increased, especially since April 2015, when Afghan National Security Adviser Hanif Atmar and Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai visited New Delhi. What should be noted is that India was the first to deliver lethal weapons to Afghanistan. (Jin, 17,7,2018).

India's strategic interests in Afghanistan have many facets. The origins of terrorism in the region, initiated by Pakistan, were almost unique to India in its early years. The course of jihadist attacks in India practically reflects the kind of government that prevailed in Kabul. The worst years were definitely between 1994 and 2002, when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan and acted as proxy fighters for their Pakistani masters. Meanwhile, India is very cautious about sending troops to Afghanistan. Although India believes that a strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan acts as a bulwark against the dangers of extreme violence and terrorist instability in the

region, India has limited its military engagement to the training of military personnel. India has long maintained the principle of "zero presence" for a military presence in Afghanistan, and only after 2005, when the Taliban killed an Indian diplomat, did it decide to send only 200 troops to Afghanistan. India is wary of supplying weapons directly to Kabul as it may provoke Pakistan and insurgents in Afghanistan. India helped train troops and officers in Afghanistan. The country annually trains 1,700 Afghan military personnel at a training camp in India. In 2011, India promised to provide more equipment to the Afghan military. An agreement has been reached between the two countries, according to which Afghanistan buys weapons from Russia and is paid for by India.

India has further enhanced its security cooperation with regional and international countries to address the security and political challenges in Afghanistan since 2014. On the one hand, India has established close military and intelligence ties with Afghanistan's neighbors, especially those in Central Asia that are under threat from extremist groups. Many extremist groups in Central Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), are trying to establish a caliphate by overthrowing governments. On the other hand, counter-terrorism measures and security and defense cooperation have laid the groundwork for India-Central Asia relations. Afghan officials traveled to India after the announcement of a new US strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, expressing concern over the escalation of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, noting that terrorism is the biggest threat to peace, stability and progress in the region. The meeting called for an end to any government support for terrorists and shelter for those fighting in Afghanistan. It was also agreed to strengthen security cooperation between the two countries. India has agreed to increase its assistance to the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces in the fight against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and money laundering. (Deutsche Welle, 2019).

The Indians see Afghanistan as a strategic hurdle to their national security; they view Afghanistan's developments in terms of undermining Pakistan's investment in creating and maintaining the Taliban. India considers the suppression of the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups as a material and spiritual defeat for the Kashmiri and Indian terrorist groups and considers it in their favor. (Office of Political and International Studies of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). Thus, India and Afghanistan are embroiled in the issue of terrorism and fundamentalism after the 1990s, which was opposed to the national security of both countries. India has realized that joint cooperation between the two countries in the region can help eliminate this ominous and dangerous phenomenon. Therefore, pursue of its interest in central Asia through Afghanistan and cooperate to counter similar issue of fundamentalism and terrorism have led to India's regional convergence with Afghanistan.

#### Conclusion

India as a strategic partner of Afghanistan has had good and flexible relations with Afghanistan since the years of its independence within the framework of internationally accepted principles. But after the rise of the Taliban (1996-2001) and the creation of terrorist groups with the financial support of the Arab state and Pakistani military training in Afghanistan and Pakistan territory, the ground for the spread of terrorism and fundamentalism in Afghanistan, India, the region and the world and has threatened the national security of countries, especially Afghanistan and India. Thus, during these years, India supported anti-Taliban forces and terrorist groups led by Ahmad Shah Massoud and Marshal Dostum (Northern Alliance) until the fall of the Taliban government by US-led in 2001 and the re-emergence of India in Afghanistan policy was prepared. The Tokyo Conference was held in 2002 to set out Afghanistan's development and reconstruction plans. Indian government officials have announced their \$ 40 million assistance to align with the Afghan government and allies in rebuilding Afghanistan, and have so far funded more than \$ 2 billion in Afghanistan's infrastructure development program.

The purpose and motive of India's convergence and unpaid assistance to Afghanistan can be summarized in a few sections. India sees Afghanistan as a good safe route to Central Asia, as it can demonstrate the cornerstone of its effective active role in the region by reaching Central Asia to make major decisions in the international system. And at the same time, given its military bases in Central Asia, it can push Pakistan's borders, which's longtime rival with this country from Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries in the northwest, to its eastern borders by India itself. And India still accounts for 15% of the world's population, and its energy needs are growing. And it needs access to vast energy resources in Central Asia, and the region's oil is becoming cheaper and more readily available due to the transit route, indicating India's cooperation with Afghanistan.

The phenomenon of terrorism and radicalism has become another factor in India's integration with Afghanistan, as the two countries are jointly involved in this issue within their own countries. And the cause of this concern is the Pakistani government and regional and global supporters of terrorist groups. After the division India subcontinent into India and Pakistan and the establishment of a border in Kashmir, Pakistan has sown the seeds of terrorist groups in the area. Over the years, Pakistan has established and supported several militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al-Mujahideen / Al-Ansar Movement, Islamic Jihad Movement and other groups operating in India and Afghanistan. All of them have been trained with the Taliban and with the spread of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Examples of such attacks and activities include the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, the attack on the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai and the attack on the Seeringer Parliament in 2001, and the joining of a number of citizens of Kerla, Maharashtra, Telangana and other states to the Islamic State Khorasan branch of IS-K can be considered a threat to this country.

India and Afghanistan signed a strategic pact in 2011 under which India pledged to assist Afghanistan in the provision of some military equipment and to provide military training to Afghanistan security forces so that these forces can counter security and defense against common threats such as terrorism and fundamentalism by military tactics. The Indians consider the suppression of the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups as a material and spiritual defeat for the Kashmiri and Indian terrorist groups and evaluate it in their favor. Therefore, India understands that joint cooperation can pave the way for the control of terrorism and fundamentalism in the region, in addition to the above, India has converged with Afghanistan.

### **Bibliography**

AhmadYasin. (2020). what is the motivation of Pakistan for supporting Taliban. Etilaatroz, 1-17.

Bajoria, J. (2009, 7 22). *India-Afghanistan Relation*. Retrieved from www.cfr.org: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/india-afghanistan-relations

Deutsche Welle. (2019, 02 15). Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from www.dw.com: https://www.dw.com/fa-af/%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-

Dr.RanginDadfarSpanta. (2018, 12 21). *Afghan Institute for Straegic studies*. Retrieved from www.aiss.af: https://aiss.af/persian/aiss/news\_details/opinions/5c1c713406e92

etilaatroz. (2014, 5 28). etilaatroz. Retrieved from www.etilaatroz.com:

https://www.etilaatroz.com/9223/%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D8%B7%DB%8C%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%8C-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%AF-%DA%AF%D9%85-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA

Fair, C. C. (2010). India in Afghanistan and Beyond:Opportunities and Constraints. New York: The Century Foundation.

Gupta, A. (2012, 9). *The United Service Institution of India*. Retrieved from www.usiofindia.org: https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/india-strategic-interest-in-afghanistan/

Irna. (1398, Bahman 1). *Irna*. Retrieved from www.irna.ir: https://www.irna.ir/news/83642306/%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%84-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AA-%

Jin, W. (17,7,2018). India's Policy toward Afghanistan: Implications to the Regional Security Governance. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, 112-120.

Marjani, N. (2018, 11 21). Etilaatroz. Retrieved from www.etilaatroz.com:

https://www.et<mark>ilaa</mark>troz.com/40945/%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA%D8%A7%<mark>D9%86%D8%B3</mark>%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%9B-%DA%AF%<mark>D8%B1%D9%88%DA%AF%</mark>D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%86%<mark>DA%AF-</mark> %D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87%E2%80%8C%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%88/

Maroof, A. (2016, 914). BBC Farsi. Retrieved from www.bbc.com:

https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2016/09/160914 zs afghan india relationship

Mohammadi, G. h. (2019, 7 29). *Etilaatroz*. Retrieved from www.etilaatroz.com: https://www.etilaatroz.com/81279/thirst-friendly-relations-overview-of-book-my-enemys-enemy

Mohib, N. (2012, 6 1). *BBC Farsi*. Retrieved from www.bbc.com: https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2012/06/120601\_mar\_afg\_pak\_history

Mullen, R. D. (August 2017). India in Afghanistan: Understanding Development Assistance by Emerging Donors to Conflict-Affected Countries. *Stimson Center*, 1-15.

Nasiri, S. F. (1391). India approach toward Afghanistan after 11 september 2001 with consider to Iran . *Quarterly of Geopolitics* , 125-152.

Office of Political and International Studies of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2010). India. Tehran: Forrign Affairs Publication.

Rudra Chaudhuri, Shreyas Shende. (2020, 6 2). *Carnegie India*. Retrieved from carnegieindia.org: https://carnegieindia.org/2020/06/02/dealing-with-taliban-india-s-strategy-in-afghanistan-after-u.s.-withdrawal-pub-81951

Sengupta, R. (2005, 8 30). Rediff.com. Retrieved from www.rediff.com: https://www.rediff.com/news/2005/aug/30spec4.htm

IJCRI

SeyedJavidHakimi. (1397, 1011). 8am. Retrieved from www.8am.af: https://8am.af/afghanistans-relationship-with-india-during-the-ashraf-ghani-era/

shakary, O. (2019, 5 22). Independent persian. Retrieved from www.independent persian.com:

https://www.independentpersian.com/node/4626/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF/%DA%86%D8%B4%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%AA-

%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B1%DA%98%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%8

SoniaPalinkar. (2019, 2 15). *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved from www.dw.com: https://www.dw.com/fa-af/%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%86-%D9%

Talayee, J. (2011, 2 23). *Dewchwella*. Retrieved from www.dw.com: https://www.dw.com/fa-ir/%D8%AE%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D9%87-%DA%AF%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%BE%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%B2%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%AD/a-6441891

Tehran-Irana. (2020, 7 19). Tehran-Irana. Retrieved from www.irna.ir:

https://www.irna.ir/news/83828741/%D<mark>8%B3%D</mark>8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%88-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9<mark>%87-%D8%B1%</mark>D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-

%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8<mark>%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-</mark>%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%

voice(AVA), A. (1393, qous 04). Afghan voice(AVA). Retrieved from www.avapress.com:

https://www.avapress.com/fa/note/102<mark>848/%D8</mark>%B3%D<mark>8%A7%D8</mark>%B1<mark>%DA%A9-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B5</mark>%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%DB%8C-

%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7%<mark>DB%8</mark>C-%D9%85%D<mark>9%86%D8%B7%</mark>D9%82%D9%87